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ABSTRACT 
 
The recent financial crisis has renewed interest in the role credit plays, particularly when granted by 
the banking sector, to amplify the economic cycle. This thesis focuses on the credit supply side to study 
the informational efficiency of bank-based financial systems when granting credit to the economy. After 
a revision of the main areas of the literature that are devoted to such purpose, we set the behavioral 
economics and finance as a conceptual framework for our research. Thus, we firstly discuss the limits to 
apply the classic paradigm in financial markets, the efficient market hypothesis, to bank-based systems, 
and offer an alternative approach in three steps, based on the behavioral literature. Then, we implement 
an experimental research to test the first step. The experiment consists of a business simulation game 
designed to replicate the basics of a bank to set its credit policies. The results are tested against the 
participants’ profiles in terms of overconfidence and prospect theory, to determine whether these 
behavioral biases might explain different credit policies across banks. Finally, we offer a theoretical 
model to analyze the second and third steps in the behavioral approach. Assuming some banks are run 
by too optimistic managers, the model shows how rational banks would herd to follow their biased 
competitors, and describes the limits of arbitrage in the industry that would prevent informational 
efficiency to be restored. 
 
 
RESUMO BREVE 
 
A recente crise financeira renovou o interese no papel xogado polo crédito, en particular bancario, na amplificación 
do ciclo económico. Esta tese céntrase no lado da oferta ao obxecto de estudar a eficiencia informativa dos sistemas 
bancarios cando conceden crédito á economía. Tras unha revisión das principais áreas da literatura centradas en 
dita cuestión, fixamos a economía e finanzas conductuais como marco conceptual da nosa investigación. Deste 
xeito, debatemos primeiro sobre as limitacións para aplicar a hipótese do mercado eficiente, paradigma clásico 
nos mercados financeiros, aos sistemas bancarios, e suxerimos un enfoque alternativo en tres pasos, baseado na 
literatura conductual. Logo, poñemos en práctica unha investigación experimental ao obxecto de testar o primeiro 
paso: un xogo de simulación deseñado para replicar o esquema básico no que un banco establece as súas políticas 
de crédito. Os resultados son contrastados cós perfís dos participantes en termos de exceso de confianza e a teoría 
prospectiva, para determinar se ditos sesgos poderían explicar diferentes políticas de crédito entre bancos. Para 
rematar, ofertamos un modelo teórico para analizar o segundo e terceiro paso. Asumindo que algúns bancos son 
dirixidos por xestores optimistas de máis, o modelo mostra como os bancos racionais seguirían aos seus sesgados 
competidores, e describe os límites da arbitraxe na industria que impedirían restablecer a eficiencia informativa. 
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RESUMEN BREVE 
 
La reciente crisis financiera ha renovado el interés en el papel que juega el crédito, particularmente bancario, para 
amplificar el ciclo económico. Esta tesis se centra en el lado de la oferta para estudiar la eficiencia informativa de 
los sistemas bancarios a la hora de conceder crédito a la economía. Tras una revisión de la literatura centrada en 
dicho objeto, establecemos la economía y finanzas conductuales como marco conceptual de nuestra investigación. 
Asi, comentamos en primer lugar los límites para aplicar la hipótesis del mercado eficiente, paradigma clásico en 
los mercados financieros, a los sistemas bancarios, y ofrecemos un enfoque alternativo en tres pasos que se basa 
en la literatura conductual. Después, llevamos a cabo una investigación experimental para testar el primer paso: 
un juego de simulación diseñado para replicar el esquema básico en el que un banco establece sus políticas de 
crédito. Los resultados se contrastan con los perfiles de los participantes en términos de exceso de confianza y la 
teoría prospectiva, para determinar si estos sesgos podrían explicar las diferentes políticas de crédito. Por último, 
ofrecemos un modelo teórico para analizar los pasos segundo y tercero. Asumiendo que algunos bancos tienen 
gerentes demasiado optimistas, el modelo muestra cómo los bancos racionales seguirían a sus competidores 
sesgados, y describe los límites del arbitraje en la industria que impedirían restaurar la eficiencia informativa. 
 
 
RELEVANT ACRONYMS 
 
AMH: Adaptive Market Hypothesis     EUT: Expected Utility Theory 
BAPM: Behavioral Asset Pricing Model    GMM: Generalized Method of Moments 
BF: Behavioral Finance      CCAPM: Consumption CAPM 
BPT: Behavioral Portfolio Theory     IPO: Initial Public Offering 
BV/MV: Book value to market value    M&A: Mergers and Acquisitions 
CAPM: Capital Asset Pricing Model     NPL: Non-performing Loans 
CPT: Cummulative Prospect Theory    NPT: Normalized Prospect Theory 
d/P: Dividend yield      OC: Overconfidence 
DDM: Dividend Discount Model      PCA: Principal Component Analysis 
DJIA: Dow-Jones Industrial Average index    P/E, PER: Price to Earnings ratio 
E/P: Earnings yield      PT: Prospect Theory 
EMH: Efficient Market Hypothesis     SEO: Seasoned Equity Offerings 
EMM: Efficient Markets Model      
For bibliographic references cited in the text, the first time a reference appears in a Chapter it is identified using all authors’ 
names (e.g., Jorda, Schularick and Taylor, 2011) when there are up to three authors or (Brunnermeier et al., 2009) when there 
are four or more authors. Subsequent citations in the same Chapter are in the form (Jorda et al., 2011) when there are three or 
more authors. A list in alphabetical order of all bibliographic references cited in the Doctoral Thesis is provided at the end.  
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“Most increases in the supply of credit do not lead to a mania, but nearly every 
mania has been associated with a rapid growth in the supply of credit”  
Ch. Kindleberger, ‘Manias, Panics and Crashes’. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The worldwide financial meltdown of 2007–2008 and the sovereign debt crisis that followed afterwards 
in the Eurozone persuaded academics and economic authorities to reassess our views about some 
aspects of the functioning of market economies. Topics that were reviewed include the nature of 
economic cycles, the effectiveness of monetary policies, the role of derivatives, the effectiveness of 
banking regulation, and others. Thus, in regards to the financial meltdown, four major factors are cited 
to have caused it (Bean, 2010): the use of derivatives on a massive scale, a long period of low interest 
rates, the imbalances of globalization, and credit growth. Derivatives and structured securities such as 
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and credit default swaps (CDS) increased the risk appetite of 
investors and reduced their risk perception. Monetary policies from 2002 to 2006 have been criticized 
for being too loose, particularly in the U.S. and the Eurozone. Current account imbalances were at 
historic levels then and they were of counterintuitive sign, with capital flowing from the high-growing 
emerging countries to the aging, stagnant Western economies.  
However, the factor that has received most attention from researchers is perhaps credit. The 
episode renewed the interest in the role credit plays in economic cycles, leading to a revival of classic 
works by authors such as Charles Kindleberger and Hyman Minsky, among others. Indeed, the good 
performance of western economies during the years before the Great Recession was largely fueled by 
credit, feeding real estate bubbles that would come to a dramatic end with the financial crisis. 
Overconfidence made economic agents believe this time was different and good times would last 
forever. Perceived risk decreased and a higher leverage followed. In consequence, the ratio of financial 
liabilities to GDP between 1995 and 2007 rose in countries like the U.K. from 128% to 213%, and 
multiple housing booms developed simultaneously during the same period in distant countries as the 
U.S., Ireland, Spain, Russia, Singapore, China or the Arab Emirates. 
Jorda, Schularick and Taylor (2011) show that higher rates of credit growth relative to GDP tend 
to be followed by deeper recessions and slower recoveries. In economies where the weight of the 
banking sector is not much relevant, the ratio of bank lending to GDP often tends to remain low. For 
instance, in the U.S., from the 1950s to 1995, the ratio ranged from 7% to 14% (Himmelberg and Morgan, 
1995). In bank-based financial systems, however, this ratio is often much higher and rose aggressively 
during the last crisis. In Spain, for instance, by mid 1990s the ratio was about 60% while it soared by 
2009 to 175% ―see charts a and b of Figure 0.1 below. Credit to households and institutions from 1995 
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to 2008 provided by the Spanish banking sector boosted from 271 to 1,870 billion euros, almost seven 
times higher. During the same period, the GDP rose 58%. 
FIGURE 0.1 – Total credit, credit ratio to GDP and delinquency ratio in Spain 
 
Source: Own elaboration from BdE, ECB and INE 
In addition, Reinhart and Rogoff’s (2011) historical analysis of financial distress episodes confirm 
two other facts. The first one evidences that private debt surges are a recurring antecedent to banking 
crises. The increased leverage of the economy during good times often lead to episodes of financial 
distress in recessive periods: delinquency ratios on loans and other credit instruments soar and bank 
profits become losses. Take for instance again the case of Spain, where by December 2007 only 0.93% 
of the credit granted to families and firms were bad loans, whereas by January 2014 the average 
delinquency ratio amounted 13.58% ―see Figure 0.1.c. Similar rates in market-based systems like the 
U.S., for instance, were only observable in credit cards and student loans, while on mortgages and auto 
loans the average delinquency ratio barely exceeded 5%. 
The effects of the financial meltdown of 2007 and 2008 over the banking sector were devastating, 
both in the U.S. and the Eurozone. The list of banks that were filed for bankruptcy, declared insolvent, 
liquidated, taken over by another private bank, received financial aid by a governments, or were 
(a) Credit to households and firms. Spain, 1996 - 2013 (b) Credit to GDP. Spain, 1996 - 2013
Sources: BdE, INE Sources: BdE, ECB
(c) Delinquency ratio (total). Spain, 1999 - 2014
Source: INE
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nationalized is extremely long: it would include the largest American investment banks (e.g., Lehman 
Brothers and Merrill Lynch) as well as commercial banks (e.g., Citigroup), the largest commercial banks 
of several European countries (e.g., HBOS, Fortis, Dexia, RBS, UBS, Bankia), banks as well as insurance 
companies and brokerage firms (e.g., AIG, MF Global), and private as well as public or government 
sponsored entities (e.g., FNMA and FHLMC, commonly known as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) and 
foundations (e.g., Spanish savings banks).  
The second fact pointed out by Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) is that banking crises often precede 
(and predict) sovereign debt crises. Indeed, they confirm a strong link between banking crises and 
sovereign default across the economic history of many countries. A link manifested as well in the recent 
Eurozone crisis as a negative feedback effect between sovereign debt and the balance of the private 
banks. Thus, banking crises that often follow after periods of indulgent lending practices have harmful 
consequences over not only the stability of the banking sector itself, but over the stability of the whole 
economy, too. 
Following these pieces of evidence, the analysis of the efficiency of the banking sector when 
granting credit to the economy reveals to be an interesting field of research. In what follows we 
summarize the main purpose of this thesis, as well as the approach we followed in our research. This is 
done in four instances. Firstly, we determine the object of study. Secondly, we enumerate the main 
objectives that were pursued. Thirdly, we specify the methodology implemented. Fourth, we describe 
the structure of the thesis and summarize the contents of each chapter. 
Object of study 
Since credit crises may be associated to both credit-supply and credit-demand effects, we must clarify 
in first instance that this doctoral research focuses on the credit supply side, in order to provide an 
alternative means to analyze the causes behind a credit boom. Credit booms would reveal either a 
banking sector unable to make a proper evaluation of credit demand and the risks involved or, at least, 
a banking industry where some participants were aware of those risks, but who chose to follow their 
competitors in order not to lose market share or to reduce the risk of underperformance. 
Thus, the object of study of this thesis is the efficiency of bank-based financial systems when 
granting credit to the economy. Consequently, the scope of our research are the retail credit markets, 
defined as the transactions between retail banks and their customers that involve some sort of credit 
granted (loans, mortgages, etc.), which are broadly funded with deposits from other clients. The main 
innovation is the conceptual framework we use for such purpose: the behavioral economics and finance. 
In market-based systems, the classic approach to examine efficiency is the Efficient Market Hypothesis, 
EMH. However, we will see imperfect competition and informational asymmetries in bank-based 
systems would leave this approach without content. Some alternatives emerged to provide an 
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interpretation of what determines how much credit banks should grant to borrowers ―alternatives that 
will be reviewed as well. Notwithstanding, a first contribution of this thesis is to provide a behavioral 
approach to analyze the efficiency of bank-based financial systems, allowing to explain how behavioral 
biases by participants in the banking industry might explain credit cycles. 
This behavioral approach allows to study the effects of behavioral biases by CEOs and employees 
in the industry over the credit policies implemented by the retail banks and their strategic behavior 
when they compete to grant credit to different niches of potential borrowers. That is indeed the main 
question we want to answer in this research: could it be that credit booms fueled by the banking sector 
are a manifestation of a herd behavior that appears as a consequence of different behavioral profiles 
and biases among participants in the industry? We provide a theoretical an experimental approach to 
answer such question. 
We find this to be a relevant question that deserves to be answered. The academic research that 
followed the financial crisis has analyzed issues such as the incentives, securitization, and the risk-taking 
moral hazard by banks, but little has been done to interpret the role that human psychology might have 
had. This is puzzling, since the behavioral economics has identified and explained a wide range of 
anomalies in areas as diverse as health, education, energy, insurance, and public choice. In particular, 
the most productive and successful area has been behavioral finance applied to financial markets: the 
excessive volatility puzzle, the evidence of overreaction, underreaction and an excessive trading, the 
preference of investors for dividends, the equity risk premium, the recurrence of financial bubbles, etc. 
Thus, we suggest to extend the insights of the behavioral economics and finance to the analysis of 
the informational efficiency in bank-based financial systems. This would complement the literature on 
credit bubbles by suggesting that the explanations already provided, such as the moral hazard and the 
role of incentives, could have been even more pervasive due to psychological biases. In addition, it would 
contribute to the open debate on questions such as the necessity to improve the macroprudential 
regulation (Brunnermeier et al., 2009) or the pros and cons of separating the monetary and credit 
functions by promoting a full-reserve banking system (Benes and Kumhof, 2012). 
Objectives 
The key goal of this thesis is to analyze the informational efficiency of retail credit markets through a 
behavioral approach. The main motivation is to provide a rationale that would explain how different 
behavioral biases by participants in the banking industry could explain an excessive lending by retail 
banks and a herd behavior among them. Such main goal may be dissected into several specific objectives. 
They follow in order below. 
First, we intend to review the main conceptual frameworks that have been used to analyze the 
informational efficiency of financial markets generally speaking, and the banking sector in particular. 
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We wish to provide an insight on the different approaches that are used in both instances, and to 
interpret the obstacles that limit the application of the classic approach in financial markets ―namely, 
the EMH― to the banking system. 
Second, we seek to provide an extensive review of the behavioral economics and finance as a 
conceptual framework for our experimental and theoretical research. In particular, we intend to 
highlight the clash between the opposite views of rationalists and behaviorists in the scope of financial 
markets. 
Third, we are in search of an alternative approach to test the informational efficiency of retail 
credit markets in a way akin to how efficiency is interpreted under the EMH in financial markets. Such 
alternative approach follows the behavioral literature to test market efficiency in financial markets, 
while it sidesteps the presence of informational asymmetries and imperfect competition within the 
banking industry that impede the extension of the EMH to bank-based systems. 
Fourth, we seek to provide experimental evidence of the effects that behavioral biases might have 
over the credit policies implemented by the banks. In particular, in regards to the biases we focus on 
two relevant areas of the behavioral literature: the effects observed for individuals with different risk 
profiles, according to prospect theory, and different levels of overconfidence. In regards to the credit 
policies, we seek to trace the effects in terms of prices, volumes and quality of credit. 
Fifth, we intend to provide a theoretical model that explains the behavior of banks of a different 
nature, some managed by excessively optimistic CEOs and others not, when they compete for potential 
borrowers to whom grant credit. Among the questions we seek to answer we may mention why and 
when rational banks would herd to follow their biased competitors, the effects of behavioral biases in 
banking competition along the economic cycle, and the lessons to be learned in the debate for an 
enhanced macroprudential regulation. 
Methodology 
We intend to extend the insights of the behavioral economics and finance to the analysis of the 
informational efficiency of the banking sector when granting credit to the economy. The purpose is to 
determine whether there is a rationale for human psychology ―in particular, different behavioral biases 
by participants in the banking industry― to explain a herd behavior that amplifies the boom and busts 
of credit cycles. The motivation for it is twofold. On one hand, we have seen that relaxed lending 
practices often antecede banking crises, and these often precede sovereign debt crises as well. The 
recent episodes of the worldwide financial meltdown and the Eurozone crisis are good examples of it. 
On the other hand, the behavioral finance is the field that has been more successful in criticizing the 
tenets of market efficiency, but little has been done about combining human psychology and banking 
crises. 
8 
 
We proceed as follows. Firstly, we identify the conceptual frameworks in the literature that may 
contribute to our work. These are the theories of credit and banking efficiency, which compile the 
different approaches available to analyze the efficiency of the banking sector, the efficient market 
hypothesis, which is the classic paradigm to test efficiency in financial markets, and the behavioral 
finance, which is the area that has succeeded in providing an alternative interpretation to the EMH in 
financial markets. 
Secondly, we focus on the behavioral finance as a conceptual framework in this research. Thus, 
we review the main behavioral biases and anomalies identified in the literature, with special attention 
on two areas of research: prospect theory and overconfidence.  
Third, we introduce a behavioral approach to analyze the informational efficiency in retail credit 
markets. It only requires to apply the classic approach, summarized by Shleifer (2000), the behavioral 
finance uses to analyze the informational efficiency in financial markets. To such purpose, we firstly 
discuss the conditions under which this approach would be valid when applied to retail credit markets. 
This provided, the behavioral approach would consist of a stepwise procedure in three steps: whether 
participants in the industry exhibit behavioral biases that may conform a market sentiment, whether 
market sentiment could exhibit trends or predictable patterns, and whether there are limits of arbitrage 
in retail credit markets. 
Fourth, in the core of this thesis, we provide a theoretical and experimental approach to answer 
those three questions in the stepwise approach. In particular, we implement an experimental research 
in order to test the first step, while we offer a theoretical model that explains how a herding behavior 
among rational and biased banks would induce a market sentiment along the cycle, and what would be 
the limits of arbitrage in retail credit markets that prevent efficiency to be restored.  
The experimental research consists of two types of tests: on one hand, a set of questionnaires 
devised to determine the psychological profile, based on prospect theory and overconfidence, of a given 
respondent; on the other, a business simulation game designed to replicate in an experimental setting 
how banks grant credit to their potential borrowers, in order to obtain information about how much 
credit and at what price different subjects would grant, under conditions of uncertainty and risk. A total 
of 126 undergraduate and postgraduate students from University of A Coruna (UDC) completed both 
types of tests. The implementation of these tests to the same group of participants allows us to trace the 
connection between behavioral profiles and risk attitudes in the game. This would help us to test the 
first step in the so-called behavioral approach: whether participants in the banking sector may exhibit 
behavioral biases that may conform a market sentiment. 
We propose, and calibrate, a series of independent variables for the behavioral profile of each 
participant, as well as a series of dependent variables representative of the credit policies they 
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implemented in the experiment. We structure the basic premise in a series of hypothesis to be tested. 
The statistical techniques used to that purpose include univariate statistics (normality tests, 
interquartile range, etc.), bivariate statistics (correlations, ANOVAs, regressions) and multivariate 
statistics: multiple linear regressions (MLR), principal component analysis (PCA), cluster analysis and 
correspondence analysis. A summary of conclusions is eventually provided. 
Steps two and three in the stepwise approach are tackled through a theoretical model. The basic 
hypotheses are, thereupon, that a herding behavior across participants in the industry might conform a 
market sentiment beyond fundamentals, and that the existence of limits of arbitrage would prevent 
efficiency in retail credit markets to be restored. To such purpose, we build a simple model of duopoly 
competition between banks of a different nature that shows how rational banks would herd to follow 
their biased competitors to grant excess credit during economic upswings. According to it, biased banks 
would lead the industry and unbiased banks herd under conditions we derive. Finally, we describe the 
limits of arbitrage that are implicit in the model. Then, we offer a dynamization of the model in order to 
provide an intuition of how the credit cycle would be amplified due to banking competition. A summary 
of conclusions is finally provided. 
Structure of the thesis 
The structure of the thesis is summarized in Figure 0.2 below. 
FIGURE 0.2 – Structure of the thesis 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
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The thesis is structured as follows. The main contents are presented in three parts plus a summary 
of results and a set of conclusions, followed by the references and appendices. Part I reviews the main 
conceptual frameworks identified in the academic literature that may contribute to analyze the 
informational efficiency of retail credit markets through a behavioral approach. These are the theories 
of credit and banking efficiency, the efficient market hypothesis, and the behavioral finance. Then, Part 
II extends our insights in behavioral finance and, in particular, overconfidence and prospect theory. 
Parts I and II will reveal convenient for the purposes of our research in Part III, where we offer an 
experimental research and theoretical model that provides a rationale for behavioral finance to 
challenge informational efficiency in bank-based systems as well. The main results of the dissertation, 
as well as a set of conclusions and guidance for future research are listed at the end. 
Part I is formed by three chapters, each of them devoted to review a different conceptual 
framework to analyze efficiency in retail credit markets. There we interpret how efficiency of the 
banking sector is analyzed, how it is analyzed when it refers to market-based systems, and how 
behavioral finance has come to dispute the orthodoxy in regards to market efficiency. 
Chapter 1 defines retail credit markets and goes on with the main theories of credit and banking 
efficiency. We identify the classic approach to analyze the efficiency of the banking sector. The review 
of the different theories and concepts of economic efficiency illustrates the way this approach differs to 
how efficiency is interpreted when analyzed in financial markets ―which is described in Chapter 2. The 
chapter ends with some theories that interpret what determines how much credit banks should grant 
and to whom: the microeconomics of credit ―that is, some theories on bank decision making when 
granting credit to individual borrowers― as well as the macroeconomics: some arguments that have 
already been suggested by researchers to justify how retail credit markets could malfunction. 
Chapter 2 describes the theoretical foundations of the efficient market hypothesis in financial 
markets. Firstly, we describe the essential role financial markets play in capitalist economies, which 
requires a pricing mechanism that provides an efficient reflection of information about fundamental 
values into prices. We then provide an extensive insight on the theoretical foundations of the EMH 
―namely, the role of expectations, information, and the discount factor. Then it follows a discussion on 
the testability of the EMH. We enumerate several reasons why researchers have criticized the validity 
of the EMH as a refutable hypothesis, including the two alternative definitions of the EMH and the joint 
hypothesis problem. The analysis is completed with a taxonomy of the different approaches suggested 
for empirically testing the three forms of the EMH (weak, semi-strong and strong forms) and the most 
relevant results that have been obtained in the academic literature. 
Finally, Chapter 3 introduces the theoretical foundations of the behavioral economics and finance. 
Faced with the postulates by standard finance of rational expectations and market efficiency, the 
behavioral economics suggests instead a wider approach based on a combination of social sciences, 
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including psychology, sociology and demography. In line with this, the behavioral finance deals with the 
influence of psychology in financial decision making and financial markets. Thus, we firstly review the 
groundbreaking research on behavioral economics and finance. This would also help us familiarize with 
the myriad of biases and anomalies that pervade decision making and challenge the postulates of 
standard finance ―biases and anomalies to be extensively reviewed in Part II. The chapter ends with a 
brief summary of the most recent theories developed by behaviorist researchers in areas like decision 
theory, financial markets, corporate finance, debiasing, and others. 
Part II is formed two chapters, both devoted to provide a deeper insight on different aspects of 
the behavioral finance that will reveal essential for the theoretical and experimental research in Part III. 
Chapter 4 presents an original taxonomy and extensive review of the most relevant biases and 
anomalies. The taxonomy synthetizes the literature to provide a comprehensive approach in two broad 
categories: psychological biases and behavioral consequences. Psychological biases are classified into 
four groups: heuristics and biases, framing, valuation/errors-of-preference and social factors. 
Behavioral consequences may refer to decision effects (related to individuals) or to market anomalies. 
The subsequent sections of Chapter 4 are devoted to enumerate and analyze the most relevant of those 
biases and consequences, as well as the main contributions in the literature about them. Our goal will 
be to choose two specific areas on which to focus our research in Part III. 
Chapter 5 reviews these two areas more extensively, namely overconfidence and prospect theory. 
We begin with a vindication of our choice: they are two of the most-well studied areas in behavioral 
finance, both concepts have been suggested to explain a risk-seeking behavior by investors, and they 
could help explain as well how misperceptions by participants in the banking sector might have led them 
to engage in unsound credit policies. Then, the chapter provides further insight into prospect theory and 
overconfidence with the focus on several aspects that will be required in the experimental research in 
Part III ―in particular, the different measures available and how to calibrate the parameters at the 
individual level through a set of questionnaires. 
Part III is devoted to provide a rationale for psychology to challenge informational efficiency in 
bank-based systems. The analysis comes in three instances, divided in four chapters. 
Chapter 6 introduces an alternative to analyze the efficiency of bank-based systems. On one hand, 
we have the classic approach in market-based systems, the EMH. However, imperfect competition and 
informational asymmetries in bank-based systems would leave this approach without content. On the 
other, we have the stepwise procedure behaviorists have followed to test market efficiency considering 
the two elements that might challenge it: market sentiment and limited arbitrage. The approach we 
suggest is simply to apply the stepwise approach to retail credit markets. To such purpose, we firstly 
discuss the conditions under which it would be valid. First, it would be a plausible alternative to test 
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only the informational efficiency side of EMH, interpreted as whether through banking intermediation 
information is transmitted efficiently in the EMH sense. This way, the approach sidesteps the analysis 
of the allocative and operational efficiencies ―which in bank-based systems are often affected by 
imperfect competition and informational asymmetries. Second, the approach would be valid only for the 
aggregate credit market. This provided, the so-called behavioral approach would consist of a three-step 
process to determine (a) whether CEOs and employees in the industry exhibit beliefs that, based on 
heuristics and other forms of bounded rationality, could conform a market sentiment; (b) whether 
market sentiment could exhibit trends or predictable patterns; (c) whether there are limits of arbitrage 
in retail credit markets. Finally, Chapter 6 ends with a research agenda to suggest various ways the 
stepwise approach might be empirically tested. Of the suggestions there provided, Chapters 7 to 9 focus 
on the effects of prospect theory and overconfidence.  
The experimental research in Chapters 7 and 8 aims to test the first step in the stepwise approach. 
In particular, we focus on the effects of prospect theory and overconfidence, analyzed in detail in 
Chapter 5. Two broad questions are to be answered. First, Chapter 7 seeks to identify the existence of 
these behavioral biases among a series of participants in an experimental test. Second, whether these 
biases could feed, among that same set of respondents, a risk-seeking behavior in a simulated credit 
market ―which is analyzed in Chapter 8. The experimental sessions took place in the Faculty of Business 
and Economics at UDC during October, 2013. A group of 126 undergraduate and postgraduate UDC 
students participated in the experiment divided in five sessions. Participants in the same session 
completed all tests at the same time, each respondent in a separate computer. 
Chapter 7 deals with the description of the behavioral tests in the experiment, how they were 
designed, variables to be measured, hypotheses to be tested (regarding the effect of several priors over 
those variables), participants in the experiment, data and results obtained. The statistical analysis 
provided describes the behavioral tests in first instance: how they were designed and variables to be 
measured. Then it compares the results of the tests with the standard results in the literature, in order 
to confirm the validity of the tests implemented. Lastly, the hypothesis to be tested are introduced and 
the results obtained are interpreted. Chapter 8 deals with the strategy game designed to infer how the 
same 126 participants would behave when granting credit to the economy. For such purpose, they 
competed for a prize in a simulation game where they played the role of a bank granting credit to their 
customers under conditions of uncertainty and risk about the economic environment. The strategies 
they implemented resulted in three types of indicators (price, quantity and quality of credit) for the 
hypotheses to be tested. Chapter 8 includes a description of how the experiment was designed, the 
basics of the game, the hypotheses to be tested (regarding the effect of the behavioral variables over the 
outcomes of the game), how the experiment was implemented, data and results obtained.  
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The combination of the research in Chapters 7 and 8 allows us to test the possible relationship 
between behavioral profiles and risk attitudes in the game, in order to determine whether the 
behavioral biases identified among participants in the experiment could feed a risk-seeking behavior in 
a simulated credit market. Then, Chapter 9 eventually provides a theoretical model that follows the 
second and third steps in the stepwise approach to determine how a duopoly of banks would compete 
to grant credit. The model provides two developments starting from the assumption that some banks in 
the industry might be biased in terms of overconfidence and excessive optimism ―particularly during 
the upswing of the economic cycle.  
In the first development, the second and third steps in the stepwise approach are analyzed: how 
would a duopoly of a rational and a biased bank compete when granting credit to the economy, whether 
herding strategies would appear, and whether limits of arbitrage in the industry are identifiable. We 
build a model of duopoly competition among banks to show that behavioral biases by participants in the 
industry explain how a credit bubble is fueled. According to it, biased banks would lead the industry and 
unbiased banks herd under conditions we derive. Finally, we describe the limits of arbitrage that are 
implicit in the model.  
The second development would contribute to explain how the credit cycle is amplified due to 
banking competition. We find pessimism would not be a powerful driver of credit cycles: instead, it is 
the euphoria during large upswings what seeds the next crunch. Finally, we offer a dynamization of our 
model to provide further insight on how boundedly rational competition would amplify the credit cycle. 
In addition, the model makes some predictions that are consistent with the empirical observation ―in 
particular, that the effects of the behavioral biases are more pervasive during upswings and the lower 
the quality of the niche market. 
Main results and conclusions. Finally, the presentation of the contents of this thesis ends with a 
disclosure of the main results obtained, as well as a set of conclusions and suggestions for future 
investigation. The appendices and bibliographic references are relegated to the end. 
All together, the research provided in this doctoral thesis could be a relevant contribution to 
identify the possible weaknesses of the banking industry, and hence to promote a complementary 
regulation ―particularly on macroprudential regulation and the role of central banking. Our model 
would show how behavioral biases might guide retail credit markets and why limits of arbitrage would 
imply bank-based systems are less likely to be informationally efficient than market-based ones.  
Would the behavioral approach introduced in this doctoral thesis provide further evidence on the 
pervasiveness of behavioral biases in the banking industry, then banking regulation should account for 
it. However, the solution is not more regulation per se, but better and different regulation. The 
behavioral approach we use would come in support of countercyclical regulation; how to implement it, 
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however, is beyond the scope of this thesis. Moreover, we must consider the possibility that the 
authorities, just like the private banks, might fail as well in their purpose to apply the required 
counterbalancing policies. 
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PART I. GENERAL REVIEW OF THE MAIN FRAMEWORKS ON 
INFORMATIONAL EFFICIENCY OF RETAIL CREDIT MARKETS 
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SUMMARY OF PART I 
 
Efficiency is a recurrent concept in Economics, as it applies to a multitude of areas. However, it may be 
misleading as it has multiple interpretations, too: economic efficiency, market efficiency, social 
efficiency, business efficiency, Pareto efficiency, technical efficiency, allocative efficiency, informational 
efficiency… The perception that a rapid growth in the supply of credit above economic fundamentals 
and, consequently, an inefficient performance by financial institutions might have been a key factor 
behind the financial crisis, must be bounded to one of those scopes and interpreted in such terms. 
The aim of Part I is to provide a literature review of the main theories that analyze the efficiency 
of the financial system generally speaking, and of the banking industry in particular. These are the 
theories of credit and banking efficiency, the efficient market hypothesis (EMH), and behavioral finance. 
Then, Part II will extend our insights in behavioral finance and, in particular, overconfidence and 
prospect theory, since we will be using a behavioral approach for the theoretical and experimental 
analysis in Part III. Thus, the review provided in Parts I and II will reveal convenient for the purposes in 
Part III, as the theories described in the former are helpful to understand our contributions in the latter. 
Part I is organized as follows. In Chapter 1 we define retail credit markets and go on with the main 
theories of credit and banking efficiency. Chapter 2 describes the theoretical foundations of the efficient 
market hypothesis in financial markets and how behavioral finance challenges them. Finally, Chapter 3 
introduces the theoretical foundations in behavioral economics and finance, which will later be 
extended in Part II. 
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CHAPTER 1. THEORIES OF CREDIT AND BANKING EFFICIENCY 
 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Are bank-based financial systems efficient when providing credit to the economy? Trying to answer 
such question requires to address several issues in first instance. First, we must delimit the scope of our 
analysis. What are bank-based financial systems? How do banks grant credit to the economy? How do 
this industry differ from credit markets in market-based financial systems? For such purpose, we will 
define retail credit markets and provide an example to illustrate. Second, we identify the classic 
approach in the literature to analyze the efficiency of the banking sector. A brief review of the different 
theories and concepts of economic efficiency will suffice to illustrate why this approach differs to how 
efficiency is interpreted when analyzed in financial markets ―which is described in Chapter 2. 
Consequently, to answer whether banks are efficient when granting credit to the economy, we 
must review the different theories that interpret what determines how much credit banks should grant 
and to whom. This is what we will do in third instance. In particular, we will analyze both the micro and 
the macroeconomics of credit: that is, some theories on a bank decision making to extend credit to 
individual customers, as well as some other arguments that were proposed to justify how retail credit 
markets could malfunction. 
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 is devoted to delimit and define retail credit 
markets, followed by a description of the Spanish banking industry as an example. Section 1.3 introduces 
the analysis of economic efficiency in the banking sector according to different approaches in the 
literature. Section 1.4 introduces different theories of credit in the literature about how banks determine 
how much and to whom credit is granted. 
 
1.2. RETAIL CREDIT MARKETS 
 
Financial systems consist of the set of institutions, markets and resources, whose primary purpose is to 
convey savings from savers to investors (Parejo et al., 2011). A traditional classification is to distinguish 
between bank-based and market-based financial systems. Following Xiao (2011), in bank-based 
systems most firms’ external funds are provided by banks with which they have long-term relationships, 
whereas banks’ main duty is to take deposits and lend directly to firms and individuals. Market-based 
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systems are characterized instead by firms that expect financial markets to meet their financial needs. 
Bonds play here the largest role in short term financing, and firewalls exist to separate the different 
types of financial services ―taking deposits and granting loans on one hand, underwriting and trading 
equities on the other.  
The Eurozone and Japan would be better described as bank-based systems ―as opposed to the 
U.K. and the U.S. (Levine, 2002; Allen, Chui and Maddaloni, 2004). Since the 19th century, two competing 
views have alternatively argued that bank-based systems are better at mobilizing savings, identifying 
good investments, and exerting corporate control, whereas market-based systems would be better in 
allocating capital, providing risk-management tools, and mitigating the problems of too-big-to-fail banks 
(Levine, 2002). The scope of analysis in this thesis will be the bank-based systems and, in particular, to 
set a behavioral approach to analyze whether the banking industry may be efficient when providing 
credit to the economy. Here, the efficiency concept we follow intends to be interpreted in a way akin to 
the Efficient Market Hypothesis in market-based systems.  
Therefore, we set our framework to be an informational efficiency analysis of the credit policies 
implemented by retail banks. We delimit retail banking as the transactions between banks and their 
customers (households and companies), and credit policies as the prices and volumes of credit banks 
set on loans and other credit instruments they provide to their clients. Consequently, we define retail 
credit markets2 as those transactions between retail banks and their clients that basically involve some 
sort of credit granted. These include personal loans, mortgages, credit accounts, credit cards and other 
credit instruments, which are broadly funded with deposits from other customers.3 
Take the Spanish banking industry as an example. In Spain there are four types of institutions:4 
banks; savings banks and CECA5 and credit cooperatives; other credit institutions (EFC and EDE);6 and 
the Government agency Instituto de Crédito Oficial, ICO. Banks and savings banks, which we will refer to 
as the banking system, represent the large majority of the industry. Table 1.1 summarizes the assets in 
the consolidated balance of these institutions by March 2011. According to it, the banking system 
granted 94.3% of all credits and loans to residents in Spain and 99.0% to those residents abroad the EU. 
                                                 
2 From here onwards we will refer to retail credit markets, retail banking and bank-based system as equivalent concepts.  
3 Obviously, credit institutions often deal with a broader list of activities others than credit. For instance, the banking regulation 
in Spain (Ley 3/1994, de 14 abril; Ley 44/2002, de 22 de noviembre) considers the following list of 15 typical activities by credit 
institutions: deposit taking; credits and loans, including consumer credit, mortgages and commercial credit; factoring; leasing; 
payment services; credit cards and travel checks; endorsements and guarantees; intermediation in interbank markets; dealing 
and brokerage; securities underwriting; services on corporate management, merges and acquisitions; wealth management; 
securities depository; business reports; safe custody services. 
4 Ley 3/1994 and subsequent modification Ley 44/2002. 
5 The Spanish Cajas de Ahorro (savings banks) are clustered in the organization CECA, Confederación Española de Cajas de 
Ahorro, which beyond providing representation services and other facilities to their members it may also act as a savings bank. 
Savings banks and CECA implemented in recent years a process of transformation into banking institutions, separating their 
financial activities from those merely associative. In the case of the CECA, this meant the launching of bank Cecabank in 2012. 
6 The Establecimientos Financieros de Crédito (EFC) include former institutions on leasing and factoring services. The Entidades 
de Dinero Electrónico (EDE) are institutions whose primary activity is the issuance of means of payment (Parejo et al., 2011). 
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TABLE 1.1 – Consolidated balance of credit institutions in Spain 
 
Source: Parejo et al. (2011) 
As mentioned in the Introduction, before the worldwide financial meltdown of 2007 and 2008 
high rates of credit growth relative to GDP were observed in most advances economies, but with a higher 
exposure in economies where the weight of the banking sector was relevant. Thus, one of the effects of 
the financial meltdown was the impact over some of the largest investment and commercial banks, both 
in the U.S. and Europe (Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Citigroup, Fortis, Dexia, RBS, UBS, etc.), which 
in some cases led to the demise of the company. 
In the case of the Spanish sector, credit to households and institutions boosted a 700% from 1995 
to 2008 while, by the same period, GDP rose 58%. Then, following the global financial crisis after 2008, 
the delinquency ratio started to soar from 0.93% by December 2007 to 13.58% by January 2014 (recall 
Figure 0.1). In consequence, the Spanish banking sector experienced a large restructuring process to 
help them overcome the effects of the crisis. This process manifested itself through several public 
interventions, merges and acquisitions, but the most relevant fact was the de facto transformation of 
savings banks into banks.7 Following IMF (2012), Table 1.2 summarizes the restructuring process in the 
Spanish banking sector after 2009. 
                                                 
7 The analysis of the restructuring process of the Spanish banking sector ―and of savings banks in particular― is beyond the 
purposes of this thesis. Notwithstanding, let us mention that this transformation of savings banks into regular banks was 
conducted basically as follows: each savings bank launched a new bank of its property to operate their financial activities 
through it, while the former savings bank was transformed into a foundation. By 2014 the only exceptions are two, namely, 
Caixa Ontinyent and Colonya, Caixa Pollença. Both are minor, local entities that maintain the status of savings banks today.  
CREDIT
INSTITUTIONS
ASSETS TOTAL Volume % Volume % Volume %
a) Residents in Spain 2,790,006 2,640,220 94.6% 46,894 1.7% 102,892 3.7%
Credits and loans 2,161,804 2,038,519 94.3% 43,939 2.0% 79,346 3.7%
Securities others than shares 522,910 496,594 95.0% 3,012 0.6% 23,304 4.5%
Investment fund shares 0 0 0 0
Shares 105,380 105,105 99.7% 34 0.0% 241 0.2%
b) Residents in other EU countries 164,507 160,219 97.4% 3,693 2.2% 595 0.4%
Credits and loans 102,009 97,797 95.9% 3,680 3.6% 532 0.5%
Securities others than shares 41,111 41,050 99.9% 0 0.0% 61 0.1%
Investment fund shares 6 6 100.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Shares 21,382 21,367 99.9% 13 0.1% 2 0.0%
c) Rest of the World 218,373 216,297 99.0% 765 0.4% 1,311 0.6%
d) Unclassified 273,419 271,328 99.2% 1,915 0.7% 176 0.1%
TOTAL ASSETS
Source: Banco de España, Boletín Estadístico (Parejo et al., 2011)
Consolidated Balance (ASSETS)
(million euros and percentage; March 2011)
Banking System EFC & EDE ICO
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TABLE 1.2 – Spain: Consolidation of the Banking Sector 
  
Source: IMF (2012), years 2012 and 2013 own elaboration 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Banco Santander Banco Santander Banco Santander Banco Santander
Banesto Banesto Banesto Banesto
BBVA BBVA BBVA
Caixa Sabadell
Caixa Terrassa Unnim
Caixa Manlleu
La Caixa
Caixa Girona
Cajasol Caixabank
Guadalajara
Caja Navarra
Caja Burgos
Caja Canarias
Banco de Valencia Banco de Valencia Banco de Valencia Banco de Valencia
21.11.2011
Caja Madrid
Bancaja
Caja Insular Canarias
Caixa Laietana
Caja Ávila
Caja Segovia 9.05.2012
Caja Rioja
Caixa Catalunya
Caixa Tarragona
Caixa Manresa
17.12.2012
Caixa Galicia
Caixanova
17.12.2012 18.12.2013
Banco Sabadell
Banco Guipuzcoano Banco Sabadell
CAM
Banco Gallego Banco Gallego Banco Gallego Banco Gallego
Banco Popular Banco Popular Banco Popular
Banco Pastor Banco Pastor Banco Pastor
Unicaja
Caja jaen
Caja Duero
Caja España
BBK
Cajasur
Caja Vital Caja Vital
Kutxa Kutxa
Caja Murcia
Caixa Penedés
Caja Granada
Sa Nostra
Ibercaja Ibercaja
CAI CAI
Caja Círculo Caja Círculo
Caja Badajoz Caja Badajoz
Bankinter Bankinter Bankinter Bankinter Bankinter
Cajastur
CCM
Caja Extremadura Caja Extremadura
Caja Cantabria Caja Cantabria
Notes: Banks coded in red were intervened; banks in green were part of the institutional protection scheme
Caixabank
Banco Popular
Unicaja
Unicaja
Banco Sabadell
Catalunya Caixa
Nova Caixa Galicia
Catalunya Banc
Novagalicia Banco
Cajastur
Unicaja
Ceiss
BBK
Banco Sabadell
CAM
Banco Mare Nostrum
Catalunya Caixa
La Caixa
Nova Caixa Galicia
BFA - Bankia
Kutxa Bank Kutxa Bank
Unnim
Cajasol-Guadalajara
La Caixa
Banca Cívica
Banco Sabadell
BBVA
Banca Cívica
BFA - Bankia
Ceiss
Banco Mare Nostrum
Caja 3
Ibercaja
Ibercaja
Liberbank Liberbank
Banco Santander
BBVA
BFA - Bankia BFA - Bankia
Catalunya Banc
NGB (ABANCA)
Banco Mare Nostrum
Ibercaja
Liberbank
Banco Popular
Unicaja
Kutxa Bank
Banco Mare Nostrum
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According to IMF (2012), the industry was concentrated by 2011 in only ten groups, four banks 
(Santander, BBVA, Popular and Sabadell) and six former savings banks (Caixabank, Bankia, Unicaja, 
Catalunya Banc, Novagalicia Banco and Kutxa Bank). These ten groups held the large majority (79.2%) 
of the assets in the industry,8 with the other 20.8% corresponding to small private banks (11.9%), all 
other non-foreign banks (5,1%) and the cooperative sector (3,7%). This concentration was the result of 
merges and acquisitions of a total sum of more than fifty banks and savings banks that existed before 
2009. Some of them remain intervened or part of the institutional protection scheme to date. 
 
1.3. ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY IN THE BANKING SECTOR  
 
The way efficiency is interpreted when applied to bank-based financial systems differs to how it is 
analyzed in market-based ones. The reason is that the approach used in financial markets, the EMH ―i.e., 
how agents analyze information to price securities, and whether through this process information is 
transmitted efficiently― collides with the classic paradigm of banking theory: market microstructure 
and asymmetries of information. Thus, Sections 1.3 and 1.4 are devoted to introduce different theories 
about how banks provide credit to the economy and banking efficiency. In what follows we first make a 
short review of the literature on banking efficiency. 
In perfectly competitive markets we expect inefficient firms to be driven out by the efficient. 
However, the empirical finding that substantial inefficiencies often arise leads to some interpretations. 
Could imperfect competition be a consequence of regulatory limits on competition or not perfectly 
integrated markets? Could it be that an oligopolistic structure makes banks implement collusive 
practices? May it be that it is efficiency what determines both the market structure and performance of 
the firms, so the positive relationship between market power and performance (profits) is spurious? 
There is an extensive research on industrial organization that finds a positive statistical relationship 
between profitability and market structure (Berger, 1995). Although this result is generally accepted, 
there is no agreement on the hypothesis which generates it (Fiordelisi, 2004). Two types of theories 
were suggested to explain this finding: Market Power hypotheses ―including the structure-conduct-
performance (SCP) and relative-market-power (RMP) models― and Efficient Structure (ES) hypotheses. 
1.3.1. Efficient structure vs. Market power paradigms 
The Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) paradigm interprets performance as a result of the exogenous 
structure of the market which influences bank’s conduct (Mensi and Zouari, 2010). The SCP model 
                                                 
8 These ten groups were Banco Santander (18.9% of the assets), BBVA (14.9%), Caixabank (12.1%), BFA-Bankia (11.9%), Banco 
Sabadell (5.6%), Banco Popular (5.5%), Unicaja (2.7%), Kutxa Bank (2.6%), Catalunya Banc (2.5%) and Novagalicia Banco 
(2.5%), In addition, the assets abroad by Banco Santander and BBVA, which are larger than their domestic interests in both 
instances, were not considered for the purposes of this classification. 
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assumes that a higher concentration allows banks to implement collusive practices, like setting lower 
deposit rates and higher loan rates, and consequently gain substantial profits (Bain, 1951; Stigler, 1964). 
An alternative paradigm is the Efficiency Hypothesis (Demsetz, 1973), which interprets market power 
and performance of banks as a consequence of their efficiency levels: banks which operate more 
efficiently than their competitors will gain higher profits resulting from lower costs, hence they hold an 
important share of the market. Consequently, the positive relationship between market power and 
performance is only spurious, what generates them both is efficiency. 
Both paradigms have been explored following different hypotheses. Smirlok (1985), subscribing 
to the efficiency hypothesis, considers market share as a proxy for efficiency. According to this 
interpretation, the efficiency hypothesis would prevail when a significant positive correlation between 
market share and profitability is detected (Mensi and Zouari, 2010). Other authors instead (e.g., 
Shepherd, 1986; Berger, 1995) advise against the use of such proxy and recommend a direct measure 
of efficiency. Shepherd (1986), for instance, considers the direct source of market power is the 
domination of participants over the individual market. Hence, it follows the emergence of a theory 
related to the SCP model, the Relative Market Power (RMP) hypothesis: only banks with a larger market 
share and well-differentiated products are able to exercise market power to determine prices and make 
supernormal profits (Berger, 1995). Nevertheless, the results may be ambiguous: a bank with a strong 
position in the market may either reinforce its domination over the market or achieve a higher efficiency 
(Mensi and Zouari, 2010). Thus, a particular case of market power hypothesis is the Quiet Life hypothesis 
(Hicks, 1935): a bank with a large market share is less centered on efficiency as the exploitation of 
market power generates automatic benefits, whereas an increase in market power generally comes with 
a deterioration of efficiency that makes banks unable of earning higher profitability. 
In order to solve this debate and methodological problems, Berger and Hannan (1997) suggest to 
explore the notion of efficiency to explicitly integrate efficiency variables in the equations. In particular, 
Berger and Mester (1997) summarize the literature on (banking) economic efficiency through the 
analysis of different efficiency concepts and measurement methods. The different interpretations of 
efficiency are described next, while the measurement methods are analyzed in subsection 1.3.3. 
1.3.2. Different concepts of economic efficiency 
In conventional microeconomic theory, firms are assumed to minimize costs irrespective of the market 
structure or economic environment in which they operate. However, Liebenstein (1975) introduces a 
theory of the organization of the firm, and its relation to its environment, under which firms do not 
minimize costs (called X-inefficiency), and this may hold even under competition. An identical set of 
inputs at identical prices would lead to a wide variety of outputs under different organizational 
circumstances. The X in X-efficiency would represent an unknown factor responsible for a non-allocative 
type of inefficiency. Examples for these unexploited opportunities would be lack of motivation, human 
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inertia, and biases in human decision making. They would be a form of inefficiency, but not allocative 
inefficiency, as they are not related to prices and markets per se; they are related to intra-firm activities 
and to errors made by individuals inside those firms.  
Following this, Berger (1995) divides the efficiency hypothesis into the X-efficiency (XE) and scale-
efficiency (SE) hypotheses. Under the X-efficiency, firms with superior management or production 
technologies have lower costs and therefore higher profits, which generates larger market shares that 
may result in higher concentration. The scale-efficiency instead assumes firms have essentially equally 
good management and technology, but some firms simply produce at more efficient scales than others, 
therefore having lower unit costs and higher unit profits. Under both interpretations, there is a positive 
relationship between profit and market structure, but it is efficiency what drives both profits and market 
structure, being the profit-structure relationship a spurious outcome. 
Fiordelisi (2004) focuses instead on three dimensions of the ES hypothesis ―namely, production 
technique, production scale, and resources allocation― to develop three alternative measures: technical 
efficiency ―firms that are the best in terms of quantities; allocative efficiency ―to produce outputs in 
optimal proportions, given prices and technology; and scale efficiency. Finally, Mester (1996) identifies 
three other levels of efficiency: scale efficiency ―whether banks are operating with the efficient level of 
outputs; scope efficiency ―whether banks are operating with the efficient mix of outputs; and X-efficiency 
―whether banks are using their inputs efficiently.  
All these taxonomies, however, refer to a single interpretation of efficiency: cost efficiency. Berger 
and Mester (1997) two more ones: standard profit and alternative profit efficiencies. In their words, 
“these concepts have the best economic foundation for analyzing the efficiency of financial institutions 
because they are based on economic optimization in reaction to market prices and competition, rather 
than being based solely on the use of technology” (p. 898). These efficiency concepts are described next. 
Cost efficiency 
Cost efficiency is a measure of how close a bank’s cost is to what a best-practice bank’s cost would be for 
producing the same output. Here the dependent variable is costs, inputs are prices (of deposits, other 
funds, labor) and outputs are quantities (loans and securities). The cost function is given by9 
𝐶 = 𝐶(𝑤, 𝑦, 𝑧, 𝑣, 𝑢𝑐, 𝜀𝑐)  →  ln 𝐶 = 𝑓(𝑤, 𝑦, 𝑧, 𝑣) + ln 𝑢𝑐 + ln 𝜀𝑐  ,   (1.1) 
where C represents variable costs, w input prices, y output quantities, z quantities of fixed netputs 
(inputs or outputs: e.g. off-balance-sheet items, physical capital, equity capital), v environmental 
variables (e.g. nonperforming loans over total loans), uc the inefficiency factor, and εc random error. 
                                                 
9 Equation (1.1) holds assuming inefficiency and random terms uc and εc are multiplicatively separable from the rest of the cost 
function, and applying natural logs. 
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The cost efficiency of a bank is expressed as a ratio between the estimated cost needed to produce 
its output vector if it were as efficient as the best-practice bank in the sample, divided by the actual cost 
of the bank, and adjusted for random error. The ratio ranges over (0, 1): 
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Then, the studies on bank efficiency are divided into those that examine scale and scope efficiency 
alone, and those that also examine X-efficiency (Mester, 1996). The first kind of studies estimate an 
average practice cost function which relates bank cost to output levels and input prices, and implicitly 
assume there is no X-inefficiency and banks are using the same technology. The second kind of studies 
estimate a best practice cost function which represents the predicted cost function of banks that are X-
efficient, and then measure the degree of inefficiency of the other banks in the sample. X-efficiency 
measures would differ in how they distinguish the inefficiency term ln uc from the random error ln εc.  
Standard profit efficiency 
The standard profit efficiency is a measure of how close a bank is to producing the maximum possible 
profit given a particular level of input and output prices. Here the dependent variable is profits, inputs 
are prices (of deposits, other funds, labor) and outputs are prices too (of loans, securities). Other 
variables (netput, environmental, inefficiency and error term) are included as in the cost function. The 
function is given by 
ln(𝜋 + 𝜃) = 𝑓(𝑤, 𝑝, 𝑧, 𝑣) + ln 𝑢𝜋 + ln 𝜀𝜋 ,    (1.3) 
where π is variable profits (interest and fee income earned on the outputs minus variable costs, C), θ is 
a constant added to every firm’s profit so the natural log is taken of a positive number; p are output 
prices, uπ the inefficiency that reduces profits, and επ random error. 
This definition of profit assumes revenues can be earned by varying both inputs and outputs. The 
profit efficiency of a bank is also expressed as a ratio, now between predicted actual profits to the 
predicted maximum profits if it were as efficient as the best-practice bank in the sample ―net of random 
error. The ratio equals 1 for the best-practice bank, but profit efficiency can be negative: 
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According to Berger and Mester (1997), the profit efficiency is superior to the cost efficiency for 
evaluating the overall performance of the firm, because the former is based on the more accepted 
economic goal of profit maximization, which requires the same amount of managerial attention to be 
paid to raising a marginal dollar of revenue as well as to reducing a marginal dollar of costs. Besides, 
since cost efficiency evaluates performance setting output constant at its current level, “standard profit 
25 
 
efficiency may take better account of cost inefficiency than the cost efficiency measure itself, since standard 
profit efficiency embodies the cost inefficiency deviations from the optimal point” (p.900-1). 
Alternative profit efficiency 
The alternative profit efficiency is a measure of how close a bank comes to earning maximum profits given 
its output levels rather than its output prices. Here, inputs are prices (of deposits, other funds, labor) and 
outputs are quantities (of loans, securities). That is, the alternative profit function employs the same 
dependent variable as the standard profit function (profit) but the same exogenous variables as the cost 
function (input prices, output quantities): 
ln(𝜋 + 𝜃) = 𝑓(𝑤, 𝑦, 𝑧, 𝑣) + ln 𝑢𝑎𝜋 + ln 𝜀𝑎𝜋 ,   (1.5) 
where y replaces p in the function f, yielding different values for inefficiency and random error. It is 
expressed using the same ratio as with standard profit efficiency (see above). 
There is no reason to estimate the alternative profit measure under the usual assumptions (Berger 
and Mester, 1997), but it may provide useful information if one or more of the following conditions hold: 
substantial unmeasured differences in the quality of banking services; outputs not completely variable 
(banks cannot achieve every output scale or product mix); output markets not perfectly competitive 
(banks have market power to charge prices); output prices not accurately measured. 
1.3.3. Efficiency measurement methods 
After the different efficiency concepts have been described, a question arises: how to measure them? 
Three concepts become determinant here: (a) the estimation techniques; (b) the functional form (if a 
parametric technique is chosen); and (c) how to account for risk. We devote the latter to a separate 
section, while we describe the other two in what follows.  
Estimation techniques 
Efficiency estimation techniques may be either parametric or non-parametric. Both are largely used in 
the empirical literature (Berger and Humphrey, 1997) and efficiency estimates are fairly robust to 
differences in methodology (Berger and Mester, 1997). 
Parametric techniques (a.k.a. the econometric approach) correspond well with the cost and 
profit efficiency concepts described above. A bank is labeled inefficient if its costs are higher or profits 
are lower than the best-practice bank after removing random error. Different parametric methods differ 
in the way the inefficiency term ln u is disentangled from the composite error ln u + ln ε (inefficiency 
plus random error). The three most common parametric techniques are the stochastic frontier approach 
(Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt, 1977), the distribution-free approach (Berger, 1993), and the thick frontier 
approach (Berger and Humphrey, 1991). 
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First, the stochastic frontier approach makes explicit assumptions about the distributions of u and 
ε. On one hand, the error term, ln ε, is assumed to be two-sided, usually normally distributed. On the 
other, the inefficiency term, ln u, is assumed to be one-sided, half-normally distributed. The estimated 
mean of the conditional distribution, ln ?̂? = 𝐸(ln 𝑢 | ln 𝑢 + ln 𝜀), is usually used to measure inefficiency. 
Second, the distribution-free approach follows Berger (1993), who shows that the assumptions of the 
stochastic frontier approach are rather arbitrary. These assumptions may be relaxed ―if panel data are 
available― assuming there is an average or core efficiency for each firm over time. Then, core inefficiency 
may be disentangled from ε by assuming the former is persistent over time, while random errors tend 
to average over time. Third, the thick frontier approach divides the sample into four quartiles based on 
total cost per unit of assets, and assume the estimated cost function for banks in the least average cost 
quartile is the cost frontier. Banks in the lowest quartile are assumed to be the most efficient, in the 
highest quartile the least, and differences inside each quartile are assigned to an error term assumed to 
represent random measurement errors and luck, rather than differences in efficiency (Mester, 1996). 
Non-parametric techniques focus on technological optimization (a.k.a. technical efficiency) 
rather than economic optimization, and do not correspond to the cost and profit efficiency concepts 
discussed above. These techniques cannot account for allocative inefficiency because they generally 
ignore prices. Another drawback is that their estimations usually do not allow for a random error 
―alternatively, they disentangle ln u and ln ε by setting random error equal to zero. 
The most common non-parametric technique is the data envelopment analysis, DEA (Farrell, 
1957; Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes, 1978). DEA is a well-established method in the literature that aims 
to evaluate technical efficiency by defining a frontier envelopment surface for all sample observations. 
We may distinguish two types of techniques: input-oriented DEA minimizes the inputs necessary to 
produce a given output set (inputs are endogenous, outputs are exogenous); output-oriented DEA, 
instead, looks for the maximum outputs achievable given inputs. For instance, the output-oriented 
efficiency estimator iˆ  can be derived by solving the following optimization program (Barros and 
García-del-Barrio, 2010): 
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for i = 1,2,...,n firms, where yi is a vector of outputs, xi a vector of inputs, and λ an I x 1 vector of constants. 
The linear programming must be solved n times, one for each firm. The value obtained for 𝛿𝑖  is the 
technical efficiency score for the ith firm: 𝛿𝑖 = 1 implies efficiency and 𝛿𝑖 > 1 inefficiency. Charnes et al. 
(1978) introduced the term DEA to describe the mathematical programming used in the construction of 
production frontiers and the measurement of efficiency. Their model, known as the CCR model, is 
probably the best-known and most widely used (Barros and Garcia-del-Barrio, 2010). They assumed 
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constant returns to scale (CRS), while Banker, Charnes and Cooper (1984) (a.k.a. BCC model) were the 
first to introduce variable returns to scale (VRS). For instance, the model in Eq. (1.6) would be a CRS 
model, while imposing the constraint ∑ 𝜆 = 1𝑛𝑖=1   transforms the model into a VRS one. The CCR model 
measures the overall efficiency for each firm, aggregating pure technical and scale efficiency into one 
value. The BCC model, instead, measures pure technical efficiency (managerial skills) alone. This way, 
using both DEA models we may decompose efficiency into technical and scale efficiencies.10 Finally, 
there are at least five other basic DEA models: the multiplicative model (Charnes et al., 1982); the 
additive model (Charnes et al., 1985); the cone-ratio DEA model (Charnes, 1990); the assurance region 
DEA model (Thompson et al., 1990); and the super-efficiency model (Andersen and Petersen, 1993).11  
Other classic non-parametric techniques are the non-parametric Malmquist productivity index 
(Malmquist, 1953), the free disposable hull analysis (Deprins, Simar and Tulkens, 1984), and the two-
stage DEA bootstrapping technique (Simar and Wilson, 2007). They are summarized in what follows. 
The Malmquist productivity index follows after Malmquist (1953), who proposes a quantity index that 
uses input distance functions to compare two or more consumption bundles, using an indifference curve 
of one of the consumers as a reference. Caves, Christensen and Diewert (1982) adapt the index from 
consumption analysis to production analysis, defining the Malmquist input, output and productivity 
indexes for general structures of production for two or more firms. 
The free disposable hull analysis was first introduced by Deprins et al. (1984). They compare two 
previous models ―one of adjusting a Cobb-Douglas production frontier to data, other of computing the 
convex hull of the data― to introduce a third method, FDH, “on the basis of the sole assumptions of input 
and output disposability” (p.243). The best feature of FDH is that it relies on the sole assumption that 
production possibilities satisfy free disposability. Its main drawback, as it was later demonstrated by 
Thrall (1999), is that it can give a technically efficient classification to output-input vectors that are 
inefficient in terms of profit maximization. However, some other authors disagree on this conclusion 
(e.g., Cherchye, Kuosmanen and Post, 1999). 
Finally, the DEA bootstrapping technique enhances the original DEA, which is simply to estimate 
but is criticized for being a non-statistical (deterministic) technique. Developed by Simar and Wilson 
(2007), the bootstrapping technique allows to benefit from the advantages of DEA, while performing 
statistical hypothesis testing on the DEA efficiency scores. It consists of a two-stage procedure: in the 
first stage, a bootstrapped DEA is used to estimate the relative efficiency scores; then, in the second 
stage, a procedure is implemented to bootstrap the DEA scores with a truncated regression. 
                                                 
10 The scale efficiency score is obtained dividing the aggregate CCR score by the technical efficient BCC score (Fare, Grosskopf 
and Lovell, 1994). Given the score in the BCC model is at least equal to that in CCR, the maximum scale efficiency score is 1. 
11 Other developments of DEA include disentangling technical and allocative efficiency (Coelli, Rao and Battese, 1998), the 
directional distance functions and the Luenberger productivity indicator (Luenberger, 1992; Briec, 1997), and the conditional 
quantile regression (Daouia and Simar, 2007). 
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Functional form and variables to use 
If a parametric model is chosen, a functional form for the cost and profit functions ―i.e., f(w, y, z, v) for 
cost and alternative profit efficiencies, f(w, p, z, v) for standard profit efficiency― must be specified. Two 
common ones are the translog form and the Fourier-flexible functional form. However popular, the 
translog form does not necessarily properly fit data that are far from the mean in terms of output size 
or mix. In consequence, some differences in scale economies may be due to this choice (Berger and 
Mester, 1997). The Fourier-flexible functional form enhances the translog by including Fourier 
trigonometric terms, and is a global approximation to virtually any cost or profit function. 
A classic dichotomy is about which variables to use. For technical efficiency analysis, for instance 
in DEA, we must decide the inputs and outputs to be used. Basically, two options are available (Cuadras, 
Fernández and Rosés, 2002). First, we may think of a bank as a services provider, in such way outputs 
are both assets ―loans, securities, etc.― and liabilities ―deposits, current accounts, etc.― whereas inputs 
are general expenses. Alternatively, we may think of a bank as a financial institution that transforms 
deposits (inputs) into loans (outputs) and tries to make a profit out of this. Notwithstanding, to test cost 
and profit efficiencies, other alternatives are available. Berger and Mester (1997) provide a list of 
variables to be used under their so-called preferred model (i.e., what they believe to be the best set of 
variables, cost and profit function specification, and frontier efficiency technique to test cost and profit 
efficiency). The variables are summarized in Table 1.3. 
TABLE 1.3 – Variables in the cost and profit functions by Berger and Mester (1997) 
 
Source: Berger and Mester (1997), own elaboration 
Authors using similar approaches and variables in their tests include, among many others, Bonin, 
Hasan and Wachtel (2005), Greene (2005), Fries and Taci (2005), Krasnikov, Jayachandran and Kumar 
VARIABLES DESCRIPTION
DEPENDENT VARIABLES
Cost variable operating plus interest costs includes costs of purchased funds, deposits and labor
Profit
variable profits includes revenues from loans and securities less variable costs
EXOGENOUS VARIABLES
Output quantities consumer loans including credit cards
business loans all other loans
securities all non-loan financial assets; ie, gross total assets less (consumer & 
business loans + physical capital)
Input prices price of core deposits
price of purchased funds
price of labor
Output prices price of consumer loans (domestic transactions accounts, time and savings)
price of business loans all other liabilities
price of securities
Fixed netput quantities physical capital
equity capital
off-balance-sheet items (commitments, letters of credit, derivatives)
using Basel Accord risk weights to be risk-equiv. to loans
Environmental variables ratio of NPL / total loans NPL = non-performing loans, past due at least 90 days
weighted aver. NPL for state/province weighted average using as weight the proportions of the loans issued by 
banks in the state/province
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(2009), Koutsomanoli, Margaritis and Staikouras (2009), Karas, Schoors and Weill (2010) and Lozano-
Vivas and Pasiouras (2010). Hence, for the purposes of our research in Part III, we will use this list of 
variables as representative of the banking efficiency literature. 
1.3.4. The problem with risk in efficiency tests of financial institutions 
Risk affects banks in several instances. Indeed, the key role of financial institutions is to manage, monitor 
and/or trade with risk. The different techniques described, as well as the different efficiency concepts 
used, would be of little value if they did not account for the risk incurred by the firms in their strategic 
decisions. In particular, three ways risk could be incorporated to the analysis of banking efficiency are 
output quality, financial capital and risk preferences. 
Output quality 
Banks produce services of a highly heterogeneous quality. For instance, commercial loans can vary in 
size, repayment schedule, risk, transparency of information, type of collateral, covenants to be enforced, 
etc. When one bank is compared to other in terms of (cost or profit) efficiency, the comparison should 
be between banks producing the same output quality (Berger and Mester, 1997). Otherwise, bad 
management and excessive lending might be disguised as an apparently highly efficient bank. In Mester 
(1996)’s words: “unless quality and risk are controlled for, one might easily miscalculate a bank’s level of 
inefficiency: banks skimping on credit evaluations or producing excessively risky loans might be labeled as 
efficient when compared to banks spending resources to ensure their loans are of higher quality” (p.1026). 
The effect of output quality is twofold. On one hand, differences in quality are likely to affect the 
costs to the bank of loan origination, monitoring and control, and financing expense. Hence, managers 
might be tempted to cut back on those expenses (known as skimping). On the other, as a consequence of 
skimping or of bad management (e.g., managers’ excessive risk-seeking), banks could be granting high-
risk loans with low delinquency ratios today, but which years ahead, under worsen economic conditions, 
might make the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans soar. Berger and DeYoung (1997) test these 
bad luck, bad management and skimping hypotheses, to find mixed evidence.12 
Two ways to control for output quality in parametric models are in order. One is to use the 
alternative profit measure which, as already discussed, helps to control for unmeasured differences in 
output quality. The other is to include environmental variables in the model ―denoted v in equations 
(1.1), (1.3) and (1.5) above. Examples of these type of variables are the volume of nonperforming loans 
(Hughes and Mester, 1993; Mester, 1996), loan losses (Berg, Forsund and James, 1992) and the ratio of 
nonperforming loans to total loans (Berger and Mester, 1997).  
                                                 
12 They find evidence in both senses: problem loans precede reductions in measured cost efficiency and cost efficiency precedes 
reductions in problem loans. They also find that reductions in capital at thinly capitalized banks precede increases in problem 
loans. Berger and DeYoung (1997) claim cost efficiency may be an important indicator of future problem loans and problem 
banks, but results are ambiguous concerning whether researchers should control for problem loans in efficiency estimation. 
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Financial capital 
A bank’s insolvency risk depends not only on the quality of its assets, but on the financial capital (equity) 
available to absorb potential portfolio losses. Since these insolvency risks affect bank costs and profits 
through a higher risk premium to be paid for uninsured debt, one way to measure and take into account 
insolvency risk in the models above is to control for the interest rates paid on uninsured debt. However, 
these rates are imperfectly measured (Berger and Mester, 1997). 
Mester (1996) solves it using equity as an input into the production process. Financial capital 
provides a cushion against losses, and represents an alternative to deposits as a funding source for loans, 
with its pros and cons: interests paid on debt count as a cost while dividends paid do not, but raising 
equity typically involves higher costs. In any way, a failure to control for equity could yield a scale bias 
―because large banks tend to depend more on debt financing than small banks. Omitting capital level 
and price would make sense only if it is assumed that financial capital is not used to fund loans, or its 
price is the same across all banks and banks use the cost-minimizing level of financial capital ―none of 
which seems plausible (Mester, 1996). Besides, cost-minimization does not fully explain a bank’s capital 
level when there are, for instance, regulations that set minimum capitalization ratios. 
Risk preferences 
Finally, there is another reason why we should control for equity in banking efficiency measures: 
risk preferences. The cost, standard profit and alternative profit efficiency concepts take as given that 
banks are risk neutral. Risk averse banks may hold a higher level of financial capital than the level that 
maximizes profits or minimizes costs. Indeed, Hughes and Moon (1995) tested and rejected the 
assumption of risk neutrality for banks, so if financial capital is ignored, the efficiency of risk-averse 
banks would be miss-measured, even though they behave optimally given their risk preferences. 
 
1.4. THEORIES OF CREDIT 
 
The discussion in Section 1.3 about the necessity to control for risk and asset quality in banking 
efficiency analysis leads us to another relevant field in the literature: the different theories that interpret 
how banks provide credit to the economy. In what follows we make a short review of this literature. 
1.4.1. Microeconomics of credit 
A review on what determines how much private credit a bank would extend to firms and individuals is 
offered by Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer (2005), who distinguish two broad views.13 First, what matters 
                                                 
13 Alternatively, Diamond (1984) considers financial intermediation may be related to either the agent–principal literature, 
which develops conditions when monitoring additional information about an agent will help resolve moral hazard problems, 
or the literature on imperfect information, about the gross benefits of delegating some informational task to an intermediary. 
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for the viability of private credit is the power of creditors (Townsend, 1979; Aghion and Bolton, 1992; 
Hart and Moore, 1994, 1998). These power theories of credit consider banks are more willing to extend 
credit the more easily they can force repayment, grab collateral, or even gain control of the firm. The 
second alternative is information theories: what matters for lending is information (Jaffe and Russell, 
1976; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). The more banks know about their clients (their credit history, financial 
situation, etc.), the more credit they are willing to extend since information reduces the lemons problem 
(Akerlof, 1970). 
Townsend (1979) represents the starting point for the power theories of credit. Arrow (1964) 
and Debreu (1959) suggest uncertainty is easy to incorporate into general equilibrium models à la 
Arrow and Debreu (1954). However, Townsend (1979) notices it is not common that agents agree to 
contract contingent dealings that depend on the state of nature. This observed absence of contingent 
dealings would be related to moral hazard and imperfect information (Arrow, 1974): the range of 
possible contingent contracts is limited to those which are easily verified by both parties. In addition, 
the information structure of an economy may be costly and endogenous (Radner, 1968). Townsend 
works on these themes suggested by Arrow and Radner to provide a model where information may be 
transmitted to other agents only if a verification cost is borne. The incentive compatibility of alternative 
contracts is then discussed. 
Following this recognition that financial contracts are inherently incomplete, a theory of vertical 
integration of companies followed in consequence (e.g., Grossman and Hart, 1986). Aghion and Bolton 
(1992) develop instead a theory of capital structure based on control rights. They work on the 
alternative situation where firms face wealth constraints ―hence vertical integration is not feasible― to 
provide a theory on the classic corporate finance decision to use debt or equity to finance their activities. 
The optimality properties of debt depend on the ability to implement two forms of efficient control 
allocation: (i) unilateral control allocations, where the entrepreneur or the investor are the sole owners 
of the firm; and (ii) contingent allocations of control, where the entrepreneur retains control of the firm 
only if he does not default on his debt obligations ―otherwise the investor gets the control rights. 
Finally, Hart and Moore extend the analysis in two instances. Hart and Moore (1994) analyze the 
case where the entrepreneur has some special skills, which implies his human capital cannot costlessly 
be replaced. They show that the threat of repudiation (the entrepreneur withdrawing his human capital) 
implies some profitable projects will not be financed. Hart and Moore (1998) discuss the trade-off 
between the size of the loan and the repayment for a debt contract to be optimal ―that is, to persuade 
an entrepreneur to pay out cash flows rather than to divert them. 
Informational theories base their analysis instead in confronting the ability of borrowers to repay 
their debts on one hand (which basically depends on the expected future income of their assets and the 
collateral pledged), and the ability of lenders to screen good borrowers from bad ones to implement the 
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credit policies that maximize their profits adjusted by risk, on the other. Two classic articles are Jaffe 
and Russell (1976) and Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). The former analyzes the rationale of credit rationing 
―that is, when lenders quote an interest rate on loans and then supply a smaller loan size than that 
demanded by the borrowers. Jaffe and Russell (1976) develop a model where, in a context of imperfect 
information and uncertainty, credit rationing arises as a market response to adverse selection.14 Stiglitz 
and Weiss (1981) show that under imperfect information the interest rate acts either as a screening 
device or as an incentive mechanism, so a loan market in equilibrium may be characterized by credit 
rationing. An increase in the interest rate charged borrowers will, in general, increase the average 
riskiness of the projects a bank is financing (Greenwald, Stiglitz and Weiss, 1985). 
Literature on business failure 
A classic field inside information theories is the literature on business failure. It is one of the most 
investigated topics in the business literature (Balcaen and Ooghe, 2006) that starts with the classic 
articles by Beaver (1966) and Altman (1968). A business failure and its possible dissolution may affect 
not only to the stakeholders of the firm, but to its workers, customers, suppliers, and creditors. In 
consequence, the business failure prediction literature, also known as literature on default and credit 
risk modelling (Carling et al., 2007) develops statistical methods to determine a firm’s bankruptcy risk 
as accurately as possible (Crutzen and Van Caillie, 2008).  
In these methods, financial statement analysis often plays a key role. The causes of a business 
failure (Argenti, 1976) may be internal (e.g., declining sales, loss of market share, poor management, 
loss of competitiveness, high indebtedness, unprofitable investments) or external (e.g., GDP growth, 
economic, technological progress, social and political changes...). Whatever the cause, they are 
manifested as a series of symptoms that are observable in the financial statements of the firm, such as 
low profitability, low productivity, liquidity problems, difficulties getting access to financing sources, 
higher delinquency ratios, etc. Consequently, the ability of banks to properly discriminate good 
borrowers from bad ones largely depends on the analysis of accounting information, basically by making 
use of financial ratios that analyze both the situation (balance sheet) and cash flows (income statement) 
of the company.  
A basic taxonomy (Rodríguez, 2000) on methods of business failure prediction splits them into 
univariate and multivariate (either opinion-based, parametric or non-parametric). Univariate models 
consider financial ratios one to one, and try to determine their tendency and ability to predict the failure. 
Multivariate models try the same by analyzing a series of independent variables, including financial 
ratios, cash flow analysis, and macroeconomic data. The first stage in the development of multivariate 
                                                 
14 In particular, Jaffe and Russell (1976) make two specific assumptions. First, there are "honest" and "dishonest" borrowers: 
honest borrowers accept only loan contracts that they expect to repay and they do in fact repay them; dishonest people instead 
default on loans whenever the costs of default are sufficiently low. Second, lenders are unable to distinguish between the two 
types of individuals on an a priori basis, who can only be identified by actual defaults. 
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analysis were the opinion-based models (Wall and Dunning, 1928; Tamari, 1966; Argenti, 1984) which 
basically consisted of synthesizing a set of ratios in a single indicator. Parametric models are divided 
into descriptive (factorial analysis, cluster analysis, etc.) and predictive methods (multiple linear 
regression, discriminant models, conditional probability models, etc. Finally, non-parametric models 
include DEA and heuristic models, among others (Rodriguez, 2000). Most of them make use of financial 
ratios in their analysis. A list of ratios claimed to have better predictive power according to the empirical 
literature would include: return (ROA, ROE, return on sales); solvency; liquidity (quick ratio, acid test); 
efficiency (productivity per employee, commercial margin); indebtedness (leverage ratios); structure 
ratios; rotation ratios; market ratios (PER, P/CF).15 
1.4.2. Macroeconomics of credit. Bubbles 
Power and informational theories of credit study how banks analyze the appropriateness of granting 
credit at the individual level. However, what happens when banks compete among them? How does the 
industry behave when granting credit to the economy? This is, indeed, a key question for the purpose of 
this thesis. 
Some theories explain why credit markets may malfunction. These include the financial instability 
hypothesis (Minsky, 1982a,b; 1992) and the related concept of the Post Keynesian endogenous money 
model (Moore, 1988), the literature on imperfect information (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981, 1983; Greenwald 
et al. 1985), the role of incentives and risk taking moral hazard (Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2011; Acharya 
and Naqvi, 2012) and the literature on credit bubbles that starts with Kindleberger (1978). We describe 
these theories below, but for now let us say a point in common among them is that they all stress the 
key role volume plays in the price mechanism of credit markets. In stock markets, the volume of 
securities potentially available ―i.e., the number of shares of a stock that could be offered― is constant 
or at least rather sticky in the short term. This yields two differences between financial and credit 
markets. On one hand, markets clear by setting the price that balances supply and demand at any level. 
Credit markets, instead, might not clear (Stiglitz, 1993). On the other, potential supply in stock markets 
may be increased through a share offer, for instance, but that does not happen all the time. In retail credit 
markets, instead, banks may boost credit supply by simply easing their credit policies. 
Minsky (1982a,b) stresses the relationship between volumes of debt accumulated by the private 
sector, and the debt payments (interests and principal) associated to them, compared to the income 
generated from the investments that debt finances. Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis, FIH, is a 
theory of financially driven business cycles which can lead to an eventual debt-deflationary crisis. In 
short, it asserts stability is destabilizing: the second theorem of the FIH postulates that, over periods of 
                                                 
15 The list is based on a review of an extensive number of empirical research papers, including Beaver (1966), Lev (1978), 
Laffarga, Martín and Vázquez (1985), Courtis (1987), Mora (1994), Laffarga and Mora (2002), Calvo-Flores and García Pérez 
(2002), and Rodríguez (2002). 
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prolonged prosperity, the economy naturally transits from hedge finance ―the only income-debt 
relationship that ensures equilibrium in the economy― to speculative and Ponzi finance.16 Minsky sees 
bankers as merchants of debt trying to profit out of it. At the beginning of the economic expansion, banks 
and firms act conservatively due to risk aversion caused by a memory of a not too distant financial 
failure. Then, the good economic performance makes bankers and managers perceive risk premiums 
are excessive and that it pays to lever. Higher leverage leads to a euphoric economy and, eventually, to 
speculative and Ponzi schemes that cause debt deflation and economic turmoil (Keen, 2011). 
Minsky’s interpretation of business cycles being driven by credit is related to the Post Keynesian 
endogenous money model (Moore, 1988). In the era of modern liability management, bank lending 
operations are neither deposit nor reserve constrained: instead, loans make deposits and deposits make 
reserves (Lavoie, 1984). Recent research evidences banking credit booms are related to the business 
cycle. Jorda, Schularick and Taylor (2011) show higher rates of credit growth relative to GDP tend to be 
followed by deeper recessions and slower recoveries. Carpenter and Demiralp (2010) note the money 
multiplier is not useful to assess the effects of monetary policy on future money growth or bank lending. 
Upswings, when based on credit booms, are often induced by financial innovations (Brown, 1997). 
The development of financial innovations such as the collateralized debt obligations (CDO) or the credit 
default swaps (CDS) surely would have made the consequences of overconfidence over leverage more 
severe, also fostering demand-side effects (Brown, 2007). Under the money endogeneity principle, the 
supply of reserves is horizontal at the central bank’s target and, since they pay low or even zero rates, 
banks continually innovate to reduce the quantity of reserves they need to hold, increasing the rate of 
return on equity within regulatory constraints (Wray, 2007). This was evident for Alan Greenspan 
himself, who complained how easy it was for CEOs to craft financial statements to deceive the public 
(Friedman and Friedman, 2009). Boz and Mendoza (2014) provide a model of financial innovation and 
overconfidence in the context of the U.S. credit crisis, showing that financial innovation can lead to 
significant underestimation of risk. 
A second branch of theories that explain why credit markets could malfunction is the literature 
on imperfect information, which highlights the externalities of financial disruption and the Pareto 
inefficiency of credit markets. Following Stiglitz (1993), standard theories require perfect information, 
but information is a public good: because of the difficulties in appropriating the returns of information, 
there are externalities associated with its acquisition. Thus, information-intensive markets are hence 
likely to be imperfectly competitive. 
                                                 
16 Hedge financing agents are able to meet all their financial obligations with the cash flows generated by the assets they own. 
Speculative finance units can pay the interest on their debt, but need to ‘roll over’ their liabilities as they expire. Finally, for 
Ponzi subjects, the cash flows from operations are not enough to meet either the principal or the interest on their debt, so they 
are forced to increase their indebtedness, or sell assets to meet the payments required. 
35 
 
The main informational problem banks face is that they do not know how the money they lend is 
being invested (Greenwald et al., 1985). This yields two results. First, credit markets cannot operate like 
ordinary auction markets, with the funds going to the highest bidder; hence, with imperfect information, 
markets may not clear. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981, 1983) show that an increase in the interest rate charged 
on borrowers will, in general, increase the average riskiness of the projects a bank is financing.17 A 
higher risk may outweigh the direct gain to the bank from increasing the interest rate, hence the bank’s 
profit may be maximized at an interest rate at which there is an excess demand for loanable funds. Credit 
rationing appears when, at this profit-maximizing interest rate, there exists excess demand for credit 
(Stiglitz, 1993). The second result comes in consequence. Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986) show that, 
when information is endogenous or markets incomplete, the economy is not constrained Pareto optimal. 
Hence, there may be government interventions that take into account the costs of information and of 
establishing markets that can make all individuals better off. 18 
A third, more recent line of investigation on the macroeconomics of credit is about the effects that 
incentives to CEOs had on excessive lending by banks ―perhaps inspired by the recent financial crisis. 
The basic argument would be that executives at banks had poor incentives because their compensation 
was not properly related to long-term performance. However, Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) find some 
evidence that banks with CEOs whose incentives were better aligned with the interests of shareholders 
performed worse and no evidence that they performed better. Contrariwise, Acharya and Naqvi (2012) 
develop a theoretical model where abundant liquidity ―defined as deposits received from investors― 
aggravates the risk-taking moral hazard at banks. In their model, incentives paid to loan officers based 
on the volume of loans granted induces greater risk taking. They show bank liquidity is likely to increase 
when the macroeconomic risk is high and investors switch from direct investments to savings in the 
form of bank deposits. Abundant liquidity aggravates the risk-taking moral hazard by CEOs at banks, 
who relax lending standards giving rise to excessive lending and asset price bubbles. 
However, if a theory on why credit markets may malfunction should be mention that is the work 
of Charles Kindleberger, on which most literature on credit bubbles sets its background. Kindleberger 
(1978) provides an anatomy of a price bubble: a self-sustaining disequilibrating process that starts with 
some good news that generate a profit in an asset, followed by a smart-money response where both 
supply and demand are encouraged by initial investors. The bubble is sustained by the same investors 
who stimulate positive feedback trading by facilitating noise trader speculation. That is, the same agents 
                                                 
17 This may happen either because borrowers switch to riskier projects or because investors with safer projects do not apply 
for loans as their projects become relatively less attractive (Greenwald et al., 1985). 
18 Following Greenwald et al. (1985), credit rationing would help to explain business cycles in three ways. First, by providing a 
rationale for the persistence of non-market-clearing. Second, a firm’s cost of capital may vary unrelated to observed variations 
in interest rates. Credit rationing in recessions may be persistent, both because greater uncertainty concerning the prospects 
of the firms and an increase in the dead-weight loss associated with bankruptcy. Third, stabilization policy is likely to work if 
it focuses on increasing the availability of loanable funds to increase investment, rather than focusing on lowering interest rates 
―which would not work as there is no shortage of willing borrowers. 
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who are benefited in the early stages of the bubble increase the asset supply and encourage other actors 
to participate, increasing the demand and sustaining asset prices until the market, eventually, collapses. 
Thus, bubbles in financial markets require supply to be encouraged as the price goes up. However, 
as we mentioned, this effect on supply is easier to be observed in retail credit markets, since banks may 
easily boost credit supply by simply easing their credit policies. Hence, a key feature in Kindleberger 
(1978)’s theory is the role credit always plays in asset bubbles: “You can’t have a real estate bubble 
without the rapid growth of credit” (p.62). Therefore, we devote a separate section to provide a review 
on the theory of bubbles beyond Kindleberger, to conclude Chapter 1. 
Bubbles 
Shleifer (2000) defines a price bubble as a situation in which “prices go up and up without much news 
just because noise traders are chasing the trend. Noise traders in price bubbles react to past price changes, 
as opposed to particular news” (p.154). In such situation, a bubble is a deviation of the market price from 
the asset’s fundamental value (Scherbina, 2013). A common feature of asset bubbles is the coexistence 
of high prices, high trading volume and high price volatility (Cochrane, 2002). A classic explanation of 
how bubbles may appear is speculation (Harrison and Kreps, 1978), defined as investors buying assets 
at prices that exceed their own valuations because they think they will be able to sell them later even 
higher. 
There is large evidence of the existence of asset bubbles, both empirically and experimentally. 
Price bubbles often precede financial crises. Historic examples are the Dutch Tulip mania, the South Sea 
bubble in England, the Mississippi bubble in France and the Great Crash of 1929 in the United States. 
Examples in the recent decades are manifold: the collapse of real estate and stock prices in Japan in 
1990; Norway, Finland and Sweden in the 1980's and early 1990's; and several financial crises in 
emerging economies like Argentina, Chile, Indonesia, Mexico, and the South East Asian economies (Allen 
and Gale, 2000). The recent global financial crisis of 2008 was not, therefore, an exception. 
Experimental research has also provided extensive evidence of the existence of bubbles. Smith, 
Suchanek and Williams (1988) study asset trading in an environment where all investors receive the 
same dividend from a known probability distribution. The results show fourteen of twenty-two 
experiments exhibit price bubbles ―i.e., prices well-above known fundamentals- followed by crashes. 
Experienced traders reduce, but not eliminate, the probability of a bubble. Subsequent research traces 
market features that would reduce the impact and frequency of bubbles. Porter and Smith (1995), for 
instance, extend the analysis by Smith et al. (1988) introducing a futures market that provides market 
participants with information on the later period price expectations. Their results evidence that the 
futures market reduced the bubble. Furthermore, Dufwenberg, Lindqvist and Moore (2005) repeat the 
setup by Smith et al. (1988) but introducing a small subset of traders that were more experienced in the 
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sense that they had previously participated in three rounds of the game. They find bubbles are 
substantially reduced or eliminated, and suggest that bubbles in real markets, where the fraction of 
experienced traders is greater and they are substantially more experienced, would only be episodes that 
happen once in a while.  
Kindleberger’s anatomy of a price bubble represents a classic interpretation of how these bubbles 
occur. For instance, Hens and Bachmann (2008) use it to explain the financial crisis of 2008 based on 
the role played by subprime mortgages.19 Akerlof and Shiller (2009a) agree with Kindleberger in the 
sense that investors buying or selling in reaction to stock price increases or decreases can feed back into 
additional price changes in the same direction. Though this price-to-price feedback may not suffice to 
create a major asset bubble, they say, other forms of feedback between asset prices and the real economy 
could reinforce it. Three sources for this would be a wealth effect, that asset prices also determine 
investment levels, and that leverage intensify other kinds of feedback effects. Unfortunately, when asset 
prices fall the feedback process works in reverse. Akerlof and Shiller note the leverage cycle operates in 
part because of bank capital requirements: rising asset prices increase banks’ capital above regulatory 
requirements, hence they may buy more assets, bidding prices up and freeing more capital... However, 
when asset prices fall, leveraged financial institutions have to meet their capital requirements by selling. 
If this effect become systemic, downward feedback fosters fire sales, collapsing prices. 
The theory of speculative bubbles flourished after Shiller (1981)’s empirical evidence of an 
excessive price volatility. Indeed, bubbles represent a challenge to standard asset pricing theories. A 
successful theory should explain why rational and informed agents optimally choose to hold bubbles in 
their portfolios, and characterize the macroeconomic consequences of their choice. Behavioral finance, 
instead, departs from the assumption of rationality to suggest that the presence of psychological biases 
of market participants suffices to generate a bubble. Scherbina (2013) classifies these behavioral models 
that explain asset bubbles in four categories: differences of opinion and short sale constraints; feedback 
trading; biased self-attribution; and the representativeness heuristic and conservatism. 
First, models on differences of opinion show that optimism and overconfidence, among other 
sources of investor disagreement, may foster bubbles. This scope is similar to that we will follow in the 
theoretical model in Chapter 9. A classic example of this literature is the model by Scheinkman and Xiong 
(2003), who use a similar approach to that by Harrison and Kreps (1978) where agents agree to disagree 
and short selling is not possible. The model is based on overconfidence, what generates different 
opinions about asset fundamentals: an investor could buy an asset and an American option to sell it to 
                                                 
19 According to them, the initial good news that raised prices on the real estate market would be the speculative money coming 
into the house market after the dot-com bubble burst. That was followed by a response by the smart-money investors who 
started the packaging of mortgage risks in new securities (MBS) that are sold outsourced in special investment vehicles (SIV) 
and sold worldwide. 
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other agents with more optimistic beliefs. This would foster a bubble in asset prices when small 
differences of beliefs are sufficient to generate a trade. 
Second, models of feedback trading assume a group of investors trade based on past price 
movements. This interpretation is closer to that by Kindleberger (1978), and is followed by Shiller 
(2002), who argues mass media amplify feedback trading tendencies, and DeLong et al. (1990b), who 
combine momentum traders and rational traders in their model to show that rational speculators, 
rather than arbitrage the market, will trade with the mispricing to sell at inflated prices tomorrow. 
Third, models based on biased self-attribution consider investors that only recognize those events that 
confirm their beliefs while those that contradict them are dismissed or attributed to external noise or 
sabotage. A classic model would be Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998). Fourth, models on 
the representativeness heuristic and the conservatism bias combine these two deviations from optimal 
Bayesian updating largely documented in psychology (Tversky and Kahneman, 1982b; and Edwards, 
1968, respectively). Representativeness would explain overreaction while conservatism would explain 
underreaction. A classic model of this type would be Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998). 
There is, however, an alternative view that suggest the possibility of bubbles to be rational 
―known as the rational bubble literature. Shiller and Summers on one side, and Fama on the other, 
started the debate between rational and irrational bubbles. Shiller and Summers on one hand present 
evidence that stock prices could take large slowly decaying swings away from fundamental values, due 
to fads or irrational bubbles (Fama, 1991). This implies markets would be inefficient but in a way that 
is missed in tests on short horizon returns, because they show no autocorrelation. Fama and French 
(1988a) on the other obtain similar results, but they emphasize that temporary swings in stock prices 
do not necessarily imply irrational bubbles as in the Shiller-Summers model: a slowly mean-reverting 
component of stock prices tends to induce negative autocorrelation in returns for long periods, but weak 
autocorrelation for daily or weekly holding periods. Fama (1991) puts it in short: irrational bubbles in 
stock prices are indistinguishable from rational time-varying expected returns. 
The seminal papers of the rational bubble literature by Tirole (1982, 1985) interpret bubbles as 
a remedy to the problem of dynamic inefficiency. Tirole (1982) analyzes static and dynamic speculation 
when traders have rational expectations, to conclude price bubbles rely on the myopia of traders and 
they disappear if they adopt a dynamic maximizing behavior. Tirole (1985) identifies Samuelson (1958) 
as the paper that uncovered dynamic inefficiency, and its consumption loan model to be the first that 
shows a bubble on money can rationally exist. Their argument is based on the dual role of capital as a 
productive asset and a store of value: money has a positive value despite its market fundamental is zero. 
Thus, a bubble ―defined as the difference between price and fundamentals― appears. Tirole (1985) 
investigates an overlapping generations model with capital accumulation to give necessary and 
sufficient conditions for the existence of an aggregate bubble on assets that are held for more speculative 
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purposes than money. Rational models conclude that when all agents are perfectly rational and all 
information is common knowledge, bubbles can exist for an inﬁnitely-lived asset if the bubble’s rate of 
growth is equal to the discount rate (Scherbina, 2013). Abel et al. (1989) develop a criterion for 
determining whether an economy is dynamically efficient and conclude that the economies of major 
OECD countries are so. 
The experimental research by Smith et al. (1988) et seq. provides evidence against this 
interpretation, as the bubbles observed in the experiments are without question market inefficiencies: 
participants were given everything they needed to calculate fundamentals, but in most experiments 
prices rose way above the fundamental value, only to crash at the end. Notwithstanding, Smith et al.’s 
results also qualify the rational bubble interpretation to some extent. According to them, when the 
lagged excess bids observed in the experimental market go to zero, results converge to rational 
expectations in the sense of unprofitable arbitrage (Fama, 1970). They also subscribe to Tirole (1982)’s 
view that bubbles might be a form of temporary myopia: agents would learn that capital gains 
expectations are only temporary sustainable, ultimately inducing common expectations. In any case, 
rational expectations would require an experiential process through which participants come to have 
common expectations (Porter and Smith, 1995). Finally, some recent experimental research suggest 
bubbles may simply do not appear. Two examples are Lei and Vesely (2009), who introduce a pre-
market phase in which subjects observe and receive a dividend ﬂow to find that the bubble-and-crash 
phenomenon never occurs in the experiment, and Kirchler, Huber and Stockl (2011), who observe that 
the declining fundamental value process assumed by Smith et al. (1988) confuses subjects: running the 
experiment with a different fundamental value process reduces mispricing as it reduces confusion.20 
Whether bubbles are rational or not is, eventually, a debate on asset-pricing models and attitudes 
toward risk. Since CAPM and other asset-pricing models of standard finance measure differences in 
expected returns of securities at a given point in time, testing whether stock markets may experience 
bubbles requires analyzing expected returns over time, and whether risk premiums change over time 
or not (Statman, 1999). The efficient market hypothesis, EMH (Fama, 1970) claims security prices are 
rational, meaning they reflect only fundamental characteristics ―such as risk― but not psychological 
ones ―such as sentiment (Statman, 1999). Behavioral finance claims instead that, beyond attitudes 
toward risk, risk premiums may be affected by psychological issues. Shefrin (1999), for instance, shows 
theoretically and empirically that both fundamentals and sentiment affect the risk premium. The debate 
between rationalists and behaviorists also extends to the rationalist critique of behavioral models in the 
                                                 
20 Recent papers subscribing to the rational approach are Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2006), who argue bubbles would be 
a useful source of liquidity in emerging market economies, Kraay and Ventura (2007), who provide a formal description of how 
bubbles and debt interact as they compete for a fixed pool of savings, Kocherlakota (2009), who constructs a model in which a 
stochastic bubble in the price of collateral allows entrepreneurs to reallocate capital more efficiently, Martin and Ventura 
(2011a,b), who interpret that the market for bubbles and the credit market are two natural channels through which bubbles 
may transfer resources from inefficient to efficient investments, and Farhi and Tirole (2012), who find bubbles are more likely 
to appear the scarcer the supply of outside liquidity. 
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sense that, even if sentiment affects prices, arbitrage forces should eliminate all mispricing. The 
literature of limits of arbitrage (see Chapter 3) by Shleifer and Vishny (1997), DeLong et al. (1990b) and 
Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003), among others, would come to respond that critique. Consequently, the 
purpose of the subsequent chapters is to delve into this debate between rationalists and behaviorists, 
in particular when it refers to the efficiency of financial markets. 
 
1.5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The way efficiency is interpreted in financial markets ―which will be described in detail in Chapter 2― 
differs to how it is often analyzed in the context of banking competition. In the classic paradigm of 
banking theory, the role of market microstructure and the effects of asymmetries of information are 
determinant. Thus, in this chapter we have focused on identifying the classic approaches in the literature 
to analyze the efficiency of the banking sector when providing credit to the economy. In what follows 
we summarize the main topics discussed. 
First, we have delimited the scope of our analysis, which is bank-based financial systems and, in 
particular, retail credit markets ―that is, the transactions between retail banks and their customers that 
involve some sort of credit granted such as loans, mortgages, other credit instruments. 
Second, we have provided a short review of the literature on banking efficiency. For such purpose, 
we have confronted the efficient structure and market power hypotheses in the interpretation of 
whether it is an oligopolistic bank structure what determines performance or, alternatively, it is 
efficiency what determines both the market structure and the performance of the firms. We ended this 
review with an enumeration of the different interpretations of efficiency, measurement methods, and 
relevant variables used in these models to determine the efficiency of the banking sector. 
Third, we reviewed as well the different theories that interpret what determines how much credit 
banks should grant and to whom. We firstly analyzed the microeconomics of credit: that is, some 
alternative theories on what determines whether banks grant credit to a potential borrower. Then, some 
additional insights were provided to justify how retail credit markets may malfunction, including the 
literature on credit bubbles that starts with Kindleberger (1978). 
Now, the purpose of this thesis will be to extend the alternatives to analyze the efficiency of retail 
credit markets. Thus, in the subsequent chapters we will discuss how the way behavioral finance (see 
Chapter 3) has challenged the tenets of market efficiency (see Chapter 2) in financial markets might be 
applied to analyze the efficiency of bank-based systems as well. 
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CHAPTER 2. EFFICIENCY IN FINANCIAL MARKETS: 
THE EFFICIENT MARKET HYPOTHESIS 
 
2.1. INTRODUCTION. EFFICIENCY IN FINANCIAL MARKETS 
 
The debate about efficiency of financial markets has been ―and continues to be― among the most bitter 
and extensive debates in Finance. Lo and MacKinlay (2001), for instance, in their best-seller A non-
random walk down Wall Street, declare the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) “one of the most 
controversial and well-studied propositions in all the social sciences. It is disarmingly simple to state, has 
far-reaching consequences for academic pursuits and business practice, and yet is surprisingly resilient to 
empirical proof or refutation. Even after three decades of research and literally thousands of journal 
articles, economists have not yet reached a consensus about whether markets ―particularly financial 
markets― are efficient or not” (p. 6). Indeed, stock market prices have probably been the most analyzed 
economic data during the last decades (Granger, 1992). 
Historically, during the first half of the 20th century, the orthodoxy about how financial markets 
work and assets are priced were dominated by fundamental analysis ―e.g., Wall and Dunning (1928)― 
and technical analysis ―the theories of Dow and Elliot on stock market cycles. The prevailing belief was 
that a profound analysis of the financial statements of companies and the history of market cycles would 
allow savvier researchers to earn windfall profits by taking advantage of mispricing generated by 
irrational markets driven by investors’ greed and fears. Then, Kendall (1953)’s empirical analysis came 
to support the contrarian hypothesis that market prices are random ―a random walk hypothesis that 
had, nonetheless, an antecedent in Bachelier (1900).  
The random walk hypothesis represented a first step to the EMH that Fama (1970) would propose 
years ahead, but it also meant a first step into a new era of finance. In the following two decades, several 
studies on portfolio theory (Markowitz, 1952), arbitrage principles and capital structure (Modigliani 
and Miller, 1958), asset pricing theory (Sharpe 1963, 1964; Lintner, 1965), market efficiency 
(Samuelson, 1965; Fama, 1965a, 1970) and option pricing theory (Black and Scholes, 1973; Merton, 
1973a) set the pillars of modern standard finance. Since then, markets were seen as essentially efficient, 
being inefficiencies (anomalies) the exception or caused by malfunctioning markets (Malkiel, 2003). 
Market efficiency became orthodoxy since the 70s; nonetheless, a large number of financial researchers 
have focused on providing evidence that challenges it, too. This way, market efficiency became the 
controversial and well-studied area of finance we mentioned… but, why? Why has the efficiency of 
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financial markets become such a popular topic among academics? One might anticipate that efficiency 
is a fundamental requirement for a well-functioning market, but this argument deserves further insight. 
Financial markets play an essential role in capitalist economies because of the wide range of 
functions they are assigned. First, they facilitate the raising and flowing of capital within the economy, 
linking agents willing to save to agents willing to borrow capital to invest. Second, they improve the 
liquidity of the economy and reduce liquidity risk by reducing information costs, providing a means to 
cash out investments in shorter periods of time and facilitating intermediation (search of counterparty). 
Third, they facilitate to transfer risks between agents willing to hedge them and agents willing to take 
them. Fourth, financial markets enhance the three basic characteristics of financial securities ―liquidity, 
risk and return― in a way any investor could elaborate a portfolio that best suits her investment 
necessities and risk-return profile. 
However, above all, “the primary role of financial markets is allocation of ownership of the 
economy’s capital stock” (Fama, 1970, p. 383). That is, prices are key to solve the fundamental economic 
problem: the allocation of scarce means that have alternative ends (Robbins, 1935). Such role requires 
a pricing mechanism that provides the information necessary for firms to make production and 
investment decisions, and for investors willing to finance them, with prices that reflect their ‘true value’. 
This way, capital flows according to its price and corresponding discount factors. Financial markets 
crucial role is pricing securities (capital resources), and whether market efficiency is satisfied requires 
the analysis of whether this objective is achieved or not. 
Chapter 2 is intended to summarize the topics discussed in the last decades about financial market 
efficiency. This way, the remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides an 
extensive insight on the theoretical foundations of market efficiency, EMH. Section 2.3 discusses on the 
testability of EMH, introducing several ways academics have criticized the refutability of EMH. Section 
2.4 summarizes the different approaches suggested to test the efficient market hypothesis and the most 
relevant results that were obtained. Finally, Section 2.5 provides some concluding remarks. 
 
2.2. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF MARKET EFFICIENCY 
 
We saw in Chapter 1 that a common classification separates bank-based and market-based financial 
systems. In market-based systems, firms expect financial markets to meet their needs. Financial markets 
are the place or mechanism where securities, commodities and other assets are traded to set their prices 
in accordance to supply and demand. Since they play a relevant role in capitalist economies, a classic 
requirement for financial markets is their efficiency. The word efficiency applied to financial markets 
often evokes misleading meanings to an ignorant of the art, such as the idea that it requires markets to 
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be perfect or infallible ―in the sense that they are able to predict the future. However, financial market 
efficiency does not mean markets are perfect. A perfect market in the sense of an Arrow-Debreu 
competitive economy (Arrow and Debrew, 1954) is a fully competitive and frictionless market that 
provides market participants with complete and homogeneous information about the items traded 
there.21 Real-world markets are not that perfect, but efficiency conditions are much less restrictive. 
Financial market efficiency neither assumes markets are infallible. Efficiency, we will see, does not imply 
an ability to predict prices: it just presumes prices fully reflect information available. 
2.2.1. Financial market efficiency: A definition 
A financial market is said to be perfectly efficient if it is simultaneously allocatively, operationally and 
informationally efficient (Blake, 2000). First, it would be allocatively efficient if it distributes scarce 
resources between competing aims the most productive way, setting prices such that the highest bidder 
for the resources gets to use them. Following Bouchaud, Farmer and Lillo (2008), allocative efficiency 
strictly speaking requires Pareto optimality. Since the first fundamental welfare theorem22 states that 
any perfectly (i.e., in absence of market failures) competitive market equilibrium is Pareto efficient, 
competitive financial markets would be, generally speaking, allocatively efficient. Second, markets are 
operationally efficient ―a.k.a. internally efficient markets― when participants can execute transactions 
and receive services at a price that reflect the actual costs required to provide them, such that no 
excessive frictional costs reduce the risk-return profile of transactions. That requires transaction costs 
to be determined competitively (Blake, 2000).  
Allocative and operational efficiencies refer to the market microstructure. Since competitive 
markets are a sufficient condition to satisfy both allocative and operational efficiencies, the debate about 
whether markets are efficient has eventually become a debate about informational efficiency. Indeed, 
when the financial literature speaks of market efficiency it is generally talking about informational 
efficiency alone. Nonetheless, we must be aware that once we depart from neoclassical equilibrium, a 
market may be informationally efficient yet allocatively inefficient (Bouchaud et al., 2008). 
A classic definition of an informationally efficient market is the one where the information set is 
identical to all investors, in a way security prices fully reflect all available information and they 
instantaneously and fully adjust to every new piece of information (Blake, 2000). This statement is 
known as the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH). The original definition was set by Eugene Fama, 
who defines efficient markets as those where prices fully reflect available information (Fama, 1970) or, 
                                                 
21 Perfect competition requires a decentralized market with no barriers to entry or exit, where participants have no market 
power to set prices, and where they have equal access to the production technology (Novshek and Sonnenschein, 1987). The 
absence of frictions requires, among others, no taxes, no transaction costs, no operative limits and no externalities. 
22 The first fundamental welfare theorem states that under certain (ideal) conditions, the competitive economy is always Pareto 
efficient, in the sense that no one can be made better off without making someone else worse off (Stiglitz, 1991). A market 
result that is below the best possible result is a market failure (Lipsey, 1989). It may occur because of public goods, imperfect 
knowledge, differentiated goods, concentrated market power or externalities. 
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alternatively, those where there are large numbers of rational, profit-maximizers actively competing, 
each of them trying to predict future market values of individual securities, and where important 
current information is almost freely available to all participants. These markets lead to a situation where 
security prices today reflect the effects of information based both on events that have already occurred 
and on events which, as of now, the market expects to take place in the future (Fama, 1965a). 
An alternative interpretation of market efficiency is summarized by Jensen (1978) and Granger 
(1992). For Jensen (1978), the EMH is in essence an extension of the zero profit competitive equilibrium 
condition from the certainty world of classical price theory to the dynamic behavior of prices in 
speculative markets under conditions of uncertainty. This way, a market is said to be efficient with 
respect to an information set Ωt simply if it is impossible to make economic profits by trading on the 
basis of information set Ωt. Likewise, Granger (1992) considers that mere forecastability is not enough: 
for a market not being efficient, traders should be able to obtain economic profits in the sense of risk-
adjusted returns net of all costs. Richard Roll puts it shorter: what the EMH asserts is that there is no free 
lunch, particularly in financial markets.23 Efficiency would be satisfied as long as none trading techniques 
are more profitable than a buy-and-hold strategy.   
However, the original and alternative definitions of market efficiency are not equivalent. Statman 
(1999) highlights the difference: the term market efficiency has two meanings: one is that investors 
cannot systematically beat the market, the other is that security prices are rational, meaning they reflect 
only fundamental or utilitarian characteristics ―such as risk― but not psychological or value-expressive 
―such as sentiment. This is a classic critique that may be traced back to Shiller (1984): unpredictability 
does not imply prices are rational. We leave further insight on this critique to Section 2.3. 
Whatever definition of informational efficiency we use, there is a point in common: prices always 
adjust, fully and instantaneously, to new information available. An efficient market is not an unerring 
mechanism to prophesy future: it is an unbiased predictor of an asset’s intrinsic value given information 
available. Markets will be efficient if their pricing mechanism provides agents with prices that fully 
reflect all information available and adjust immediately to any new data being published. Investors 
rationally analyze information and estimate a subjective expected security price. In an uncertain world, 
the intrinsic value ―defined as the present value of all the asset’s expected cash flows in the future― can 
never be determined exactly, so it would be different to each investor, even if they all have the same 
information available. But in an efficient market, competition among agents will make multiple 
expectations of the asset’s value wander randomly about its intrinsic value (Fama, 1965a). Otherwise, if 
discrepancies between price and intrinsic value are systematic, not random, rational agents (known as 
arbitrageurs) will exploit those differences ―thus obtaining a riskless profit― to make them disappear. 
                                                 
23 Richard Roll’s foreword to Lo (1997). 
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Hence, Fama (1970) asserts efficiency would hold as long as there is a sufficient number of rational 
investors that have access to available information and exploit those price discrepancies. 
Following this, the rationalists have classically interpreted the two definitions of EMH ―unbiased 
estimator and price unpredictability― as equivalent. The seminal papers of this interpretation are 
Samuelson (1965) and Fama (1965a). Samuelson proves that properly anticipated prices fluctuate 
randomly. Put it simple, in an informationally efficient market, prices reflect all that is predictable; hence 
price changes must reflect only new, unpredictable information. Fama (1965a) states that if prices 
instantaneously and fully reflect all relevant information, security prices will wander randomly about 
its intrinsic value ―hence prices will be good estimators of fundamental values. If not, the difference 
between actual price and the security’s true value will be small enough such that, given transaction costs, 
that difference cannot be exploited profitably. 
Consequently, an efficient market is considered to be a fair game where all investors, using the 
information available to make their expectations about future prices, have the same possibility to win 
or lose. In a fair game there is no systematic difference between the actual return on the game and the 
expected return before the game is played.24 Mathematically 
𝑟𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝐸(𝑟𝑖,𝑡+1|Ω𝑡) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡+1 ,     (2.1) 
where ri,t+1 is the actual return on security i in period t+1, E(ri,t+1 | Ωt) is the expected return on security 
i in period t+1, conditional on the set of information available in period t, Ωt , and εi,t+1 is the prediction 
error on security i in period t+1. One consequence is that, if EMH holds, markets will be in a continuous 
stochastic equilibrium: return on securities will change randomly to new information available, since 
new information comes in a random fashion. Market efficiency would imply the randomness of security 
price series, and that is the reason why, since Bachelier (1900), efficiency has been classically modeled 
to test the hypothesis that prices follow a random walk or other types of random series. 
To sum up, the Efficient Market Model (EMM) asserts that asset prices are determined by 
investors’ expectations on future cash flows (coupons, dividends) discounted to present, with 
expectations conditioned on information available, E(·|Ωt).25 Hence, (informational) efficiency 
essentially depends on three critical features: expectations, information and the discount factor. 
These are the concepts we need to interpret to understand market efficiency. We analyze them next. 
2.2.2. Expectations 
Keynes (1936) pioneered to point out the importance of expectations, contributing at least in two ways. 
First, in analyzing their effects on interest rates and unemployment, he differentiated short-term and 
                                                 
24 Alternatively, a fair game is one in which the value of a play is zero (von Neumann and Morgernstern, 1944). 
25 Alternatively, in Shiller (2003)’s words, the EMM asserts that “the price of a share equals the mathematical expectation, 
conditional on all information available at the time, of the present value of actual subsequent dividends accruing to that share” (p. 
85) while the EMH posits that price equals the optimal forecast of that present value of future dividends. 
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long-term expectations to suggest their effects might persist over time. Second, Keynes suggested that 
economic instability may be a consequence of psychological characteristics of people: the animal spirits 
would dominate human decision-making, and so most of our activities would depend on spontaneous 
optimism rather than on a mathematical expectation. This relationship between psychology and 
economics would be assumed decades later by the behavioral economics. 
Nonetheless, it was Grunberg and Modigliani (1954) who first noticed that expectations of future 
events play an essential role in economics they do not play in physical sciences. Thus, our understanding 
of economic events is bounded by our limitations to explain the role expectations play in decision-
making. In particular, they investigate whether social sciences would be limited to predict both publicly 
and correctly ―since, in reacting to a public prediction, individuals might influence the course of events 
and thereby falsify the prediction.26  
Early models assumed agents make systematic biases. These include, among others, the Cobweb 
theorem,27 the adaptive expectations (Cagan, 1956), and the extrapolative expectations (Duesenberry, 
1958). When analyzing the monetary dynamics of hyperinflation, Cagan suggested agents use past 
prediction errors to reassess their expectations about the future value of the variable. Duesenberry, 
instead, suggested the persistence of business cycles would be a consequence of agents extrapolating 
their expectations, in the sense that they believe past price increases would continue in the future. 
Extrapolative and adaptive expectations were criticized for assuming agents only use past performance 
to predict future performance and for assuming agents do not learn from their mistakes. Rational 
expectations (Muth, 1961) would succeed to overcome these objections. 
Rational expectations 
The rational expectations hypothesis is generally regarded as the best model to analyze dynamic 
economic processes. Under this setup, alternative hypotheses suggesting that systematic biases may 
appear are interpreted as anomalies. An antecedent is the analysis by von Neumann and Morgenstern 
(1944) of economic decisions in the context of a theory of games. They interpreted rational behavior as 
the players’ optimal strategies given the alternatives and possible outcomes of a pre-specified game. The 
game solution requires that each participant accounts for every possible conduct of other participants, 
                                                 
26 Grunberg and Modigliani conclude that a correct public prediction is conceptually possible: if the agents’ reaction to public 
prediction alters the course of events, the reaction can conceptually be known in advance and taken into account. 
27 The Cobweb theorem was originally proposed simultaneously by Schultz (1930), Tinbergen (1930) and Ricci (1930), and 
enhanced by Lundberg (1937), Ezekiel (1938), Samuelson (1948) and Schneider (1948). Here we follow Akerman (1957)’s 
interpretation: take an agricultural market under conditions of pure competition and in an original state of equilibrium at a 
given price, where once plans are made farmers require at least one whole period to change production levels. Here, if some 
sort of disturbance occurs (e.g., unusual weather causing exceptionally small crops) it would give rise to a discrepancy between 
actual demand and supply, such that a higher price is set. The Cobweb theorem assumes a situation where a permanent 
enlargement of a crop will, for different reasons, cause some additional cost. Such cost will be undertaken only if the higher 
price is expected to be of a permanent nature, but farmers will convince themselves that the new price will remain high only 
after several years. The rise in prices in period 1 will, therefore, cause an increase in supply in period 2 considerably lower than 
the one that would clear the market. Prices and production levels would gradually adjust during a series of periods until a new 
equilibrium is reached, graphically forming a kind of spider net or ‘cobweb’. 
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as well as the influence of chance events. Muth (1961) formalized this rational behavior into a model: 
the rational expectations hypothesis. Since expectations would be informed predictions of future events, 
they should be essentially the same as the predictions of the relevant economic theory. In particular, the 
rational expectations hypothesis asserts three things. First, information is scarce, so the economy does 
not waste it. Second, the way expectations are formed depends on the structure of the relevant economic 
theory. Third, a public prediction in the sense of Grunberg and Modigliani will have no substantial effect 
on the operation of the economic system ―e.g., on how prices are formed in financial markets― unless 
it is based on insider information. 
A key assumption behind the rational expectations hypothesis is the Harsanyi doctrine (Harsanyi, 
1967). In their theory of games, von Neumann and Morgenstern categorized games of complete and 
incomplete information, as well as games of perfect and imperfect information,28 but assumed complete 
information without any further discussion. The theory of games with incomplete information made 
little progress since then, until Harsanyi (1967). Harsanyi highlights that games with incomplete 
information “appear to give rise to an infinite regress in reciprocal expectations”: sellers of an asset should 
have expectations on buyers’ expectations, but buyers also have expectations on other potential buyers, 
so sellers should have an expectation on buyers’ expectations on potential investors… and so on. These 
sequential–expectations models for games with incomplete information are known as Keynesian beauty 
contests, after Keynes (1936).29 
Harsanyi proposes a solution, known as the Harsanyi transformation: for any given I-game G (an 
incomplete information game, G), some C-game G* (a complete, but imperfect, information game) can 
be constructed that is equivalent to G. This is done by introducing Nature as a player: we treat a player 
who has different payoffs under different circumstances as a player of different types, involving random 
events assumed to occur before players choose their strategies (i.e., Nature moves first). To show the C-
game G* is equivalent to I-game G, Harsanyi assumes each player assigns a subjective30 joint probability 
                                                 
28 On one hand, for a description of a game to be complete, specifications about the state of information, payoffs and strategies 
available to every player at each decision point have to be set. On the other hand, games of perfect information require that any 
player making a move Mk has to be informed about the choices of all preliminary moves M1,M2,...,Mk-1 in the game. Chess is a 
typical representative of games with perfect information. Preliminarity is a requisite for perfect information, but anteriority 
does not mean preliminarity: in games of imperfect information the player who makes the move Mk is not informed about 
everything that happened previously. Poker is a good example of games with imperfect information. These games are strongly 
influenced by the players’ strategies and signaling ―that is, the spreading of true or false information to other players. 
29 Keynes described price fluctuations in equity markets as a consequence of investors’ iterative expectations like in a beauty 
contest. In this type of contests, a naive strategy would be to choose the faces most beautiful to the entrant. In order to maximize 
the chances to win the prize, a more sophisticated strategy for a rational player would be “anticipating what average opinion 
expects the average opinion to be” about beauty, based on some inference from his knowledge of public perception. 
30 If probabilities are assumed to be objective, like in the Von Neumann–Morgenstern theory, we are assuming randomness and 
probabilities do "exist" in Nature. This objectivist position was set by Laplace (1774), the relative frequentist view by Mises 
(1928) and Reichenbach (1949a,b) ―related to Bernoulli‘s (1713) law of large numbers― and the propensity view by Peirce 
(1910) and Popper (1959). Many statisticians and philosophers objected to this view, arguing that probabilities are an 
epistemological and not an ontological issue: they are a measure of the lack of knowledge about the conditions which might 
affect a so-called random event, and thus merely represent our beliefs about it. Ramsey (1926) asserted that probability is 
related to the knowledge possessed by a particular individual alone. Probability would be, this way, subjective. The difficulty 
was to derive mathematical expressions for probabilities from personal beliefs, but Ramsey suggested a way to do it. De Finetti 
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distribution to the variables they ignore, and shows we can find a natural analogue of the I-game G, a C-
game G* with the same payoff functions and the same strategy spaces where the information or attribute 
vector of each participant are reinterpreted as random vectors (chance moves) with an objective joint 
probability distribution. Hence, both games will be Bayes–equivalent, a postulate known as the Harsanyi 
Doctrine:31 “every player will use his subjective probabilities exactly in the same way as he would use 
known objective probabilities numerically equal to the former” (p. 174). The postulate implies that if all 
agents have the same knowledge, then they ought to have the same subjective probability assignments. 
This assertion is nowhere implied in the Ramsey-de-Finetti subjective probability theory, but it lies in 
the background of the rational expectations hypothesis. 
Several authors argued against Harsanyi doctrine. Morris (1995) criticize the use of the common 
prior assumption and the unwillingness of economists to use truly subjective probabilities the same way 
we accept the idea of a personal utility function. Biais and Bossaerts (1998) assert that the Harsanyi 
transformation holds not because of the common prior assumption, but only if agents use the same rule 
to form their expectations. However, a strength of the model is that rationality is an assumption that can 
be modified (Muth, 1961). Systematic biases, poor memory, incomplete or incorrect information, etc. 
may be examined under the assumption that agents generally behave rationally. Hence, the rational 
expectations hypothesis has been widely accepted in the context of market efficiency and beyond: the 
debate on money neutrality (Lucas, 1972), the effectiveness of alternative monetary policies (Sargent 
and Wallace, 1975; Barro, 1976), real business cycle models (Lucas, 1975; Kydland and Prescott, 1982), 
etc. Nonetheless, some of its limitations have been outlined. Some critiques come from the behavioral 
literature, hence will be reviewed in Chapter 3. Others are reviewed in the remainder of this section. 
Critiques to rational expectations 
A classic in the literature is the concept of bounded rationality (Simon 1955, 1959). Simon criticizes the 
assumption of rationality because it leads to theories unable to explain the observed phenomena. He 
suggests instead people should be viewed as boundedly rational, where utility maximization is replaced 
by satisficing: information is vast but we have limited information–processing abilities, hence we 
construct simplified models of the world to make decisions. Following this, Haltiwanger and Waldman 
(1985) provide a model where agents are heterogeneous in terms of information processing abilities.  
Together with bounded rationality and information processing limits, the rational expectations 
hypothesis has been criticized for two other reasons: the effects of incomplete, imperfect or costly 
information on one hand, and the possibility of speculation on financial markets on the other. In regards 
                                                 
(1931, 1937) suggested a similar derivation. The Ramsey-de Finetti approach says that subjective probabilities can be inferred 
from observation of people's actions, a revealed belief akin to the revealed preference approach in consumer theory. The 
Ramsey-de Finetti was developed into a full theory by Savage (1954)’s Foundations of Statistics. 
31 The Harsanyi doctrine is also known as the ‘common prior’ assumption, because the lottery played by Nature occurs prior to 
any other move in the game. 
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to the former, information is rarely costless, measured either in terms of money, time or effort. This may 
make different market participants have access to different information sets (see subsection 2.2.3), but 
also affect how expectations are formed. Feige and Pearce (1976) observe agents base their expectations 
about inflation only on a subset of data readily available, due to the cost-benefit trade-off of searching 
for additional information. They call these expectations economically rational. Copeland (1989) suggests 
a similar idea for currency markets and names them weakly rational expectations: a variable’s expected 
value, conditional on an information set that contains only the past history of the variable.  
Speculation, defined as investors buying a stock now in order to sell it later for more than what 
they think it is actually worth (Harrison and Kreps, 1978), goes against the rational prices interpretation 
of EMH: if investors have rational expectations, why would they speculate? Harrison and Kreps (1978) 
set one of the first and most relevant papers in behavioral finance with a model of speculation based on 
overconfidence and heterogeneous beliefs. According to it, if investors may form different opinions even 
when they have the same information, there can be no objective intrinsic value for the stock. Instead, 
intrinsic values would be obtained through market aggregation of the diverse investor assessments. The 
main result is that different levels of optimism across investors make financial assets carry a speculative 
premium: holding a stock gives the owner the option to resell it to someone more optimistic. Speculators 
would then base their expectations on interactions among agents rather than on relevant information 
about the true value of a security (Peters, 1991). This would make speculative markets inefficient in the 
sense they are not unbiased predictors of an asset’s true value. Furthermore, random time series would 
not necessarily imply efficiency (Black, 1986): noise causes markets to be inefficient, but often prevents 
us from taking advantage of inefficiencies, and makes it difficult as well to test the theories about the 
way financial markets work. “We are forced to act largely in the dark” (p. 529). 
In the end, the debate on expectations and speculation leads to the Harsanyi doctrine of a common 
prior. Aumann (1976) shows people with the same priors and common knowledge about a future event 
cannot agree to disagree about such event, excluding the possibility of a purely speculative trade among 
them (Bossaerts, 1995). Shiller (1995) analyzes some opinion polls of investors about their expected 
prices in equity markets, and concludes that a mutually recognized disagreement among them is clear. 
Now, if we deviate away from the common prior assumption and admit agents may agree to disagree, 
the distribution of beliefs in the economy is not common knowledge, agents update higher-order beliefs 
like in the Keynesian beauty contest, and the computation of equilibria becomes intractable.32 
                                                 
32 Early efforts to solve this problem include Böge and Eisele (1979) and Mertens and Zamir (1985), who prove an equilibrium 
exists in static games with infinite beliefs hierarchies, and El-Gamal (1992), who does the same for dynamic models without 
strategic interactions, assuming agents agree from a certain order on. Biais and Bossaerts (1998) analyze instead an average 
opinion rule they claim to be consistent with Muth’s original description of rational expectations: prior to the game, agents 
consider their own private valuations to be average, and to do so, they first analyze what they think other investors’ private 
valuations are on average. When agents disagree on the speculative value of an asset, some trading patterns (known as 
controversial trades) may arise. The impact of such controversial trades on trading volume and return volatility would not be 
significantly different compared to those under the common prior assumption. 
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Despite these criticisms, rational expectations have also succeeded to explain speculation and 
market efficiency. Kodres and Pritsker (2002) develop a multiple asset rational expectations model of 
asset prices that explains financial market contagion. Condie and Ganguli (2011) prove the existence of 
fully-revealing rational expectations equilibria for almost all sets of beliefs when investors are 
ambiguity averse and have preferences that are characterized by Choquet expected utility. The paper 
extends the works of Radner (1979) and Allen (1981, 1982), who show that smooth preferences imply 
generic full revelation and provide conditions for informational efficiency under ambiguity.33 
2.2.3. Information 
Information is the key concept in the formulation of the EMH, as it refers to whether prices fully reflect 
available information. Two topics are essential: first, to know which are the relevant contents of the 
information set for market efficiency; second, to analyze which market participants have access to that 
set and to which extent. The interpretation of these two topics would lead Fama (1970) to propose three 
different degrees of efficiency. Consequently, in what follows we describe the information set, market 
participants’ access to information, and the three degrees of efficiency in the EMH. 
Information set 
The relevant information set for market efficiency, denoted Ωt in Eq. (2.1), is the one that conditions 
agents’ expectations on asset prices. Fama (1965b) theorized it should include two subsets: events that 
have already occurred and events which, as of now, the market expects to take place in the future. 
Considering the information in these two subsets, market participants make their bets on the intrinsic 
value of securities. In addition, intrinsic values change over time because the information set includes 
market expectations on future events and, by definition, what markets expect changes if new relevant 
information is available. Competition in an efficient market will, on average, make changes in the 
intrinsic value due to new information to be reflected fully and instantaneously in prices (Fama, 1965b). 
We emphasize three words ―on average, fully and instantaneously― because under uncertainty we 
should not expect market prices to adjust immediately and exactly at the proper size. Prices may over 
and underreact, and their changes may also precede or lag the occurrence of the event that made 
intrinsic values change. Nonetheless, for market efficiency to hold, overreaction will happen as often as 
underreaction, while the lag period for prices to adjust to new intrinsic values will be itself an 
independent random variable. 
                                                 
33 Further research on rational expectations may be found, among others, in the works of Givoly (1985), who finds evidence 
that financial analysts’ earnings forecasts are rational in the sense they use available information, but adaptive in the way they 
form those forecasts; Bray and Savin (1986), who investigate whether agents can learn how to form rational expectations using 
standard econometric techniques; Hamilton (1988), who performs a rational expectations econometric analysis of the term 
structure of interest rates; Veronesi (1999), who provides an asset pricing model where investors' willingness to hedge against 
uncertainty explains overreaction to bad news in good times and underreaction to good news in bad times; Beeby, Hall and 
Henry (2001) who analyze whether the specification of the learning rule in macroeconomic models is arbitrary; and Pearlman 
and Sargent (2005), Allen, Morris and Shin (2006) and Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2008), who analyze iterative expectations. 
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The consequence of this adjustment property of efficient markets is that successive price changes 
of a given security will be independent and identically distributed. Thus, the best estimation of the 
return on a security tomorrow is the return on the security today. Mathematically, 
𝐸(𝑟𝑖,𝑡+1|Ω𝑡) = 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 .     (2.2) 
Substituting (2.2) in (2.1) we have market returns in efficient markets must follow a random walk 
(i.e., a martingale),34 
𝑟𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡+1 .     (2.3) 
Security prices, instead, are expected to drift upwards ―since no one would invest in risky 
securities unless they offered a positive expected return. Consequently, prices would follow a 
submartingale (a random walk with a positive drift).35 Mathematically, 
𝑃𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑔𝑖,𝑡+1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡+1
∗  ,    (2.4) 
where the positive drift, g, would be a random variable as well, such that gi,t+1 = r i,t+1 · Pi,t . 
In well-functioning markets, market forces would make the positive drift equal to the required 
return for securities of the same level of risk. Therefore, we interpret (2.4) as the security price series 
adjusted for required returns (Jensen, 1978). Indeed, Fama (1970) claims that the random walk model 
is a more detailed extension of the fair game efficient markets model. The latter only says that the 
conditions of a market equilibrium can be stated in terms just of expected returns, thus it says little 
about the stochastic process that generates these returns. The random walk model, instead, requires 
that the conditional and marginal probability distributions of an independent random variable are 
identical. In consequence, empirical tests of the random walk model would be more strongly in support 
of the EMH than tests of the fair game properties. A consequence of the random walk property is that 
price series should have no memory, meaning historic prices cannot be used to predict future price 
movements or, at least, they cannot increase the expected gains above those expected for a naive buy-
and-hold strategy. 
Market participants’ access to information 
The second crucial topic to define the role of information in the EMH is to analyze which market 
participants have access to it and to which extent. In particular, we will focus on two aspects that are 
relevant to determine the different degrees of market efficiency: whether some agents might profit from 
private inside information, and whether markets might not adjust instantaneously to new information 
when it is costly. The EMH assumes information is costless and identical to all investors. However, what 
                                                 
34 Security returns follow a martingale “when the expected rate of return on stock conditional on past realized rates of return is 
always equal to its unconditional expectation” (LeRoy, 1973, p. 436). 
35 Security prices follow a submartingale whenever   titti PPE ,1, |   holds.  
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happens if it does not? Fama (1970) admits that “a frictionless market in which all information is freely 
available and investors agree on its implications is not descriptive of markets in practice” (p. 387). 
Nonetheless, having costless information available to all market participants is only a sufficient, not 
necessary, condition for market efficiency.36 Therefore, markets where information is not costless and 
not identical to all investors can still be efficient if there is a sufficient number of rational investors having 
ready access to available information so they can profit from discrepancies between prices and intrinsic 
values. A question remains open about how many investors are sufficient enough. 
Accepting information may be costly leads to several arguments against EMH. Here we consider 
five: the possibility for insider traders (i.e., investors having access to private information) to make 
excess profits, whether competitive markets may reach an equilibrium, whether financial analysis may 
be profitable or not and the impossibility of informationally efficient markets, the extent to which prices 
are informative, and the extent to which they adjust instantaneously or not to new information revealed. 
They are reviewed in what follows. 
If information is costly and, consequently, not all investors have the same information available, 
asymmetric information problems may appear. Two consequences follow. First, there is a possibility for 
insider trading to be profitable. Second, the assertion that competitive markets reach an equilibrium is 
now disputed. Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) highlight that, if prices in equilibrium eliminate potential 
arbitrage profits, then no competitive markets would be in equilibrium at any time when arbitrage is 
costly. The competition between informed arbitrageurs and noise traders would lead to an ‘equilibrium 
degree of disequilibrium’: prices would reflect the information of arbitrageurs but only partially. 
Jensen (1978) then modifies the strict interpretation of costless information. Markets are efficient 
if it is impossible to make economic profits trading on the information set available, where economic 
profits mean ‘risk-adjusted returns net of all costs’. However, if the benefits of fundamental analysis are 
lower than its costs, why would financial analysts be willing to spend time and money on it? Moreover, 
the incontestable evidence that financial analysts do exist may be argued against Jensen’s interpretation 
of EMH. Market efficiency would imply prices reflect available information only to the extent that the 
marginal benefits of exploiting the information exceed the transaction costs incurred in doing so, but 
Jensen’s interpretation puts a limit to that possibility. 
Grossman (1976) and Grossman and Stiglitz (1976, 1980) work on that contradiction to suggest 
the impossibility of informationally efficient markets: “if the market aggregated information perfectly, 
                                                 
36 Fama (1970) reckons three sufficient conditions for capital market efficiency, the other two being the absence of transaction 
costs in trading and that all market participants agree on the implications of information on future prices. Again, these are 
neither necessary conditions: large transaction costs do not imply that, when trades take place, prices will not fully reflect 
available information; disagreement among investors about the implication of information on intrinsic values does not itself 
imply market inefficiency unless there are investors who can consistently make better evaluations of available information 
than what is implicit in market prices. 
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individuals’ demands would not be based on their own information, but then, how would it be possible for 
markets to aggregate information perfectly?” (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1976, p. 250). Grossman and 
Stiglitz (1980) show that, in markets with both informed investors and noise traders, the number of 
individuals who choose to be informed becomes an endogenous variable of the model. When informed 
investors pay for research, the price mechanism conveys information from informed to noise traders. 
This makes publicly available the information informed investors had paid for, but only imperfectly “for 
were it to do it perfectly, an equilibrium would not exist” (p. 393). If prices fully revealed information, 
nobody would pay for it; if they choose to be uninformed, markets are plenty of profit opportunities.37 
All equilibria that might exist are a sort of equilibrium degree of disequilibrium where some agents are 
informed, others are not, and prices imperfectly convey information.38 
A final argument against EMH that follows if the cost of collecting and processing information is 
non-negligible is that, since time and money is required for analysts to process information, markets 
would not necessarily adjust instantaneously to new information. Instead, the adjustment would occur 
only after a certain period of adaptation or learning by the market.  
Degrees of efficiency 
We have seen that the contents of the information set include information about past events and about 
events the market expects to take place in the future. When new information is available, efficient 
markets are expected to fully and instantaneously incorporate them on prices. Besides, we discussed 
that if information is costly it would introduce asymmetries of information that might challenge EMH in 
at least two instances: the possibility for some agents to profit from private inside information, and the 
extent to which markets would not instantaneously adjust to new information. 
One of the contributions of Fama (1970) ―and previously Roberts (1967)― was to anticipate that 
the proper answer to the question ‘are markets efficient?’ might not be a binary variable “yes/no”. 
Instead, he defined three degrees of efficiency ―weak, semi-strong and strong― that take into account 
the topics considered above. Fama argued expectations could be conditioned on three subsets of 
                                                 
37 The more individuals are informed, the more informative becomes the price system, but at the same time the excess return 
informed traders can obtain is reduced. The equilibrium number of agents who choose to be informed depends on three 
parameters. First, the higher the cost of information the smaller the equilibrium percentage of informed individuals. Second, 
the higher the quality of the informed trader’s information, the more informative the price system will become. However, the 
equilibrium proportion of informed to uninformed individuals may increase or decrease, because even though the value of 
being informed increases with the quality of the information, the value of being uninformed also rises when the price system 
becomes more informative. Third, the greater the magnitude of noise the less informative the price system will be, so in 
equilibrium the greater the noise, the larger the proportion of individuals that will choose to be informed. 
38 Some authors enhanced this argumentation. Hellwig (1980) suggests prices do not depend only on the information vector 
but also on agents’ preferences (i.e., the strength of the agent’s reaction to information). Two consequences follow. First, the 
less risk averse an agent is, the more relatively important the information vector will be. Second, in large markets the 
equilibrium price will only reflect pieces of information that are common to a large number of agents. Therefore, a market will 
fully aggregate information only if there are many agents with many independent sources of information, so noise is filtered 
out and does not affect the price. However, noise is necessary for smart investors to earn profits. If information is costly, it is 
against noise traders ―individuals who trade on what they think is information but is in fact merely noise― that smart investors 
earn their rents (Grossman, 1976; Black, 1986). 
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information. First, a weak form information set, which contains the historical prices of the security under 
consideration. Then, a semi-strong form information set, concerning any other information that is 
publicly available. Finally, a strong form information set, which contains both public and private inside 
information. The difference between the weak and the semi-strong form information sets takes into 
account the distinction between information about past events and events the market expects to take 
place in the future. The second subset, the semi-strong form, also takes into account the extent to which 
markets would not instantaneously adjust to new information revealed. Finally, the difference between 
the semi-strong and strong form subsets accounts for the possibility that some agents might profit from 
private insider information. 
Based on these three subsets of information, Fama (1970) proposed three versions of the efficient 
market hypothesis to be tested. They follow in order: 
 The weak form EMH states that security prices fully reflect all past information contained in 
the historical series of prices. Hence, no investors will be able to consistently outperform 
founding their investment decisions on the analysis of past prices and trading volumes. In a 
weak-form efficient market, security price series behave as a random variable, markets have 
no memory, and technical analysis or any other trading techniques based on the analysis of 
historical prices will be of no value. Tests of the weak form EMH usually involve serial 
correlation analysis, as we shall see in Section 2.4. 
 The semi-strong form EMH states that prices fully reflect all publicly available information 
and, in consequence, they instantaneously and fully reflect any changes in such information 
set. When new information that affects the intrinsic value of a security becomes publicly 
available, competition will force the effects to be, on average, fully and instantaneously 
incorporated into prices. In a semi-strong form efficient market no investors will be able to 
systematically outperform the average market return through the analysis of publicly 
available information. Hence, fundamental analysis would be worthless. Tests of the semi-
strong form EMH try to identify market anomalies where a rationale for rational behavior 
of market participants could not be vindicated. 
 The strong form EMH states that prices instantaneously and fully reflect information, 
including not only publicly but privately available inside information too. Markets would 
respond so quickly to investors trying to profit out any piece of inside information they own, 
that they would not be able to take advantage of it. Tests are usually conducted through a 
performance analysis of market participants expected to have access to inside information, 
such as mutual fund managers or executives of companies quoting at the markets. 
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In Section 2.4 we will provide a summary of the different tests that are performed to account for 
the three levels of efficiency in financial markets, as well as a review of some relevant articles.39 
2.2.4. Discount factor 
One of the central tenets of modern financial economics is the tradeoff between risk and expected 
return. However, the early version of the EMM only focused on expected returns and did not account for 
risk in any way (Lo, 1997). As we saw, the EMM asserts that asset prices are determined by investors’ 
expectations, conditional on all information available at the time, of the present value of the expected 
future cash flows. The best predictor of future return would be today’s return ―i.e., market returns are 
a martingale, see (2.3)― while security prices would follow the submartingale in (2.4): they drift 
upwards because no one would invest in risky securities unless they offered a positive expected return. 
In his search for a plausible way to test the EMH, Fama (1970) noticed has empirical content only 
within the context of a more specified model of price formation and market equilibrium. Thus, he 
suggested to use asset valuation models like the Sharpe–Lintner CAPM to estimate the drift in (2.4) ―i.e., 
the expected return investors require to invest in stocks. The CAPM posits that such expected return is 
a function of its risk. However, different theories differ primarily on how risk is defined ―CAPM, for 
instance, uses beta to measure the risk premium one expects to be paid for. Besides, the assumption that 
market equilibrium can be stated in terms of expected returns, where the value of the equilibrium 
expected return E(rt+1|Ωt) would be determined from the particular expected return theory at hand, also 
introduces a joint hypothesis problem that will be later discussed (see subsection 2.3.2). 
Fama and MacBeth (1973) offered the first test of the CAPM, introducing the Fama–MacBeth 
regressions for parameter estimation.40 Then, Merton (1973b) extended the CAPM to an intertemporal 
general equilibrium model based on consumer–investor behavior where investors maximize the utility 
of lifetime consumption. Subsequent models showed that rational asset prices may have a forecastable 
element that is related to the forecastability of consumption (Lucas, 1978) and that a stock’s risk 
premium (beta) would also depend on per capita consumption (Breeden, 1979). At that point, the 
discount factor efficient markets would use to compute the present values of future cash flows was 
interpreted to be equal to the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution for consumption that Merton, 
                                                 
39 Further references on information and market efficiency may be found. Classic works include Granger and Morgenstern 
(1970) on predictability of stock prices, Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) on market equilibrium under imperfect information, 
Stiglitz (1982) on the inefficiency of incomplete markets, He and Wang (1995) and Kandel and Pearson (1995) on trading 
volume and information flow in markets with informational asymmetries among investors. Among recent literature, some 
relevant articles are in order. Marín and Rahi (2000) develop a theory of endogenous market incompleteness. Amato and Shin 
(2003) analyze how central bankers disclosures on monetary policy shape agents’ expectations when agents have diverse 
private information. Kasa, Walker and Whiteman (2006) develop a dynamic asset pricing model with persistent heterogeneous 
beliefs, and characterize the resulting high-order belief dynamics. Cespa and Vives (2009) investigate the dynamics of prices, 
information and expectations in a competitive, noisy, dynamic asset pricing model, and find two possible outcomes, Keynesian 
―with prices far away from fundamentals― and Hayekian. Biais, Bossaerts and Spatt (2010) develop a theory of capital markets 
and portfolio choice under asymmetric information. 
40 These regressions are a particular case of the Generalized Method of Moments, GMM, by Hansen (1982) that we will later 
describe. 
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Lucas and Breeden were using to derive stock returns in their models. Besides, the relevant risk factor 
that would explain the expected return of a stock was the sensitivity to the market according to the 
updated CAPM versions. 
However, Fama would later endorse two additional risk factors. The empirical literature had 
identified two categories of stocks that seemed to outperform the market. The first category was small-
cap stocks (Banz, 1981). Banz conjectured that the availability of corporate information is related with 
the firm’s size and so investors would require additional returns to invest in small-cap firms to 
compensate for that risk. He then found empirical evidence that small caps beat the market over long 
horizons. The second evidence was that value stocks ―stocks with low ratios of price to a fundamental 
like book value (P/B), cash flow (P/CF) or earnings (P/E)― have higher average returns than growth 
stocks, which have higher ratios of price to fundamentals (DeBondt and Thaler, 1985; Fama and French, 
1992). In particular, Fama and French (1992) confirmed the empirical contradictions of the CAPM: 
variables that have no special standing in asset-pricing theory ―namely, size, leverage, book-to-market-
equity and earnings-to-price ratios― show reliable power to explain the cross-section of average 
returns. When β is unrelated to size, they find no relation between β and average return, contrary to 
CAPM. Instead, they find clear evidence on the robustness of the size effect and an even more powerful 
book-to-market effect. Furthermore, leverage ratios are captured by the book-to-market ratio, whereas 
the combination of size and book-to-market absorbs the apparent role of E/P in average stock returns. 
As a result of these two findings, the size effect and the book-to-market effect, Fama and French 
(1993) propose a three-factor model for stock returns: the expected returns would respond to three risk 
factors, associated with size, value versus growth (book-to-market ratios) and sensitivity to the 
market.41 In addition, Fama and French (1993) identify two factors for bonds, related to maturity and 
default risks.42 More specifically, the expected excess return on portfolio i under the three-factor model 
would be explained by the sensitivity to three factors, 
  )()()()( HMLEhSMBEsrREbrRE iifMifi   ,   (2.5) 
namely, the excess return of the market portfolio (RM - rf), the difference in return between a portfolio 
of small stocks and a portfolio of large stocks (SMB, small minus big), and the difference in return 
between a portfolio of high-book-to-market stocks and a portfolio of low-book-to-market stocks (HML, 
high minus low). Fama and French (1996) obtain some results, consistent with the intertemporal CAPM 
(Merton, 1973b) and APT asset pricing (Ross, 1976), that would explain the most significant anomalies 
                                                 
41 Recently Fama and French (2012) seem to have subscribed as well to a classic in the behavioral literature, the evidence that 
stocks may exhibit momentum: stocks that have done well over the past year tend to continue to do well (Jegadeesh and Titman, 
1993; Griffin, Ji and Martin, 2003). Nonetheless, rationalists interpret this would be explained by risk factors that affect firm 
investment life cycles (see momentum strategies in Chapter 4). 
42 In this paper, Fama and French use a time series regression approach instead of the cross-section regressions used in Fama 
and French (1992). The reason is that it would be difficult to add bonds to the cross-section regressions since size and book-
to-market equity would have no obvious meaning as explanatory variables for returns on government or corporate bonds. 
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identified in the academic literature except momentum. Further research would support their results: 
for instance, Kothari and Shanken (1997) find evidence that book-to-market and dividend yield track 
time-series variation in expected real stock returns, whereas Pontiff and Schall (1998) find the book-to-
market ratio of the DJIA index predicts both broad market returns and small firm excess returns. 
Excess volatility 
In early 80s, the literature on excess volatility came to contradict the tenets of the EMM in regards to 
risk in financial markets. The articles by Shiller (1979, 1981) represent a groundbreaking research in 
behavioral finance: they impose a theoretical limit on bond and stock market volatility that were largely 
violated according to empirical data observed. Shiller (1981), in particular, shows stock prices are too 
volatile to be justified by new information about future real dividends. This finding would put into 
question the basics of the entire efficient markets theory (Shiller, 2003), as it implies that changes in 
prices occur for no fundamental reason, just animal spirits of mass psychology.  
The research on excess volatility on stock markets interprets the EMM applying a dividend 
discount model (DDM) to estimate the present value 𝑃𝑡
∗ of future dividends accruing to a share. Different 
forms of the EMM differ in the choice of the discount rate to compute the present value, but the general 
EMM can be written just as 
𝑃𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡𝑃𝑡
∗ ,     (2.6) 
where Et refers to the mathematical expectation conditional on public information available at time t. 
Then, it follows from the EMM that 
𝑃𝑡
∗ = 𝑃𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡  ,     (2.7) 
where εt, the forecast error, must be uncorrelated with any information available at time t and, 
consequently, also with Pt. Since the variance of two uncorrelated variables is the sum of their variances, 
and the variance of εt cannot be negative, it follows 
𝜎(𝑝) ≤ 𝜎(𝑝∗) .    (2.8) 
That is, the fundamental principle of optimal forecasting is that the forecast must be less variable 
than the variable forecasted (Shiller, 2003).43 Empirical evidence showed on the contrary that the 
volatility of the DJIA and S&P500 price series was between five times and thirteen times greater than 
the highest possible volatility it should be expected when discounting dividends. 
Two critiques of Shiller’s 1981 paper were in terms of the stationarity of prices44 and the use of 
the discount rate. In order to model the EMH, Shiller assumed the real expected rate of return on the 
                                                 
43 In Chapter 4 we provide further insight on the mathematical derivation of the variance inequalities in Shiller (1979, 1981). 
44 We focus on the discount factor critique as it deals with the topic explored here. The critique on the stationarity of prices is 
explored in Chapter 4. For now, only mention that Marsh and Merton (1986) noticed that “dividend smoothing could make stock 
prices non stationary in such a way finite sample prices appear more volatile than the present values” (Shiller 2003, p. 87). 
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stock market is constant over time (Merton, 1987a). However, the discount rate in the EMM can take 
different forms. A first alternative is to set it equal to the interest rate. However, if we introduce time-
varying interest rates in the present value formula of the EMM we find the actual price is still more 
volatile than the present value of future dividends, particularly during the last half century (Shiller, 
2003). A more refined alternative makes the discount factor equal to the intertemporal marginal rate of 
substitution for consumption Merton (1973b), Lucas (1978) and Breeden (1979) used to derive stock 
returns in their models above mentioned. Nonetheless, Grossman and Shiller (1981) provide a plot for 
that present value since 1881 to find it was only loosely related to actual stock prices, and was not 
volatile enough to justify the prices observed unless the coefficient of relative risk aversion used in the 
estimations ―they use a value of three― is pushed to ridiculously high levels (Shiller, 2003).45 
The idea that dramatic shifts in investors’ risk aversion are needed to justify seemingly erratic 
price performances was later adopted by Fama and French (1988a,b, 1989). Price volatility would be a 
consequence of changes in the equity risk premium, rather than fundamentals. However, these changes 
would be rational: risks in the economy can go up and investors’ willingness to bear risks can go down. 
We provide further insight on this interpretation in what follows. 
The rationalist interpretation of changes in the discount factor (risk premium) 
The early formulation of the EMH by Fama assumed investors expected the same returns in all periods. 
Differences in price-to-fundamental ratios across firms would explain expected changes in future firms’ 
earnings: when dividend yields ―i.e., the dividend to price ratio, d/P― are high investors perceive firms 
will not be able to pay high dividends much longer, while low yields imply investors believe dividends 
will eventually rise. Anticipated changes in fundamentals would explain why ratios are high or low. This 
way, the dividend yields of a stock would serve to forecasts long-term future changes in the company’s 
future dividends. 
However, in the late 80s there was extensive evidence that stock returns are predictable, though 
the predictable component of returns was only less than 5% of return variances. Then, Fama and French 
(1988b) show that this ability of dividend yields to forecast stock returns is much higher ―more than 
25% of variance― for longer return horizons. Behaviorists argue this predictability implies market 
inefficiency; rationalists, however, defend it is a result of rational variation in expected returns. Fama 
and French (1988b, 1989), in particular, defend that long- and short-term economic conditions produce 
a rich mix of variation in expected asset returns. 
                                                 
Campbell and Shiller (1987) then provided a test for expected volatility that modeled dividends and stock prices in a more 
general way. Other relevant works in line with Shiller’s findings are West (1988a) and Campbell (1991), while Barsky and 
DeLong (1993) show on the contrary that if dividend growth rates are unstationary, EMM looks closer to the data. 
45 Hansen and Jagannathan (1991) generalized a lower bound on the volatility of the marginal rate of substitution. The violation 
of this ‘Hansen–Jagannathan bound’ is regarded today as an important anomaly in finance (Shiller, 2003). 
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First, Fama and French (1988b) interpret that time-varying expected returns generate mean-
reverting components of prices.46 They leave the question open to whether the predictability of returns 
implied is driven by rationality (e.g., “the investment opportunities of firms and the tastes of investors for 
current versus risky future consumption”, p. 5) or by animal spirits. Then, Fama and French (1989) show 
that expected returns on stocks and bonds contain both a risk premium that is related to the business 
cycle. Dividend yields and default spreads forecast expected returns that are lower (higher) for stronger 
(weaker) economic conditions. This return predictability would have two alternative, complementary 
interpretations. On one hand, it may be that the variation in expected returns with business conditions 
is due simply to variation in the risks of bonds and stocks. On the other hand, return predictability might 
be a consequence of changes in discount factors due to anticipated changes in economic conditions.47 
Since then, rationalists accept that changes in fundamentals or interest rates are often not enough 
to explain the volatility of markets. Instead, price movements in the short term would be a consequence 
of changes in the risk premium. Ever since, the discount factor condenses two elements: the investors’ 
intertemporal marginal rate of substitution for consumption and, now also, their appetite for risk. 
Today, explaining why the risk premium for stocks varies is the main source of disagreement between 
rationalists and behaviorists: both agree P/E and d/P are good forecasters of future returns; both agree 
risk premium changes mostly in periods of economic stress; however, they diverge in the interpretation 
of whether changes in prices are rational or not.48 Thus, under a rationalist interpretation, return 
predictability would be a result of variations in the discount factor: in some market circumstances the 
marginal investor (rationally) requires a higher risk premium to compensate for risk than in others. 
Testing the volatility of the discount factor 
The Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences 2013 recognizes that Fama and Shiller (and Hansen) “laid the 
foundation for the current understanding of asset prices. It relies in part on fluctuations in risk and risk 
attitudes, and in part on behavioral biases and market frictions”.49 Thus, whether bubbles are rational or 
not is, eventually, a debate on asset-pricing models and attitudes toward risk: the EMH claims security 
prices are rational; behavioral finance claims instead that, beyond attitudes toward risk, risk premia 
                                                 
46 This happens because, on one hand, autocorrelation of expected returns makes its variance to grow faster with the return 
horizon but, on the other, this growth in variance is attenuated by a discount rate effect: shocks to expected returns are 
associated with opposite shocks to current prices. On average, the expected future price increases implied by higher expected 
returns are offset by the immediate decline in the current price. Thus, the time variation of expected returns gives rise to mean 
reversion of prices. 
47 The latter interpretation implies that when business conditions are poor, income is low and expected returns on bonds and 
stocks must be high to induce substitution from consumption to investment. Vice versa, when times are good and income is 
high markets clear at lower levels of expected returns (Fama and French, 1989). 
48 As we have seen, informational efficiency depends on three critical features: expectations, information and the discount 
factor. Shiller’s contribution on excess volatility was to show that the volatility of prices cannot be explained only on 
fundamentals (information). Consequently, it must be either the expectations or the discount factor. Behaviorists and 
rationalists diverge in their interpretation of whether changes in prices are due to rational expectations and rational changes 
in the discount factor, or not. 
49 The Prize in Economic Sciences 2013, available from http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-
sciences/laureates/2013/press.pdf 
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may be affected by psychological issues. Here, the work of the other Nobel laureate in 2013, Lars Peter 
Hansen, would come to shed some light on the issue. In particular, he developed the Generalized Method 
of Moments (GMM) that is well suited to test rational theories of asset pricing. We provide a brief 
explanation in what follows. 
The findings of excess volatility and return predictability called for a better understanding of what 
drives expected returns. The line initiated by Merton (1973b) to construct dynamic asset-pricing models 
introduces the possibility that investors’ preferences may vary over time as a result of consumption or 
wealth shocks, thus generating fluctuations in risk premia and return predictability (Nobel Prize, 2013). 
These models are known as the consumption capital asset pricing models (CCAPM). Grossman and 
Shiller (1981) were the first to evaluate them quantitatively, showing that the CCAPM implied a much 
lower level of equity returns than empirically observed ―an antecedent to Mehra and Prescott (1985) 
subsequent analysis of the equity premium puzzle. 
In short, the CCAPM states returns are predictable if investors are risk averse and are able to 
anticipate variations in consumption. However, for this theory to be testable it required to solve some 
obstacles (e.g., nonlinearity, specifying a stochastic process for consumption, etc.). Hansen and Singleton 
(1983) tried a first approach by developing a log-linear version of the CCAPM. The model was strongly 
rejected to explain returns on individual stocks and bonds. This result was against the rationalist view, 
but it was not clear whether the rejection was due to the linearization and other assumptions implied 
by the model. Then, the GMM (Hansen, 1982) provided a plausible approach for estimating nonlinear 
systems. Hansen and Singleton (1982) were the first to test CCAPM using GMM: they rejected the model 
with findings in line with the excess-volatility of Grossman and Shiller (1981). This refuted the simple 
version of CCAPM, leading to further research to propose enhanced versions of it. 
One aspect that would help to develop an enhanced CCAPM was to define the properties that the 
stochastic discount factor should feature. Hansen and Jagannathan (1991) show that the Sharpe ratio 
―the ratio of the asset expected excess return over the risk-free rate to the standard deviation of the 
excess return― gives a lower bound to the volatility of the discount factor. Specifically, 
𝜎(𝑑𝑡+1)
𝐸(𝑑𝑡+1)
≥
𝐸(𝐸𝑅𝑡+1)
𝜎(𝐸𝑅𝑡+1)
     (2.9) 
where the left-hand side is the ratio of the standard deviation of the discount factor to its expected value 
and the right-hand side is the Sharpe ratio. The Hansen–Jagannathan bound gives us a clue of why 
consumption-based models such as the CCAPM are not able to explain the excess volatility of markets: 
the observed Sharpe ratios imply that the volatility of the discount factor has to be very high,50 but a low 
                                                 
50 For the postwar U.S. stock market, The Sharpe ratio for the U.S. stock market is about 0.50. This implies the annualized 
standard deviation of the discount factor has to be at least 50%, which is really high given that the mean of the discount factor 
should be close to one (Nobel Prize, 2013). 
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volatility of consumption and a realistic level of risk aversion imply a much lower volatility of the 
stochastic discount factor according to CCAPM. 
Hansen’s method has been useful, nonetheless, to show investors' appetite for risk and their 
expectations for future returns may vary over time. Since then, some enhanced versions of the CCAPM 
have had some success in explaining equity premia, volatility and return predictability, although today 
we cannot find a widely accepted “consensus model” (Nobel Prize, 2013). The behavioral literature, 
meanwhile, has tried to provide evidence that variations in the discount factor are often not rational. 
Shefrin (1999), for instance, shows theoretically and empirically that both fundamentals and sentiment 
affect the risk premium.  
 
2.3. THE TESTABILITY OF THE EMH. CRITIQUES FROM BEHAVIORAL FINANCE 
 
The EMH has been tested, re-formulated and re-tested a myriad of times by an endless number of 
researchers. However, there is still no consensus among academics about whether financial markets are 
efficient or not. Moreover, despite the many advances in statistics, databases and theoretical models, it 
seems that the main outcome has been a clash between the proponents on each side (Lo and MacKinlay, 
2001). Much of this disagreement comes from three sources. First, the two alternative definitions of the 
EMH were used with the rationalist interpretation that they were equivalent, when they were not. 
Indeed, the confusion of both definitions and the misinterpretation of the behaviorist view on this 
regard has only added more noise to the debate.  
Second, as rationalists have eventually subscribed to the view that former anomalies like return 
predictability and excess volatility may be explained under a rational approach, the differences between 
rationalists and behaviorists have eventually become a debate on topics for which either there is mixed 
evidence or are hard to test in a complex environment such as financial markets. These include whether 
investors are boundedly rational or not, whether biases are the exception or the rule, whether these 
biases propagate among investors, whether they have consequences on prices, etc. Finally, a third 
source of a lack of consensus is the fact that, eventually, the EMH is not a well-defined and empirically 
refutable hypothesis by itself. The joint hypothesis problem was already highlighted by Fama in his 
original formulation of EMH (Fama, 1970): the theory is only testable by posing additional assumptions 
on how asset prices are formed. Then, there is no way to disentangle whether a particular test is 
rejecting the efficient market hypothesis or any of the additional assumptions. 
This section is devoted to provide deeper insight on these and other critiques that have been 
exposed, mostly by behaviorist researchers, in regard of the testability of the EMH. These include the 
confusion of the two alternative definitions of the EMH, the joint hypothesis problem, some theoretical 
62 
 
and empirical approaches behavioral finance has provided to defy the efficient markets hypothesis, and 
the alternative interpretation of how markets operate according to behaviorists. They are analyzed next. 
2.3.1. Two alternative definitions of EMH 
As we saw in Section 2.2, there are two alternative definitions of EMH. The original interpretation 
defines efficient markets as those where prices fully reflect available information. This responds to the 
primary reason why we need markets to be efficient: financial markets allocate the economy’s capital 
stock, and for such purpose we require a pricing mechanism that provides firms and investors with 
unbiased estimations of the fundamental value of such capital stock. A second definition of EMH came 
in consequence: a market is efficient if it is impossible to make economic profits, in the sense of risk-
adjusted returns net of all costs, by trading on the basis of information available. The former definition 
says security prices are rational, in the sense that they reflect only fundamental characteristics such as 
risk, but not psychological ―such as sentiment (Statman, 1999). The latter says ‘there is no free lunch’: 
investors cannot systematically beat the market. The rational-prices interpretation provides support to 
the economic role of financial markets; the unpredictability-of-markets interpretation provides a 
testable means to accept or reject the efficiency hypothesis. 
However, the original and alternative definitions of market efficiency are not equivalent. This 
critique could be traced back to Shiller (1984), when he says “one form of argument (regarding market 
efficiency) claims that because real returns are nearly unforecastable, the real price of stocks is close to the 
intrinsic value, that is, the present value with constant discount rate of optimally forecasted future real 
dividends. This argument for the efficient market hypothesis represents one of the most remarkable errors 
in the history of economic thought” (p. 459). Saying ‘it is sunny in Australia’ does not imply that the logic 
‘it is sunny, hence we are in Australia’ holds. Unpredictability would not be a sufficient condition for 
market prices to be rational (Soufian, Forbes and Hudson, 2012). 
Moreover, trading by irrational investors should make prices excessively volatile too, making 
price patterns to resemble a random walk in the short term (Shiller, 1984). Shiller and Perron (1985) 
and Summers (1986) would later formally develop the argument that the power of short-run 
predictability tests is likely to be very low. In particular, Summers (1986) examines the power of 
statistical tests used to evaluate the efficiency of speculative markets, and demonstrates they are unable 
to reject the hypothesis tested, which makes them not useful to claim evidence in favor of market 
efficiency. To illustrate, in order to have a 50% chance of rejecting the null hypothesis, it would be 
necessary to have data for over 5.000 years. Poterba and Summers (1988) find similar results. 
In addition, the implicit link between the EMH and the random walk hypothesis is incorrect (Lo 
and MacKinlay, 2001). The reason is the required trade-off between risk and expected return. A positive 
change in the expected price of an asset may only be the premium required to persuade risk-averse 
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investors to buy the asset and bear the risks. Thus, unpredictability is neither a necessary nor a sufficient 
condition for rationally determined prices: unpredictable prices do not imply markets are efficient, and 
the evidence of price predictability does not imply inefficiency. Only under specific assumptions such as 
risk neutrality they are equivalent. LeRoy (1973) and Lucas (1978) construct explicit examples of well-
functioning markets in which the EMH holds but returns are not completely random. LeRoy (1973) 
shows that, if an investor is sufficiently risk averse as to be willing to avoid holding a security which has 
unforecastable returns, the random walk hypothesis and the martingale model need not to be satisfied 
even if markets are informationally efficient. To show it, LeRoy develops a multiperiod capital market 
model whose main result is that successive rates of return might be positively or negatively correlated 
depending on how expectations and the variance of the next-period return depend on past earnings. 
Meanwhile, Lucas (1978) shows rational asset prices may have a forecastable element that is 
related to the forecastability of consumption. He develops a model to examine the conditions under 
which a price series that does not possess the Martingale property would be an evidence of irrational 
behavior. He suggests that rational expectations as in Muth (1961) is not a description of how agents in 
the economy behave, but a property likely to be possessed by the outcome of the agents’ (unspecified) 
process of learning and adapting. Hence, a good complement to the rational expectations hypothesis 
would be some form of stability theory that explains which forces move an economy toward equilibrium. 
These ideas were the basis of the eventual adoption of the price forecastability evidence by the 
rationalist school of thought. 
In face of this evidence, behaviorists like Statman (1999) plead for an engagement of rational and 
behavioral researchers: “finance scholars and professionals would do well to accept market efficiency in 
the beat-the-market sense but reject in the rational-prices sense” (p. 18). This would allow finance 
researchers to stop fighting the market efficiency battle, and start exploring asset-pricing models that 
reflect both psychological and fundamental characteristics. The behavioral finance asserts that some 
free lunch may appear randomly: occasional excess profit opportunities are required for efficiency to be 
satisfied (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980). However, these profits would depend on the ability to obtain 
some competitive advantage that need not to be regarded as a market inefficiency, but as a fair reward 
to breakthroughs in financial technology.51   
Thus, just like in the efficient markets interpretation, most behaviorist researchers accept that no 
investors will be able to earn excess profits systematically. First, in financial markets barriers to entry 
are lower and the degree of competition much higher, which makes the average life of excess 
profitability of financial innovation much smaller (Lo and MacKinlay, 2001). But, moreover, there is no 
free lunch ―particularly in a behaviorist world― because an investor trying to beat the market should 
                                                 
51 Lo and MacKinlay (2001) provide an interesting metaphor: If the market for biotechnology would be required to be efficient 
in the EMH sense, a vaccine for the AIDS virus can never be developed ―if it could, someone would have already done it! 
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be able to identify at any given point in time (i) whether stock prices represent fundamental values and, 
if they do not, (ii) whether irrationality will continue or revert. Markets can remain irrational a lot longer 
than you and I can remain solvent ―once said John M. Keynes. 
In their battle against the standard finance interpretation that markets are unbeatable, many 
investment professionals have embraced behavioral finance as an ally (Statman, 1999). However, that 
is not what behaviorists suggest. In the new paradigm behavioral finance is suggesting, investment 
professionals will concentrate on investment counseling (Ellis, 1998) rather than market beating. For 
such purpose, investment professionals should overcome their reluctance to mix the utilitarian features 
of investments, such as risk, with value-expressive characteristics. The behavioral asset pricing model, 
BAPM (Shefrin and Statman, 1994), and the behavioral portfolio theory, BPT (Shefrin and Statman, 
2000) would be the first efforts in a series of models in such direction. 
2.3.2. The joint hypothesis problem 
One of the reasons why rationalists and behaviorists seem to have reached a dead end street is the fact 
that the EMH, by itself, is not a well-defined and empirically refutable hypothesis. Fama himself noticed 
the joint hypothesis problem: the theory of efficient markets is concerned with whether prices fully 
reflect available information, but the theory only has empirical content within the context of a more 
specified model of market equilibrium (Fama, 1970). We need an asset pricing model that guarantees 
prices reflect all information available, but that, in turn, would impose market efficiency as a sine qua 
non condition. 
 “This is the price we have to pay to give the theory of efficient markets empirical content” (p. 384): 
we must specify some auxiliary hypotheses, but then a test of the EMH becomes a test of the auxiliary 
hypotheses as well. This fact restricts any empirical tests of market efficiency: if it is accepted, it 
validates both the hypotheses of the model as well as the market efficiency; however, if it is rejected, 
does it mean markets are inefficient, the asset pricing model is incorrect, or some assumptions (risk 
aversion, the stochastic process of consumption, dividend smoothing…) are wrong? Moreover, any new 
statistical tests designed to provide additional insight will require further auxiliary hypotheses which, 
in turn, may be questioned (Lo and MacKinlay, 2001). 
Shleifer (2000) acknowledges that this “dependence of most tests of market efficiency on a model 
of risk and expected return is Fama’s (1970) deepest insight” (p. 6). However, the problem of joint testing 
also makes the market efficiency battle futile (Statman, 1999). No matter how many anomalies are found 
against the EMH, rationalists may always regard market efficiency as a fact, and move a step forward to 
modify the last version of the asset pricing models or to suggest a rational interpretation for any new 
anomaly identified. Furthermore, since the joint hypotheses problem seems to have no solution ahead, 
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the possibility that rationalists and behaviorists ever come to an agreement seems hopeless. Thus, the 
behavioral finance has had to look for alternative approaches to test the EMH. We analyze them next. 
2.3.3. Alternative approaches to question the EMH 
In this subsection we introduce several approaches that were suggested to dispute the validity of the 
EMH. Some of them are theoretical arguments, some are empirically testable approaches. Some were 
previously mentioned or described along this thesis (e.g., the excess volatility puzzle) while others are 
first mentioned now, but this is a good opportunity to feature them all together. We have assembled 
them in three categories: tests for relative efficiency, a stepwise approach, and experimental research. 
They follow in order. 
Tests for relative efficiency 
In his address for more cooperation between the fields of economics and finance, Summers (1985) made 
a fierce critique of the recent developments in the discipline of finance. Many results in finance are based 
on the pillars of market efficiency (Fama, 1970) and arbitrage principles (Modigliani and Miller, 1958), 
including the option pricing theory (Black and Scholes, 1973; Merton, 1973a) and the arbitrage pricing 
theory, APT (Ross, 1976) among others. However, Summers (1985) claims these results only make 
financial economists comparable with researchers on ketchup economics: “they have shown that two 
quart bottles of ketchup invariably sells for twice as much as one quart bottles of ketchup, except for 
deviations traceable to transaction costs” (p. 634). They reject any analysis based on accounting 
information, costs of production, wages, consumer incomes and any other factor that might determine 
the fundamental determinants of prices and, instead, consider prices as the only data worth studying. 
The evidence that one cannot get a bargain on ketchup makes them claim the efficiency of the ketchup 
market is the best established fact in empirical economics. 
Ketchup economics would show financial economists are only concerned with the inter-
relationships among the prices of different financial assets, but they ignore the more important question 
of what determines the overall level of asset prices. The ‘law of one price’, that is, the rule that identical 
goods must have identical prices in different markets (Lamont and Thaler, 2003), ensures relative 
efficiency, not absolute. The fact that two quart bottles of ketchup sell for twice as much as one quart 
does not say anything about whether the price of a bottle of ketchup is an efficient estimation of its true 
value. This way, Summers’ interpretation provides behaviorists with a theoretical device symmetrical 
to that of the joint hypothesis for rationalists. On one hand, the metaphor by Summers (1985) evidences 
that the law of one price does not imply markets are efficient in absolute terms. On the other, testing the 
law of one price and rejecting it implies an irrefutable evidence that the price is biased in at least one of 
the markets and, in consequence, markets are inefficient. Indeed, economic theory requires the law 
should hold in competitive markets with negligible transaction costs and no barriers to trade. 
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The good point about relative efficiency is that it can be measured: the average discounts of two 
different prices for a similar asset can be used for such purpose. This way, several anomalies of the EMH 
in relative terms have been identified. These include the closed-end fund puzzle, twin stocks, corporate 
spin-offs, and the forward premium puzzle, among others. Closed-end equity funds are similar to mutual 
funds, but they are traded in markets: investors cannot redeem their fund shares for cash but they have 
to sell their shares in the market instead (Lee, Shleifer and Thaler, 1991). The so-called closed-end fund 
puzzle, originally discovered by Zweig (1973), is the empirical evidence that these funds often trade at 
prices not equal to the per share market value of their underlying stock portfolio. Both discounts and 
premia of greater than 30 percent are commonly observed (Lamont and Thaler, 2003). Lee et al. (1991) 
argue that fluctuations in discounts of closed-end funds are driven by irrational investor sentiment and 
correlated with returns on small stocks. Baker and Wurgler (2007) show that a sentiment index, which 
includes closed-end fund discounts, is highly correlated with aggregate stock returns. 
Twin stocks or Siamese Twins are stocks traded in more than one location. A classic example is 
Royal Dutch/Shell, which has Royal Dutch shares traded in Amsterdam and Shell shares traded in 
London. The merger agreement of 1907 states that all cash flows are split 60% for Royal Dutch shares 
and 40% Shell shares, hence the ratio of their market values should be 1.5. However, this ratio has varied 
from discounts of 30% in 1981 (Rosenthal and Young, 1990) to premia over 15% in 1996 (Lamont and 
Thaler, 2003). Froot and Dabora (1999)  and Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002) show that the relative 
price of twin stocks is highly correlated with the indexes of the countries where the stocks are traded 
most actively, suggesting prices are driven by local investor sentiment. A similar situation where the 
price of two stocks is bounded by a common ratio are in corporate spin-offs. Mitchell, Pulvino and 
Stafford (2002) and Lamont and Thaler (2003) report examples of how the irrationally high valuation 
of the spun-off company imply that the parent’s stub value, i.e., the value of the parent’s remaining assets, 
was negative. A possible explanation is that short-sale constraints and the fact that mispricing often 
deepens in the short run before it disappears imply limits of arbitrage for risk averse arbitrageurs 
(DeLong et al., 1990a). Finally, the forward premium is defined as the difference between the forward 
and spot exchange rates in forex markets. The forward premium puzzle is the empirical evidence that 
the forward premium forecasts subsequent exchange rate changes (Froot and Thaler, 1990; Burnside et 
al., 2011), in contradiction with rational expectations models. Froot and Thaler (1990) suggest the bias 
is due to expectation errors, not to time-varying rational premia for systematic risk, as Fama (1984) 
suggests. Burnside et al. (2011) offer an alternative explanation based on investors’ overconfidence.52 
                                                 
52 Other examples of empirical refutation of the law of one price are in order. First, the index inclusion effect (Shleifer, 1986): 
the price of a stock tends to increase following the listing announcement. Second, the pricing of American Depositary Receipts 
(shares of foreign securities traded in U.S. markets): like closed-end funds, ADRs may have prices different from the value of 
the underlying portfolio (Lamont and Thaler, 2003). Third, short-sale constraints are possible explanations to the evidence 
that hedge funds preferred to buy tech stocks and ride the dot-com bubble rather than shorting them (Brunnermeier and Nagel, 
2004) or that the pricing of Chinese warrants in the late 2000s traded far above their fundamental value (Xiong and Yu, 2011). 
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 In most cases, short sale constraints and other limits to the forces of arbitrage are the alleged 
causes of these anomalies of the law of one price. Defining arbitrage as the simultaneous buying and 
selling of the same security for different prices, the absence of arbitrage opportunities is a pillar in 
modern finance, and should ensure relative efficiency is satisfied. In consequence, when violations of 
the law of one price are observed, this must be ascribed to two factors (Lamont and Thaler, 2003). First, 
bounded rationality by some investors make them interpret there are real differences between the two 
identical assets. Second, some limits to arbitrage must exist for rational arbitrageurs not restoring the 
equilibrium of prices between both markets. This explanation would lead Shleifer (2000) to summarize 
the way behavioral finance challenges EMH through the 3-step process that is described below. 
A stepwise approach 
Shleifer (2000) identifies that the EMH rests on three arguments that rely on progressively weaker 
assumptions: first, investors are rational, so they value securities rationally; second, to the extent that 
some investors are not rational, their trades are random, cancelling each other out without affecting 
prices; and third, to the extent that noise traders are irrational in similar ways, they are met at the 
market by rational arbitrageurs who eliminate their influence on prices. This interpretation leads 
Shleifer (2000) to summarize a 3-step process to determine whether efficiency holds in a market or not. 
Firstly, we determine whether market participants are fully rational. All the beliefs that, based on 
heuristics rather than rationality, could influence people’s behavior are known as investor sentiment. 
Secondly, we analyze whether this sentiment may exhibit trends, rather than generating random trades 
that cancel each other out. Thirdly, if investors’ trades are correlated, how does these inefficiencies 
survive to price corrections by rational arbitrageurs? That is, could we identify the limits of arbitrage? 
This stepwise procedure provides a framework to test informational efficiency in financial 
markets, considering the elements that might challenge it: market sentiment (behavioral biases leading 
to market anomalies) and limited arbitrage. The behavioral finance has shown the pervasiveness of 
these elements in financial markets. First, biases in decision making identified include, among many 
others, heuristics such as representativeness (Kahneman and Tversky, 1972), judgmental biases such 
as overconfidence (Oskamp, 1965; Moore and Healy, 2008), theories of choice alternative to expected 
utility theory such as prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) 
and the effects of framing (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981), and social factors such as social contagion 
(Asch, 1952; Shiller, 1984). Second, among the reasons suggested to explain a correlated behavior we 
may include a social behavior by amateur investors (Shiller, 1984) and professional managers 
(Lakonishok et al., 1992), inducing a market sentiment that contradicts the EMH in instances such as the 
excess volatility (Shiller, 1981), return predictability (Keim and Stambaugh, 1986; Banz, 1981), herding 
(Scharfstein and Stein, 1990), overreaction (De Bondt and Thaler, 1985), momentum (Jegadeesh and 
Titman, 1993), and the equity premium puzzle (Mehra and Prescott, 1985). Finally, some limits of 
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arbitrage in financial markets were identified. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) provide the most extensive 
analysis. According to them, arbitrage would be risky and limited for several reasons: close substitutes 
are often not available; fundamental risk is large because mispricing can go worse before it disappears; 
risk-averse arbitrageurs would have limited interest in risk arbitrage; and agency problems that arise 
when arbitrageurs manage capital of outside investors.  
The limits of arbitrage have been determinant for behavioral finance to contradict the postulates 
of market efficiency. In short, the EMH as it is interpreted today struggles between two choices: refuting 
excess volatility (Shiller, 1981) and refuting limits to arbitrage (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Refuting 
both, simultaneously, seems not to be possible. To refute excess volatility, the EMH needs that changes 
in prices are justified by changes in investors' risk appetite, but this is the same as accepting arbitrage 
is risky. The original interpretation of a rational arbitrageur now does not make sense: arbitrageurs 
should be able to (i) correctly interpret fundamentals and (ii) correctly anticipate investors’ changes in 
risk appetite ―otherwise their efforts to correct mispricing might be offset by changes in risk appetite 
in the contrary direction. The analysis of behavioral biases, market anomalies and limits of arbitrage 
represents the bulk of the behavioral literature. Moreover, this stepwise procedure summarized by 
Shleifer (2000) is perhaps the best tool behaviorists have to test the validity of the efficient market 
hypothesis in absolute terms ―although their conclusions will always be limited by the joint hypothesis 
problem. The study of the different behavioral biases and market anomalies identified in the literature, 
as well as a closer insight on the limits of arbitrage, will be provided in Chapter 4. 
Experimental research 
A third approach to test the EMH is the use of experimental research. Controlled experiments may be of 
two types, laboratory and field experiments. Three elements any of them must incorporate are an 
environment defining the payoffs, an institution defining language and rules, and the participants’ 
behavior (Smith, 2001). Laboratory experiments are randomized experiments that employ a standard 
subject pool of students, an abstract framing, and an imposed set of rules (Harrison and List, 2004), and 
which consist of three main factors; experimental manipulation, standardization and random allocation 
of the sample (Howitt and Cramer, 2008). Field experiments are divided into three categories (Harrison 
and List, 2004): artefactual, framed and natural. Natural field experiments take place in the participant’s 
natural environment, while artefactual and framed field both mimic a lab experiment and use non-
standard subjects. Framed field experiments, in addition, incorporate important elements of the 
naturally occurring environment (Harrison and List, 2004; Levitt and List, 2009).  
Natural field experiments, as they take place in the natural environment, are easier to generalize, 
but have a problem in regards to their internal validity: researchers have less control over the variables 
in the experiment. The problem for laboratory and framed field experiments, instead, is in regards of 
their external validity: the fact that individuals are in an environment where they are aware that their 
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behavior is being monitored, recorded, and subsequently scrutinized, might cause generalizability to be 
compromised (Levitt and List, 2007). Framed field experiments have the advantage of avoiding some 
shortcomings of social experiments such as randomization bias, attrition bias and substitution bias 
(Levitt and List, 2009). The incorporation of markets, repetition and monetary incentives improve their 
validity, but perhaps not completely solve the problem (Loewenstein, 1999). 
The experimental research has revealed helpful to behaviorists because controlled laboratory 
experimentation helps to go beyond correlational analysis to provide insights on causation (List, 2009), 
and it revealed a good method to understand human behavior (Levitt and List, 2009). In consequence, 
the success of experimental economics is particularly relevant in behavioral economics and finance. 
Only for illustrative purposes, some relevant examples follow: Asch (1952) on social contagion; 
Milgram’s experiments on obedience to authority (Milgram, 1963, 1974); Tversky and Kahneman 
(1973, 1982a) on representativeness; Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Tversky and Kahneman 
(1992) on prospect theory; Knetsch and Sinden (1984) and Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) on the 
status quo bias; Novemsky and Kahneman (2005) on loss aversion; Fischhoff, Slovic and Lichtenstein 
(1977), Camerer and Lovallo (2004) and Biais et al. (2005) on overconfidence; Lo, Repin and 
Steenbarger (2005) on emotional responses to trading, etc. 
Finally, a relevant area in experimental research to test the EMH is the replication of bubbles. The 
classic article is Smith, Suchanek and Williams (1988), whose methodology was groundbreaking in the 
sense that it solved the main drawback of empirical studies that tested the EMH: the fundamentals are 
unobservable in empirical studies, while they become perfectly observable in laboratory asset markets. 
Additional experimental research on asset bubbles include Porter and Smith (1995), Dufwenberg, 
Lindqvist and Moore (2005) and Lei and Vesely (2009), among many others. Further description of asset 
bubbles was provided in Chapter 1, while for further review on experimental markets we recommend 
Cason and Noussair (2001) and Plott and Smith (2008). 
2.3.4. Adaptive market hypothesis: An alternative theory to EMH 
This fourth subsection, rather than a critique to the testability of the EMH, provides an alternative 
interpretation to how markets work: the Adaptive Market Hypothesis, AMH (Lo, 2004). The AMH seeks 
to reconcile the EMH and its critics through an evolutionary approach to economic interactions. The key 
point is what Andrew Lo names the sociology of market efficiency: economic systems involve human 
interactions, much complex than the interactions in physical sciences; in consequence, a purely 
deductive approach as in modern physics may not always be appropriate for economic analysis. Instead, 
the AMH can be viewed as a new version of the EMH, derived from evolutionary principles: financial 
markets would be ecological systems in which different species (different groups of market participants) 
compete for scarce resources. Financial markets would be neither efficient nor irrational, but some 
combination of both: “prices reflect as much information as dictated by the combination of environmental 
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conditions and the number and nature of "species" in the economy or, to use a more appropriate biological 
term, the ecology” (p. 23). The dynamics of evolution (i.e., competition, mutation, reproduction, and 
natural selection) determine market efficiency and the profitability of the investment strategies. 
The evolutionary framework in AMH helps to reconcile the contradictions between EMH and the 
behavioral literature at least in two instances. First, Simon’s (1955, 1959) notions of bounded rationality 
and satisficing ―as an alternative to optimization― were dismissed by rationalists because of one 
specific criticism: what determines the point at which an individual stops optimizing and reaches a 
satisfactory solution? The evolutionary perspective in AMH provides the answer: it is determined not 
analytically, but through trial and error and natural selection. The heuristics investors use may work in 
a specific environment, but if it changes, they will fail. In such cases, we observe behavioral biases, but 
rather than being an irrational behavior, it would be evidence of a ‘maladaptive’ behavior. Second, 
Grossman and Stiglitz’s impossibility of informationally efficient markets (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980) 
highlighted the paradox of efficient markets: if all investors believe markets are efficient, markets will 
be inefficient because there would be no investors willing to spend resources on fundamental analysis. 
The AMH, instead, considers profit opportunities do exist in financial markets. However, they disappear 
as they are exploited, while new opportunities are also constantly being created.53 
Finally, the AMH better responds to some critiques that were posed to EMH. A first example is that 
the EMH postulates markets are always efficient while behaviorists, on the contrary, do not say markets 
are always irrational: they simply may go irrational sometimes. However, rationalists may argue as well 
this may be interpreted as the EMH being the paradigm by default, and behavioral biases the exception. 
The AMH, with its suggestion that markets are neither efficient nor irrational, but some combination of 
both, meets the best of both views. The second example is a classic one. The EMH implies that active 
portfolio management is useless. Hence, the popularity of active management among investors would 
imply a market failure: informational efficiency leads to economic inefficiency in the financial industry. 
Fama himself declares to find it completely puzzling why investors still entrust around 80% of the 
money in mutual funds to active managers.54 The AMH, instead, considers that profit opportunities do 
exist, investors compete to exploit them, and the best way to approach markets is to adapt to changing 
market conditions. 
                                                 
53 Lo (2004) sets several implications. First, the risk-return tradeoff is unlikely to be stable over time. Instead, market ecology 
and changes in institutional aspects such as the regulatory environment and tax laws would determine how it evolves. Second, 
arbitrage opportunities do arise from time to time ―otherwise there would be no incentive to gather information, and the price 
discovery aspect of financial markets would collapse. Third, the profitability of investment and trading strategies will also wax 
and wane. Fourth, while profit and utility maximization are relevant aspects of market ecology, what determines the evolution 
of markets ―and, in consequence, is the only objective that matters― is survival. Fifth, innovation is the key to survival: “The 
classic EMH suggests that certain levels of expected returns can be achieved simply by bearing a sufficient degree of risk. The AMH 
implies that because the risk/reward relation varies through time, a better way to achieve a consistent level of expected returns is 
to adapt to changing market conditions” (p. 25). 
54 Here we quote an interview at CNN Money, available from http://money.cnn.com/2013/12/06/investing/eugene-fama-
markets.pr.fortune/ 
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2.4. EMPIRICAL TESTS OF THE EMH. A SHORT REVIEW 
 
Although the testability of the EMH has been put under question, as we summarized in Section 2.3, a 
myriad of empirical tests of the weak, semi-strong and strong form of the EMH that have been 
performed. In this section we make a brief review which, nonetheless, is not intended to be exhaustive. 
On one hand, the number of articles published in the last fifty years is immeasurable. On the other, a 
detailed analysis of all the approaches available to test the different degrees of market efficiency is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. For a deeper insight on the tests and a more extensive list of research 
articles, we recommend some of the authors we have followed to compose this taxonomy. These include 
Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1996), Fama (1970, 1991), Lo (1997), Nobel Prize (2013) and Ruiz (2005).  
The taxonomy basically follows Fama (1970), but with some amendments. In his first suggestion, 
weak form tests were concerned with the forecast power of past returns (‘how well do past returns 
predict future returns’), semi-strong tests with how quickly security prices adjust to public information 
announcements (denoted event studies in Fama 1991) and strong form tests with private information 
that is not fully reflected in market prices (‘tests for private information’ in Fama 1991). The main 
change is the category we include the literature on tests of return predictability ―both time series and 
cross section. Fama (1991), for instance, changes the categories in Fama (1970) to make the first one 
cover the broader topic of tests for return predictability rather than only tests for the forecast power of 
past returns. However, two criticisms can be made to this interpretation. First, some of these tests may 
be regarded as either test of the weak form or the semi-strong form. Take for instance the tests for 
overreaction and the contrary investing strategy versus underreaction and the momentum strategy. We 
may interpret them as tracing whether past performance helps to predict future price movements, but 
we may also interpret them as an evidence of markets not properly adjusting information into prices, 
either going too far (overreaction) or being too slow to reflect fundamentals (underreaction). Second, 
some other tests simply fit better in the second category. For instance, volatility tests analyze the excess 
volatility of prices to reflect the fundamentals, while tests of herd behavior seek to trace evidence of 
whether investors follow other investors’ decisions rather than fundamentals. 
In consequence, the taxonomy that follows below considers the following distribution. Tests of 
the weak form EMH are concerned with the forecast power of past returns. These include tests of the 
random walk hypothesis that may take the form of tests for serial correlation, runs tests, and filter tests. 
Besides, the classic tests for calendar effects are also included: they are used to determine whether non 
informative data (like the month or the day of the week) is helpful to predict future price performance. 
Tests of the semi-strong form EMH are concerned with the estimation of abnormal returns. These 
include time series analyses of public information, cross section analyses of public information, and 
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event studies. Finally, tests of the strong form EMH analyze the ability that corporate insiders and other 
groups of professional investors may have to obtain excess profits, which would evidence they are 
making use of private information that is not fully reflected in prices. 
2.4.1. Weak form EMH tests 
Tests of the weak form EMH are concerned with the forecast power of past returns. Following Fama 
(1965b), tests of the random walk hypothesis may take the form of tests for serial correlation, runs tests, 
and filter tests.  Besides, following Fama (1991), tests of the weak-form EMH would also include 
calendar effects. The taxonomy is summarized in Table 2.1. 
TABLE 2.1 – Tests of the weak form EMH 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
Tests of statistical independence of prices or returns trace evidence of short term predictability 
(within days or weeks) due to statistical correlation between consecutive prices or returns. This type of 
tests are divided in two categories: serial correlation and runs tests. Early serial correlation tests that 
support the independence assumption include Kendall (1953), Osborne (1959), Cootner (1962), Fama 
(1965b), Samuelson (1965), Fama and Blume (1966) and Mandelbrot (1966). Methods of spectral 
analysis such as Granger and Morgenstern (1963) and Godfrey, Granger and Morgenstern (1964) yield 
similar results. Literature in the 70s and 80s finds a serial correlation of short-term returns, but agreeing 
that predictability would be small in magnitude. These include Keim (1986), French and Roll (1986), Lo 
Tests of weak form EMH
Evidence in favour EMH Evidence against EMH
I.- Tests of statistical independence of prices / returns
a) Serial correlation
∎ Autocorrelation
Kadel (1953), Fama (1965b) Poterba and Summers (1988)
∎ Non-linear stochastic processes
Taylor (1982)
b) Runs tests
Fama (1965)
II.- Tests of trading rules
c) Filter rules
Alexander (1961), Fama (1965b),
Curcio et al. (1997) Conrad and Kaul (1998)
III.- Tests for seasonality of returns
d) Calendar effects
January effect
Gaunt et al. (2000), Gu (2003) Officer (1975), Keim (1983),
Grinblatt and Keloharju (2004)
Monday effect
Jaffe and Westerfield (1985), 
Berument and Kiymaz (2001)
Type of Test
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and MacKinlay (1988), Poterba and Summers (1988) and Fama and French (1988b). However, all these 
autocorrelation and spectral tests assume returns are generated by a linear stochastic process, an 
assumption Taylor (1982a) shows to be assumption. Hence, several authors have modeled non-linear 
stochastic process using models of conditional variance such as ARCH (Engle, 1982) and GARCH 
(Bollerslev, 1986) ―recent articles are Bekaert and Harvey (1997) and Andersen et al. (2003). Others 
have followed chaos theory (Eckmann and Ruelle, 1985), including Hinich and Patterson (1985, 1989) 
and Brock and Hommes (1998). Recent papers for this line of research on nonlinearity and 
autoregressive models include Shively (2003) and Narayan (2006), among others. Finally, runs tests are 
another means to test the statistical independence of prices. Introduced by Fama (1965b), the approach 
determines the randomness of a price series by analyzing whether a run of successive price changes of 
the same sign happen more frequently than could be as a result of chance. Recent examples are El-Erian 
and Kumar (1995), Hassan, Haque and Lawrence (2006) and Worthington and Higgs (2009). 
A second type of tests of the weak form EMH are trading tests or tests of trading rules. The early 
approach was again settled by Fama (1965b), who notices that if the random walk hypothesis holds, no 
trading rules should give excess profits above a buy-and-hold strategy. Thus, we may test the actual 
profitability of any given trading rule. Since Fama (1965b) tested Alexander’s filter rule in particular 
(Alexander, 1961), this type of tests are often named filter rule tests. Fama and Blume (1966) show that 
any potential profits of these filter rules were exceeded by trading costs. Later research traced some 
profitability, such as Conrad and Kaul (1998) and Neely and Weller (1999). Results are mixed, however, 
when it comes to compare potential profits and transaction costs: some suggest they are not profitable 
(e.g., Curcio et al., 1997), others suggest they are so (e.g., Cooper, 1999). 
Finally, a third type are the tests for calendar effects or seasonality of returns, which pioneered 
the research on market efficiency, as early works go back to Wachtel (1942) and Osborne (1962), while 
the January effect (Wachtel, 1942; Officer, 1975) was already a classic when Shiller uncovered the excess 
volatility. These tests search for whatever patterns of seasonality in prices or returns, but two classics 
are the day-of-the-week effect and the January effect. The latter was described as the most mystifying 
seasonal (Fama, 1991). Officer (1975) detected that Australian stock returns, particularly on small cap 
stocks, were on average higher in January than in any other month. Rozeff and Kinney (1976) traced the 
same evidence on the NYSE, and similar results were replicated in different markets and periods since 
then. Keim (1983), in particular, shows the January effect is basically a size effect as in Banz (1981). The 
day-of-the-week effect, instead, seeks for return patterns for different days of the week. A classic result 
is the Monday effect: several authors (e.g., Cross, 1973; French, 1980; Jaffe and Westerfield, 1985) noted 
that Monday returns are on average lower than on other days. Other traced regularities are the weekend 
effect, holiday effect, end-of-month, turn-of-the-year and Tuesday effect ―perhaps a delayed Monday 
effect caused by the different trading hours worldwide (Keim, 1983; Martikainen and Puttonen, 1996). 
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Some rational interpretations have been suggested for these seasonal effects. Thus, the January 
effect has been attributed to tax effects since Watchel (1942) ―investors sell losers in December to avoid 
paying higher taxes― while the Monday effect is explained in terms of market microstructure ―returns 
deviate from average daily returns by less than the bid-ask spread (Lakonishok and Smidt, 1988). 
However, many authors suggest these effects would be only spurious and tend to disappear once they 
are identified (e.g., Gu, 2003). The debate continues today: Chen and Singal (2004), Grinblatt and 
Keloharju (2004) and Starks, Yong and Zheng (2006) support the tax-loss selling explanation of the 
January effect, Gaunt, Gray and Mclvor (2000) reject the January effect, Berument and Kiymaz (2001) 
verify a Monday effect, and Yuan, Zheng and Zhu (2006) identify a correlation between lunar phases and 
stock market returns. 
To sum up, the prevailing opinion today regarding the weak form EMH is that stock returns are 
somewhat predictable in the short term, but this forecast power is hardly profitable if transaction costs 
are considered. Stock markets seem to satisfy the no-arbitrage model with unpredictable forecasting 
errors in the short term, but this does not impede that long term returns may exhibit considerable 
predictability (Nobel Prize, 2013). 
2.4.2. Semi-strong form EMH tests 
Tests of the semi-strong form EMH are concerned with the estimation of abnormal returns. Following 
the discussion above, we included time series and cross section analysis of public information, as well 
as the classic event studies considered by Fama (1991). The list is summarized in Table 2.2. 
Time series analysis 
A relevant field in the literature of market efficiency are the tests for long-term predictability of stock 
returns. Long-term predictability contradicts the EMH as it suggests markets are not properly 
incorporating information into prices, but some rational interpretations for these apparent anomalies 
have also been provided. Indeed, the fact that the joint hypothesis problem is particularly relevant in 
these type of tests only makes it harder to reach a consensus. The category includes the excess volatility 
puzzle, tests for mean reversion and predictability of returns, tests for overreaction and the contrary 
investing strategy, tests for underreaction and momentum strategy, and the research on herd behavior 
in financial markets. A brief review of each topic follows.  
The first volatility tests were devised by Shiller (1979) in bond markets and Shiller (1981) and 
LeRoy and Porter (1981) in stock markets. They are regarded as the first strong evidence against EMH, 
as they confirmed markets fluctuate much more than they should if prices only followed fundamentals. 
Marsh and Merton (1986) and Kleidon (1986) questioned the general validity of these findings as they 
assumed price stationarity and a constant discount rate over time. The critique on stationarity of prices 
was later solved by Campbell and Shiller (1987), who use the recently developed theory of cointegrated 
75 
 
processes (Engle and Granger, 1987) to model dividends and stock prices in a more general way. The 
second critique, regarding the discount factor to be used, was tackled by Grossman and Shiller (1981) 
who made it equal to the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution for consumption only to confirm 
the excess volatility anomaly was again observed. A classic paper that deserves mention is Roll (1984), 
who analyzes the orange juice futures market to find that weather surprises only explain a small part of 
the variability in prices. Other relevant papers during the 80s include Michener (1982), Flavin (1983), 
Merton (1987a), West (1988a), Campbell (1991) and Barsky and DeLong (1993). Recent examples are 
Gabaix et al. (2006), Otrok, Ravikumar and Whiteman (2007) and Dumas, Kurshev and Uppal (2009). 
TABLE 2.2 – Tests of the semi-strong form EMH 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
Tests of semi-strong form EMH
Items Evidence in favour EMH Evidence against EMH
I.- Time Series analysis
a) Long-term return predictability
∎ Volatility tests Shiller (1979, 1981), Roll (1984)
∎ Mean reversion and predictability of returns Dividend yield (D/P), PER Ang and Bekaert (2007) Shiller (1984), Campbell and Yogo (2006)
∎ Tests of contrary investing strategy Overreaction De Bondt and Thaler (1985),
Daniel et al. (1998)
∎ Tests of momentum strategy Underreaction Jegadeesh and Titman (1993),
Chui et al. (2010)
∎ Herding Lakonishok et al. (1992),
Jegadeesh and Kim (2010)
b) Predictability in other asset markets
Default spread, TS spread
Foreign Exchange market
Fama and French (1992) Campbell and Shiller (1991)
Froot and Thaler (1990)
II.- Cross section analysis
c) Size
Fama and French (1993), Amihud (2002) Banz (1981)
d) Financial ratios
PER, BV/MV Fama and French (1992) Basu (1977), Stattman (1980),
Bhandari (1988)
e) Neglected firms
Beard and Sias (1997) Barber et al. (1993)
III.- Event studies
f) Announcements
Quarterly earnings reports
Dividend announcements Liv et al. (2008)
Ball and Brown (1968), Ball (1992)
Charest (1978), Bali (2003)
g) Corporate events
IPOs, M&As
Strategic decisions
Brav and Gompers (1997) Loughran and Ritter (1995)
h) Stock exchanges
Splits
Block trades
Exchange listings
Fama et al. (1969)
Scholes (1972)
Grinblatt et al. (1984)
i) Economic news
Changes in interest rates
Accounting changes
World and economic news
French et al. (1987)
Type of Test
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A second field in the literature of long-term predictability is the evidence that financial ratios such 
as dividend yield and PER are helpful to predict stock returns over time. Since the excess volatility 
implies returns should be mean reverting, a first focus was set on the predictability of dividend yields. 
Shiller (1984) finds empirical evidence that high d/P ratios forecast higher returns. Hence, a contrary 
investing strategy would be profitable by buying when price-to-dividend ratios are low and vice versa. 
Other variables observed to have a predictable power over returns follow in order. First, excess returns 
on stocks tend to be negatively correlated with expected inflation (Bodie, 1976) so, in consequence, high 
short-term interest rates tend to anticipate lower stock-market returns (Fama and Schwert, 1977). 
Second, Keim and Stambaugh identify credit spreads on bond markets and two constructed variables on 
stock markets. Third, the term structure of interest rates would predict stock returns (Campbell, 1987). 
Fourth, a long moving average of real earnings predicts future dividends, and the ratio of such earnings 
variable to price anticipates future stock returns (Campbell and Shiller, 1988a).55 The fact that these 
variables are often correlated with the business cycle would support the rationalist view that return 
predictability would be a consequence of changes in the discount factor. However, the debate continues. 
Campbell and Yogo (2006) note that the classic tests of return predictability may be invalid when the 
predictor variable is persistent and its innovations are highly correlated with returns. They introduce 
an efficient test of predictability to solve this problem and find evidence of it. Contrariwise, Ang and 
Bekaert (2007) find no evidence that dividend yields predict excess returns in the long run. 
The ability of the contrary investing strategy to outperform is also implicit in the hypothesis that 
markets overreact. Research in experimental psychology suggests people adopt an internal approach to 
prediction that is likely to produce underestimation (Kahneman and Tversky, 1982a). Hence, when they 
revise their beliefs in face of unexpected events, they tend to overweight recent news and underweight 
prior data. De Bondt and Thaler (1985) used these ideas to introduce the concept of overreaction in 
stock markets: portfolios of loser stocks ―those that have experienced extreme capital losses in the past- 
outperformed the market by 20% three years after portfolio formation, while winners lose 5%. Similar 
results, theoretical or empirical, were obtained by Lo and MacKinlay (1990), Chopra, Lakonishok and 
Ritter (1992), Campbell and Kyle (1993), Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998), Gropp (2004), 
Peyer and Vermaelen (2009), Diether, Lee and Werner (2009), and Schmeling (2009).56 
                                                 
55 This result was later used by Shiller (2000b) to propose his famous Cyclically Adjusted Price-Earnings (CAPE) ratio. Also 
known as the P/E 10 ratio or the Shiller ratio, it is a refined version of the PER ratio where a 10-year average, inflation-adjusted, 
estimation of earnings is used to compute the ratio. A similar method to smooth earnings over past years can be traced back to 
Graham and Dodd (1934). 
56 Some authors provide a rational explanation for periods when a contrary investing strategy yields good results. Chan (1988) 
suggests that the risk of winners and losers varies over time. This way, losers would have higher betas when they are added to 
the portfolio because lower prices imply higher indebtedness, hence higher risk. In consequence, the excess returns of losers 
would not be such thing, but only a fair return for the greater risk assumed. Nonetheless, this interpretation goes against Fama 
and French (1993)’s finding that the book-to-market ratio captures a risk factor that β does not explain. Conrad and Kaul (1993) 
suggest that overreaction findings in the literature would be attributable to biases in computed returns when monthly 
cumulative average returns are used. Loughran and Ritter (1996) dispute this only makes little difference in returns, as Conrad 
and Kaul (1993) confound cross-sectional patterns and aggregate time-series mean reversion, and introduce a survivor bias. 
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Then, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) documented evidence on the opposite direction. Momentum 
strategies may also work: buying winners and selling losers generate positive returns over 3 to 12 
months after portfolio formation, suggesting prices underreact to new information available. The first 
evidence of market underreaction is the post-earnings announcement drift, by Ball and Brown (1968). 
Since then, many researchers have found markets underreact, including Bernard and Thomas (1990), 
Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1996), Lee and Swaminathan (2000), Jegadeesh and Titman (2001), 
Griffin et al. (2003), Grinblatt and Han (2005) and Chui, Titman and Wei (2010). Others argue that the 
profitability of investing in momentum strategies might be a compensation for bearing asymmetric risks 
―in particular, the higher exposure to downside risk of some stocks (e.g., Ang, Chen and Xing, 2001). 
Thus, there is evidence that markets can overreact as well as underreact, and some theoretical 
models suggest how overreaction and underreaction may coexist. Relevant examples are Barberis, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1998) and Hong and Stein (1999). This would contradict the original EMH view 
that prices fully reflect information, while it satisfies the no free lunch interpretation: otherwise it would 
require investors to anticipate whether contrarians will beat momentum traders or vice versa. In 
addition, markets may be even more complex than that: investors, both amateur and professional 
traders, often mimic other investors’ investment decisions ―a behavior known as herding. Several 
empirical tests have confirmed investors do herd, including Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1992), 
Wermers (1999), Hwang and Salmon (2004), Jegadeesh and Kim (2010).  
All these tests above refer to stock markets, but there is evidence of return predictability in other 
asset markets, too. Two relevant examples are bond markets and foreign exchange markets. In bond 
markets, the excess volatility of long-term bonds (Shiller, 1979) implies bond returns are predictable. 
Several authors (Shiller, Campbell and Schoenholtz, 1983; Fama and Bliss, 1987; Campbell and Shiller, 
1991) find the slope of the yield curve has a forecast power. Campbell (1987) and Fama and French 
(1989) observe that the term structure predicts stock returns as well, and consequently the excess 
returns on stocks and long-maturity bonds would be correlated. A second predictor in bond markets are 
default spreads ―that is, the difference in returns between corporate bonds and long-term government 
bonds. Authors that confirm it include Chen, Roll and Ross (1986) and Fama and French (1993). Finally, 
in foreign exchange markets, strategies such as the currency carry trade ―i.e., borrowing low-yielding 
currencies and lending high-yielding ones― should not yield excess returns, since the uncovered 
interest rate parity predicts the difference in interest rates will be equivalent to the currency 
depreciation (Bekaert, Wei and Xing, 2007). However, the forward premium puzzle (e.g., Froot and 
Thaler, 1990) already described would be an evidence against it. 
Cross section analysis 
A second type of tests of the semi-strong EMH are those that seek to trace evidence of a long-term 
predictability of cross-sectional returns. Cross-sectional return predictability would contradict the EMH 
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because it suggests markets are not properly incorporating firms’ fundamentals into prices. However, 
the joint-hypothesis problem introduces the possibility to modify the asset pricing models to account 
for the anomalies observed. Early tests of the CAPM (Douglas, 1969; Black, Jensen and Scholes, 1972) 
obtained values for the riskless rate of return that were too high to be acceptable and led to biased 
inference due to the common strong cross-sectional correlation in stock returns. Then, Fama and 
MacBeth (1973) provided the famous Fama–MacBeth regressions for parameter estimation: a two-step 
approach that solves that problem of cross-sectional correlation,57 and that is today a standard method 
for testing multi-factor cross-sectional asset pricing models (Nobel Prize, 2013). Now, the ability of the 
CAPM to explain differences in expected returns across stocks could be tested, and Fama and MacBeth 
(1973) obtained positive results. However, some empirical contradictions of the Sharpe–Lintner model 
were finally found, being the most relevant the size effect, leverage risk, and the predictability of 
financial ratios such as PER and BV/MV (book value to market value). They are analyzed next. 
The first observed cross-sectional anomaly was the size effect: small-cap stocks tend to exhibit 
higher risk-adjusted returns than those predicted by the CAPM (Banz, 1981). Reinganum (1981), 
Lakonishok and Smidt (1986), and Fama and French (1992, 1993) later confirmed this result. Zarowin 
(1989, 1990) argues size explains the profitability of contrary investing. More recent papers include 
Loughran (1997), Barry et al. (2002), Fama and French (2008) and Hou, Karolyi and Kho (2011). Most 
explanations of this anomaly suggest small firms are exposed to risk factors not recognized in classic 
asset pricing models. Banz (1981), for instance, follows Klein and Bawa (1977) to suggest it is likely that 
there is a lack of corporate information for smaller firms. Authors providing empirical evidence of this 
include Atiase (1985, 1987) and Dempsey (1989), while Barry and Brown (1984) and Merton (1987b) 
provide two models on a similar basis. Finally, Arbel and Strebel (1982) associate the lack of information 
to the neglected firms’ effect. An alternative risk factor would be a liquidity premium due to a lower 
trading volume (James and Edmister, 1983). Amihud (2002) supports this view and Roll (1981) suggests 
that infrequent trading leads to a bias in risk estimation, understating the actual risk from holding a 
small firm portfolio. This would refute the mere existence of a size effect. However, other authors (e.g., 
Reinganum, 1982; Keim, 1983) consider this bias too small to explain the anomaly. Eventually, Fama 
and French (1993) included firm size as a common risk factor in the returns on stocks. 
A second group of cross-sectional anomalies include some financial ratios claimed to have some 
predictive power. The most relevant ratios are PER and its inverse E/P (Basu, 1977, 1983), book value 
to market value, BV/MV (Stattman, 1980; Rosenberg, Reid and Lanstein, 1985), and financial leverage 
measured as debt-to-equity ratio (Bhandari, 1988). First, Basu (1977) finds evidence that securities 
                                                 
57 Noting that lack of predictability and constant expected returns over time imply returns are uncorrelated over time, Fama 
and MacBeth (1973) suggest a two-step procedure to obtain empirical estimations of the CAPM. The first step estimates a series 
of cross-sectional regressions of stock returns to obtain the expected returns according to the asset-pricing model. The second 
step estimates the time-series average of the coefficients from the cross-sectional regressions, in order to test whether the 
averages deviate from the expected values. 
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with low PER ratios tend to outperform high P/E stocks, and Basu (1983) extends the evidence to the 
earnings yield even if experimental control is exercised over differences in firm size. Recent research 
includes Desai, Rajgopal and Venkatachalam (2004) and Dechow, Ge and Schrand (2010). Second, 
Stattman (1980) finds a positive relationship between average returns on U.S. stocks and BV/MV, while 
Rosenberg et al. (1985) show that a book/price strategy that buys stocks with high ratios and sells those 
with low ones is profitable. Recent research include Chan, Hamao and Lakonishok (1991), Raghavendra 
and Vermaelen (1998) and Dong et al. (2006). Finally, Bhandari (1988) show that a positive relationship 
exists between debt-to-equity ratios, D/E, and expected returns. Leverage risk is obviously a factor that 
should be captured by betas in the CAPM model, but Bhandari finds debt-to-equity ratios are able to 
explain the cross-section of average stock returns once size and beta have been considered. Recent 
research includes Penman, Richardson and Tuna (2007) and Gomes and Schmid (2010).  
Lastly, another common cross-sectional anomaly is the neglected firms’ effect: stocks that are not 
followed by security analysts tend to outperform the market. This anomaly is easy to interpret under 
the theory of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980): in markets where analysts choose not to be informed, prices 
do not fully reveal information and hence profit opportunities may appear. The effect is related to the 
size bias, since neglected firms are often small firms (Arbel and Strebel, 1982; Arbel, Carvell and Strebel, 
1983). Recent papers offer a mixed evidence. On one hand, the number of analysts following the security 
(Barber, Griffin and Lev, 1993) and the informational deficiency associated to these firms (Downs and 
Güner, 2000) would be key factors that influence whether excess returns are observed or not. Besides, 
Hong, Lim and Stein (2000) find the effect greater for stocks that are past losers than for past winners. 
On the other hand, Beard and Sias (1997) find no evidence of a neglected premium, while Ennis and 
Sebastian (2002) suggest the small-cap alpha is a myth that stems from tests that ignore management 
fees, use inappropriate benchmarks, and ignore a survivorship bias (Brown et al., 1992).58 
Event studies 
The third category of tests of the semi-strong form are known as event studies after Fama (1970): the 
study of how security prices adjust to “one kind of information generating event (e.g., stock splits, 
announcements of financial reports by firms, new security issues, etc.)” (p. 404). The seminal paper is by 
Fama et al. (1969), who noted that empirical tests at that time tried to infer market efficiency from the 
independence of successive price changes, but this does not say much about the speed of adjustment of 
prices to new information. In particular, Fama et al. (1969 studied the effect on prices of stock splits,59 
but all event studies follow the same logic. When new information about some significant economic 
event arrives to the market, there must be an immediate price impact and some unusual behavior in the 
                                                 
58 The list of anomalies is endless, and so our analysis is obviously not fully comprehensive. As an example, a recurrent anomaly 
in the literature not included here is the Value Line effect (Copeland and Mayers, 1982; Porras and Griswold, 2000). 
59 However Ball and Brown (1968), another classic in the literature of event studies, was published in 1968, an original version 
of Fama et al. (1969) was available as a Report No. 6715 of the University of Chicago in 1967. 
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rates of return at the time of the announcement, and then prices should subsequently remain 
unpredictable. The difference across the alternative tests available is in regard of the kind of event that 
is analyzed. Four are the most common categories, which are analyzed in what follows. 
The first one considers earnings and dividends announcements. Ball and Brown (1968) analyzed 
the effect on prices of the release of the income report, to provide empirical evidence that prices not 
only adjust to new information, but they often anticipate the announcement. However, they also find an 
apparent anomaly: when firms do not meet their expected profits, prices tend to respond to earnings 
for about a year after they are announced. Several studies confirmed this post-earnings announcement 
drift, both for unexpectedly positive or negative profits, including Jones and Litzenberger (1970), Foster, 
Olsen and Shevlin (1984) and Ball (1992). Recent literature includes Bartov, Radhakrishnan and Krinsky 
(2000), Mendenhall (2004), Sadka (2005) and DellaVigna and Pollet (2009). They all confirm evidence 
of the anomaly. In addition, La Porta et al. (1997) relate the observed outperformance of value stocks 
with this announcement anomaly: earnings surprises are systematically more positive for value stocks.  
Rational interpretations of the anomaly include an incorrect measurement of corporate results 
(Warfield and Wild, 1992) and the existence of different econometric problems (Patel, 1989; Brennan, 
1991). In addition, it might be a fair compensation for changes in non-observed risk factors such as 
liquidity risk (Sadka, 2005). However, Fama (1998) considers it, together with the profitability of 
momentum strategies, the two anomalies that rationalists are not able to explain. Indeed, the classic 
interpretation considers it is caused by investors’ underreaction to information when it is first released 
(Bernard and Thomas, 1990), also because they are not aware of the serial correlation in profits 
(Bernard, 1993) and they underestimate such correlation (Ball and Bartov, 1996). Recent articles (e.g., 
Mendenhall, 2004; DellaVigna and Pollet, 2009) mostly subscribe to this view. Models that provide a 
formal approach to this underreaction interpretation include Barberis et al. (1998), Daniel et al. (1998) 
and Hong and Stein (1999). Similar studies about the effect of dividend announcements on prices 
include Charest (1978), who obtains empirical evidence that excess returns are observable during two 
years after a dividend rise is announced and, in the same line, Ball (1978), Roll (1984), Grinblatt, Masulis 
and Titman (1984) and Michaely, Thaler and Womack (1995). Recent literature, though, offers mixed 
reviews, including Bali (2003) in favor of the anomaly and Liu, Szewcyk and Zantout (2008) in favor of 
market efficiency. 
The second category of event studies analyzes the effect on prices of corporate events such as 
IPOs, mergers and acquisitions, and other types of corporate strategic decisions. The most common are 
the analysis of the announcement of initial public offerings, IPOs, and seasoned equity offerings, SEOs. 
Asquith and Mullins (1986) find empirical evidence that investors consider SEOs to be bad news, 
reducing stock prices in consequence. Besides, the IPOs underpricing puzzle is the empirical evidence 
that a large number of initial public offerings have been underpriced by more than 10% (Purnanandam 
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and Swaminathan, 2004) and showed a significant price appreciation during the first days of trading in 
consequence. Then, after the initial run-up in price, IPOs often become poor long run investments 
(Loughran and Ritter, 1995). However, recent literature is not so conclusive. For instance, Brav and 
Gompers (1997) suggest venture-backed companies do not significantly underperform, but the smallest 
nonventure-backed firms do; Loughran and Ritter (2004) provide evidence that IPO underpricing 
changes significantly over time; and Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004) show IPOs may also be 
significantly overvalued. Recent literature includes Shivakumar (2000) and Cohen and Zarowin (2010) 
on SEOs, and Ritter and Welch (2002) and Arthurs et al. (2008) on IPOs. Similar studies were performed 
on mergers and acquisitions (Dennis and McConnell, 1986; Aktas et al., 2007), market share repurchases 
(Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen, 1995; von Eije and Megginson, 2008) and other strategic 
decisions of firms, such as joint ventures (Park and Dongcheoi, 1997; Hanvanich and Çavusgil, 2001) 
and others (e.g., Balasubramanian, Matour and Thakur, 2005; Jeong and Stylianou, 2010). 
The third category analyzes the potential effect on prices of information about trading in stock 
exchanges. This includes splits announcements, exchange listings and block trades. The study of stock 
splits and their effect on prices is a classic since Fama et al. (1969). Grinblatt et al. (1984) show stock 
prices, on average, react positively to stock split announcements. Similar results were replicated by 
Asquith, Healy and Palepu (1989) and Ikenberry and Rammath (2002), among others. Ikenberry, 
Rankine and Stice (1996) suggest splits realign prices to a lower trading range and that the market 
underreacts to split announcements. However, we may find evidence against this anomaly, too ―e.g., 
Byun and Rozeff (2003). Regarding block trades, Kraus and Stoll (1972b) and Scholes (1972) provided 
early evidence that prices react efficiently to the information conveyed in the sale of large blocks of 
shares. Subsequent literature in support of the efficient hypothesis includes Easley and O’Hara (1987) 
and Fama (1990). The study of price effects following a stock exchange listing announcement ―i.e., the 
inclusion of a given stock in a particular selective or sectorial index― was pioneered by Dharan and 
Ikenberry (1995). Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2004) find that foreign firms listed in the U.S. are valued 
significantly higher than non-cross-listed firms from the same country. They suggest that a U.S. listing 
reduces the extent to which controlling shareholders can engage in expropriation, which would increase 
the firm’s ability to take advantage of growth opportunities. 
Finally, a fourth category of events are the effects that relevant economic news might have on 
prices. Examples are the effects of changes in the interest rate over prices (e.g., French, Schwert and 
Stambaugh, 1987; Bomfim, 2003; and Rigobon and Sack, 2004), the effect on prices of accounting 
changes (e.g., Nourayi, 1994), changes in reserve requirements of banks (e.g., Kolari, Mahajan and 
Saunders, 1988) and other normative standards (e.g., McGuire and Dilts, 2008), as well as major 
economic news (e.g., Conrad et al., 2006). 
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To sum up, the evidence against EMH for time series studies led to a debate between rationalists 
and behaviorists about the role of the discount factor. The strong evidence against EMH in cross section 
led Fama and French (1993) to provide a model that aims to substitute CAPM by accounting for several 
additional risk factors, both in the stock market (3-factor model) and the bond market. Finally, the vast 
majority of event studies have supported EMH (Nobel Prize, 2013), with only some exceptions ―the 
most notable, the post earnings announcement drift first documented by Ball and Brown (1968). 
2.4.3. Strong form EMH tests 
The analysis of the strong form tests the effect of private information not fully reflected in market prices. 
This is the less analyzed form of efficiency, due to the difficulties implied in its empirical contrast (Del 
Brío, 2003): we cannot observe either the private information available at the market or what would be 
the market prices that fully reflect this information. Thus, indirect ways to test it had to be performed, 
by considering the study of agents which are supposed to have access to inside information, including 
corporate insiders and different sorts of professional investors. However, these tests are also limited as 
there is not much data available, neither we will be able to assert when a particular piece of inside 
information has arrived to the market. Unlike tests of semi-strong EMH, tests of the strong-form EMH 
analyze market returns before a particular announcement in order to trace evidence of insiders making 
excess profits by making use of such privileged information. Following the discussion above, we have 
considered to include two types of tests: those that focus on corporate insiders, and those that focus on 
other groups of professional investors. The taxonomy is summarized in Table 2.3. 
TABLE 2.3 – Tests of the strong form EMH 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
The seminal paper on corporate insiders is Jaffe (1974a,b), who analyzes the trades executives 
and large shareholders performed on stocks of their own companies, to conclude they were able to 
obtain excess profits. Since then, most studies obtained empirical evidence against the strong form EMH. 
These include Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Seyhun (1988), Beneish and Vargus (2002) and Ke, Huddart 
Tests of strong form EMH
Evidence in favour EMH Evidence against EMH
I.- Corporate insiders
Sharpe (1981) Jaffe (1974), Aboody and Baruch (2000)
II.- Groups of professional investors
Stock exchange specialists Harris and Panchapagesan (2005)
Security analysts Shane and Stock (2006)
Professional money managers (Mutual funds)
Treynor (1965), Sharpe (1966),
Jensen (1969), Sauer (1997)
Grinblatt and Titman (1992)
Type of Test
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and Petroni (2003). Nonetheless, some results in favor of the strong hypothesis are also available. These 
include Trivoli (1980), who notices the increasing effectiveness of regulation, and Sharpe (1981), who 
suggests investment funds make insider information less valuable because the number of potential 
imitators of a given strategy increases. Recent literature has focused on the sources of insider trading 
gains (Aboody and Baruch, 2000), their ability to perform as contrarian investors (Lakonishok and Lee, 
2001), the effects of regulation and firm’s ownership (Fidmuc, Goergen and Renneboog, 2006), the 
credibility of voluntary disclosure (Gu and Li, 2007), and legal insider trading contribution to efficiency 
(Aktas, Bodt and van Oppens, 2008), among other topics. 
Among tests of insider information for groups of professional investors, the most common type 
are tests that analyze the performance of mutual fund managers. The classic papers are Treynor (1965), 
Sharpe (1966) and Jensen (1969), who obtained evidence in favor of the strong-form EMH. More 
significant was their contribution to the study of the investment management performance, providing 
measures such as the Sharpe and Treynor ratios and Jensen’s alpha. Most literature supports the strong-
form efficient hypothesis, including Kon and Jen (1978), Sauer (1997) and Bilson, Frino and Heaney 
(2005). The main evidence is the lack of a consistent outperformance by fund managers over a series of 
years. For the only relevant anomaly observed, the hot hands effect,60 there is no consensus on whether 
this implies past fund returns are helpful to predict future performance (e.g., Grinblatt and Titman, 
1992) or not (e.g., Pätäri, 2009). Similar tests have focused on other groups of professional investors, 
such as stock exchange specialists (e.g., Harris and Panchapagesan, 2005) and security analysts (Shane 
and Stock, 2006). We may conclude that most tests of the strong-form EMH provide strong evidence 
against EMH in what corporate insider trading is referred, and strong positive evidence in favor of the 
EMH in what professional investors’ ability to consistently beat the market is referred. 
 
2.5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
In this chapter we have given an extensive review of how efficiency is analyzed in the context of financial 
markets. In what follows we summarize the main topics discussed. First, we interpreted the efficient 
market hypothesis and, in particular, the key aspect of the informational efficiency of financial markets. 
Then, we described the three main elements that determine informational efficiency: namely, 
expectations, information and the discount factor. 
Second, we discussed whether the EMH is testable or not, presenting several critiques that have 
been posed in regards of its testability. These include the confusion of the two alternative definitions of 
                                                 
60 Hendricks, Patel and Zeckhauser (1993) observed that a hot-hands phenomenon was consistent during 1974–87: mutual 
funds that performed well one year continued to outperform in the following year. 
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the EMH, the joint hypothesis problem, some approaches behaviorists have provided to test the EMH, 
and an alternative interpretation of how markets operate according to the adaptive market hypothesis. 
Third, we provided a taxonomy and a brief review of the empirical tests of the weak, semi-strong 
and strong form of the EMH available in the literature. The mixed evidence of market efficiency that 
stems from this review, together with the theoretical challenges exposed by the behavioral finance ―the 
critics to its testability, the struggle to refute excess volatility and limits to arbitrage simultaneously― 
lead us to have further insight on behavioral finance. We do it in the subsequent chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3. EFFICIENCY IN FINANCIAL MARKETS: 
BEHAVIORAL FINANCE 
 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Behavioral finance is the most relevant field within behavioral economics. Behavioral economics has 
provided evidence of how non-standard preferences, non-standard beliefs, and non-standard decision 
making lead to an unconventional behavior by people in their economic decisions (DellaVigna, 2009). 
For instance, when people choose their retirement savings, use their credit cards, pay not to go to the 
gym, devote more or less effort at their jobs, give to charities, go on strike in response to wage cuts, 
neglect some costs and opaque or complex information, avoid to make decisions or tend to choose 
familiar or salient options, exploit consumer biases or voter inattention, and many others. However, if 
there is a field within behavioral economics that has been productive and successful to challenge the 
rationalist interpretation, that is behavioral finance applied to financial markets. 
Behavioral economics represents a return to reality (Shiller, 2005) that criticizes the rational 
optimizing model as the only possible framework, and suggests instead a wider approach based on a 
combination of all social sciences. It combines psychology and economics to explain why and how people 
make seemingly irrational or illogical economic decisions (Belsky and Gilovich, 1999). Moreover, it may 
also feature relationships with sociology and anthropology (Shiller, 2000a), demography and history 
(Shiller, 2000b). It follows the conviction that an increasing realism of the psychological foundations 
will improve the fields of economics and finance (Camerer and Loewenstein, 2004). The more realistic 
our assumptions about the economic actors, the better our economics will be (Rabin, 2002a). 
Behavioral finance would be open-minded finance (Thaler, 1993), dealing with the influence of 
psychology in financial decision making and financial markets (Shefrin, 2001a). It does not imply a 
global rejection of efficiency, utility maximization and equilibrium, but standard finance is so weighted 
down with anomalies that it makes sense to reconstruct it based on behavioral lines (Statman, 1995). 
Psychology provides alternative views to the standard finance’s homo economicus about how people do 
behave (as opposite to how they should behave). According to this view, markets are not something that 
is outside us, it is us; how we perceive, how we want it to be, and how we study it are inextricably 
intertwined (Frankfurter, McGoun and Allen, 2004). Textbook economics teaches the benefits of free 
markets, presenting capitalism as essentially stable since people in free markets behave rationally and 
exhaust all mutually beneficial opportunities to produce and exchange (Akerlof and Shiller, 2009a). 
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Behavioral finance, instead, interprets markets may be guided by Keynes’s animal spirits as well: 
sometimes we are irrational, wrong, shortsighted, or evil; others we hold to non-economic values like 
fairness, honor, or justice; and prices, many times, seem to be correlated with social changes. This view 
justify why markets might be inefficient. 
However, changes in scientific paradigms never come without acrimony. Behavioral finance is an 
area with a growing acceptance and recognition among academics and authorities,61 but rationalists still 
argue that anomalies are no more than methodological limitations. The goal of Chapter 3 is to provide 
an extensive review on the groundbreaking research on behavioral economics and finance. This serves 
two purposes. First, to show the foundations on which behaviorists have laid their theories about 
markets. The study of most of these theories, nonetheless, exceeds the scope of this thesis, so we will 
only provide a brief summary in this chapter (see Section 3.3). Second, it will help us familiarize with 
the myriad of biases and anomalies that pervade standard decision making and challenge the efficiency 
postulates of standard finance. These biases and anomalies will be extensively reviewed in Part II, 
particularly in Chapter 4, providing us a solid basis to decide on which aspects of the behavioral 
literature we want to focus on Part III ―i.e., the experimental research and theoretical models.  
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the foundations of 
behavioral finance, mainly in chronological order. Section 3.3 introduces the most recent theories 
developed in search for a unified theory. Section 3.4 concludes with some remarks. 
 
3.2. THE FOUNDATIONS OF BEHAVIORAL FINANCE 
 
This section is devoted to review the main landmarks of behavioral finance. To facilitate understanding, 
the survey follows primarily a historical approach, describing first some of the early antecedents 
(subsection 3.2.1), followed by the main achievements by the researchers that pioneered this literature 
(subsection 3.2.2). Finally, how these and other groundbreaking researchers came to challenge the 
orthodoxy during the 1980s to 2000s is summarized in subsection 3.2.3. 
3.2.1. The antecedents 
Some authors go as far as Adam Smith’s (1759) “The Theory of Moral Sentiments” to trace the first link 
between economics and psychology. Camerer and Loewenstein (2004) notice that when economics was 
born as a science, psychology did not exist as such, so economists were the psychologists of their times: 
“the book [by A. Smith] is bursting with insights about human psychology, many of which presage current 
                                                 
61 Ben Bernanke, in his testimony before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission on the ‘Causes of the recent financial and 
economic crisis’, Washington D.C., September 2, 2010, said “it is frankly quite difficult to determine the causes of booms and busts 
in asset prices; psychological phenomena are no doubt important, as argued by Robert Shiller, for example”. He explicitly referred 
to Shiller (2000b) and Akerlof and Shiller (2009a). 
87 
 
developments in behavioral economics. For example, Adam Smith commented (1759/1892, p. 311) that ‘we 
suffer more... when we fall from a better to a worse situation, than we ever enjoy when we rise from a worse 
to a better’. Loss aversion!” (p. 5). Then, the work “The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind”, by Gustave 
Le Bon (1896), is considered to be an influential book in social psychology for its analysis of crowds 
from the psychological point of view and the study of their ‘mental unity’.62 
Selden (1912) was probably the first to suggest prices may be dependent on the mental attitude 
of investors, identifying psychology as a main driver of financial markets. Some concepts he would 
introduce, such as panics, booms, fear of a loss, speculative cycles or deviations from rationality 
(‘inverted reasoning’), were to be used by the behavioral finance later on. An early critique to the axioms 
of the expected utility hypothesis was introduced by French economist Maurice Allais (1953): the so-
called Allais paradox would later be exploited by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky in their prospect 
theory. A cornerstone in the behavioral literature is also the notion of bounded rationality, introduced 
by Herbert Simon (1955, 1957). Simon suggests decision makers should be viewed as boundedly 
rational, with utility maximization being replaced by satisficing (Kahneman, 2003a). Simon also 
represents an antecedent for the concept of heuristics: since information is vast but people have limited 
information-processing abilities, they construct simplified models of the world to decide. 
Festinger, Riecken and Schachter (1956) and Festinger (1957) introduce the concept of cognitive 
dissonance: when two cognitions63 are inconsistent, an unpleasant state of cognitive dissonance follows. 
The book “When Prophecy Fails” reports their experiences when they infiltrate in a group of believers 
that the end of the world was about to come, and a flying saucer from outer space would rescue in a due 
date only those who truly believed. Their goal was to analyze what would believers do as cognitive 
dissonance arises when the prophecy of the UFO coming fails, and found believers may become even 
more convinced if some conditions hold.64 Then, Festinger (1957) elaborates a theory of cognitive 
dissonance. Two elements are dissonant if they do not fit together. The existence of dissonance, being 
psychologically uncomfortable, motivates the person to try to reduce it. Either some attempts are made 
to rationalize them, or to avoid situations and information which would likely increase the dissonance.65 
                                                 
62 Psychology asserts that, beyond instincts, passions and feelings, individuals are guided by rational intelligence. However, Le 
Bon (1896) describes some circumstances ―e.g., a contagion effect and individual responsibility disappearing in the anonymity 
of crowds― that may form a collective mind with different characteristics from those of the individuals that compose it. 
63 Following Festinger (1957), cognitions are things a person knows about herself, her behavior and her surroundings. 
64 Believers must had strongly committed to their faith or to the group, doing some actions that are difficult to undo. The belief 
must have some relation with what believers do, such that when they commit they also give support to their beliefs. Besides, 
they need a group: a single believer probably would not be able to persevere, but social support helps them believe. 
65 About ways to rationalize the dissonance, there is the classic example of a smoker, who knows it is bad for his health but 
thinks (a) he enjoys smoking so much; (b) health damages may not be so serious; (c) he can’t avoid every possible dangerous 
contingency and still live; (d) perhaps if he stopped smoking he would put on weight. Festinger (1957) relates several ways to 
reduce dissonance. First, by changing a behavioral cognitive element. We often change our behavior and feelings in accordance 
to new information. Second, by changing an environmental cognitive element. This is sometimes impossible, except in extreme 
cases which might be called psychotic. Third, and perhaps more common, it is possible to reduce the magnitude of dissonance 
by adding new cognitive elements. For example, a smoker may actively seek new information ―e.g., opinions critical of the 
perils of smoking― that would reduce the dissonance he feels, while at the same time he avoids reading that research. 
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Following their research on cognitive dissonance, Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) analyze the 
effects of forced compliance and the dissonance it generates. This represents a prelude to Stanley 
Milgram’s experiments on obedience to authority. When a person is forced to do or say something 
contrary to her opinion, her personal opinions may change under some conditions as to bring them 
closer to the behavior she was forced to perform. Later, Stanley Milgram (1963, 1974) would conduct 
his famous experiment to show most people were able to perform acts that violate even their deepest 
moral beliefs, with relatively few people having the initiative needed to resist authority.66 
Finally, other antecedents are Oskamp (1965) and Alpert and Raifa (1969) on overconfidence, 
Chapman and Chapman (1971) and Langer (1975) on illusion of control, and Edwards (1968) about 
conservatism.67 Oskamp (1965) analyzed, in the context of clinical practice by psychologists, whether 
their confidence to make diagnostic conclusions is justified by a corresponding increase in accuracy. He 
finds confidence increases with information, but no evidence of a significant increase in accuracy. Alpert 
and Raifa (1969) analyze overconfidence when individuals assess probability distributions of uncertain 
quantities. Edwards (1968) observes conservatism in how individuals process new information: 
opinion changes are orderly and usually proportional to the outputs of the Bayes’ theorem, but 
insufficient in amount. Chapman and Chapman (1971) identify an illusory correlation, that is, a tendency 
to see two events occur together more often than they actually do. Finally, Langer (1975) identifies an 
illusion of control: people behave as though chance events are subject to control. 
3.2.2. Groundbreaking research 
In this section we review the main achievements by the researchers that pioneered the literature on 
behavioral finance and economics. These are Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, Richard Thaler, 
Robert Shiller, Hersh Shefrin and Meir Statman. 
If there is a milestone in behavioral economics, that must be acknowledged to Daniel Kahneman 
and Amos Tversky’s articles in the 1970s. Their most acclaimed paper, Prospect theory: An analysis of 
decision under risk, was published in 1979. Nonetheless, some years before, they already started to 
contribute to the field introducing three relevant heuristics: representativeness, the availability 
heuristic, and anchoring-and-adjustment. Heuristics, from the Greek word eureka (‘to find’ something), 
refer to the way people perceive, process and evaluate the probabilities of uncertain events in the 
context of decision making under risk. They are rules of thumb people use to make financial decisions: 
                                                 
66 In particular, participants in the experiment were required to give fake (but they were unaware of it) electro-shocks up to 
450 volt to other participants, to the extent to cause them severe damages or even death. “I set up a simple experiment at Yale 
University to test how much pain an ordinary citizen would inflict on another person simply because he was ordered to by an 
experimental scientist” (Milgram, 1974). They were not compelled to do it under coercive methods, only asked to do it because 
it was required for scientific purposes. 
67 Other authors that deserve to be mentioned are Slovic (1972), who noted the importance of analyzing human information-
processing limitations and its effects over judgmental accuracy in investment analysis, and Meehl (1954), who wrote about the 
controversy on clinical versus statistical prediction ―that is, the evidence that algorithmic methods make better predictions of 
human behavior than (subjective) clinical procedures. 
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information in financial markets is vast and changes every second, hence heuristics help to provide 
simple means to make a decision. However, empirical evidence shows people use subjective probability 
estimates that deviate from objective probability in a systematic way (Kahneman and Tversky, 1972). 
People exhibits representativeness when they assess the subjective probability of an event by the 
degree to which it is similar in essential characteristics to its parent population, and it reflects the most 
relevant features of the process by which it is generated. Kahneman and Tversky (1972) find empirical 
evidence of probability judgments being determined by the most salient characteristics of the sample,68 
even in the intuitive judgments of expert psychologists. Representativeness also shows people view 
chance as unpredictable but essentially fair: we expect short sequences of, for example, coin tosses, to 
include about the same number of heads and tails, as if a ‘law of small numbers’69 applied as well 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1971). The availability heuristic, introduced by Tversky and Kahneman (1973), 
describes the tendency to evaluate the probability of events or the relevance of information depending 
on the degree to which information is readily available, memorable or vivid, even when there are better 
sources of information: for instance, we may assess the divorce rate in the country by recalling divorces 
among our acquaintances. Availability is a useful clue for the judgment of frequency because frequent 
events are easier to recall, but since it also depends on other factors different from true objective 
frequency, this heuristic leads to systematic biases. Finally, Tversky and Kahneman (1974) describe 
anchoring-and-adjustment. Anchoring refers to people being influenced in their assessments by 
arbitrary data, even when they are non-informative (Hens and Bachmann, 2008).70 Besides, in some 
situations people adjust the initial value they obtain as to yield the final answer they expected, a 
behavior known as adjustment. 
In 1979, Kahneman and Tversky published one of the most cited papers in economics. Kahneman 
and Tversky, 1979 introduce prospect theory, an alternative model to the expected utility theory (EUT) 
that would better describe how people make financial decisions in a context of uncertainty. In particular, 
they observe three effects that contradict EUT. First, people overweight outcomes that are considered 
certain (known as the certainty effect). Second, the reflection of prospects around zero ―that is, with 
losses of a same magnitude replacing gains― reverses the preference order (denoted reflection effect). 
                                                 
68 For example, respondents to a test answered that a sequence girl-boy-girl-boy-boy-girl for the exact order of births in families 
of six children is more likely than a sequence boy-girl-boy-boy-boy-boy, when they are, indeed, equally likely. They did so 
because the sequence with five boys and one girl fails to reflect the proportion of boys and girls (50-50) in the population. The 
same representativeness bias appears when comparing sequences BBBGGG and GBBGBG. Both reflect the proportion of boys 
and girls in the population, but the first one appears to be less random.  
69 The law of large numbers, first enunciated in Bernoulli’s (1713) Ars Conjectandi, ensures very large samples are highly 
representative of the populations from which they are drawn. However, the results observed by Tversky and Kahneman (1971) 
would imply a belief in what they called the ‘law of small numbers’, that is, as if the law of large numbers applies to small 
numbers as well. 
70 Different starting points yield different estimates, which are biased toward the initial value. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) 
feature a classic experiment where several subjects were asked to estimate some percentages after a wheel-of-fortune with 
numbers from 0 to 100 was spun in their presence. The results evidence they anchored their estimations to the random 
numbers obtained by the spinning wheel, which are non-informative. 
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Third, people generally discards elements that are shared by all prospects, and focus only on the 
components that distinguish them (known as the isolation effect). 
The identification of these effects led Kahneman and Tversky to propose an alternative theory of 
choice, prospect theory, where the utility function is replaced by a value function that is assigned to 
gains and losses ―as deviations from a reference point that is taken to be the status quo― rather than to 
final assets, and where probabilities are replaced by decision weights.71 Under this theory, people would 
exhibit risk aversion for gains (meaning a concave value function for positive values) and risk-seeking 
for losses (a convex value function for negative values), with the value function being steeper for losses 
than for gains (implying loss aversion). Further insight was provided by Tversky and Kahneman (1981), 
where they introduce the concept of framing in decision making,72 Kahneman and Tversky (1984), 
where the concept of loss aversion was first coined, and Tversky and Kahneman (1986), where they 
suggest deviations of actual behavior from the normative model are too widespread to be ignored. An 
extended version was developed in Tversky and Kahneman (1992), called cumulative prospect theory, 
CPT. It extends the original model as it employs cumulative rather than separable decision weights,73 
applies to uncertain as well as to risky projects with any number of outcomes, and allows for different 
weighting functions for gains and losses. Experimental evidence would later confirm the distinctive 
fourfold pattern of risk attitudes predicted by this theory: risk aversion for gains and risk seeking for 
losses of high probability; risk seeking for gains and risk aversion for losses of low probability.  
In his Nobel Prize lecture and subsequent articles, Kahneman (2003a,b) acknowledges their 
findings became useful to economics when Thaler (1980) used them to explain riskless choices. Thaler 
shows loss aversion explains a violation of consumer theory known as endowment effect: the value of a 
good increases when the good becomes part of the individual’s endowment.74 Other situations where 
consumers fail to behave in accordance with the normative prescriptions of economic theory include 
failure to ignore sunk costs, underweighting opportunity costs, choosing not to choose and regret, and 
precommitment and self-control. Thaler (1980) also formally introduces the concept of mental 
accounting: the cognitive process by which people evaluate their financial activities. Then, in three 
subsequent articles, he extends the analysis of consumer anomalies.  
                                                 
71 Decision weights, introduced by Fellner (1961) to explain aversion to ambiguity, are not probabilities: they do not obey the 
probability axioms and are generally lower than the corresponding probabilities, except in the range of low probabilities. These 
overweighting of low probabilities explain the attractiveness of insurance and gambling (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). 
72 Tversky and Kahneman (1981) use the term decision frame to refer to the decision-maker's conception of the acts, outcomes, 
and contingencies associated with a particular choice. They show that, because of imperfections of human perception and 
decision, changes of frame often reverse preferences between options. 
73 The weighting scheme in Kahneman and Tversky (1979) is a monotonic transformation of outcome probabilities that exhibits 
two problems: it does not always satisfy stochastic dominance, and it is not readily extended to prospects with a large number 
of outcomes. CPT solves both problems: it assumes transparently dominated prospects are eliminated in the editing phase, and 
normalizes the weights so that they add to unity. 
74 The selling price appears to be much higher than the buying price, often by a factor of 2 or more, which is inconsistent with 
economic theory. Loss aversion would be a plausible explanation since the value of a good appears to be higher when the good 
is viewed as something that could be lost than when it is seen as a potential gain (Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler, 1990). 
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First, Thaler (1981) analyzes the dynamic inconsistency of consumer choice, showing people 
discount gains more than losses (a behavior known as sign effect) and large outcomes less than small 
ones (known as the magnitude effect). Second, Thaler and Shefrin (1981) introduce the concept of self-
control in intertemporal choice. They provide a rationale for individuals to impose themselves 
constraints on their future behavior, assuming any person is two-fold: a farsighted planner with long-
run preferences who is concerned with lifetime utility, and a myopic doer that exists only for one period, 
has short-run preferences and is completely selfish.75 Thaler and Shefrin then model self-control as an 
internal conflict resembling the principal–agent conflict. Some techniques to alter incentives and rules 
that restrict opportunities, such as precommitment or self-imposed rules of thumb, could be used to 
solve the conflict. Third, Thaler (1985) develops a model of consumer behavior. He suggests framing 
may be a variable that explains the consumer’s optimal behavior, but framing itself cannot alter 
behavior. Thus, he analyzes consume under a prospect theory approach: the value function replaces the 
utility function, and prices are introduced in the value function using the concept of a reference price. 
Then, if a mental coding of combinations of gains and losses using the prospect theory ―i.e., mental 
accounting― is assumed, Thaler shows individuals violate some basic economic principles. 
Thaler’s main contribution to behavioral finance came in 1985 as well. The article by De Bondt 
and Thaler (1985) Does the stock market overreact? sets the first link between behavioral biases and the 
efficient market hypothesis. They analyze whether the tendency to overreact to unexpected and 
dramatic news events may affect stock prices, and find evidence of overreaction surviving the process 
of arbitrage. If stock prices systematically overshoot, then their reversal should be predictable from past 
returns, which violates the weak-form EMH. Focusing on stocks that experienced extreme capital gains 
(‘winners’) or extreme losses (‘losers’) over periods up to five years, they find evidence that loser stocks 
tend to be future winners, confirming overreaction in capital markets. 
The testing of the EMH by a behavioral researcher was pioneered, nonetheless, by Robert Shiller. 
As we saw in Chapter 2, Shiller (1979, 1981) imposed a theoretical limit on bond market and stock 
market volatility. In particular, Shiller (1979) shows that the EMH implies that long term interest rates 
should not be too volatile, contrarily as it is empirically observed. Likewise, Shiller (1981) shows stock 
prices are too volatile to be justified by new information about future dividends. The demonstration of 
these anomalies, as we will see in Chapter 4, does not require a behavioral interpretation, but Shiller 
would later provide it. Shiller (1984) claims that investing in speculative assets is a social activity. This 
means that mass psychology is the key factor that explains price movements in stock markets: investors 
discuss their investments with other people, read about investments, gossip about other investors’ 
failures or successes, etc. As a consequence, security prices fluctuate following fads, just like they do in 
                                                 
75 Authors claim to be the first to provide a formal treatment of a two-self economic man, though they granted the idea to 
economists like Adam Smith (1759) or psychologists such as Freud (1958). 
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other popular instances ―e.g., food, clothes or politics. This way, Shiller gave a social interpretation to 
behavioral biases such as herding, momentum, optimism, under and overreaction, and more.  
Finally, a review of the groundbreaking research in behavioral finance is only complete if it 
mentions the early work of Hersh Shefrin and Meir Statman. Shefrin had already made his first 
contribution to behavioral economics in Thaler and Shefrin (1981) mentioned above. However, it is his 
work with Statman (Shefrin and Statman, 1984, 1985) that represents, according to many, the dawn of 
the behavioral finance. In these two papers they provide two models which, based on behavioral 
concepts recently developed, were able to explain two observed phenomena that concerned people in 
the academics and the industry for long. On one hand, Shefrin and Statman (1984) explains the dividend 
puzzle76 based on four major elements: prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), mental 
accounting (Thaler, 1980), the theory of self-control (Thaler and Shefrin, 1981), and regret aversion. 
Firms would pay dividends because investors exercise better self-control if they are given dividends 
than if they have to sell shares ―which might lead to a liquidation of the portfolio faster than desirable. 
Shefrin and Statman (1985), on the other hand, provide a first insight on anomalies of trading activities, 
the most relevant being the disposition effect: investors exhibit a general disposition to sell winners too 
early and ride losers too long.77 Shefrin and Statman suggest the disposition effect is part of the general 
folklore about investing, though it has no interpretation under standard finance models. This theory was 
later confirmed in a series of papers by Odean (1998a, 1999) and Barber and Odean (2001, 2002).  
3.2.3. 1980 – 2000: A challenge to orthodoxy 
Since the 1980s, the pieces of evidence against standard finance by behaviorist researchers increased 
exponentially, to the point of setting behavioral finance in a position to become the new orthodoxy in 
finance. Three relevant topics in the literature during these years were herding, underreaction and the 
limits of arbitrage. The early research on these topics is reviewed in what follows, while other relevant 
contributions are outlined afterwards. 
The tendency of agents to follow the herd, that is, to mimic the investment decisions of other 
investors, is known as herding. Selden (1912) and Keynes (1936) were probably the first to suggest 
investors make decisions influenced by what other investors do, but the first to model a herd behavior 
were Scharfstein and Stein (1990) and Banerjee (1992). The first paper provides a model, valid both for 
corporate investment decisions and the stock market, based on a principal–agent problem where the 
                                                 
76 The dividend puzzle refers to the evidence of the persistence of firms paying dividends to their shareholders in spite of the 
recognition that share repurchases are a means of cash distribution that confer tax advantages (Subrahmanyam, 2007). 
77 Shefrin and Statman see in this behavior the aversion to a sure loss predicted in prospect theory. Indeed, the theoretical 
framework used in Shefrin and Statman (1985) is an extension based on the four elements used in the 1984 paper: prospect 
theory predicts winners will be sold and losers will be hold when the proceeds are held, rather than rolled over into another 
gamble; mental accounting clarifies when the disposition effect holds if realization proceeds are reinvested in another gamble; 
regret aversion would be an important rationale for investors having difficulty in realizing both gains and losses; and self-
control explain the rationale for methods investors use to force themselves to realize losses. 
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distortion in incentives plays a key role: herding is rational from the perspective of managers who are 
concerned about their reputations in the labor market. Banerjee (1992), instead, develops a model of 
with no incentive distortion that sets the basis for future analyses of herding. Under a sequential 
decision model where each decision maker rationally looks at the decisions made by previous agents, 
the equilibrium decision rule is shown to be characterized by extensive herding: “agents abandon their 
own signals and follow others, even when they are not really sure that the other person is right” (p. 807). 
Banerjee suggests herding might be a good explanation for the excess volatility: in his model, since the 
herd externality is of a positive-feedback type, the signals generated by the first few decision makers 
determine ‘where the first crowd forms’, while the others join the crowd and amplify the effect. 
Two years before that, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) pioneered the study of momentum.78 De 
Bondt and Thaler (1985) had previously found evidence of overreaction for periods up to five years, but 
professional managers and investors still used relative strength as a selection criterion. Jegadeesh and 
Titman assume that, for both strategies to be profitable, either the abnormal returns of momentum 
strategies are spurious, or the discrepancy is due to the different time horizons used in the trading rules. 
Thus, they analyze 32 different strategies and find that the return of all the zero-cost portfolios (buying 
winners, selling losers) generate positive returns over 3 to 12 month holding periods ―though half of 
the abnormal returns dissipates in the following two years. They also confirm that the momentum 
strategy works because of delayed price reactions to firm-specific information (implying market 
inefficiency) and not because of the higher systematic risk or lead-lag effects from delayed stock price 
reactions to common market factors. 
A key step for behavioral finance to provide an alternative interpretation to the efficient markets 
is the literature on the limits of arbitrage. A classic objection to behavioral finance interpreted as a 
‘collection of anomalies’ is that, even if some agents were less than fully rational, rational agents would 
avoid systematic deviations of security prices from fundamental values through arbitrage (Barberis and 
Thaler, 2003). Hence, a rationale for arbitrage to be limited was necessary for behavioral finance to 
succeed as an emerging theory. The limits of arbitrage show how a market with both rational and 
irrational traders can drive prices towards market inefficiency. Arbitrage, as it is traditionally defined,79 
requires no capital, entails no risk, and brings prices to fundamental values. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
came to suggest instead real-world arbitrage is risky and limited. Arbitrageurs are highly specialized 
professional agents who manage other investors’ capital and who may incur in temporary losses. Here 
an agency problem arises. Shleifer and Vishny provide then an agency model of limited arbitrage, 
                                                 
78 An early article is Levy (1967), who finds a positive relationship between buying stocks with high historical prices and future 
outperformance. However, Jensen and Bennington (1970) attribute the result to data mining. 
79 Arbitrage is the simultaneous purchase and sale of the same, or essentially similar, security in two different markets for 
advantageously different prices (Sharpe and Alexander, 1990). Friedman (1953a) was the first to assert arbitrage would ensure 
market efficiency, even if not all investors are rational: irrational investors would lose money, but they cannot lose money 
forever, so they would eventually disappear (Shleifer, 2000). 
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showing arbitrage is ineffective in extreme circumstances: basically, when assets are significantly 
mispriced and arbitrageurs are fully invested. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) worked their theory about the limits of arbitrage on the concept of 
noise trader risk ―the risk of noise traders’ beliefs not reverting to the mean for a long time― by DeLong 
et al. (1990a), who in turn borrow from Black’s (1986) concept of noise:80 people trade on noise as if it 
were information and causes markets to be inefficient, but it prevents investors from taking advantage 
of inefficiencies, too. DeLong et al.’s (1990a) model helps to explain some financial anomalies, like the 
mean reversion of stock returns, the closed-end fund puzzle, the excess volatility and the equity 
premium puzzle.81 In a scenario where perfect substitutes are available, arbitrageurs focus on exploiting 
noise traders’ misperceptions. However, arbitrageurs are likely to be risk averse and have short 
horizons, so their ability to take positions against noise traders is limited: thus, there is a chance that 
noise traders’ beliefs will not revert to their mean for a long time, or even become more extreme in the 
meantime. As a result, if an arbitrageur has to liquidate his positions before the price eventually 
recovers, he suffers a loss. Being aware of this in advance, the fear of a loss forces the agent to limit his 
original arbitrage position.  
Finally, a classic in the literature of limits of arbitrage is the rationale for an aggregate-market 
inefficiency. Authors like Figlewski (1979), Campbell and Kyle (1993) and Siegel (1998) suggest the 
impossibility to pin down stock or bond markets because a close substitute cannot be found. The idea 
that markets may be efficient from a micro but not from a macro perspective (for the aggregate market) 
gained relevance after the ‘Samuelson’s dictum’ (Jung and Shiller, 2006):82 “Modern markets show 
considerable micro efficiency (... the minority who spot aberrations from micro efficiency can make money 
from those occurrences and... wipe out any persistent inefficiencies). In no contradiction to the previous 
sentence, I had hypothesized considerable macro inefficiency, in the sense of long waves in the time series 
of aggregate indexes of security prices below and above various definitions of fundamental values” (p. 221). 
Jung and Shiller (2006) agree macro inefficiency is plausible because there is more information available 
about future changes in fundamentals of individual firms than of the aggregate stock market. 
Beyond limits of arbitrage, differences in opinion (Harrison and Kreps, 1978) are shown to 
provide a rationale for speculative markets. Several authors extended the analysis on the relationship 
between noise, heterogeneous expectations and speculative markets. An example is Cutler, Poterba and 
Summers (1990, 1991), who follow Kindleberger (1978) to model asset price dynamics when investors 
follow heterogeneous trading strategies. They show empirical evidence of speculative dynamics on 
                                                 
80 Black (1986) identifies three sources of noise: a large number of small events; noise as uncertainty about prices in the future; 
and noise in the form of expectations that need not to follow rational rules. 
81 Three relevant papers about the closed-end fund puzzle, the excess volatility and the equity premium puzzle are Lee, Shleifer 
and Thaler (1991), Campbell and Kyle (1993) and Benartzi and Thaler (1995), respectively. They are reviewed in Chapter 4. 
82 Shiller (2000) and Jung and Shiller (2006) quote this excerpt from a private letter by Paul Samuelson to John Campbell and 
Robert Shiller, reflecting a point Samuelson had set explicitly already in Samuelson (1998). 
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returns on stocks, bonds, foreign exchange, real estate and other assets.  These years witnessed as well 
the controversy on overreaction, underreaction and momentum. On one hand, De Bondt and Thaler 
(1987), Fama and French (1988a,b), Poterba and Summers (1988) and Campbell and Shiller (1988a,b), 
among others, reported additional evidence supporting the overreaction hypothesis. Jegadeesh (1990), 
Lehmann (1990) and Lo and MacKinlay (1990) also find evidence of a reversal behavior of extreme 
winners and losers. On the other hand, early papers showing evidence of underreaction and momentum 
include Bernard (1992), Michaely, Thaler and Womack (1995), Loughran and Ritter (1995), Spiess and 
Affleck-Graves (1995), Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1995), Ikenberry, Rankine and Stice 
(1996), and Rouwenhorst (1998).  
Some authors suggested a rationalist interpretation for overreaction, including Chan (1988) and 
Ball and Kothari (1989), who argue that contrary investing profits are due to a failure to correctly 
account for risk-adjusted returns, and Zarowin (1989, 1990), who argues they are related to the size 
effect (Banz, 1981).83 However, the evidence of momentum profitability stood out as a major unsolved 
puzzle: much research at that time was conducted to explain reversals in stock prices, but satisfactory 
explanations were still not available.84 Thus, Chan et al. (1996) try to rationalize the existence of 
momentum. They analyze different strategies that exploit market underreaction to two pieces of 
publicly available information ―namely, past returns and recent earnings surprises― and confirm that 
drifts in future returns over the next six and twelve months are predictable from them.85 Then, they pose 
a question: is there a contradiction between evidence of underreaction and contrarian overreaction? 
A full reconciliation of both theories would be an open area of research during the subsequent 
years. Chan et al. (1996) provide a first intuition: perhaps they are not incompatible, since a common 
element is a market’s tendency to anchor too heavily on past trends. Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1998) noticed as well that most researchers agree overreaction happens over long horizons (e.g., De 
Bondt and Thaler, 1985) while momentum tends to be profitable over short horizons (e.g., Jegadeesh 
and Titman, 1993). Consequently, they propose a model of investor sentiment motivated on the 
representativeness heuristic and conservatism. Extrapolation from random sequences, wherein agents 
expect patterns in small samples to continue, creates overreaction, while conservatism creates 
                                                 
83 Chopra, Lakonishok and Ritter (1992) and Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) later evidenced that contrarian investing 
yields higher returns because they exploit a suboptimal behavior of investors and not because they are fundamentally riskier. 
84 Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1996) cite these possible explanations for overreaction: bid-ask spreads (Kaul and 
Nimalendran, 1990; Jegadeesh and Titman, 1995), lead-lag effects between stocks (Lo and MacKinlay, 1990), investors’ 
tendency to overreact (De Bondt and Thaler, 1985, 1987; Chopra et al., 1992), microstructure biases (Ball, Kothari and Shanken, 
1995; Conrad and Kaul, 1993), time-variation in expected returns (Ball and Kothari, 1989), and differences in book-to-market 
value of equity (Chan, Hamao and Lakonishok, 1991; Fama and French, 1992; Lakonishok et al., 1994). However, not even Fama 
and French’s three-factor model was able to account for it. Possible explanations for the profitability of momentum strategies 
that were probed before Chan et al. (1996) were that medium-horizon returns could be related to earnings surprises (Affleck-
Graves and Mendenhall, 1992) or that positive feedback trading strategies (DeLong et al., 1990) could induce such profitability. 
85 Chan et al. (1996) suggest conservatism might be an alternative explanation for the profitability of momentum strategies. In 
this sense, Basu (1997) interpret conservatism as the accountants’ tendency to require a higher degree of verification for 
recognizing good news than bad news in financial statements, resulting in earnings reflecting bad news more quickly than good 
news, and causing systematic differences and earnings persistence. 
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momentum through underreaction. The model helps explain statistical evidence of underreaction of 
stock prices to a news announcement, and overreaction to a series of good or bad news announcements. 
Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998) propose another model to explain under and 
overreaction, but based on investor overconfidence and biased self-attribution.86 In addition, Lee and 
Swaminathan (2000) suggest a theory to reconcile intermediate-horizon underreaction and long-
horizon overreaction: they use past trading volume as a link between momentum and value strategies. 
Other early works that model investors’ behavior in a way that they generate both under and 
overreaction include Frankel and Froot (1988), Hong and Stein (1999), and Veronesi (1999). 
Beyond the debate on over and underreaction, the behavioral finance has also focused on 
providing additional insights on decision-making. Yaari (1987), for instance, modifies the expected 
utility theory in his so-called ‘dual theory’ of choice under risk: instead of requiring independence with 
respect to probability mixtures of risky prospects, it requires independence with respect to direct 
mixing of payments of risky prospects. Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) obtain experimental evidence 
that individuals disproportionately choose the status quo alternative ―that is, doing nothing or 
maintaining one’s previous decision. This is known as the status quo bias, a concept closely related to 
the endowment effect by Thaler (1980). Kahneman et al. (1990) analyze the discrepancies between 
willingness to accept (WTA) and willingness to pay (WTP),87 which are not explained under the Coase 
theorem (Coase, 1960). Those discrepancies reflect an effect of reference positions on preferences, as 
suggested by the endowment effect. Kahneman et al. show the effect is a manifestation of loss aversion. 
Further insight of endowment effect, loss aversion and status quo bias is provided by Kahneman, 
Knetsch and Thaler (1991). Finally, Tversky and Kahneman (1991) present a reference-dependent 
theory of consumer choice based on prospect theory which explains status quo by a deformation of 
indifference curves about the reference point. 
In the 1990s, Gigerenzer (1991, 1996) and Kahneman and Tversky (1996) engaged in a discussion 
on whether heuristics and biases are susceptible to represent large and systematic biases. Gigerenzer 
asserts that most errors in probabilistic reasoning ―such as overconfidence, conjunction fallacy or base-
rate neglect― are in fact not violations of probability theory, because researchers ignore conceptual 
distinctions fundamental to probability theory, such as the single case versus relative frequency.88 
                                                 
86 Daniel et al. (1998) also provide a first response to Fama (1998), when he claims that the increasing evidence of overreaction 
and underreaction is not sufficient to dismiss the theory of market efficiency, because anomalies seem to distribute randomly 
between underreaction and overreaction. Daniel et al. (1998) respond arguing that the return patterns are strong and regular, 
occur in different international markets and in different time periods, and some of those patterns (they specifically refer to the 
post-corporate event and the post-earnings announcement drift) are obtained in the majority of event studies. 
87 WTA is the minimum compensation demanded by an individual to give up a good or to accept something undesirable; WTP 
would be, instead, the maximum amount she would be willing to pay in the opposite situation. 
88 For example, overconfidence would not be a violation of probability theory, since such theory is not violated if one’s degree 
of belief (confidence) in a single event is different from the relative frequency of correct answers in the long run. For frequentists, 
the term probability referred to a single event has no meaning at all, probability theory is about frequencies. For subjectivists 
instead, probability is about single events, but rationality is identified with the internal consistency of subjective probabilities: 
there is no empirical criterion to prove an individual evaluation of the probability of an event to be right or wrong. 
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Kahneman and Tversky respond that Gigerenzer misrepresents their work for two reasons. First, biases 
and heuristics are not exclusively concerned with biases in assessments of subjective probability ―e.g., 
Kahneman and Tversky (1974) discuss twelve biases and only two involve subjective probability―but 
Gigerenzer “dismisses the entire body of research because of a debatable philosophical objection to two of 
twelve phenomena” (p. 583). In fact, Gigerenzer’s argument would lead to the conclusion that there is no 
normative basis for diagnosing whether any judgment is wrong or biased. Second, he misrepresents 
their position when characterizing judgmental heuristics as independent of context and content, when 
in fact framing has been a hallmark of their theory. Furthermore, they assert Gigerenzer ignores critical 
evidence that judgments of frequency are susceptible to large and systematic biases.89 
Eventually, by the new millennium behavioral finance was no longer as controversial as it once 
was (Thaler, 1999a) and was on the verge of going mainstream (Rabin, 2002a). Thus, the leading 
behaviorists condensed the knowledge developed so far in several books and literature review articles. 
Rabin (1998) enumerates the basic psychological phenomena that contradict the expected utility 
theory, including mild biases, severe biases in judgment under uncertainty, and psychological findings 
that represent a radical critique of the utility model. Shiller (2000a) makes a list of theories from other 
social sciences used by researchers in finance, that have done most of the work on understanding less-
than-perfectly rational human behavior. Relevant ones are prospect theory, mental accounting, regret 
and cognitive dissonance, anchoring, overconfidence, over and underreaction, and representativeness. 
Three classic books at the time were Kahneman and Tversky (2000) “Choices, values and frames”, 
Shefrin’s “Beyond Greed and Fear” and Shiller’s “Irrational Exuberance”.90 The former is a selection from 
their collaborative research on prospect theory. Shefrin (2000) provides a review of the three basic 
themes that underlie behavioral finance: how heuristic-driven biases and frame dependence lead to 
inefficient markets. Shiller (2000b) provides evidence that the stock market was significantly 
overvalued for reasons ranging from structural factors (internet, the decline of foreign rivals, 
materialistic values, baby boom, capital gains tax cuts, rise in pension plans and mutual funds), 
amplification mechanisms, cultural factors (news media, ‘new era economic thinking’), psychological 
factors (anchors, herd behavior), and others. Shleifer (2000) and Barberis and Thaler (2003) condense 
behavioral finance in two building blocks: limits of arbitrage and psychology (‘market sentiment’ in 
Shleifer’s terminology). Finally, Gilovich, Griffin and Kahneman (2002) edit “Heuristics and Biases: The 
Psychology of Intuitive Judgment”, a book that compiles the most influential research in heuristics and 
biases since their 1982 collection (Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky, 1982).91 
                                                 
89 The debate would continue, since Gigerenzer (alone and together with other authors) has developed a line of thought 
somewhat critical with behavioral finance. The discussion is analyzed in ‘heuristics’, subsection 4.2.1 of Chapter 4. 
90 Shiller chose the term Irrational exuberance quoting Alan Greenspan’s words in December 1996, when the former Chairman 
of the Federal Reserve expressed his concern with the excessive optimism in stock markets. 
91 Other publications include “Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart” (Gigerenzer, Todd and the ABC Research Group, 1999), 
a book about ‘fast and frugal heuristics’ that looks for a plausible notion of rationality; Starmer (2000), who reviews several 
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3.3. THE FUTURE OF THE BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND FINANCE 
 
The main critique of the rationalist school (e.g., Fama, 1998) is that behaviorists should provide a unified 
theory alternative to the EMH about the functioning of financial markets. As Subrahmanyam (2007) 
reckons, this critique may well be true at this point. However, since traditional finance does not appear 
to be supported by data, it makes more sense to improve those theories that are consistent with 
evidence (behavioral finance). In addition, the behaviorists defend this critique would only be partly 
justified, for two reasons. Firstly, psychological theories of intuitive thinking cannot match the precision 
of formal normative models, but this only means rational models are psychologically unrealistic 
(Kahneman, 2003a). Secondly, there is no single unifying model in behavioral finance, but neither can it 
be found in other fields of economics which are organized around several small models describing 
specific mechanisms (Shleifer, 2000). 
This subsection is devoted to review some of the most relevant of these models and theories that 
behavioral economics and finance have recently provided. In recent years, the research in the field has 
evolved to what Rabin (2002a) has called a ‘second wave behavioral economics’, which goes beyond a 
mere identification of problems with standard economic assumptions, to systematically exploring 
alternatives. However, we will only provide a brief summary of them, as the study of these theories 
exceeds the scope of this thesis. Namely, in what follows we review the following areas: decision theory; 
behavioral finance in financial markets; behavioral corporate finance; behavioral economics in 
consumption and inter-temporal decision making; debiasing techniques; and neuroeconomics. 
Decision theory. Prospect theory is the best established model in behavioral economics (Rieger 
and Wang, 2008a), replacing EUT as the dominant descriptive theory of risky decision making 
(Birnbaum, 2008a). Indeed, Rabin’s (2000) calibration theorem shows that no concave utility function 
can simultaneously explain plausible small-scale and large-scale risk attitudes, making expected utility 
theory an utterly implausible explanation for appreciable risk aversion over modest stakes. Following 
this, Rabin and Thaler (2001) pronounce the expected utility hypothesis dead.92 
Nonetheless, being the best description available of decision making under risk and uncertainty, 
prospect theory is imperfect (Starmer, 2000; Birnbaum, 2008a). Birnbaum (2008a) notes there is 
                                                 
alternatives to expected utility theory, including decision weights, reference dependent models, and non-transitive 
preferences; Belsky and Gilovich (1999), who highlight the most relevant biases why people use to make big money mistakes; 
and Gigerenzer (2001) and Gigerenzer and Selten (2001), who develop the concept of ecologically bounded rationality: to think 
of rational behavior as people using an ‘adaptive toolbox’ of fast and frugal heuristics rather than optimizing calculus. 
92 Kahneman (1994) highlights two different notions of utility: experienced utility and decision utility. People correctly perceive 
the consequences of their decisions, but misperceive the utility derived from them. Thus, the experienced utility of an outcome 
measures the hedonic experience of such outcome, whereas the decision utility would be the weight assigned to that outcome 
in a decision. Both measures may be systematically different, and make the ‘revealed preference’ method flaw. 
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evidence of paradoxes violating both versions of prospect theory, too. Critics include Brandstätter, 
Gigerenzer and Hertwig (2006), Gonzalez and Wu (2003), Starmer (2000) and others, though often 
followed by controversy (e.g., Rieger and Wang, 2008a). Models trying to solve recent critiques to 
prospect theory include Birnbaum’s (2008b) transfer of attention exchange model, Schmidt, Starmer 
and Sugden’s (2008) third generation prospect theory, and Harrison and Rutström’s (2009) proposal to 
reconcile EUT and PT using a mixture model. Finally, although originally a static model, prospect theory 
has been widely applied to dynamic settings in economics to understand work effort, brand choices, 
capital budgeting, stock returns, trading volumes, and option exercises (Arkes et al., 2010). Examples of 
dynamic settings of prospect theory include Heath, Larrick, and Wu (1999), Barberis and Huang (2001), 
and Grinblatt and Han (2005). 
BF in financial markets. The greatest advances in the behavioral literature have come from the 
behavioral finance applied to financial markets. Traditional finance appears to be limited to understand 
three main issues: why do individual investors trade and how they perform, how do they choose their 
portfolios, and why do returns vary across stocks for reasons other than risk (Subrahmanyam, 2007). 
In addition, recent evidence indicates that mergers and acquisitions and capital structure decisions do 
not conform to rational managers’ behavior. Following this, we split this review in three sections: asset 
pricing and portfolio choice, trading models, and inefficient markets (limits of arbitrage). Behavioral 
corporate finance is analyzed afterwards. 
Campbell (2000) reviews the literature on asset pricing and optimal portfolio choice until then. 
Modern research interprets that the trade-off between risk and return depends on the behavior of the 
stochastic discount factor (SDF, pricing kernel) that prices all assets in the economy. The behavior of the 
term structure of real interest rates restricts the conditional mean of the SDF, whereas the patterns of 
risk premia restrict its conditional volatility and factor structure. The behavioral models of asset pricing 
start with Shefrin and Statman’s (1994) Behavioral Capital Asset Pricing Model (BAPM), which models 
asset pricing as in CAPM but in a market where noise traders interact with informed traders. 
Information traders are the ones in the standard CAPM: free of cognitive errors and have mean–variance 
preferences. Noise traders live outside the CAPM, commit cognitive errors, and do not have strict mean–
variance preferences. The expected returns of securities in the BAPM are determined by their 
‘behavioral betas’, that is, the betas relative to the tangent mean–variance efficient portfolio, which is 
not the market portfolio because noise traders affect security prices.93 
Hirshleifer (2001) asserts that the purely rational approach to asset pricing is being replaced by 
a broader psychology-based approach, where security expected returns are determined both by risk 
                                                 
93 For example, if noise traders prefer growth stocks, this would raise the relative price of growth stock versus value. Thus, the 
BAPM mean–variance-efficient portfolio would be tilted toward value stocks. However, the estimation of standard and 
behavioral betas has some problems: we must use imprecise proxies for the true market portfolio, and for behavioral betas the 
proxy problem is even more severe because the composition of the BAPM mean–variance-efficient portfolio changes over time. 
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and misvaluation. Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (2001), for instance, offer a model in which 
asset prices reflect both covariance risk and misperceptions of firms’ prospects, and arbitrageurs trade 
against mispricing. Authors extending this view include Dean and Faff (2011), who develop a behavioral 
intertemporal CAPM useful for markets that display the feedback trading phenomenon, Anderson, 
Ghysels and Juergens (2005), who investigate whether the amount of heterogeneity in analysts’ 
forecasts can explain asset pricing puzzles, and Diether, Malloy and Scherbina (2002), who obtain 
evidence consistent with the hypothesis that prices reflect optimism. Chordia and Shivakumar (2002), 
instead, get evidence against this interpretation: momentum strategies might be explained by a set of 
lagged macroeconomic variables. Shefrin (2008a) summarizes this literature to examine how 
behavioral finance principles affect asset pricing. 
Shefrin and Statman’s (2000) Behavioral Portfolio Theory (BPT) enhances their BAPM model to 
determine the mean–variance efficient frontier when investors segregate their portfolios into mental 
accounts, overlooking the covariances among them. In consequence, the CAPM two-fund separation 
does not hold in BPT. Goetzmann and Kumar (2008) show younger and less wealthy investors hold 
under-diversified portfolios, which might suggest they exhibit stronger behavioral biases. Dumas, 
Kurshev and Uppal (2009) work to identify which portfolio strategies would allow an investor to take 
advantage of excess volatility and fluctuations in sentiment risk. Finally, Das et al. (2010) generalize 
Markowitz’s mean–variance portfolio theory and Shefrin and Statman’s BPT via a unified mental 
accounting framework. They show that the aggregate allocation across mental accounting subportfolios 
is mean–variance efficient with short selling, resulting in a fruitful connection between investor 
consumption goals and portfolio production. 
Eventually, these models try to infer whether markets are driven by fundamentals or sentiment. 
Shefrin (2001b) gives a formal definition of sentiment as a coefficient λ that accounts for either market 
optimism or pessimism. Then he relates sentiment and asset pricing by stating that the pricing kernel94 
can be decomposed into two stochastic processes: a fundamental process based on aggregate 
consumption growth that is associated with zero market error, and a sentiment component that reflects 
the market error. Baker and Stein (2004) build a model that uses market liquidity as a sentiment 
indicator. They conclude that, in the presence of short-sale constraints, high liquidity would be a 
symptom that the market is dominated by market sentiment, hence it would be overvalued. 
The first trading models to exploit patterns in stock returns were Daniel et al. (1998), Barberis et 
al. (1998), and Hong and Stein (1999), already mentioned in subsection 3.2.3. Recent extensions are in 
                                                 
94 The pricing kernel is the stochastic discount factor that prices all assets in the economy (Campbell, 2000): “In the absence of 
arbitrage opportunities, there exists a ‘stochastic discount factor’ that relates payoffs to market prices for all assets in the economy. 
This can be understood as an application of the Arrow–Debreu model of general equilibrium to financial markets. A state price 
exists for each state of nature at each date, and the market price of any financial asset is just the sum of its possible future payoffs, 
weighted by the appropriate state prices” (p. 1516). 
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order. Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) show that the interaction of overconfidence and short sale 
constraints may lead to asset pricing bubbles. Hong, Scheinkman and Xiong (2006) show such 
phenomena can be exacerbated if assets have limited float. Hong, Kubik and Stein’s (2005) model where 
agents use overly-simplified models to evaluate stocks is able to explain a phenomena like momentum 
and asset bubbles. Grinblatt and Han (2005) argue loss aversion helps to explain momentum. Kausar 
and Taffler (2006) provide evidence supporting Daniel et al. (1998). Daniel and Titman (2006) argue 
that the return predictability of market-to-book ratios (Fama and French, 1992) is driven by 
overconfidence. Doukas and Petmezas (2007) find support for the self-attribution hypothesis in the 
market for corporate control. Finally, Vayanos and Wooley (2013) provide an institutional theory of 
momentum based on flows between investment funds, where flows are triggered by changes in fund 
managers’ efficiency, which investors either observe directly or infer from past performance. 
Barberis and Thaler (2003) classify the behavioral models above in three groups, according to 
which mechanism generates the anomaly: models based on beliefs (e.g., Barberis et al., 1998), models 
based on institutional frictions ―often short sale constraints― combined with mild interpretations of 
investor irrationality (e.g., Scheinkman and Xiong, 2003), and models based on preferences, like 
Barberis, Huang and Santos (2001) and Barberis and Huang’s (2001) interpretation on narrow framing 
and changing degrees of loss aversion. Finally, Barberis and Shleifer (2003) analyze the investors’ 
tendency to categorize assets into groups, such as growth and value. Their model generates three 
empirical predictions. First, style investing generates common factors in asset returns that happen to be 
grouped in the same style, and that can be accompanied by higher average returns for reasons other 
than risk. Second, it also increases the correlation between assets in the same style, while it lowers 
between assets in different styles. Third, the model predicts a rich structure of style return 
autocorrelations and a high profitability of style momentum and value strategies.  
Finally, some models have been offered to explain the limits of arbitrage that would justify why 
markets are inefficient. Following Subrahmanyam (2007), if financial market prices are driven at least 
in part by irrational agents, two questions arise. First, why does arbitrage not remove any mispricing? 
Second, why do irrational traders not get driven out of the market in the long-run? In regards to the first 
question, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) point two main reasons why inefficiencies may not be arbitraged 
away, as we mentioned in subsection 3.2.3. The first one is risk arbitrage: based on the concept of noise 
trader risk (DeLong et al., 1990), they suggest mispricing can go worst before it eventually disappears, 
so arbitrageurs might have to close or scale back their bets in order to meet margin calls for the short 
positions in the asset (Scherbina, 2013). Xiong (2001) and Gromb and Vayanos (2002) extend this view. 
Another source of risk is that the mispricing may disappear because a change in fundamentals. Hence, 
Daniel et al. (2001) argue that due to risk aversion, arbitrageurs may not be able to remove all systematic 
mispricing. The second reason why inefficiencies may not be arbitraged away is performance-based 
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arbitrage: an agency problem arises when arbitrage is conducted by specialized agents who manage 
capital of outside investors. In such case, investors may rationally allocate their money based on past 
returns of arbitrageurs. 
Several models on limits of arbitrage were subsequently proposed. Shleifer and Vishny’s (1997) 
agency model of limited arbitrage shows arbitrage is ineffective when assets are significantly mispriced 
and arbitrageurs are fully invested. Three consequences follow. First, arbitrageurs’ ability to bear 
against mispricing is limited (they are vulnerable to liquidity constraints and to risks coming from other 
traders’ mistakes). Second, arbitrageurs may bail out of the market when their participation to correct 
prices is most needed. Third, they will prefer markets with three characteristics: markets where it is 
easier to estimate fundamental values; markets where investments can be cashed quickly; and, perhaps 
counterintuitively, markets with lower volatility ―the higher the volatility the higher the possibility of 
losses, and hence the worst for risk averse arbitrageurs. Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) offer a model 
with short sale constraints which predicts arbitrageurs, being aware of the existence of an asset bubble, 
will optimally choose not to short sell the asset and ride the bubble for some time. Brunnermeier and 
Nagel (2004) provide empirical support to this result: during the dot-com bubble, that was the strategy 
most hedge funds followed. 
In regards to the second question asked before, that is, why irrational traders are not driven out 
of the market in the long-run, Subrahmanyam (2007) suggests three counter-arguments. First, DeLong 
et al. (1991) suggest overconfidence may lead irrational agents to bear more risk, which may make them 
earn a higher return in the long run. Kyle and Wang (1997) offer a similar interpretation. Second, 
Hirshleifer, Subrahmanyam and Titman (2006) argue that irrational agents who act on sentiment 
sequentially on the same direction would push up prices. If stock prices influence fundamentals by 
affecting corporate investment, that would result in the irrationals, as a group, outperforming the 
rationals. Third, Subrahmanyam argues as well that some investors may trade just for pleasure, as a 
consumption good. These traders may continue to trade even if they lose money on average.  
Behavioral corporate finance. Behaviorist researchers on this area have mainly focused on 
corporate financial decisions such as capital budgeting, the choice of capital structure, the payment of 
dividends, and mergers and acquisitions. Stein (1996), on the empirical evidence that CAPM betas are 
not able to explain cross-sectional stock returns while other variables, such as the book-to-market ratio, 
do, poses a question: how should one set hurdle rates for capital budgeting decisions? Hence, he offers 
a new estimator on the assumption that markets are inefficient. Gervais and Goldstein (2004) model a 
team in which the marginal productivity of a player increases with the eﬀort of others in the team. In 
such context, an overconﬁdent agent may overestimate her own marginal productivity and work harder, 
thereby increasing the marginal productivity of her teammates. Similar results are obtained more 
recently by Gervais, Heaton and Odean (2011).  
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Traditional finance texts teach that the debt-to-equity choice is a tradeoff between interest tax 
shields and bankruptcy costs. Baker and Wurgler (2002) suggest instead firms are more likely to issue 
equity when their stock seems overvalued. In consequence, current capital structure is strongly related 
to historical market values. Welch (2004) provides empirical evidence that U.S. corporations do not 
counteract the influence of stock price changes on their capital structures, against rational theories of 
capital structure. In consequence, the debt-to-equity ratios of these companies vary closely with 
fluctuations in their stock prices: over five-year horizons, stock returns can explain about 40 percent of 
debt ratio dynamics. Leary and Roberts (2005) suggest instead that these findings implicitly assume 
that rebalancing is costless. However, with the presence of adjustment costs, which may make it 
suboptimal to respond immediately to capital structure shocks, they find firms actively rebalance their 
leverage to stay within an optimal range. Further insights are provided by Dell’Acqua et al. (2013). 
Finally, a common result in the corporate finance literature is that firms tend to issue new equity after 
periods of high stock returns. Alti and Sullaeman (2012) document such behavior only in periods when 
high returns coincide with strong institutional investor demand.  
A behavioral explanation of the dividend puzzle was first given by Shefrin and Statman (1984), as 
discussed in Section 3.2. More recently, Baker and Wurgler (2004) argue that investors, during certain 
times, demand higher dividends. They show that the decision of companies to pay dividends is driven 
by variations in an empirical proxy for such dividend desire. Brav et al. (2005) survey 400 executives to 
determine the factors that drive dividend and share repurchase decisions. The executives claim that 
maintaining the dividend payout is as important to them as the firm’s investment decisions, while they 
repurchase stock only when there is residual cash flow after investment spending. Denis and Osobov 
(2008) find that the propensity to pay dividends is higher among larger, more profitable firms, and those 
for which retained earnings comprise a large fraction of total equity. 
Finally, another classic puzzle is why, in M&A transactions, acquiring firms do not earn superior 
returns after the takeover, despite the synergistic benefits, while target companies do (Asquith, Bruner 
and Mullins, 1983). Roll (1986) suggests the hubris hypothesis of corporate takeovers, in which financial 
markets are rational but corporate managers are not. Shleifer and Vishny (2003), on the contrary, 
suggest a theory of acquisitions where financial markets are inefficient and some firms are valued 
incorrectly, while managers are rational, understand stock market inefficiencies, and take advantage of 
them. Thus, merger transactions would be driven by the stock market valuations of the merging firms: 
companies with high market valuations would acquire those with low ones. Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson 
and Viswanathan (2005) and Dong et al. (2006) provide empirical support to the assertion that market 
misvaluation influences corporate takeovers. Finally, Malmendier and Tate (2008) obtain empirical 
results closer to Roll’s (1986) view: overconfident CEOs overestimate their ability to generate returns 
and, as a result, overpay for acquired firms. 
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Behavioral economics. Here the field of analysis is interminable, as it may include areas as 
diverse as health, public choice, labor markets and others. To make it shorter, in what follows we 
basically review only some behavioral models on consumption and inter-temporal decision making. 
Mullainathan and Thaler (2000) suggest two main areas where the behavioral deviations from 
the standard economic model ―bounded rationality, bounded willpower and bounded self-interest― 
are more interesting to analyze: namely, financial markets and savings. Savings, in particular, mostly 
refers to decisions on saving for retirement and the life-cycle model. The behavioral finance tries to 
explain how the embedded rationality assumptions in the life-cycle model of savings might fail. These 
assumptions, according to Benartzi and Thaler (2007), are the explicit assumption that savers save and 
then deplete their savings to maximize some lifetime utility function, and the implicit assumptions that 
households have the cognitive ability to solve the optimization problem and that they also have 
sufficient self-control to execute this optimal plan. Then, Benartzi and Thaler (2007) offer a theoretical 
approach to saving-for-retirement decision making that satisfies the empirical findings previously 
observed by Benartzi and Thaler (2001). These include a naïve and poor portfolio diversification (they 
show people often allocate 1/n of their savings amongst n available investment options), lack of self-
control and commitment (bounded willpower), mental accounting and framing, and others. In addition, 
a classic line of research to explain why people fail to save what they need for retirement observes 
people tend to exhibit excessive discounting of the future due to a present or immediacy bias. Baley, 
Kumar and Ng (2011) analyze as well some behavioral biases of mutual fund investors, such as attention 
to news, tax awareness, and familiarity bias. They find biased investors poorly perform due to bad 
decisions about fund style and expenses, trading frequency, and timing.  
Wiener and Doescher (2008) identify the factors that influence people's intention to save for 
retirement and focus on the role that persuasive communications can play to enhance them. Hershfield 
et al. (2011) explore how to mitigate lack of self-control by allowing participants in an experiment to 
interact with realistic computer renderings of their future selves using immersive virtual reality 
hardware and interactive decision aids. Alternatively, instead of focusing on savings, we may focus on 
its counterpart: consume. Some efforts have recently been performed to understand consumer decision 
making. Yoon, Cole and Lee (2009), for instance, analyze the decision making process by older 
consumers. They identify the notion of fit between individual characteristics, task demands and the 
contextual environment: when the fit is high, older consumers use their experience to compensate for 
age-related changes in abilities and resources; when it is low, they feel need to adapt their decision 
making processes. Mata and Nunes (2010) perform additional research on aging and consumer choice. 
Debiasing. A relevant area of research within behavioral economics and finance is the study of 
strategies for debiasing. If behaviorists have been able to provide empirical evidence that agents and 
investors tend to make biased decisions, perhaps they might be helpful as well for people to choose 
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better. Rabin (1998) poses a first question about debiasing: do learning and expertise eliminate biases? 
Rationalists often argue that if economic activity is performed by experts, or the same individuals 
perform the same tasks repeatedly, full rationality prospers. However, Rabin (1998) reviews the 
academic literature to argue on the contrary. Kahneman and Tversky (1972) and Tversky and 
Kahneman (1982b) find that the biasing effects of representativeness are also found in the intuitive 
judgments of sophisticated psychologists. Kahneman and Tversky (1982c) talk about errors of 
applications when people do learn about their biases but do not apply this knowledge in subsequent 
cases. Similar results are in Griffin and Tversky (1992) about overconfidence, who also show learning 
can even sometimes lead to exacerbate errors. Finally, Hinds (1999) finds experimental evidence that 
experts may have a cognitive handicap that leads them to be worse predictors of novice performance 
and to be more resistant to debiasing techniques. 
Hence, the study of debiasing techniques and their ability to correct biased choices makes sense. 
Early research on debiasing, mostly summarized by Kahneman et al. (1982),95 served to demonstrate 
the robustness of systematic biases to various corrective measures. Larrick (2004) provides a more 
recent review. First, he highlights two alternative approaches to ‘close the gap’ between normative and 
descriptive decision-making. One approach tries to increase the motivation to perform well. This 
approach assumes people possess normative strategies and use them when the benefits exceed the 
costs. The second approach assumes instead that intuitive strategies are imperfect, but may be replaced 
by strategies that approach normative standards. This is known as prescriptive decision making. 
These approaches share a common implication: debiasing requires intervention, since there are 
many reasons to doubt individuals can debias themselves (Kahneman, 2003b). Several examples of 
debiasing techniques follow in order. Mahajan (1992) provides experimental evidence that training to 
reason counterfactually or even providing humbling feedback could help reduce overconfidence. 
Camerer and Hogarth (1999) show incentives are generally ineffective to reduce biases. Thaler and 
Benartzi (2001) show firms can rebias employees to save more by changing the status quo and by 
exploiting mental accounting. Indeed, the effectiveness of changing the status quo to induce others to 
‘choose right’ is behind a whole area of research developed thereafter by Richard Thaler and others, 
known as libertarian paternalism (Thaler and Sunstein, 2003).  
Kahneman and Frederick (2002) suggest some conditions under which biases may disappear, 
including statistical sophistication, intelligence, manipulations of attention, frequency format, and 
within-subjects factorial designs. Sanna and Schwarz (2003) test the role of accessibility experiences 
and attributions in debiasing the hindsight bias. Soll and Klayman (2004) show overprecision to 
estimate confidence intervals may be reduced by asking judges to generate 10th and 90th percentile 
                                                 
95 This would include the works by Singer (1971), Dawes (1979), Kahneman and Tversky (1982a), Fischhoff (1982a), and 
Nisbett et al. (1982). 
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estimates in separate stages. Lovallo and Kahneman (2003) notice a firm’s competitiveness can be 
seriously damaged if executives actively discourage pessimism ―which is often interpreted as 
disloyalty: “When pessimistic opinions are suppressed while optimistic ones are rewarded (groupthink 
theory) an organization's ability to think critically is undermined” (p. 60). They suggest to take an ‘outside 
view’ to remove excess optimism. In the same line, Shefrin and Cervellati (2011) defend that the accident 
drilling British Petroleum’s well in the Gulf of Mexico on 2010 was a result of capital budgeting pitfalls 
due to biased decision making ―affected by excessive optimism, overconfidence, confirmation bias, and 
aversion to a sure loss. They suggest several debiasing procedures using cognitive repairs (Heath, 
Larrick and J. Klayman, 1998). 
Notwithstanding, some limits of debiasing have been suggested. The strongest critique denies the 
validity of debiasing in its totality. According to Frankfurter et al. (2004), behavioral finance has taken 
a marked prescriptive turn with the purpose of remedying deviations from the normative expected 
utility axioms of rational choice. This view assumes that “if people do not behave according to the 
prescriptions of the theory, then something is wrong with people and not with the theory” (p. 450). In 
consequence, irrational human behavior must be modified. However, Frankfurter et al. (2004) claim 
against this view: when the limitations of the normative model have become so obvious, it is nonsense 
to insist upon changing humanity to conform to it. Softer critiques include those by Weinstein and Klein 
(1995), who find a resistance of personal risk perceptions to debiasing. In particular, they describe four 
studies regarding health prevention where optimistic biases in perceived risk were found in all studies. 
The attempts to reduce optimism did not reduce these biases consistently; in contrast, conditions using 
opposite manipulations often exacerbated the biases. More recently, Kaustia and Perttula (2012) report 
different debiasing attempts to reduce overconfidence that yield mixed results. First, there are different 
types of overconfidence (see Chapter 4) and they respond differentially to debiasing. Explicit written 
warnings, for instance, reduce overplacement. In contrast, they report limited success in reducing 
miscalibration in probability assessments. 
Neuroeconomics. The last area of research to join the behavioral economics and finance is 
neuroeconomics, which uses knowledge about brain mechanisms to inform economic theory (Camerer, 
Loewenstein and Prelec, 2004). The foundations of economics were laid in a moment when we did not 
have access to the human brain. Theories such as expected utility and Bayesian updating assumed 
rationality of choice and made use of the ‘as if’ assumption (Friedman, 1953b), assuming people behave 
as if they use those mathematical tools they derived, sidestepping any psychological detail (Camerer, 
Loewenstein and Prelec, 2005). The rationality assumption was criticized by some economists already 
before the emergence of revealed preference, which would show some anomalies in decision making 
were indeed observed. Now, neuroeconomics allows for a direct measure of feelings and thoughts, 
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allowing scientist to identify whether neural mechanisms produce rational choice and judgment and, if 
they do not, the brain evidence has the potential to suggest better theory (Camerer et al., 2004). 
Camerer et al. (2004, 2005) provide a first insight. Neuroscience uses tools such as brain imaging, 
behavior of patients with brain damage, animal behavior and recording single neuron activity. Its 
measurements are challenging our understanding of how people make choices and its implications for 
economics. First, the brain is composed of multiple systems which interact, and automatic processes 
which are faster than conscious deliberations and need not follow normative axioms of inference and 
choice. Second, brain evidence shows emotional activation of some systems in ambiguous choice and 
strategic interaction, whose design is common to humans and many animals. Third, cognition and affect 
on one hand, and automatic and controlled processes on the other, work separately, and interact. 
Glimcher, Dorris and Bayer (2005) claim these findings place mathematical constraints on 
existing economic models. Neuroeconomics, indeed, might reconcile the tension between prescriptive 
and descriptive approaches: when people deviate from rationality it is a physiological encoding of 
desirability, which Glimcher et al. (2005) name physiological expected utility, what leads people’ choices. 
Camerer et al. (2005) set four implications for economics. First, these findings cast doubts on commonly 
used constructs in economics such as risk aversion, time preference, and altruism. Second, the existence 
of specialized systems suggests intelligence and bounded rationality are likely to be highly domain 
specific. Third, brain-scans suggest that money activates similar reward areas as do other primary 
reinforcers like food and drugs. This would imply that money confers direct utility, rather than being 
valued for what it can buy as a medium of exchange. Fourth, neuroeconomics challenges the assumed 
connection between motivation and pleasure.  
Camerer (2007) summarizes the areas where rational theories and behavioral economics would 
better work. Simple kinds of decisions on life-and-death (food, sex and danger) do occur as rational 
theories assume. Instead, classic constructs in behavioral economics such as a preference for immediacy 
and nonlinear weighting of small and large probabilities are observed. Zak (2011) makes a physiological 
study of moral sentiments as in Adam Smith (1759). His research provides direct evidence on the brain 
mechanism, called HOME (human oxytocin-mediated empathy), which produces pro-social behaviors. 
The HOME circuit permits to identify situations in which moral sentiments will be engaged or not, with 
applications in areas as diverse as perceived trustworthiness of economic institutions, how moral 
sentiments can be promoted or inhibited by the firm’s environment, and others. 
Finally, some criticisms to neuroeconomics have been posed as well. Harrison (2008) argues 
against some methodological flaws of neuroeconomics and behavioral economics. In particular, his 
complaints are with the epistemological basis of neuroeconomics research,96 whose claims would 
                                                 
96 Epistemology is the study of knowledge claims in philosophy (Harrison, 2008). 
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appear to build on poor experimental and statistical foundations. Ross (2008) distinguishes two types 
of research that are both known as neuroeconomics: neurocellular economics (NE) and behavioral 
economics in the scanner (BES). Harrison’s (2008) criticisms of neuroeconomics would not apply to NE 
but to BES. NE uses constrained maximization and equilibrium analysis to model functional parts of 
brains. Brains are, like markets, information-processing networks, and NE analyzes the executive 
systems that govern them. Behavioral economics in the scanner, instead, is the more famous style of 
neuroeconomics. BES would mainly consist of repeating protocols from behavioral economics 
experiments while participants are observed under neuroimaging, in order to use brain data to justify 
arguments for replacing standard microeconomics by notions based on human psychology. Ross (2008) 
claims this methodology is naively reductionist. 
 
3.4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Chapter 3 has served as a first approach to the basic research and theories on behavioral economics and 
finance. To such purpose, we have provided a brief review of the main landmarks of behavioral finance, 
following a historical approach. 
First, after describing some of the early antecedents, we described the main achievements by the 
researchers that pioneered the behavioral literature. Namely, the prospect theory by Daniel Kahneman 
and Amos Tversky, the application of psychology to economics by Richard Thaler, the disclosure of the 
volatility anomaly in financial markets by Robert Shiller, and the first theoretical models by Hersh 
Shefrin and Meir Statman. 
Second, we outlined the main achievements by behaviorist researchers that came to challenge the 
orthodoxy from the 1980s to the 2000s. These would include the literature on herding, underreaction, 
the limits of arbitrage, speculative markets, and decision making. 
Third, we reviewed some models and theories that behavioral economics and finance have 
recently provided, in their effort to become an alternative to the academic orthodoxy in areas as diverse 
as decision theory, financial markets, corporate finance, consumption and inter-temporal decision 
making, debiasing techniques, and neuroeconomics. 
The review of the behavioral literature continues in Part II. Firstly, in Chapter 4, with an extensive 
insight on the main behavioral biases and anomalies studied in the literature. This would serve for 
having a better criterion to select which will be the main lines of research in Part III ―i.e., the theoretical 
and experimental research. Secondly, such lines of research will be analyzed in detail in Chapter 5.  
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SUMMARY OF PART II 
 
Behavioral finance has proved to be a powerful means to highlight anomalies in financial markets and 
investor decision making. Though it does not imply a global rejection of market efficiency, it does stress 
the limits of the rationality assumption and the ability to explain phenomena such as return 
predictability and price bubbles under a behavioral interpretation. 
In this thesis we seek to extend the virtues of the behavioral approach to the analysis of 
informational efficiency in bank-based financial systems ―particularly, to the role banks play when 
granting credit to the economy. Thus, Part II is devoted to provide a deeper insight on the main theories 
of behavioral economics and finance, theories that will reveal essential to interpret our theoretical and 
experimental research in Part III. In particular, Chapter 4 reviews the extensive list of biases and 
anomalies that contradict the efficiency postulates of standard finance. Then, Chapter 5 focuses on two 
of the most relevant topics within the behavioral literature: namely, overconfidence and prospect 
theory. Those are the areas we will focus on in our research in Part III, both in the experimental tests 
(Chapters 7 and 8) and the theoretical models (Chapter 9). 
Part II is organized as follows. Chapter 4 is devoted to an extensive research on the main biases 
and anomalies in the behavioral literature. Then, Chapter 5 focuses the analysis on two areas that will 
serve as a starting point for our work in Part III; namely, prospect theory and overconfidence. 
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CHAPTER 4. A TAXONOMY OF BIASES AND ANOMALIES 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter is devoted to provide an extensive review of the main biases and anomalies identified by 
the literature on behavioral economics and finance. We start providing an original taxonomy that is 
based on relevant literature. We then focus on an extensive description of the most relevant of those 
biases and anomalies, as well as a review of the main contributions in the literature about them. Finally, 
our goal will be to choose, based on the previous analysis, some items on which to focus in Part III. These 
items will be analyzed more extensively in Chapter 5.  
We start providing a taxonomy of biases and anomalies. Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1991) 
define anomaly as an empirical result that “is difficult to ‘rationalize’, or if implausible assumptions are 
necessary to explain it within the paradigm” (p. 193). A bias, meanwhile, is a predisposition toward error 
(Shefrin, 2006). Many authors have provided different taxonomies of the most relevant behavioral 
biases and anomalies, but rarely using a comprehensive approach. The rules to classify behavioral 
anomalies are diverse, and different authors often use different names for quite similar concepts ―or 
different anomalies that are closely related― what makes it quite difficult to provide an inclusive 
classification that satisfies all of them. The taxonomy provided here is based on some relevant works, 
including Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky (1982), Tversky and Kahneman (1992), Kahneman and Riepe 
(1998), Rabin (1998), Thaler (1999a,b), Shiller (2000a), Shefrin (2000), Gilovich and Griffin (2002), 
Barberis and Thaler (2003), Camerer and Loewenstein (2004), and Hens and Bachmann (2008).97 
                                                 
97 Kahneman et al. (1982) summarize heuristics and judgmental biases in seven categories: representativeness, causality and 
attribution, availability, covariation and control, overconfidence, conservatism (multistage evaluation), and judgmental biases 
in risk perception. Tversky and Kahneman (1992) mention two phases in the choice process ―namely, framing and valuation― 
and list five major phenomena: framing effects, nonlinear preferences, source dependence, risk seeking and loss aversion. 
Kahneman and Riepe (1998) classify the deviations from rationality in three categories and a consequence. The categories are 
heuristics (judgmental biases, overconfidence, optimism, hindsight bias and overreaction), errors of preference (prospect 
theory and loss aversion), and framing. In addition, investment decisions have emotional and financial consequences people 
must bear ―this basically involves regret. Rabin (1998) separates mild biases (reference level and loss aversion, endowment 
effect, status quo bias), severe biases in judgment under uncertainty (law of small numbers, confirmatory bias, anchoring and 
adjustment, hindsight bias), and psychological findings that imply a radical critique of the maximizing utility model (framing 
effects, preference reversals, self-control). Thaler (1999a) cites five market effects: excessive trading volume, excess volatility, 
equity premium puzzle, preference for dividends, and return predictability. Thaler (1999b) links mental accounting to prospect 
theory. Shiller (2000a) lists some theories from social sciences used by researchers in finance, like prospect theory, regret and 
cognitive dissonance, anchoring, mental accounting, over and underreaction, overconfidence, and representativeness. Shefrin 
(2000) separates heuristic-driven biases (availability, representativeness and gambler’s fallacy, anchoring-and-adjustment 
and conservatism, overconfidence, aversion to ambiguity), frame dependence (related to loss aversion, mental accounting, 
hedonic editing, self-control, money illusion and regret) and inefficient prices. In the introduction to Gilovich, Griffin and 
Kahneman (2002), Gilovich and Griffin (2002) identify six general purpose heuristics (affect, availability, causality, fluency, 
similarity and surprise) and six special purpose heuristics (attribution substitution, outrage, prototype, recognition, choosing 
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These authors considered,98 an original taxonomy was elaborated following some considerations. 
Firstly, we separate psychological biases and the consequences of those biases. In regards to the former, 
Kahneman (2003a,b) summarizes his work with Tversky in three parts: the heuristics people use and 
the biases to which they are prone when judging under uncertainty; prospect theory, as a model of 
choice under risk, and loss aversion in riskless choice; and framing effects. In addition, Tversky and 
Kahneman (1981) consider two phases in the choice process, an initial of framing and a subsequent of 
evaluation. While framing might be viewed as a heuristic error ―as it implies people are boundedly 
rational― Rabin (1998) considers framing effects more relevant: more than confusing people, frames 
may determine a person’s preferences. In any case, we must be aware of the very close interrelation 
between framing and prospect theory that makes them form a natural pair (Barberis and Huang, 2009). 
Alternatively, other authors (e.g., Barberis and Thaler, 2003) merge prospect theory and ambiguity 
aversion in a same category (preferences), a line we shall not follow here. In addition, we consider to 
include a fourth group within biases, which refers to those we make because we are influenced by other 
people (culture, social contagion, fads, etc.). We denote this group social factors, which refer to cultural 
and social influences on individual’s behavior. Authors highlighting the importance of this group include 
Shiller (2000a), Shefrin (2000) and Hens and Bachmann (2008), among others.  
In regards to the second category, that is, the behavioral consequences that come as a result of our 
biases in decision-making, we follow Barberis and Thaler (2003) to split them into market anomalies 
and decision effects (‘investor behavior anomalies’ in Barberis and Thaler’s terminology). To sum up, 
                                                 
by liking and choosing by default). Barberis and Thaler (2003) note two kinds of irrationality and two of anomalies. The former 
includes beliefs (representativeness, conservatism, anchoring, confirmation bias, availability, overconfidence and optimism) 
and preferences (prospect theory and ambiguity aversion). Anomalies split in market anomalies (e.g., equity premium, excess 
volatility, return predictability, size effect) and investor behavior anomalies (e.g., naive diversification, excessive trading, 
disposition effect). Camerer and Loewenstein (2004) separate two categories in decision research: probability judgments 
(heuristics, availability, representativeness) and preferences (loss aversion, reference dependence, preference reversals, 
hyperbolic time discounting, framing, anchoring). Hens and Bachmann (2008) distinguish five types of heuristics that lead to 
anomalies: information selection biases (availability causes overreaction to new information), information processing biases 
(e.g., representativeness causes gambler’s fallacy), decision biases (e.g., mental accounting explains the disposition effect), 
decision evaluation biases (e.g., hindsight bias) and biases in intertemporal decisions (e.g., hyperbolic discounting). 
98 Some additional authors are in order. Gigerenzer (1991) cites a list of biases, fallacies and errors in probabilistic reasoning 
(e.g., base-rate fallacy and conjunction fallacy), and explanations of these biases in terms of cognitive heuristics (such as 
representativeness). Plous (1993) focuses on the social aspects of decision making processes, organized in six sections: 
perception, memory, and context; how questions affect answers; models of decision making; heuristics and biases; the social 
side of judgment and decision making; and common traps. Statman (1995) says behavioral finance tries to answer three 
categories of questions: investor behavior, the interaction of investors in markets (determines security prices), and the 
interaction of citizens in public policy arenas (determines financial regulations). Belsky and Gilovich (1999) highlight the most 
relevant biases why people make ‘big money mistakes’: mental accounting, loss aversion, endowment effect, misconceptions 
of chance and probability, anchoring and confirmation bias, information cascades and herding, overconfidence, and emotional 
biases (included in the 2009 edition). Raghuvir and Ranjan Das (1999) classify anomalies in four sections: price and return 
effects (e.g., return predictability), volume and volatility effects (e.g., excess volatility), time-series patterns (IPO and M&A 
anomalies) and miscellaneous effects (dividend puzzle, market sentiment). Mullainathan and Thaler (2000) distinguish three 
ways humans deviate from the standard economic model (bounded rationality, bounded willpower and bounded self-interest). 
Daniel, Hirshleifer and Teoh (2002) review the systematic errors performed by investors (e.g., loss aversion, excessive trading, 
portfolio underdiversification, representativeness based on past returns) and analysts (overoptimism and conservatism 
causing biased and predictable recommendations). Akerlof and Shiller (2009b) highlight five aspects of animal spirits: 
confidence and feedback mechanisms, attitudes about fairness, the temptation toward corrupt or antisocial behavior, the 
money illusion, and social contagion. Finally, DellaVigna (2009) offers a classification of deviations from the standard theory 
in three instances: non-standard preferences, non-standard beliefs, and non-standard decision making. 
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we differentiate two broad categories, psychological biases and behavioral consequences. On one hand, 
psychological biases are classified into four groups: heuristics and biases, framing, valuation/errors-of-
preference and social factors. Behavioral consequences, on the other hand, may refer to decision effects 
(related to individuals) or to market anomalies. Table 4.1 provides the basic outline of our taxonomy. 
TABLE 4.1 – Schematic taxonomy of biases and anomalies 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
In the next sections we analyze some relevant biases and consequences within each category. The 
remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 reviews the psychological biases. Section 
4.3 does the same with the behavioral consequences. Section 4.4 concludes with some remarks. 
 
4.2. PSYCHOLOGICAL BIASES 
 
The category of psychological biases comprises four groups: heuristics and biases, framing, 
valuation/errors-of-preference and social factors. In what follows we analyze them in order.  
4.2.1. Heuristics and judgmental biases 
Heuristics are economical shortcuts for information processing; that is, simple strategies that ignore 
information (Marewski, Gaissmaier and Gigerenzer, 2010). Information is vast and changes every 
second, so people develop rules of thumb to make decisions, what often leads them to make some errors 
(Shefrin, 2000). In its initial conception, heuristics were restricted to the domain of judgment under 
uncertainty, a scope later broadened (Kahneman and Frederick, 2002) to a variety of domains that share 
a common process of attribute substitution: “difficult judgments are made by substituting conceptually or 
semantically related assessments that are simpler and more readily accessible” (Kahneman and Frederick, 
2005, p. 287). Two contrary views among academics are those who defend heuristics are efficient 
shortcuts for inference and those who do not. On one hand, authors like Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier 
PSYCHOLOGICAL BIASES BEHAVIORAL CONSEQUENCES
HEURISTICS & BIASES MARKET ANOMALIES
          · Heuristics           · Financial markets
          · Judgmental biases           · Corporate finance
FRAMING DECISION EFFECTS
VALUATION / ERRORS OF PREFERENCE
          · Prospect theory
          · Intertemporal preferences
SOCIAL FACTORS
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(2011) claim heuristics are efficient unless empirically shown otherwise. The concept of ecological 
rationality, as opposite to logical rationality, asks in which situations a given strategy performs better 
and in which it fails. Thus, no rule is considered to be rational per se, or best in all tasks; what matters is 
to understand when a given heuristic performs better. Marewski et al. (2010) argue we do not need 
complex cognitive capabilities to make good judgments; instead, it is the simplicity and robustness of 
human cognition what makes us capable decision makers. Heuristics would be adaptive strategies that 
evolved in tandem with fundamental psychological mechanisms (Goldstein and Gigerenzer, 2002).99  
On the other, authors like Kahneman (2003a,b) identify two cognitive systems, reason and 
intuition, with the latter being the norm. In these dual-process theories (Kahneman and Frederick, 
2005), heuristics would be the fast, intuitive, affect-driven and effortless cognitive system, as opposed 
to the slow, controlled and analytical of reasoning. Heuristics can be powerful and accurate, but when 
misapplied can cause big mistakes (Hirshleifer, 2008). While judgments are always intentional, intuition 
generates spontaneous and involuntary impressions that depend on their accessibility ―i.e., the ease 
with which thoughts come to mind. Hence, to understand intuition we need to understand why some 
thoughts are more accessible than others, both in perception and in judgment.100 Through the process 
of attribution substitution, a target attribute of the judged object is substituted by a heuristic attribute. 
However, because the target and heuristic attributes are different, the substitution introduces 
systematic errors in judgment and decision, known as judgmental biases.  
Heuristics and biases specify how agents form expectations, and consequently they are sometimes 
merged. Nonetheless, most authors consider first the heuristics people use and then the biases they 
precipitate ―for instance, the original approach by Tversky and Kahneman (1974). Thus, the relevant 
heuristics and judgmental biases are summarized in Table 4.2 and are reviewed below. In particular, we 
proceed separately with the analysis of each heuristic and the judgmental biases associated to each of 
them. For better understanding, we proceed in three instances. We start with a review of the three major 
heuristics introduced by Tversky and Kahneman (1974), representativeness, availability and anchoring-
and-adjustment, and the biases related to them. Next, we explain that Kahneman and Frederick (2002) 
redefine heuristics in terms of the existence of an attribute substitution, and how this implies anchoring 
is replaced by the affect heuristic. Finally, we analyze some other classic heuristics in the literature, such 
as overconfidence, optimism, familiarity and others. 
                                                 
99 In addition, much research has been performed to investigate whether and when people rely on heuristics (e.g. Cokely and 
Kelley, 2009), when do heuristics perform well (e.g. Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 1996) or how accurate they are for predicting 
uncertain events, such as the performance of stocks on the stock market (Ortmann et al. 2008). 
100 There are two complementary interpretations. On one hand, Tversky and Kahneman (1983) denote natural assessments 
those attributes that are automatically produced, without intention or effort, by the perceptual system or by the intuition. On 
the other, Kahneman (2003a,b) notes that perceptual systems are designed to enhance the accessibility of changes and 
differences. Hence, a relevant property of perception is that it is reference-dependent. Just like one feels water at 20ºC fine 
when weather is cold, and cold when is hot outside, Kahneman and Tversky applied the same idea to construct the experiments 
about the study of risky choice that led to the formulation of prospect theory. 
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TABLE 4.2 – Heuristics and judgmental biases 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
HEURISTIC Related concepts Notes
AVAILABILITY ATTENTION ANOMALIES Overreaction to new info Availability causes overreaction to new info (Hens and Bachmann, 2008)
Post-earnings announcement drift T&K'74, availability, representativeness and anchoring, the 3 basic heuristics
HINDSIGHT BIAS (overconfidence)
Camerer and Loewenstein (2004): availability contributes to hindsight bias
Fischhoff (1982): hindsight bias explains overconfidence
REPRESENTATIVENESS LAW OF SMALL NUMBERS Gambler's fallacy T&K'74: Gambler's fallacy and Law of small numbers, as misconceptions of chance
Hot hand fallacy Momentum and reversals Rabin and Vayanos (2010)
Extrapolation bias Hens and Bachmann (2008): Extrapolation bias is due to representativeness
BASE RATE NEGLECT Cognitive dissonance
Kahneman and Frederick (2002): base rate neglect and conjunction bias come
from Tom W. and Linda experiments of representativeness
ILLUSION OF VALIDITY Tversky and Kahneman (1974)
CAUSALITY AND ATTRIBUTION Kahneman et al. (1982)
CONJUNCTION &
ANCHORING-AND-ADJUSTMENT DISJUNCTION FALLACIES Reference points
AFFECT
OVERCONFIDENCE SELF ATTRIBUTION BIAS Cognitive dissonance Daniel et al. (1998) relate self-attribution to cognitive dissonance
Under- and overreaction
e.g., "Overconfidence causes markets to underreact to relevant information, 
and to overreact to less relevant information" (Odean, 1998b)
CONFIRMATION BIAS Illusion of validity Griffin and Tversky (1992) link the illusion of validity to confirmation bias to induce OC
Groupthink theory Shefrin and Cervellati (2011)
ILLUSION OF CONTROL Barber and Odean (2002) notice illusion of control increases overconfidence
IRRELEVANCE OF HISTORY Shiller (2000a)
(EXCESSIVE) OPTIMISM Wishful thinking Barberis and Thaler (2003)
FAMILIARITY AVERSION TO AMBIGUITY Status quo bias Familiarity explains aversion to ambiguity and the status quo bias (Ackert et al., 2005)
RECOGNITION HEURISTIC Endowment effect Recognition heuristic (Gigerenzer et al., 1991), fluency heuristic (Marewski et al., 2010)
FLUENCY HEURISTIC Home bias, underdiversification Huberman (2001): Familiarity causes home country bias
PRIORITY HEURISTIC Cokely and Kelley (2009)
TAKE-THE-BEST HEURISTIC Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996)
JUDGMENTAL BIASES
After the 'Anchoring-and-adjustment dispute', anchoring-and-adjustment falls from the
heuristics list, to be considered among the 'errors of preference', and affect is included
Conjunction fallacy is consequence of anchoring in T&K'74, but a consequence
of representativeness in Kahneman and Frederick (2002).
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A. Availability heuristic 
Availability, the most important information selection bias (Hens and Bachmann, 2008), refers to our 
tendency to estimate the probability of an event by the ease with which occurrences can be brought to 
mind (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973). Due to limited attention, memory and processing capacities, we 
make decisions based on subsets of information that are easily available. This is a useful shortcut to 
assess probability because instances of large classes are usually better recalled, but since availability is 
affected by factors other than frequency, it leads to several predictable biases (e.g., illusory correlation). 
Three classic determinants of the availability heuristic are familiarity, salience and imagination.101 
Early papers include Ross and Sicoly (1977) about egocentric perceptions in availability and 
attribution, Taylor (1982b) about availability within social psychology, and Kahneman and Tversky 
(1982b), who identify the simulation heuristic, a mental operation that explains how the availability 
heuristic works. Availability contributes to attention anomalies (Shiller 2000a), overreaction to new 
information (Hens and Bachmann, 2008), the hindsight bias, and the curse of knowledge: people who 
know a lot are not aware of how little others know (Camerer and Loewenstein, 2004). Moreover, Heath, 
Larrick and Klayman (1998) assert availability effects are ubiquitous: “A particularly important form of 
missing information is the absence of experience with highly unusual events. Bank examiners rarely see a 
bank fail, nuclear technicians rarely see a meltdown, airline personnel rarely witness a crash” (p. 14). 
Attention anomalies – Also known as limited attention (Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003). Attention is 
a scarce resource and people’s ability to process information is limited, hence before decision making 
we must select which options to analyze. If the attributes that catch our attention are not critical, 
attention may lead to suboptimal choices. Barber and Odean (2008) note three indicators of attention 
for stock investors ―recent news about the stock, high price volatility, and abnormal trading volume― 
and find strong evidence that amateur investors are more likely to buy rather than sell those stocks that 
catch their attention.102 Professional investors, instead, would not display the attention-driven buying 
effect. Odean (1999) suggests attention anomalies, together with overconfidence and the disposition 
effect, might explain the excessive trading in financial markets. Shiller (2000a) notes attention may be 
capricious because it is affected by the salience of the object. Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) show that 
limited attention to how information is displayed in financial reports may cause investors underreaction 
to earnings news and explain the post-earnings announcement drift (Bernard and Thomas, 1989). 
Hindsight bias – Remembering the past is not straightforward: memories can be lost or distorted, 
even induce events that never happened (Hoffrage and Hertwig, 1999). Human memory has a limited 
capacity, so it must work by reconstruction. Hindsight bias results as a side-effect: once we known the 
                                                 
101 See familiarity later in this section. Salience is the fact that “colorful, dynamic, or other distinctive stimuli disproportionately 
engage attention and accordingly disproportionately affect judgments” (Taylor, 1982b, p. 192). 
102 They suggest as a possible explanation that investors search across thousands of stocks when buying, but only from the few 
stocks they own when selling ―they generally do not sell short. 
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outcome of an event, our recalled judgments are typically closer to the outcome than our first judgments 
were (Hoffrage, Hertwing and Gigerenzer, 2000). That is, in hindsight we exaggerate what could have 
been anticipated in foresight (Fischhoff, 1982b). The availability heuristic contributes to this bias: since 
events that actually occurred are easier to imagine than counterfactual ones, we tend to overestimate 
the probability we previously assigned to events that later happened (Camerer and Loewenstein, 2004). 
One of the most widely studied judgmental bias in risk perception (Rabin, 1998), biases in hindsight 
would explain overconfidence (Fischhoff, 1982b) and amplified regret (Pan and Statman, 2010). 
B. Representativeness heuristic 
Tversky and Kahneman (1983) define representativeness as “the degree of correspondence between a 
sample and a population, an instance and a category, an act and an actor, or more generally between an 
outcome and a model” (p. 295). The idea behind the heuristic is that we infer the probability that an 
object A belongs to class B, or that it originates from it, by evaluating the degree to which A is 
representative of B (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). A tendency to rely on stereotypes, it implies people 
estimate probabilities based on their beliefs and ignoring the laws of probability (Shleifer, 2000). 
Kahneman (2003a) and Kahneman and Frederick (2005) embed representativeness in a broader class 
of prototype heuristics, which share the representation of categories by their prototypes as a common 
psychological mechanism.103 
Most early research was performed by Kahneman and Tversky ―indeed, Kahneman and Tversky’s 
first article (Tversky and Kahneman, 1971) was about the law of small numbers. Kahneman and Tversky 
(1972) analyze some determinants of representativeness, like the similarity of sample to population and 
a reflection of randomness, while Tversky and Kahneman (1973) provide experimental evidence of it. 
Other relevant articles are Bar-Hillel (1982) and Chen et al. (2007). In addition, several models use this 
heuristic. For instance, Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) suggest investors, in forecasting future 
earnings, interpret recent past earnings using the heuristic, and Gennaioli and Shleifer (2010) provide 
a memory-based model of probabilistic inference. Finally, representativeness leads to several biases of 
judgment under uncertainty. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) mention insensitivity to prior probability 
of outcomes (a.k.a. the base rate neglect), insensitivity to sample size, misconceptions of chance (which 
includes the law of small numbers and the gambler’s fallacy), insensitivity to predictability, illusion of 
validity, extrapolation bias, and misconceptions of regression. In addition, the gambler’s and hot hand 
fallacies have been suggested to cause both over and underreaction (Rabin 2002a). We see them next. 
                                                 
103 Kahneman and Frederick (2002) notice two uses of the word representative until then: first, a prototype (a representative 
exemplar) is used to represent categories; second, the probability of an object belonging to a category is judged by the degree 
the object is representative of the category. Thus, representativeness involves two separate acts of substitution ―the prototype 
instead of the category, and the heuristic attribute of representativeness instead the target attribute of probability. Now, they 
describe the prototype heuristics when a prototype is substituted for its category, but where representativeness is not 
necessarily the heuristic attribute. Base-rate neglect, scope neglect and duration neglect would also fall in this category. 
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Law of small numbers – People have strong intuitions about random sampling. One of them is 
that they tend to exaggerate how closely a small sample will resemble the parent population (Tversky 
and Kahneman, 1971). A bias related to representativeness and to the tendency to under-use base rates 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1974), the law of small numbers leads to gambler’s fallacy and misperception 
of regression to the mean (Rabin, 1998), and a belief in the hot hand fallacy. Rabin (2002b) develops a 
model alleged to be a plausible explanation for the empirical finding in stock markets of short-term 
underreaction but medium term overreaction to announcements. 
Gambler’s fallacy – A consequence of misconceptions of chance, the gambler’s fallacy is a 
judgmental bias caused by representativeness (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) that implies the mistaken 
belief that random sequences should exhibit systematic reversals (Rabin and Vayanos, 2010) and a 
tendency to see patterns in truly random sequences (Barberis et al., 1998). 
Hot hand fallacy – Related to the law of small numbers and to representativeness, the fallacy 
appears when an individual predicts long streaks of similar signals will continue (Rabin and Vayanos, 
2010). Similar to the gambler’s fallacy in the sense that it implies a failure to appreciate statistical 
independence, the hot hand fallacy involves instead the belief in an excessive persistence rather than 
reversals. Nonetheless, some authors suggest the hot hand fallacy may arise as a consequence of the 
gambler’s fallacy (e.g., Rabin, 2002b). Both fallacies would explain some financial puzzles, such as 
momentum and reversals in asset returns (Rabin and Vayanos, 2010). In addition, the hot hand fallacy 
is related to the hot hands effect (Hendricks, Patel and Zeckhauser, 1993) cited in Chapter 2. 
Extrapolation bias – Caused by representativeness, the extrapolation bias suggests people bet on 
trends (Shefrin, 2000). Tversky and Kahneman (1973) provided first experimental evidence, while 
alleged empirical evidence includes Benartzi (2001), who shows employees tend to buy stocks of the 
company for which they work for after prices had already gone up. Its presence may lead to either 
overreaction or underreaction. 
Base rate neglect – Tversky and Kahneman (1974) noticed that prior probabilities (i.e., base-rate 
frequencies) play a relevant role in probability estimation but have no effect on representativeness. This 
implies a base rate neglect (a.k.a. base rate fallacy or base rate bias): an insensitivity to prior probability 
of outcomes. Prendergast and Stole (1996) relate it to cognitive dissonance reduction: individuals 
overweight their own information to the detriment of others. Although it received the most attention in 
social psychology among all cognitive illusions (Gigerenzer, 1991), the base rate neglect remains a 
controversial bias. First, the neglect of base rates seems in direct contradiction to the widespread belief 
that judgments are unduly affected by stereotypes (Landman and Manis, 1983). Second, a relevant 
source of controversy refers to the debate, already acknowledged, between Kahneman and Gigerenzer 
about whether heuristics are efficient shortcuts or not. In particular, Tversky and Kahneman (1982a) 
obtained experimental evidence on the impact of base-rate data using questions of the type (p. 154): 
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If a test to detect a disease whose prevalence is 1/1000 has a false positive rate of 5%, what is 
the chance that a person found to have a positive result actually has the disease, assuming you 
know nothing about the person’s symptoms or signs? 
Students at Harvard Medical School answered this medical diagnosis problem, half of them judged 
the probability that the person actually had the disease to be 0.95, average answer was 0.56, and only 
18% of participants responded 0.02, the correct answer. However, Cosmides and Tooby (1990) 
rephrased the medical diagnosis problem in a frequentist way to find the Bayesian answer ‘one out of 
50’ was given by 76% of the subjects: the base-rate fallacy disappeared. Kahneman and Tversky (1996) 
reply they ignore critical evidence that judgments of frequency are susceptible to systematic biases. 
Illusion of validity – People tend to select the outcome that is most representative of the input, 
and in doing so the confidence they have in their prediction depends on the degree of representativeness 
with no regard to the factors that limit predictive accuracy (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). A sort of 
confirmation bias leading to overconfidence (Shefrin, 2000), the illusion of validity tends to persist even 
when we are aware of the factors that limit the accuracy of our predictions. Einhorn and Hogarth (1978) 
suggest we exhibit the bias because we search for confirming evidence (see confirmation bias). 
Causality and attribution – When people attempt to infer the causes for the effects observed, 
they may make mistakes related to salience, availability, representativeness, egocentric biases and 
many others. The early research on causality and attribution is summarized in Kahneman et al. (1982), 
including Nisbett et al. (1976), Tversky and Kahneman (1980), Tversky and Kahneman (1982a) and 
Ross and Anderson (1982). The bias extends to groups as well, causing xenophobia (Hirshleifer, 2008). 
Conjunction and disjunction fallacies – A conjunction fallacy appears when people believe the 
probability of a conjunction of two events is greater than that of one of its constituents. Related to it is 
the disjunction fallacy: the probability of an event A must be equal to the total probability of all events 
whose union is equal to A, but experimental subjects often underestimate the probability of residual 
hypotheses. Gennaioli and Shleifer (2010) offer a model able to explain both fallacies. An antecedent to 
these studies on conjunction and disjunction fallacies is Bar-Hillel (1973):104 However, the conjunction 
fallacy is original of Tversky and Kahneman (1982b), which includes the classic Linda experiment (here 
reported as in Tversky and Kahneman (1983), p. 299): 
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken and very bright. She majored in philosophy. As a student, 
she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice, and also participated 
in antinuclear demonstrations. Which of this two alternatives is more probable: 
Linda is a bank teller (T) 
Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement (T&F) 
                                                 
104 In this study, subjects chose whether to participate in three types of events: (i) simple, like drawing a red marble from a bag 
with 50% red marbles; (ii) conjunctive, like drawing a red marble seven times in succession, with replacement, from a bag with 
90% red marbles; and (iii) disjunctive, like drawing a red marble at least once in seven successive tries, with replacement, from 
a bag with 10% red marbles. Most preferred the conjunctive (p = .48) rather than the simple event (p = .50), and the simple 
rather than the disjunctive event (p = .52). 
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Most respondents answer T&F when the (obvious) correct answer is T. We must mention we have 
included the conjunction and disjunction fallacies as an alleged consequence of the representativeness 
heuristic. However, that is not the original view. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) suggest both fallacies 
are induced by anchoring: the stated probability of the simple event provides a natural starting point to 
estimate the probabilities of both conjunctive and disjunctive events. Later, Tversky and Kahneman 
(1983) would suggest them to be a consequence of representativeness: judgments are based on the 
match (similarity, representativeness) between the description of Linda and the two alternatives. This 
change in interpretation is related to the concept of attribution substitution, eventually developed by 
Kahneman and Frederick, 2002), and the debate it generated about whether anchoring-and-adjustment 
is a heuristic or not. In what follows we delve into the concept of attribution substitution and the debate 
on anchoring-and-adjustment as an aside.  
Aside: Attribution substitution and the debate on Anchoring-and-adjustment 
The article that defined the heuristics and biases approach (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) included 
anchoring-and-adjustment as one of the three basic general-purpose heuristics (the others being 
representativeness and availability).105 They describe it as follows: “people make estimates by starting 
from an initial value that is adjusted to yield the final answer. The initial value, or starting point, may be 
suggested by the formulation of the problem, or it may be the result of a partial computation. In either case, 
adjustments are typically insufficient” (p. 1128). For instance, their classic wheel-of-fortune experiment 
(see subsection 3.2.2) would be an example of a reference point given by the formulation of the problem. 
However, Kahneman and Frederick (2002) would later introduce attribution substitution and remove 
anchoring from the list of the essential heuristics. Attribution substitution is an underlying psychological 
process that explains how representativeness, availability and other heuristics and biases operate: 
people often try to solve a difficult question by answering an easier one instead, usually being unaware 
of the substitution. Through this process, judgment is mediated by a heuristic when we assess a target 
attribute of an object by substituting another property of that object, the heuristic attribute, which comes 
easier to mind (e.g., representativeness replacing probability). Moreover, the process is not restricted 
to the domain of judgment under uncertainty, unlike in the early work of Kahneman and Tversky. 
This change in understanding the process of how heuristics work modified the list of heuristics in 
consequence. First, attribute substitution is implied in some classic articles, like Kahneman and Tversky 
(1973) on the base rate neglect and the conjunction/disjunction fallacies (Kahneman, 2003a). Second, 
it led to the introduction of new heuristics such as the affect heuristic (Finucane et al., 2000): affect is a 
natural assessment, automatically computed and always accessible, so the basic evaluative attribute 
(e.g., good/bad, like/dislike) is a candidate for substitution in any task that calls for a favorable or 
                                                 
105 Slovic and Lichtenstein (1971) must be reckoned here as an antecedent to the study of anchoring. 
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unfavorable response. Third, Kahneman and Frederick (2002) note anchoring does not fit the definition 
of a judgment heuristic anymore, “because it does not work through the substitution of one attribute for 
another, but by increasing the plausibility of a particular value of the target attribute” (p. 54). Thus, they 
suggest anchoring should be replaced by the affect heuristic in the list of major heuristics. Ever since, 
most authors (e.g., Camerer and Loewenstein, 2004) classify anchoring-and-adjustment as an error of 
preference that derives from the existence of reference points (see Table 4.4). Indeed, reference points 
play a determinant role in determining how people anchors their beliefs to a given level and then make 
inferences from there to adjust their initial guess.106 
C. Affect heuristic 
The third of the major-purpose heuristics was introduced by Finucane et al. (2000), who suggest people 
rely on affect ―i.e., the specific quality of goodness or badness- when judging risks and benefits of 
specific hazards. Representations of objects and events in our minds are tagged to varying degrees with 
affect. Then, the affect heuristic would be the reliance on such feelings to make judgments, which may 
provide faster and more efficient intuitions than retrieving from memory some relevant examples. The 
failure to identify the affect heuristic, say Kahneman and Frederick (2002), “reflects the narrowly 
cognitive focus that characterized psychology for some decades. There is now compelling evidence that 
every stimulus evokes an affective evaluation” (p. 55), conscious or not.  
Finucane et al. (2000) obtain experimental evidence that the observed negative correlation 
between risk and perceived benefit is stronger if time pressure, designed to increase reliance on affect, 
is introduced. In consequence, Loewenstein et al. (2001) propose an alternative theoretical perspective 
to all cognitive theories of choice under risk to date, the so-called model of risk-as-feelings. The model 
emphasizes the role affect plays in decision making: beliefs about risk would be expressions of emotion 
that often diverge from cognitive assessments. Slovic et al (2002) introduce a theoretical framework for 
affect, and show it to be the heuristic attribute for numerous target attributes, in common with the 
model of risk-as-feelings by Loewenstein et al. (2001). 
D. Overconfidence 
Overconfidence, the human tendency to overestimate our own skills and predictions for success 
(Ricciardi and Simon, 2000), is a classic in the field. Indeed, most academic reviews include it as one of 
the most relevant heuristic-driven biases. It entails a miscalibration of subjective probabilities. 
Following Lichtenstein and Fischhoff (1977), a judge is said to be well calibrated if “over the long run, 
                                                 
106 The concept of attribution substitution contributed as well to develop heuristic elicitation. Traditionally, heuristics were 
studied by examining biases from normative rules, but attribution substitution permits to apply more direct tests: a heuristic 
elicitation can be designed such that one group of respondents judge a target attribute for a set of objects, while another 
evaluates the hypothesized heuristic attribute. Measured in comparable units (e.g., percentiles), we prove the use of a heuristic 
if both results are identical. Following this, Kahneman and Frederick (2005) present an attribute-substitution model of 
heuristic judgment where difficult questions are tackled by answering to an easier one, and introduce a research design for 
studying attribute substitution. 
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for all propositions assigned the same probability, the proportion true is equal to the probability assigned” 
(p. 161). However, researchers like Oskamp (1965), Alpert and Raifa (1969), Fischhoff, Slovic and 
Lichtenstein (1977) and Lichtenstein, Fischhoff and Phillips (1982) showed people use to be poorly 
calibrated, and later research only confirmed the results ―surveys include Rabin (1998) and Griffin and 
Brenner (2004). However, the study of overconfidence is not so straightforward since it may refer to 
different concepts. Moore and Healy (2008) provide a reconciliation of the three different uses. First, a 
person may be overconfident in estimating her own performance ―named overestimation. Interestingly, 
overestimation seems not to be universal: people are overconfident when estimation involves hard 
tasks, but underconfident when it involves easy tasks ―contrariwise if they have placed themselves in 
such tasks. Second, a person might be overconfident in her own performance relative to others. They 
call this overplacement, also known as the ‘better-than-average’ effect (Williams and Gilovich, 2008; 
Grieco and Hogarth, 2009). Third, people may exhibit an excessive precision to estimate future 
uncertainty (e.g., Alpert and Raiffa, 1969), this one known as overprecision.  
Koriat, Lichtenstein and Fischhoff (1980) suggest overconfidence is caused by a confirmation bias: 
after one alternative is chosen, people look for information that confirms the answer, but not that could 
falsify it. In Gigerenzer’s (1991) words, “the mind is not a Popperian” (p.4) and this selective information 
search artificially increases confidence. Researchers suggest men are more overconfident than women. 
Lundeberg, Fox and Punccohar (1994) show men are more overconfident particularly in tasks that are 
perceived to be masculine ―this would include financial topics (Prince, 1993). Barber and Odean (2001) 
test it and find men trade more frequently and exhibit more losses.107 Barber and Odean (2002) suggest 
the bias explains why investors who switched from phone-based to online trading in the 1990s traded 
more speculatively and less profitable since then. Biais et al. (2005) find experimental evidence of 
subjects with greater judgmental overconfidence performing worse as a trader. Recent tests include 
Grinblatt and Keloharju (2009) on equity trading, Grieco and Hogarth (2009) on overestimation and 
overplacement, Williams and Gilovich (2008) on the better-than-average effect, and Chen et al. (2007) 
on cultural differences: Chinese investors hold fewer stocks, but trade more often than Americans.  
The boom in overconfidence research within behavioral finance would come in the 1990s. Daniel, 
Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998) were perhaps the first to note the importance of this bias in 
financial markets with their theory of under and overreaction based on investor overconfidence and 
biased self-attribution. Odean (1998b) considers the increase of the expected trading volume the most 
robust effect. Odean (1999) and Statman, Thorley and Vorkink (2006) test such hypothesis with partial 
positive results. Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) offer a model that uses overconfidence to explain the 
generation of asset bubbles. In regards to corporate finance, the research on managerial overconfidence 
                                                 
107 They find men trade 45% more than women thereby reducing their returns more than women do (-2.65% a year versus -
1.72%). The differences are even higher between single men and single women (single men trade 67% more and see their 
returns reduced by 1.44% a year compared to women). Barber and Odean attribute the results to overconfidence. 
123 
 
is a classic as well. Camerer and Lovallo (1999) explore whether the observed high rates of business 
failure are caused by an excessive business entry due to overconfidence and optimistic biases.108 
Malmendier and Tate (2005a,b) obtain similar results linking managerial overconfidence to the high 
rates of corporate merger and acquisition. Additional research may be found in surveys by Shefrin 
(2006) and Baker, Ruback and Wurgler (2007). 
Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (2001) suggest there is rationale to think “overconfidence 
may have evolved under natural selection as a way to promote genetic reproduction” (p.922). Training to 
reason counterfactually or even providing humbling feedback could help reduce the bias (Mahajan, 
1992), yet overconfidence may have pervasive effects through several biases and anomalies it is related 
to. For instance, Pan and Statman (2010) note overconfident investors are likely to overstate their risk 
tolerance. Hirshleifer (2001) and Barberis and Thaler (2003) confirm overconfidence has been alleged 
to explain return predictability, excess volatility and excess trading, the forward premium puzzle 
(Burnside et al., 2011), and sensation seeking (Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2009). Finally, Keren (1987) and 
Griffin and Tversky (1992) suggest ambiguity of evidence is an important mediating factor in both 
overconfidence and confirmation bias. Some of these biases are analyzed next. 
Self-attribution bias – Attribution theory (Bem, 1965) asserts individuals tend to attribute to 
their high ability those events that confirm the validity of their actions, while evidence against it is 
attributed to external noise or sabotage. Daniel et al. (1998) relates this to the notion of cognitive 
dissonance, in which individuals internally suppress information that conflicts with past choices. Some 
anomalies are attributed to be a consequence of a biased self-attribution. Daniel et al. (1998) suggest 
this bias can promote feedback to cause over and underreaction, and Shiller (2003) follows them to 
assert that the effect of self-attribution in the spread of stories is essential in the formation of speculative 
bubbles. Statman et al. (2006) observe the impact of self-attribution bias on investor’s overconfidence 
when they find some investors become more (less) overconfident about the goodness of active trading 
when they have experienced positive (negative) portfolio returns. 
Confirmation bias – A departure from Bayesian rationality where subjects, once they formed a 
strong hypothesis, attach too much importance to news that support their views while they are 
inattentive to new information that might contradict them (Rabin, 1998; Shefrin, 2006). It is a form of 
anchoring in some way: people tend to accept confirming evidence for their initial positions (Lord, Ross 
and Lepper, 1979). The bias does not necessarily imply people misinterpret additional evidence, but that 
they ignore it (Bruner and Potter, 1964) or, even worst, that they tend to misread evidence as additional 
                                                 
108 Overconfidence causing excessive business entry was already in the hubris hypothesis by Roll (1986), but Camerer and 
Lovallo (1999) were the first to test it experimentally. They set some entry games in which the entrants’ payoffs sometimes 
were random and others they were told in advance to depend on their own skill, and find evidence of an overconfidence effect 
on business entry and that self-selection makes the effect stronger. This last result made authors suggest a reference group 
neglect: self-selected subjects seem to neglect they are competing with a group of subjects who all think they are skilled too. 
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support for their hypothesis (Rabin and Schrag, 1999). Empirical tests of confirmation bias include Lord 
et al. (1979) on capital punishment, Darley and Gross (1983) on the influence of background information 
and Plous (1991) on safety of nuclear technology. Griffin and Tversky (1992) and Rabin and Schrag 
(1999) link the illusion of validity to confirmation bias to induce overconfidence.  Stiglitz (2012) says 
equilibrium fictions may appear because the only pieces of evidence people see are those in accordance 
with their convictions. This would lead to social rigidity (Hoff and Stiglitz, 2010, 2011): in social sciences 
convictions may affect reality ―a phenomenon coined reflexivity by Soros (2010). Indeed, groupthink is 
a form of collective confirmation bias (Shefrin and Cervellati, 2011). Thus, since convictions change 
slowly due to confirmation bias, collective actions, political actions included, change slowly. This might 
explain the existence of very different belief systems and cognitive frames across societies. 
Illusion of control – Langer (1975) defines the illusion of control as people behaving as though 
chance events were subject to their control. That is, we judge an outcome as a consequence of our acts 
when in fact we have been simply lucky. Ji, Nisbett and Su (2001) find Americans believe in stability of 
events so they think things are more predictable than they really are, what would explain why 
Americans exhibit illusion of control, as reported in Presson and Benassi (1996) and others. 
Irrelevance of history – According to Shiller (2000a), a common kind of overconfidence is the 
tendency to perceive history as irrelevant: history would not be a guide to the future, which must be 
judged only using factors we see now. This effect discourages taking lessons from history and statistics. 
E. (Excessive) Optimism 
Kahneman and Riepe (1998) declare optimists those who underestimate the likelihood of bad outcomes 
over which they have no control. Shefrin (2006) says they both overestimate how frequently they will 
experience favorable outcomes and underestimate unfavorable ones. A classic topic of research on 
excessive optimism are firms’ executives, whose overoptimism would be a result of both cognitive 
biases (e.g., anchoring) and organizational pressures, when not of hubris. They often fall victim of what 
psychologists call the planning fallacy: they make decisions based on excessive optimism instead of a 
rational evaluation of gains, losses and probabilities, they exaggerate benefits and underestimate costs, 
and overestimate scenarios of success while overlooking the potential for mistakes and miscalculations, 
setting themselves for a future failure (Lovallo and Kahneman, 2003). Large capital investments, M&As 
and efforts to access new markets are classic situations where optimism pervade managers decisions, 
explaining the high rates of failure observed. 
Cowen, Groysberg, and Healy (2006) provide a measure of forecast optimism by market analysts, 
and suggest that trading incentives affect their optimism bias. Lovallo and Kahneman (2003) observe 
that the competitiveness of a company may be seriously damaged if executives actively discourage 
pessimism among their employees ―often interpreted as a sign of disloyalty. Overoptimism is related 
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to biases such as self-attribution (Lovallo and Kahneman, 2003), overconfidence, groupthink theory, 
wishful thinking (Barberis and Thaler, 2003), and others. 
F. Familiarity 
The familiarity bias is related to the evidence that people fear change and the unknown (Cao et al., 2011). 
Ackert et al., 2005 find experimental evidence that familiarity is a key determinant of investment 
behavior. It helps to explain biases and anomalies like ambiguity aversion and status quo bias (Ackert 
et al., 2005), recognition heuristic (Gigerenzer, Hoffrage and Kleinbölting, 1991), fluency heuristic 
(Marewski et al., 2010), and decision effects like the endowment effect, portfolio underdiversification, 
and home and local biases (Cao et al., 2011). For instance, Huberman (2001) explains the home and local 
biases as people simply preferring to invest in the familiar. The decision effects are analyzed in detail in 
subsection 4.3.2. Aversion to ambiguity and recognition heuristic, instead, are reviewed in what follows. 
Aversion to ambiguity – Ambiguity is the uncertainty about uncertainties (Einhorn and Hogarth, 
1986).109 Then, the aversion to ambiguity describes a preference for known over unknown risks ―as 
demonstrated in the Ellsberg paradox.110 The paradox suggests people behave differently when they are 
given objective probabilities than when they are not and, since ambiguous situations are typical in 
financial markets, ambiguity aversion is expected to have relevant effects there. Early papers include 
Fellner (1961), who introduced the concept of decision weights. Epstein and Schneider (2010) review 
models of ambiguity aversion and their implications for portfolio choice and asset pricing. Nonetheless, 
the opposite result ―people preferring ambiguous alternatives― may be found in some circumstances. 
Einhorn and Hogarth (1986) develop a descriptive model of judgment under ambiguity that specifies 
conditions for ambiguity seeking and avoidance, whereas Roca, Hogarth and Maule (2006) show that 
the status quo bias could lead to ambiguity seeking, when individuals in various experiments preferred 
not to exchange an ambiguous alternative in their possession for an unambiguous one. 
Recognition heuristic – Two processes govern the use of the recognition heuristic, recognition 
and evaluation. Recognition is the capacity to make inferences in cases of limited knowledge (Goldstein 
and Gigerenzer, 2002): “If one of two objects is recognized and the other is not, recognition heuristic infers 
that the recognized object has the higher value with respect to the criterion” (p. 75). Evaluation judges its 
ecological rationality: the heuristic will be ecologically rational if the recognition validity for a given 
criterion is substantially higher than chance (α > .5). Recognition is the most frugal of all heuristics 
(Goldstein and Gigerenzer 1999), allowing people to benefit from ignorance by making inferences from 
patterns of missing knowledge. It was explicitly proposed as a model of inferences made from memory 
                                                 
109 Einhorn and Hogarth (1986) suggest payoffs can, in the presence of ambiguity, affect the weight given to uncertainty, making 
real probabilities more ambiguous than the exact probabilities of gambles. 
110 The Ellsberg paradox shows people tend to prefer a lottery A, where a ball is picked at random from an urn with 50 red and 
50 black balls, to a two-stage lottery BC, where first a coin is flipped and then either urn B (80 red, 20 black balls) or urn C (20 
red, 80 black) is used to pick up a ball at random ―however, both lotteries have a 50% chance of winning (Thaler, 1983). 
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―as opposed to inferences from givens, where cue values are provided by the experimenter (Gigerenzer 
and Goldstein, 1996). Similarly, Schooler and Hertwig (2005) pose the notion of beneficial forgetting: 
loss of information aids inference heuristics that exploit mnemonic information. In addition, recognition 
heuristic is related to familiarity, since it implies a probabilistic cue (Gigerenzer et al., 1991). 
Gigerenzer and Goldstein (2011) compile the literature over a decade. Goldstein and Gigerenzer 
(1999) provide experimental evidence of people using the heuristic. Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002) 
identify the conditions under which the recognition heuristic leads to efficient results due to a less-is-
more effect: when ignorance is systematically rather than randomly distributed, recognition and 
criterion are correlated, so the heuristic leads to successful results. The correlation between recognition 
and criterion can be learned from experience or can be genetically coded. Finally, Ortmann et al. (2008) 
analyze how the heuristic performs in portfolio management to beat the market, finding mixed results. 
Fluency heuristic – The recognition heuristic is binary, that is, an alternative is either recognized 
or not, so it does not help when two alternatives are recognized but one more strongly than the other. 
Fluency heuristic fills the gap: if one alternative is recognized faster than another, the fluency heuristic 
infers the one that has the higher value on the criterion (Schooler and Hertwig, 2005). 
G. Other heuristics 
Priority heuristic – According to the priority heuristic, decisions between sure versus risky 
options are the result of considering simple reasons for a decision in a fixed order, until a stopping rule 
is met (Cokely and Kelley, 2009). Rieger and Wang (2008b) see it as an alternative model to the best ‘as-
if’ models of decision under risk, including cumulative prospect theory. 
Take-the-best heuristic – This heuristic considers cues sequentially in the order of their validity 
(Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 1999), where validity is the probability that an alternative has a higher value 
on a criterion than another (Marewski et al., 2010). 
4.2.2. Framing 
The second group in the category of psychological biases consists of framing and the biases related to it. 
Behaviorists have shown agents do not make their choices in a comprehensively inclusive context as the 
rational-agent model predicts. In particular, an essential aspect of rationality is invariance: preferences 
are not affected by inconsequential variations in the description of outcomes (Kahneman, 2003a). 
However, invariance is violated in framing, because alternative descriptions lead to different choices 
only by altering the salience of different features of the problem. Framing effects include a variety of 
biases related to two classics in the literature: frame dependence and mental accounting. This way, 
decision making would be better characterized by narrow framing (Kahneman and Lovallo, 1993) and 
the related notions of mental accounting (Thaler, 1985) and choice bracketing (Read, Loewenstein and 
Rabin, 1999), among others. They are summarized in Table 4.3 and reviewed in detail below. 
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TABLE 4.3 – Framing 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
A. Frame dependence 
The antecedent of frame dependence is the isolation effect by Kahneman and Tversky (1979): people 
tend to discard elements shared by all prospects, focusing only on those that distinguish them. This led 
to the concept of framing (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981): “the decision-maker’s conception of the acts, 
outcomes and contingencies associated with a particular choice” (p. 453), which may produce predictable 
shifts of preference when the same problem is framed differently. It results that the most accessible 
features influence decisions while those of low accessibility are ignored. Thus, the way a prospect is 
posed will affect the eventual choice ―a result known as frame dependence. The passive acceptance of 
the formulation given is a basic principle: two logically ―but not transparently― equivalent statements 
of a problem lead decision makers to choose different options (Rabin, 1998). Some concepts closely 
related are narrow framing, context effects, repeated gambles and hedonic editing. We see them next. 
Narrow framing – Narrow framing (Kahneman and Lovallo, 1993) is the tendency to analyze 
problems in a specific context without reflection of broader considerations (Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003). 
Hence, people evaluate risks in isolation, apart from other risks they are already facing (Barberis and 
Huang, 2009). Kahneman (2003a,b) interprets framing in terms of accessibility: narrow framing occurs 
because decisions are made through intuition instead of effortful reasoning. Several models incorporate 
narrow framing. Barberis, Huang and Santos (2001) extended asset pricing to a framework where 
investors derive utility not only from consumption, but from stock market fluctuations too. Then, 
Barberis and Huang (2009) improve that model with an intertemporal preference specification that 
incorporates framing into standard preferences: the utility function depends directly on the outcome of 
a gamble and indirectly on the gamble’s contribution to wealth. The specification is shown to be 
tractable in partial equilibrium ―allowing to analyze portfolio and consumer choice― and in equilibrium 
―allowing to study the effect of narrow framing on asset prices. Barberis, Huang and Thaler (2006) and 
Barberis and Huang (2007) apply a similar model, the former to account for the stock market 
participation puzzle and the latter to study the equity premium puzzle. 
Related concepts Notes
FRAME DEPENDENCE Narrow framing Equity premium puzzle
Narrow framing & Equity premium
puzzle: Barberis and Huang (2007)
Loss aversion Tversky and Kahneman (1986)
Money illusion Narrow framing & Money illusion: Kahneman et al. (1986a)
Context effects Simonson and Tversky (1992)
Repeated gambles Repeated gambles, see Kahneman and Riepe (1998)
MENTAL ACCOUNTING House money effect House money effect: Hens and Bachmann (2008)
Self-control Thaler and Shefrin (1981)
Choice bracketing Choice bracketing (Read et al. 1999)
Hedonic editing
FRAMING BIASES
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Framing has been related to several biases and anomalies. Narrow framing may be a result of 
taking regret into account in utility functions (Barberis and Huang, 2009). Kumar and Lim (2008) say 
that active intra-day investors tend to exhibit a weaker disposition effect, because they are more likely 
to think about portfolio-level outcomes. Framing influences loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity: a 
frame that highlights losses makes a choice less attractive, whereas if it makes losses small relative to 
the scales involved it exploits diminishing sensitivity, making the choice more attractive (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1986). In addition, money illusion is an effect derived from framing (Kahneman, Knetsch 
and Thaler, 1986a). Other related concepts are analyzed in what follows. 
Context effects – Context effects refer to situations where a subject’s preferences among options 
depend on which other options are in the set (Camerer and Loewenstein, 2004). Thus, adding or 
subtracting options in a menu of choices may affect the proportion of consumers who choose one of the 
existing options. Simonson and Tversky (1992) provide examples that the menu of choices influences 
people’s decisions. Rabin (1998) identifies it as one of the elicitation effects, together with framing 
effects and preference reversals. 
Repeated gambles – Statistical aggregation reduce the relative risk of a series of gambles. 
Kahneman and Riepe (1998) show that, when people are asked these two questions… 
#1 What is your cash-equivalent for one play of the following gamble: 50% chance to win $1,000, or a 
50% chance to win nothing. 
#2 What is your cash-equivalent for five plays of the following gamble: a 50% chance to win $1,000, or 
a 50% chance to win nothing. 
…most people set a cash equivalent more than five times higher for #2 because, due to statistical 
aggregation, the second proposition is relatively less risky. However, if asked… 
#3 You are offered one play of the gamble: a 50% chance to win $1,000, or a 50% chance to win nothing. 
More opportunities to play this gamble may be available later. What is your cash equivalent for 
the present opportunity? 
…a decision-maker who frames options narrowly will not distinguish between #1 and #3, setting the 
same cash-equivalent. This fails to take advantage of reduced risk in repeated gambles due to statistical 
aggregation: they behave as if the current decision problem was the last one they will ever made. 
Hedonic editing – A concept related to frame dependence and mental accounting, hedonic editing 
refers to the evidence that people code combinations of events in a way it make them as happy as 
possible (Thaler, 1999b). Under a framing interpretation (e.g., Shefrin, 2000), investors may choose to 
interpret problems in a way, for instance, they seem to be able to avoid a loss.111 Alternatively, Thaler 
and Johnson (1990) suggest a theory of hedonic editing where people organize their mental accounts in 
a way that makes them feel better. 
                                                 
111 An example is the advice by stockbrokers to their costumers to transfer their assets to a position currently recommended, 
instead of recommending to sell an asset previously recommended that now quotes at a loss.   
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B. Mental accounting 
Closely related to framing, mental accounting refers to the implicit methods individuals use to code and 
evaluate transactions, investments, gambles, and other financial activities (Kahneman and Tversky, 
1984; Thaler, 1985). Through this process, people keep track of and evaluate their transactions, like 
financial accounting in firms (Thaler, 2008). Shiller (2000a) calls it mental compartments and Statman 
(1999) puts it shortly: people think “some money is retirement money, some is fun money, some is college 
education money, and some is vacation money” (p.19). Three key elements of Thaler’s (1985) mental 
accounting theory are compounding principles, transaction utility and budgetary rules. Compounding 
principles refer to framing outcomes, aggregating or segregating them, in a way they increase their 
perceived utility. Transaction utility depends on the price the individual pays compared to a reference 
price: the total utility from a purchase is the sum of acquisition utility ―the value of the good compared 
to the outlay― and transaction utility ―which depends on the perceived merits of the deal. Finally, 
budgetary rules refer to the optimization process: individuals select the purchases that maximize the 
acquisition and transaction utilities of the goods purchased subject to a budget constraint. 
Thaler (1999b) explains people engage in mental accounting activities in three instances. The first 
one captures how outcomes are perceived, and how decisions are made and then evaluated by assessing 
both ex ante and ex post cost-benefit results. The second one involves the assignment of activities to 
specific accounts ―i.e., funds are labeled. Finally, the third one concerns the frequency with which 
accounts are evaluated. The three of them violate the economic principle of fungibility.112 The model 
helps to explain some puzzles as why some markets fail to clear. Several other models feature mental 
accounting. The behavioral portfolio theory, BPT (Shefrin and Statman, 2000) introduces the possibility 
that investors segregate their portfolios within multiple mental accounts. Das et al. (2010) integrate 
some features of BPT and Markowitz’s MPT into a mental accounting framework, and obtain a 
connection between investor consumption goals and portfolio construction. In addition, Barberis and 
Shleifer (2003) analyze the investors’ tendency to categorize investments into groups, such as growth 
and value, and generate a number of empirical predictions. 
An effect of mental accounting is that attitudes toward risk vary across mental accounts: people 
are often highly risk averse in some accounts and much less risk averse, even risk seeking, in others. Pan 
and Statman (2010) find empirical evidence of it. In addition, it may lead to a house money effect (Hens 
and Bachmann, 2008). Mental accounting and framing may be used to mitigate self-control problems 
(Thaler and Shefrin, 1981). Instead, loss aversion causes the decision making to be affected by the way 
alternatives are framed (Tversky and Kahneman, 1986). Following this, Barberis and Huang (2001) 
wonder what the relevant context for loss aversion is: gains and losses over total wealth, versus gains 
                                                 
112 Two assets are fungible when, having the same characteristics, they are interchangeable. It implies money has no labels: the 
fungibility assumption is what permits all the components of wealth to be collapsed into a single number (Thaler, 1990). 
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and losses of each particular investment. They find the second approach ―i.e., a narrow framing where 
investors are loss averse over the value of individual stocks― better to explain the observed behavior. 
Some ambiguities appear when consumption is temporally separated from purchase, such that the value 
of things can change due to depreciation, appreciation, personal taste, and others. Shafir and Thaler 
(2006) analyze these situations and identify some mental accounting rules people tend to use.113 
Choice bracketing – Kahneman (2003a) says decision making is characterized by narrow framing 
and the related notions of mental accounting and decision bracketing ―i.e., the grouping of individual 
choices into sets (Read et al., 1999). A set of choices are bracketed together when choices are made in a 
way they take into account the effect of each one on all other choices in the set, but not outside it. 
4.2.3. Valuation / Errors of preference 
The third group within the category of psychological biases consists of valuation and errors of 
preference. We divide this category in two groups. On one hand we include prospect theory (Kahneman 
and Tversky, 1979), a descriptive theory of choice that better explains how individuals evaluate the 
outcomes of risky prospects and choose in consequence. On the other hand, there is much empirical 
evidence as well that people make inconsistent choices when they make decisions over time. This group 
is related to the literature on intertemporal preferences that starts with the problems of self-control in 
intertemporal choice by Thaler and Shefrin (1981). Prospect theory, intertemporal preferences, and the 
biases that are related to them are summarized in Table 4.4. They are reviewed in detail below. 
TABLE 4.4 – Valuation / Errors of preference 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
Prospect theory is the most relevant descriptive theory of decision making under uncertainty. 
According to it, individuals evaluate the outcomes of risky prospects through a value function where the 
carriers of value are changes in wealth compared to a reference point rather than final assets, and a 
                                                 
113 These include treating advances purchases (e.g., a case of wine) as investments, rather than spending, and then consider it 
for free or even as savings when it is eventually consumed as planned (a wine bottle opened for dinner). Costs are only 
associated with the event if it is not consumed as planned (the bottle is dropped and broken), with perceived costs being the 
cost of replacing the good, especially if replacement is likely. 
Related Concepts Notes
REFERENCE POINTS ANCHORING-AND- Conservatism 
After the 'Anchoring-and-adjustment dispute', it falls from the
heuristics list to be considered among the 'errors of preference'.
ADJUSTMENT Sunk costs fallacy Anchoring closely related to reference points (Rabin, 1998)
LOSS AVERSION Myopic loss aversion Mental accounting
Myopic loss aversion explains the equity risk premium and the
disposition effect (Kahneman and Tversky, 1990)
DIMINISHING SENSITIVITY Risk seeking Favorite longshot bias Tversky and Kahneman (1992)
PREFERENCE REVERSALS Projection bias Projection bias: Loewenstein et al. (2003)
(Lack of) Self control Precommitment
Thaler and Shefin (1981): Mental accounting and framing
to mitigate self control problems
Hyperbolic discounting Rabin (2002a)
Source dependence Tversky and Kahneman (1992)
Probability matching Hens and Bachmann (2008)
P
ro
sp
e
ct
 T
h
e
o
ry
In
te
rt
e
m
p
o
ra
l 
p
re
fe
re
n
ce
s
VALUATION - ERRORS OF PREFERENCE
131 
 
probability weighting function where probabilities are replaced by decision weights. An extended 
version of prospect theory was later developed by Tversky and Kahneman (1992), called cumulative 
prospect theory, CPT. The theory accounts for a distinctive fourfold pattern of risk attitudes confirmed 
by experimental evidence: people tend to exhibit risk aversion for gains and risk seeking for losses of 
high probability, and risk seeking for gains and risk aversion for losses of low probability. In addition, 
the value function being steeper for losses than for gains implies loss aversion. These features stem from 
some particular characteristics of the value and weighting functions. Both functions are described next. 
In prospect theory, people evaluate risks using transformed rather than objective probabilities, 
by applying a weighting function to the objective probabilities. This allows for the overweighting of tails, 
a modeling device that captures the common preference for a lottery-like, or positively skewed, wealth 
distribution (Barberis and Huang, 2008), in accordance with the empirical fact that people tend to put 
much weight on rare events. Thus, probability weighting may help explain the IPOs underpricing puzzle. 
Besides, individuals replace the utility function by a value function with three essential characteristics: 
reference dependence (the carriers of value are gains and losses defined relative to a reference point), 
loss aversion (the function is steeper in the negative than in the positive domain) and diminishing 
sensitivity (the marginal value of both gains and losses decreases with their size). This results in a value 
function that is concave above the reference point and convex below, kinked at the reference point, and 
represents investor’s loss aversion. Moreover, diminishing sensitivity applies to the weighting function 
as well. These three essential features predicted under prospect theory, loss aversion, reference points, 
and diminishing sensitivity, are analyzed in what follows. 
A. Reference points 
In prospect theory, it is not final states what carries utility and matters for choice, but changes relative 
to a reference point. Just like one feels water at 20ºC fine when weather is cold, and cold when it is hot 
outside, perception is reference-dependent. A first study of reference points is in Helson (1964), who 
shows individuals tend to be more sensitive to changes with respect to some reference level rather than 
to absolute levels (Rabin 1998). Reference points are closely related to diminishing sensitivity and loss 
aversion, as well as to the status quo bias (Tversky and Kahneman, 1991), among others. Several 
candidates to be a natural reference point were suggested. In stock markets, Shefrin and Statman (1985) 
and Odean (1998a) suggest the privileged role by the buying price. Kõszegi and Rabin (2006) suggest 
the reference point is set by the subject’s rational expectations given the economic environment. Kõszegi 
and Rabin (2007) describe different options ―including the status quo, lagged status quo, and the mean 
of the chosen lottery― that generate inconsistent predictions on risk attitudes.114 Then, using Kõszegi 
                                                 
114 Under a status quo specification of the reference point, loss aversion predicts a high displeasure of modest-scale risks 
involving both gains and losses, and diminishing sensitivity predicts risk lovingness in high-probability losses. Under the lagged 
status quo (e.g., Thaler and Johnson, 1990) diminishing sensitivity predicts a willingness to take unfavorable risks to regain the 
previous status quo ―i.e., disposition effect― inconsistent with the risk aversion predicted by a status quo model. Finally, under 
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and Rabin’s (2006) model they suggest the predicted inconsistent risk attitudes may be manifestations 
of the same preferences in different domains.115 Moreover, the model predicts less risk aversion when 
deciding whether to remove an expected risk than when deciding whether to take on that risk. 
Another possibility is that the reference point varies from the purchase price to a new one as the 
stock price changes. Indeed, a relevant implication of prospect theory analyzed in a dynamic context is 
that reference points may change over time following gains and losses. Arkes et al. (2008) analyze this 
reference point adaptation, and discover an asymmetry: the magnitude of the adaptation is significantly 
greater following a gain than following a loss of equivalent size. The asymmetric adaptation suggests a 
mental accounting and hedonic maximization, as it results from the hedonic benefits of segregating 
intertemporal gains and integrating intertemporal losses (Thaler, 1999b). Baucells, Weber and Welfens 
(2011) study how reference points are updated after a sequence of information, and find they are not 
recursive, in the sense that the new reference point is not a combination of the previous one and the 
new information. Instead, they are a combination of the purchase (first) and the current (last) price of 
the time series. Finally, Arkes et al. (2010) analyze how cultural differences influence reference point 
adaptation (see cultural differences, subsection 4.3.2). 
Anchoring-and-adjustment – Considered to be a key judgmental bias in risk perception, closely 
related to reference points (Rabin, 1998), anchoring-and-adjustment was initially seen as a heuristic but 
changed its classification after the enunciation of the attribution substitution. It is often referred to lead 
to underreaction (Barberis and Thaler, 2003) and to cause some relevant biases, such as conservatism 
(Shefrin, 2000). The literature starts with Tversky and Kahneman (1974), who set anchoring as one of 
the three basic heuristics in intuitive judgment. Early literature also includes Einhorn and Hogarth 
(1986), who develop a descriptive model of judgment under ambiguity where an initial estimate serves 
as an anchor and further adjustments are made for ambiguity. However, subsequent literature provided 
little or no support to this hypothesis. Then, Epley and Gilovich (2001) reestablished its validity by 
providing evidence that insufficient adjustment produces anchoring effects when anchors are self-
generated. Epley and Gilovich (2006) provide experimental evidence. Finally, Oppenheimer et al. (2008) 
show anchors can operate across modalities. They show that for large or small anchors the notion of 
their general magnitudes may prime (that is, ‘largeness’ or ‘smallness’), such that once a sense of size is 
activated individuals may exhibit bias in subsequent judgments. These results suggest the boundaries 
of anchoring effects may be wider than previously thought. 
Finally, a closer insight on this bias is in a series of papers by Epley and Gilovich, compiled in Epley 
and Gilovich (2010). They see three waves of research on anchoring. The first wave starts with Tversky 
                                                 
specifications based on the certainty equivalent of the chosen lottery ―e.g., the disappointment aversion model of Bell (1985) 
― loss aversion implies substantial aversion to any risk, which is inconsistent with the risk lovingness of the disposition effect. 
115 The model predicts both risk lovingness after surprise modest losses but risk aversion when a risk and the possibility to 
insure it are expected (matching both status quo prospect theory and disappointment aversion). 
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and Kahneman (1974), but they consider this wave over. The second one tries to set the psychological 
mechanisms that produce anchoring effects. These include a confirmatory hypothesis testing (Chapman 
and Johnson, 1994), numeric or magnitude priming (Oppenheimer, Leboeuf, and Brewer, 2008), and 
insufficient adjustment (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Epley and Gilovich, 2001). The third wave makes 
predictions about the consequences of anchoring. Epley and Gilovich suggest some lines of future 
research: analyzing the types of anchors that occur in everyday life, identifying social moderators of 
anchoring effects, and determining the sources of variability in the consequences of anchoring effects. 
Conservatism – Defined as the slow updating of models in face of new evidence (Shleifer, 2000), 
conservatism explains why markets often respond gradually to new information (Chan, Jegadeesh and 
Lakonishok, 1996). It results in earnings reflecting bad news more quickly than good news (Basu, 1997). 
Thus, conservatism has been suggested to explain the profitability of momentum strategies (Chan et al., 
1996) and the evidence of underreaction (Barberis et al., 1998). Early papers include Edwards (1968) 
―see Chapter 3― and analysis on multistage evaluation (e.g., Gettys, Kelly and Peterson, 1973). 
Sunk costs fallacy – Prendergast and Stole (1996) define it as the unwillingness of individuals to 
respond to new information, and relate this bias to conservatism and cognitive dissonance reduction. 
B. Loss aversion 
As above mentioned, in prospect theory changes relative to a reference point determine utility. In 
addition, investors assign more significance to losses than to gains with respect to the reference point. 
This asymmetry in the value function is called loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky, 1984): people 
suffer a loss more acutely than they enjoy a gain of the same magnitude (Shefrin, 2006). Loss aversion 
is thought to occur because people expect the pain of losing something to exceed the pleasure of gaining 
it, with the evidence of negativity biases in non-monetary domains reinforcing this belief (McGraw et al., 
2010). However, that represents a contradiction to expected utility theory: Knetsch (1989) shows that 
if loss aversion is present, the basic property of EUT that two indifference curves never intersect no 
longer holds.116 The influence of loss aversion in choices is observed in many contexts (Thaler, 1985; 
Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler, 1990; Camerer, 2000; Novemsky and Kahneman, 2005) and may 
explain empirical findings like the disposition effect and higher levels of trade when prices are rising 
than when they are falling (Shefrin and Statman, 1985), how the number of market transactions may be 
reduced (Knetsch, 1989), why consumers and managers may take fewer risks (Rabin, 2000), and why 
stocks pay larger returns over bonds than theory predicts (Benartzi and Thaler, 1995). It is related to 
endowment effect and status quo bias (described in subsection 4.3.2). Loss salience (Hirshleifer, 2008) 
extends the notion of loss aversion to the social sphere: we care more about the financial losses than the 
financial gains of others. Finally, Tversky and Kahneman (1991) offer a theory of consumer choice where 
                                                 
116 This requires indifference curves to be reversible: if a person owns x and is indifferent between keeping it and trading it for 
y, then if owning y it should be indifferent for him to trade it for x. (Kahneman et al., 1991). 
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losses have greater impact on preferences than gains, and provide empirical evidence that losses are 
weighted about twice as gains.  
However, some limits of loss aversion were identified. Novemsky and Kahneman (2005) obtain 
experimental evidence that exchange goods given up as intended (e.g., money paid in purchases) do not 
exhibit loss aversion. It is individual’s intentions ―that is, defining a good as an object of exchange or of 
consumption― what codes outcomes as gains or losses, and determines whether giving up a good is 
evaluated as a loss or a foregone gain. McGraw et al. (2010) note empirical evidence of losses having 
greater effect on feelings than gains on judged feelings is mixed.117 They suggest an interpretation: loss 
aversion requires people comparing gains and losses, but while choice enforces comparison, judging 
feelings does not necessarily require it ―instead, we tend to consider similar outcomes for comparison 
(i.e., losses against losses). 
Myopic loss aversion – A concept related to loss aversion is myopic loss aversion: the combination 
of loss aversion and the investors’ common habit of evaluating their portfolios frequently (Benartzi and 
Thaler, 1995). It rests on two behavioral principles: loss aversion and mental accounting. It helps to 
explain the equity risk premium, the disposition effect, and implies that the decision making is affected 
by the way alternatives are framed. Finally, Thaler et al. (1997) find experimental evidence of two 
implications: investors will be more willing to accept risks if they evaluate their investments less often, 
and if all payoffs are incremented enough to eliminate losses, investors will accept more risk. 
C. Diminishing sensitivity 
The third essential feature of prospect theory applies to both the value and weighting function. 
Diminishing sensitivity states that the impact of a change diminishes with the distance to the reference 
point (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). Then, marginal effects in perceived well-being are greater for 
changes close to the reference level than for changes further away (Rabin 1998). Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979) note that diminishing sensitivity is a pervasive pattern of human perception, being perceptions 
a concave function of the magnitudes of change. Hence, they conjecture the value function would be 
concave for gains and convex for losses, reflecting the principle of diminishing sensitivity. This implies 
different attitudes toward risk: while people are likely to be risk averse over gains, they are often risk-
loving in the domain of losses (i.e., we are willing to gamble to avoid losses). Diminishing sensitivity 
applies to the weighting function, too (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992): “In the evaluation of uncertainty, 
there are two natural boundaries ―certainty and impossibility― that correspond to the endpoints of the 
certainty scale. Diminishing sensitivity entails that the impact of a given change in probability diminishes 
with its distance from the boundary” (p. 303). Two related biases follow next.  
                                                 
117 For example, Mellers et al.’s (1997) study emotional reactions “to outcomes of mixed gambles (e.g., win or lose $16) on a 
standard bipolar scale from -50 (extremely disappointed) to +50 (extremely elated), and found that gains and losses were rated as 
roughly equal in intensity. Other studies have provided only limited evidence of an asymmetry” (McGraw et al., 2010, p. 3). 
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Risk seeking – Prospect theory asserts most people are risk averse, as standard finance predicts, 
but only when confronted with the expectation of a financial gain. Instead, when facing the possibility 
of losing money, people often behave as a risk lover, preferring to gamble if there exists a possibility to 
avoid a sure loss. Thus, this feature is also known as aversion to a sure loss: people choose to accept an 
actuarially unfair risk in an attempt to avoid a sure loss (Shefrin, 2006). More specifically, risk-seeking 
choices are common to be observed in two types of choices, namely aversion to a sure loss and the 
favorite-longshot bias (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). The first type stems directly from the shape of 
the value function; the favorite-longshot bias, instead, represents a miscalibration of probabilities that 
is often related to the probability weighting function ―see next. 
Favorite-longshot bias – It is often observed in betting markets that bettors tend to put too much 
weight on rare events (longshot bets) while they underestimate the probability of favorites. Thus, the 
expected return on longshot bets tends to be systematically lower than on favorite bets (Ottaviani and 
Sorensen, 2007), or alternatively, the normalized prices on the favorites understate their winning 
chances while the normalized prices on the longshots exaggerate their winning chances (Shin, 1992). A 
common manifestation of a risk-seeking behavior, the favorite-longshot bias is one of the most studied 
biases in behavioral finance and other disciplines. The first documentation is attributed to Griffith’s 
(1949) observation of this behavior in horse-race betting. Classic papers include Shin (1992) and 
Woodland and Woodland (1994). Recent studies include Hodges, Tompkins and Ziemba (2008), who 
observe a favorite-longshot bias in the derivatives markets,118 and Ottaviani and Sorensen (2007), who 
review the main theoretical explanations suggested, including a misestimation of probabilities (Griffith, 
1949), market power of informed bettors, preference for risk, heterogeneous beliefs, market power by 
uninformed bookmakers (Shin, 1992), limited arbitrage by informed bettors, and simultaneous betting 
by partially informed insiders (Ottaviani and Sorensen, 2007). 
D. Preference reversals 
When people make decisions over time, their intertemporal preferences are rational if they are time 
consistent ―i.e., if they exhibit no preference reversals as time passes (Hens and Bachmann, 2008). 
However, empirical evidence shows people do exhibit preference reversals, have problems to commit 
with decisions they had taken in the past, and exhibit present-biased preferences. For simplicity, we see 
these concepts together under the epigraph of preference reversals. 
Economists compare preferences over time with exponential discounting, what implies time 
consistency. However, psychological research shows this assumption is wrong: preferences vary over 
time. The first to notice were perhaps Phelps and Pollak (1968), who reviewed Ramsey’s postulate that 
                                                 
118 They find investors tend to pay too much for deep out-of-the-money call options (longshots) because they are seen as a sort 
of lottery tickets. 
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all generations exhibit a perfect altruism.119 More recently, Kirby and Herrnstein (1995) show changes 
in delayed rewards make subjects’ preferences reverse from a larger, later reward to a smaller, earlier 
reward as the delay decrease. Related to preference reversals is the existence of a projection bias: people 
exaggerate the degree to which their future tastes will be similar to their current ones. Loewenstein, 
O’Donoghue and Rabin (2003) provide evidence and model this bias, which presumably stems from 
habit formation, and which makes people consume too much early in life, and to consume more and save 
less than originally planned as time passes. Finally, two important consequences of preference reversals 
are that people exhibit problems of self-control and a present bias. We see both concepts in what follows. 
Self-control (and precommitment) – We sometimes make certain decisions precisely to restrict 
our own future flexibility (Rabin, 1998). Strotz (1955) realized that a person, when choosing a plan of 
consumption for the future, might recognize he later might not obey to that plan. Knowing this, he may 
choose to precommit his future behavior by excluding future options, or by modifying his plan as to take 
account for future disobedience. Those who are aware of their future self-control problems would be 
sophisticated, and those who are not, naive. Loewenstein (1996) concludes, however, that any of us may 
end up being naive indirectly due to psychological biases that makes us mispredict changes in utility. 
Thaler and Shefrin (1981) suggest mental accounting and framing may be used to mitigate self-control 
problems. Finally, Shefrin (2000) relates self-control to preference for dividends: some investors may 
prefer dividends because they don’t want to dip into capital. 
Hyperbolic discounting – Also known as present bias. Standard economic models assume people 
discount streams of utility over time exponentially. However, this has been shown to generate time-
inconsistent preferences, with ample evidence that people exhibit present-biased preferences instead 
(Rabin, 2002a): “We are more averse to delaying today’s gratification until tomorrow than we are averse 
to delaying the same gratification from 90 days to 91 days from now. This difference in attitudes towards 
delay in gratification generates time inconsistency when considering potential dynamics of behavior” (p. 
668). A way to account for present-biased preferences is to apply hyperbolic discounting. Thus, standard 
economics model exponential discounting as 
𝑈𝜏 = ∫ 𝑒−𝑟(𝑡−𝜏) ∙ 𝑢𝑡𝑡=𝜏     (4.1) 
where Uτ are intertemporal preferences, ut instantaneous utilities, and r>0 a parameter. Continuous-
time hyperbolic discounting would be instead expressed as 
𝑈𝜏 = ∫
1
(𝑡−𝜏)+𝑘
∙ 𝑢𝑡𝑡=𝜏      (4.2) 
                                                 
119 Phelps and Pollak (1968) describe Ramsey’s postulate: “each generation’s preference for their own consumption relative to 
the next generation’s consumption is no different from their preference for any future generation's consumption relative to the 
succeeding generation” (p. 185). However, what if people do not subscribe to this ethic? Phelps and Pollak investigate the 
optimal saving policy of an imperfectly altruistic present generation, an antecedent to the study of changes in preferences.  
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where k>0 is a parameter. Alternatively, since the continuous-time hyperbolic discounting function is 
difficult to deal with and its specific functional form not very important, we can model present-biased 
preferences with a discrete-time discounting function of the type  
for all t,      
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where parameters β and δ are less than 1, with δ very close to 1. The discrete-time exponential model 
corresponds to β = 1. While exponential discounting is a theory of 100% short-term patience, present-
biased preferences account for different immediate and future discounting: one can be extremely 
patient in the long run and very impatient in the short run. Camerer and Loewenstein (2004) highlight 
this immediacy effect as the most striking consequence of time discounting: “discounting is dramatic 
when one delays consumption that would otherwise be immediate” (p. 23). 
E. Other errors of preference 
Source dependence – People's willingness to bet on an uncertain event depends not only on the 
degree of uncertainty but also on its source (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992).  
Probability matching – Another violation of rationality on binary choice problems is a tendency 
to match probabilities, allocating responses in proportion to their relative payoff probabilities (Hens 
and Bachmann, 2008). For instance, people often choose 49% heads and 51% tails when they know an 
unfair coin has those probabilities, when the optimal choice would be, indeed, to always select tails. 
4.2.4. Social factors 
The last group of psychological biases consists of social factors: cultural and social influences on 
individual’s behavior. The main biases in this group are summarized in Table 4.5 and reviewed below. 
TABLE 4.5 – Social factors 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
Related Concepts Notes
SOCIAL CONTAGION Obediency to authority Herd behavior
Social contagion: Asch's (1952) experiment. Shiller (2000b) links
herding to social contagion and obedience to authority
Communal reinforcement Shiller (1984)
Groupthink theory (Collective) Confirmatory bias Lunenburg (2010)
Persuasion Johnson and Eagly (1989)
STATUS, ENVY, SOCIAL COMPARISON Self esteem, Pride, Prejudice Rabin (1998)
Cooperation, altruism
INFORMATIONAL CASCADES Availability cascades Asset bubbles Shiller (2002b) cites cascades as one of the causes of the dot-com bubble
Herding Bikhchandani et al (1998) relate informational cascades and herding
GLOBAL CULTURE Cultural differences Guiso et al. (2006); Statman and Weng (2010)
GREED AND FEAR Familiarity People exhibit fear of the unknown, causing familiarity (Cao et al., 2011)
Status quo bias Fear of change causes a status quo bias (Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988)
FAIRNESS, RECIPROCITY & JUSTICE Trust Kahneman et al. (1986a)
SOCIAL FACTORS
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A. Social contagion 
Social contagion was first reported in the classic Asch’s experiment (Asch, 1952): a subject was placed 
into a group of several people confederated with Asch, and asked to answer a sequence of questions 
about the lengths of some line segments shown to them. The subject heard other people’s answers 
before giving his own answer. Every time the confederates gave unanimous and obviously wrong 
answers, most subjects tend to answer the same. Moreover, they often showed signs of anxiety or 
distress that evidence they surrendered to avoid being seen as different of foolish before the group. 
Ach’s experiment highlights the power of social pressure on individual judgment. Shiller (1984) 
claims then that a consequence of social dynamics on markets is that fads influence financial markets 
just as they do in instances such as fashion or politics.120 Manski (2000) surveys the literature on social 
interaction and suggests the neoclassical view, where non-market interactions are not of interest, ends 
by the 1970s when some developments in micro, macro and labor economics expose the importance of 
the economic analysis of social interactions ―in particular, the adoption of non-cooperative dynamic 
game theory. Finally, a basic distinction between social interaction literature and literature about 
culture, which we will review later in this section, is that the former focuses on peer group effects that 
can be viewed as the fast-moving component of culture (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2006), while 
culture-related topics rely on inherited, slow-moving components of culture.  
Obedience to authority – Milgram’s experiments (Milgram, 1963, 1974) show few people has the 
initiative to resist authority, to the point of performing acts that violate their deepest moral beliefs: most 
subjects were willing to hurt or even kill another person if they were simply asked to do it, with no 
coercive methods, by a person or an institution they recognized as an authority. A few years before, 
Festinger (1957) analyzed the effects of forced compliance, showing that a person forced to do 
something contrary to her opinion may eventually change her view in order to avoid cognitive 
dissonance. Shiller (2000b) links herd behavior to social contagion and obedience to authority: Asch’s 
experiment evidence the immense power of social pressure on individual judgment; Milgram’s 
experiments, the enormous power of authority over the human mind. Thus, Shiller suggests, the study 
of asset bubbles could draw upon epidemic models used by sociologists to predict the course of word-
of-mouth transmission of ideas. 
Communal reinforcement – Communal reinforcement is a type of social dynamics. Early articles 
on social psychology of individual suggestibility, group pressure and diffusion of opinions include 
Katona (1901), Sherif (1937) and Asch (1952). Katona uses the term social learning for the process of 
“mutual reinforcement through exchange of information among peer groups by word of mouth, a major 
condition for the emergence of a uniform response to new stimuli by very many people” (p.203). Sherif 
                                                 
120 Investors follow gurus, read magazines, discuss investments with other investors, gossip about others’ successes or 
failures... and through this process, market psychology influences markets (Shiller, 1984). 
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shows how individual opinions are influenced by the opinion of others in his classic experiment on the 
autokinetic effect.121 Asch, as we have seen, finds evidence of decision errors under social pressure. 
Groupthink theory – Groupthink, a term coined by Janis (1972), is the tendency of cohesive 
groups to reach consensus without offering, seeking or considering alternative hypothesis (Lunenburg, 
2010). Janis identifies some symptoms of groupthink, including an illusion of invulnerability which lead 
groups to take excessive risks, or members imposing themselves a self-censorship to avoid appearing 
as a dissenter. Shefrin and Cervellati (2011) interpret it as a form of collective confirmation bias. 
Persuasion – Under some circumstances, people may be persuaded by others to think or act in a 
specific way. A classic concept to explain when persuasion succeeds is involvement (Johnson and Eagly, 
1989): the closer the values and attitudes by the persuader and how the individual defines himself, the 
stronger the involvement. Persuasion has been widely studied in areas such as marketing, politics, and 
sociology. Examples are Di Blasio and Milani (2008), who show persuasion succeeds better in face-to-
face conditions; DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007), who show the ability of media to persuade voters; and 
Todd and Miller (1999), who analyze the effects of persuasion in mate search. 
B. Status, envy and social comparison 
An important field of social psychology relevant to economics refers to self-perception compared to 
others, and the feelings of jealousy, self-esteem, pride or prejudice such comparison provokes. We 
denote this category ‘status, envy and social comparisons’ as in Rabin (1998). Not all feelings stemming 
from social comparisons are negative, as cooperation (Argyle, 1991) or reciprocal altruism (Trivers, 
1971) fall within this category. Examples of this literature are Salovey and Rodin (1984) on jealousy; 
Gilbert, Price and Allan (1995), who suggest social comparison occurs in many forms of human 
interaction, such as relative social hierarchy (status), sexual selection, competition for parental 
investment, or reciprocal exchange and altruism; and Richins (1991), who reviews the literature on 
consumer dissatisfaction when they compare themselves with the idealized advertising images. 
C. Informational Cascades 
News media often act as precipitators of attention cascades: significant market events only occur if large 
groups of people think the same, and news media could be the vehicles for such spread of ideas. Shiller 
(2000b) cites informational cascades among the causes of the dot-com bubble. Bikhchandani, 
Hirshleifer and Welch (1998) argue that some puzzling phenomena such as herding, fads, asset bubbles 
and crashes may be seen as consequences of informational cascades. We learn by observing what others 
do, and then imitate those acts. Such propensity to imitate would be an evolutionary adaptation for 
survival, allowing individuals to take advantage of the hard-won information of others. 
                                                 
121 Subjects seated in a totally darkened room were asked to report the magnitude of the movement of a point of light five 
meters ahead. They reached consensus on the magnitude when, in fact, the point of light wasn’t moving at all (Shiller, 1984). 
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Availability cascades – Related to informational cascades, these are self-reinforcing processes of 
collective belief formation that have a combination of informational and reputational motives as driving 
factors (Kuran and Sunstein, 1999). By the availability heuristic, people judge the importance of a theme 
according to their ability to remember examples of it. Then, as a chain reaction result, the more people 
talk about an issue ―and media often play a relevant role here― the more relevant it seems due to its 
rising availability in public discourse, leading to a self-reinforcing cycle (Hirshleifer, 2008).  
D. Global culture 
Culture refers to the values that ethnic, religious, and social groups transmit across generations (Guiso 
et al., 2006; Statman and Weng, 2010). The first to note culture is a determinant of economic growth 
was perhaps Weber (1905), who argued the Protestant Reformation was crucial to the development of 
capitalism. Economists have been reluctant to use culture as an explanatory factor, perhaps because of 
the vague and ubiquitous ways culture can enter the economic discourse, making it difficult to design 
testable hypotheses (Guiso et al., 2006). Nonetheless, recent techniques and data available have made it 
possible to identify systematic differences in people’s beliefs, and relate them to their cultural legacy. 
Thus, the way people perceive events is influenced by culture (Levinson and Peng, 2007). Nisbett and 
Masuda (2003) describe how East Asians and Westerners perceive the world and think of it 
differently.122 Cultural psychology has a significant influence on social psychology as well (e.g. Miller, 
1984). Shiller (2000a) notices the emergence of a global culture in examples of imitation or convergence 
of fashions across countries separated by physical and language barriers. Shiller (2000b) suggests 
cultural factors help explain the dot-com bubble, such as the belief we were in a new era. 
Cultural differences – Though a global culture might be emerging, cultural differences are still 
ubiquitous. Empirical evidence includes Arkes et al. (2010), who study cultural differences between 
China, Korea and the U.S., in reference point adaptation following gains or losses in security trading. 
Differences between Asians and Americans are also studied by Ji et al. (2001), who show Chinese, 
compared to Americans, anticipate more changes and are more likely to predict the direction of change; 
Levinson and Peng (2007), who find significant differences in how framing, morality and out-group 
information affects judgments of American and Chinese cultures; and Chen et al. (2007), who find 
differences among Chinese and American investors regarding overconfidence and disposition effect. 
Some authors analyze how culture impacts on expectations and preferences. These include Guiso et al. 
(2006), on the role culture plays to determine prior beliefs in decision making, Henrich et al. (2001), on 
variations across tribes in their responses to the classic ultimatum and dictator games,123 and Hoff and 
                                                 
122 East Asians exhibit a broader perceptual and conceptual view of the world, noticing relationships and changes. They tend 
to group objects based on family resemblance and live in complex social networks. Westerners, instead, live in less constraining 
social worlds and attend more to single objects and their goals with respect to them. 
123 A 2-person ultimatum bargaining game is a perfect information game where on every stage of the bargaining process only 
one player has the option to offer a proposal which the other party can either accept or reject. A dictator game would be similar, 
but where the second player has to accept what is being offered. 
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Priyanka (2004), who show the effects of social inequality linger: beliefs that are the legacy of extreme 
inequality conditions for generations determine individual’s expectations that reproduce the inequality. 
Finally, other authors have focused instead on cultural differences in economic and financial variables. 
Examples are Statman and Weng (2010), who find immigrants exhibit different borrowing patterns and 
real estate and international investing long after they settled in their new countries, and Stulz and 
Williamson (2003), who claim culture may affect finance through three channels: the country values, its 
institutions, and how resources are allocated. 
E. Greed and Fear 
Shefrin’s “Beyond Greed and Fear” (Shefrin, 2000) identifies human emotions as the determinants of 
risk tolerance and portfolio choice, with fear and greed being the main drivers. However, Shleifer (2004) 
claims that the unethical conduct usually blamed to stem from greed is often a consequence of market 
competition.124 Fear, greed, and other emotional responses have been argued against the efficient 
market hypothesis. Thus, Lo, Repin and Steenbarger (2005) offer experimental evidence that even the 
most experienced traders exhibit strong emotional responses to increases in price volatility and that 
there is a negative correlation between successful trading behavior and emotional reactivity. Pan and 
Statman (2010) show risk tolerance varies with conditions and the emotions associated to them. Thus, 
tests of risk tolerance performed after periods of high stock returns are likely to exaggerate investors' 
risk tolerance. In addition, fear is often related to other biases: fear of the unknown would be an 
explanation for the familiarity heuristic (Cao et al., 2011); fear of change, a possible explanation for the 
status quo bias (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988); while fear and greed play a key role in concepts like 
market sentiment, bubbles and crashes, social contagion, and others (Shiller, 2000a; Shefrin, 2000).  
F. Fairness, Reciprocity and Justice 
According to Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1986b), “the absence of considerations of fairness and 
loyalty from standard economic theory is one of the most striking contrasts between this body of theory 
and other social sciences” (p. S285). Camerer and Loewenstein (2004) observe people spend money to 
punish others who have harmed them, to reward those who have helped, or to make outcomes fairer. 
Güth, Schmittberger and Schwarze (1982) conduct a series of dictator and ultimatum games to show 
people often rely on what they consider to be a fair or justified result.125 This shows most individuals 
prefer an inefficient result rather than an unfair result, even if it goes against their interests (Stiglitz, 
2012). Further analyses of these games are available in Camerer and Thaler (1995) ―about ultimatum 
games― and List (2007) ―about dictator games.  
                                                 
124 Shleifer shows the role of competition, as opposed to greed, in the spread of five censured activities: employment of children, 
corruption, excessive executive pay, corporate earnings manipulation, and involvement of universities in commercial activities. 
125 In dictator games, rather than taking everything for themselves (the normative solution), subjects often offer something to 
the counterpart. In ultimatum games, rather than sharing only the smallest possible positive payoff, offers are usually within 
30 to 40 percent of the given amount, while their counterparts tend to reject the proposal when it offers less than 20 percent. 
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For behaviorists, it is a short-sighted view to believe firms simply maximize profits subject only 
to legal and budgetary constraints: markets that fail to clear evidence that some additional constraints 
are operative (Kahneman et al., 1986a,b). Akerlof (1979) and Solow (1980) use fairness to explain why 
firms often do not cut wages during periods of high unemployment, giving rise to the literature of 
efficiency wages where higher wages increase productivity (Akerlof and Yellen, 1990; Fehr and Falk, 
1999). Okun (1981) says fairness can also alter the outcomes in customer markets ―where suppliers 
have some monopoly power and repeat business with their clientele. Thaler (1985) and Kahneman et 
al. (1986a,b) find fairness is relevant for customers to determine their reference prices, with loss 
aversion playing a key role in what they find to be acceptable. Stiglitz (2012) goes further: the perception 
of an increasing inequality and that our economic system is unfair may have very harmful effects over 
our democracies. Additional literature includes Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) on equity and competition; 
Falk, Fehr and Fischbacher (2003) on fairness; and Sen (1995) on moral values.  
Fairness and justice are related to other concepts, like money illusion: people observe nominal 
rather than real changes in wages and prices to assess the fairness of a firm’s behavior (Kahneman et al, 
1986a). The endowment effect implies people feel foregone gains (opportunity costs) less painful than 
perceived losses (out-of-pocket costs). Hence, our perceptions strongly depend on whether a question 
is framed as a gain reduction or an actual loss (Kahneman et al., 1991). Finally, Shleifer (2004) analyzes 
the relationship between ethics and efficiency. When ethical norms promote cooperative behavior they 
help for the successful functioning of social institutions and so, ethics and efficiency go together. Three 
ways to avoid unethical behavior are long-run market pressure, moral suasion and regulation. Shleifer 
suggests they are limited and advocates for competition:126 it would lead to economic growth and wealth 
creation, and as societies grow richer their ethics will change to emphasize cooperation and inclusion. 
Trust – Pan and Statman (2010) identify trust as one of the five deficiencies of risk tests aimed to 
help investors’ advisors. Trust matters to advisors since trusting investors are likely easier to guide. 
 
4.3. BEHAVIORAL CONSEQUENCES 
 
Our taxonomy separates psychological biases and the consequences of those biases. These behavioral 
consequences, known as anomalies, are empirical results that are difficult to rationalize. Following 
Barberis and Thaler (2003), we split this category into market anomalies and investor behavior 
anomalies ―what we call decision effects. We analyze them separately in what follows. 
                                                 
126 People express concern for child labor, but they want cheaper shoes; moral suasion works when competition is less keen, 
but not when companies are bounded by the imperative of commercial survival; and government regulation is limited to battle 
against cost-reducing competition ―that is why corruption, child labor and bad accounting practices remain so pervasive. 
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4.3.1. Market anomalies 
A classic field in finance is the literature on financial market anomalies. We reviewed them in Chapter 2, 
so in most instances we will refer to that chapter for further description. Another field are the anomalies 
in the decisions companies make. Thus, we divide this category in financial markets anomalies and 
anomalies in corporate finance. The most relevant are summarized in Table 4.6 and reviewed below. 
TABLE 4.6 – Market anomalies 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
A. Excess volatility 
As described in Chapter 2, Shiller (1979, 1981) impose a theoretical limit on bond and stock market 
volatility, respectively. Using the dividend discount model (DDM), Shiller demonstrates that, though the 
efficient markets model does not say stock prices p should be equal at any time to their ex post rational 
counterpart p* (given by DDM), two theoretical volatility bounds must hold:127 
                                                 
127 The first inequality comes from the fact that, if markets are efficient, then p* = p + ε, where ε is a white noise prediction error, 
that is uncorrelated with p. Hence, the variance of the stock price series, p, must be lower than the variance of the ex post 
counterpart, p*, given by DDM. The second inequality starts from the concept of ‘innovation in a variable’, δt = Et – Et-1. The 
expected innovation in stock prices, when prices are derived from expected future dividends (as in DDM), is equal to δt · pt = 
Δpt + dt-1 – r · pt-1. Since innovations are serially uncorrelated, and assuming price (and dividend) stationarity, Shiller ends up 
with an optimization program for var(δp), that is, he looks for the highest possible variance of stock price innovations that 
could be explained by innovations in dividends. The solution for that optimization program is equation (4.5).  
MARKET ANOMALIES
Related Effects 
and Trading Strategies CAUSAL FACTORS Notes
FINANCIAL MARKET ANOMALIES
EXCESS VOLATILITY Sentiment, cascades and bubbles Heuristics
Shiller (1979, 1981)
Related to sentiment, cascades... (Raghubir & Ranjan Das, 1999)
Prospect theory and Mental accounting Prospect theory and mental accounting explain
the excess volatility (Barberis et al. 2001).
EXCESSIVE TRADING VOLUME Gambling and speculation Attention anomalies, Disposition effect Attention anomalies and disposition effect (Odean, 1999)
Overconfidence, illusion of control Overconfidence (Odean, 1998b);
Illusion of control (Raghubir & Ranjan Das, 1999)
OVERREACTION Long term reversals Beliefs (representativeness, overconfidence)
Preferences (loss aversion, narrow framing)
Overreaction & long term reversals: De Bondt & Thaler (1985)
Beliefs and preferences: Barberis and Thaler (2003)
CONTRARIAN INVESTING Gambler's & hot hand fallacies Gambler's and hot hand fallacies explain both over
and underreaction (Rabin 2002b)
UNDERREACTION MOMENTUM
Anchoring, Conservatism
Momentum: Jegadeesh & Titman (1993)
Conservatism (Chan et al., 1996)
POSITIVE FEEDBACK TRADING Overconfidence, Disposition effect Beliefs and preferences: Barberis and Thaler (2003)
Disposition effect (Grinblatt and Han, 2005)
HERDING Social contagion Herding would be related to social contagion (Shiller, 2000a)
RETURN PREDICTAB. (time series) Dividend-to-price ratio Fama & French (1988)
RETURN PREDICTAB. (cross-sect) Scale-Price ratios
Event studies Heuristics, Prospect th., Mental accounting IPO-related pricing anomalies caused by prospect theory
and mental accounting (Barberis & Huang, 2008)
EQUITY PREMIUM PUZZLE Stock market participation puzzle Myopic loss aversion
(loss aversion & framing)
Mehra and Prescott (1985)
Myopic loss aversion explains the puzzle: Benartzi & Thaler (1995)
Ambiguity aversion Ambiguity aversion: Maenhout (2004)
FORWARD PREMIUM PUZZLE Overconfidence Burnside et al. (2011)
CLOSED-END FUND PUZZLE Mental accounting Related to mental accounting (Raghubir & Ranjan Das, 1999)
ANOMALIES IN CORPORATE FINANCE
DIVIDEND PUZZLE Self-control, Prospect theory Shefrin and Statman (1984)
BUSINESS FAILURE Overconfidence Camerer and Lovallo (1999)
HIGH RATES OF M&A Overconfidence Roll (1986), Malmendier and Tate (2008)
CORPORATE DIVERSIFICATION Overconfidence Malmendier and Tate (2008)
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where d is the dividend paid and r the real interest rate (cost of capital). Likewise, Shiller (1979) shows 
that an upper limit on the volatility of the long-rate series exists. An equation similar to (4.4) applies to 
interest rate markets, with the holding period return, H, on bonds playing the role of Δp, and the short 
term interest rate, r, playing the role of dividends. That is:  
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H
2
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   .     (4.6) 
These bounds show that the fundamental principle of optimal forecasting is that the forecast must 
be less variable than the variable forecasted. However, Shiller (1979, 1981) provides empirical evidence 
that those limits were dramatically violated in stock markets ―as well as in bond markets, though to a 
lesser extent. Since empirical evidence shows most market volatility is not explained by fundamentals, 
this puts into question the entire efficient markets theory (Shiller, 2003). 
Some authors suggest Shiller’s work misspecifies some fundamental values and has econometric 
difficulties. Following Merton (1987), Shiller (1981) makes three assumptions: prices reflect rational 
expectations of future dividends, the real expected rate of return is constant over time, and aggregate 
real dividends can be described by a finite-variance stationary stochastic process with a deterministic 
exponential growth rate. Merton asserts there is evidence to reject the second one, but Grossman and 
Shiller (1981) obtain similar results with a discount factor equal to the intertemporal marginal rate of 
substitution for consumption ―as described in Chapter 2. In addition, Kleidon (1986) reports evidence 
against stationarity for both stock prices and dividends. Later work would correct the stationary 
assumption: Campbell and Shiller (1988a) model dividends and stock prices in a more general way, and 
get results that support the excess volatility. Similar results were obtained by West (1988a,b), Campbell 
and Shiller (1988b), Campbell (1991) and LeRoy and Parke (1992). Barsky and DeLong (1993), instead, 
show that if dividend growth rates are unstationary, EMM looks closer to the data. 
B. Excessive trading volume 
Odean (1999) suggests trading volume in financial markets seems higher than rationally expected for 
rebalancing and hedging needs, and provides evidence that it is indeed excessive for investors with 
discount brokerage accounts. Shefrin and Statman (1994) and Odean (1998b) suggest overconfidence 
would cause the excessive trading. Odean (1999) tests the hypothesis, but the results are too extreme 
to be explained only by overconfidence. Additional causes would be the disposition effect, attention 
anomalies, reluctance to sell short, gambling and speculation, and illusion of control. 
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Gambling and speculation – Shiller (2000a) reports that about 4% of men and 1,5% of women 
were probably or potentially addicted gamblers in the U.S. by 1974, and suggests compulsive gambling 
is only an extreme form of a more common behavior. This tendency to gamble has always represented 
a puzzle in the study of behavior under uncertainty, since it shows people simultaneously exhibit risk 
aversion (insurance) and a risk-loving behavior (gambling). This propensity to gamble would be a 
partial explanation for excessive trading, bubbles in speculative markets, and irrational exuberance. 
C. Overreaction and underreaction 
As we saw in Chapter 3, De Bondt and Thaler (1985) use Kahneman and Tversky’s (1982a) insights to 
show markets overreact. Then, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) show they may underreact as well.128 A 
full reconciliation of both theories, under the behaviorist paradigm, would come with models by 
Barberis et al. (1998), Daniel et al. (1998), Hong and Stein (1999) and Lee and Swaminathan (2000), 
among others. All these models assume investors’ cognitive and emotional biases to explain both under 
and overreaction. Barberis and Thaler (2003) summarize three groups: beliefs (conservatism, 
representativeness, overconfidence...), institutional frictions, and preferences (loss aversion, narrow 
framing). Thus, a market overreaction that eventually reverses (a.k.a. long term reversal or mean reversion) 
makes a contrary investing strategy profitable, while a market that underreacts is a good place for investors to 
perform momentum and positive feedback trading strategies. Finally, other investors simply might try to follow 
what others do, a strategy known as herding. In what follows we review contrary investing, momentum and 
positive feedback trading, and leave herd behavior for a subsequent section. 
Contrarian investing – A negative autocorrelation in stock returns (Fama and French, 1988b) 
suggest the profitability of contrary investing strategies over long horizons (De Bondt and Thaler, 1985). 
However, later research would find little or no evidence of mean reversion, including Jegadeesh (1991), 
Kim, Nelson and Startz (1991), McQueen (1992), and Gangopadhyay (1996). The validity of previous 
research suggesting empirical evidence of mean reversion was also put under question by Lamoureux 
and Zhou (1996), who criticize the properties of the tests used to detect predictability in stock prices. 
Gropp (2004) came to address these critiques, providing a rationale for the failure of previous research 
to detect mean reversion: the standard methods classify stocks by market capitalization, what fails to 
account for temporary shocks in prices and decreases the likelihood of detecting mean reversion. To 
                                                 
128 Evidence of overreaction includes Fama and French (1988b), Poterba and Summers (1988), and Cutler, Poterba and 
Summers (1991) of slight negative autocorrelation in stock returns over horizons of three to five years; Campbell and Shiller 
(1988a), Kothari and Shanken (1997) and Pontiff and Schall (1998) that low dividend yields and book to market ratios predict 
a low subsequent return; Campbell and Kyle (1993) that stock prices respond more to news about fundamentals than it 
otherwise would do. Evidence from the cross-section of stock returns by De Bondt and Thaler (1985), Chopra, Lakonishok and 
Ritter (1992), of earnings by Zarowin (1989), of price to book value by De Bondt and Thaler (1987), Fama and French (1992), 
and of price to cash flow by Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994). Evidence of underreaction include Cutler et al. (1991) for 
aggregate time series of security returns; Bernard (1992), Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) or Chan et al. (1996) for cross-section 
of stock returns; again Chan et al. (1996) and Rouwenhorst (1998) of underreaction to earnings announcements; Ikenberry, 
Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1995) to share repurchases; Ikenberry, Rankine and Stice (1996) to stock splits; Michaely, Thaler 
and Womack (1995) to dividend initiations; Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) to SEOs. 
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solve it, he uses industry-sorted portfolios instead, and finds strong evidence of mean reversion in 
industry portfolios for the U.S. over the period 1926–1998 which, after temporary shocks, revert 
halfway toward their fundamental levels over 4–8 years.  
Momentum – The profitability of momentum strategies (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993) seems to 
be consistent. Chan et al. (1996) note the sources of profitability may come from past returns or recent 
earnings surprises. In addition, momentum does not appear to be only driven by positive feedback 
trading (because drifts in returns are not subsequently reversed).129 In consequence, rationalists like 
Fama and French (2012) seem to have subscribed to this evidence, but they consider it may be explained 
by economic risk factors that affect investment life cycles and growth rates (Chordia and Shivakumar, 
2002), like interest rates and slow turnover in the firm’s project portfolio, what leads to persistence in 
systematic risk (Berk, Green and Naik, 1999). However, Griffin, Harris and Topaloglu (2003) review 
recent empirical research ―including Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), Fama and French (1996) and 
Grundy and Martin (2001)― and claim it favors the behaviorist interpretation that momentum is not 
driven by market risk. Moreover, Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) show momentum returns quickly 
dissipate after the investment period, rejecting the rationalist hypothesis.130 Behavioral interpretations 
include conservatism (Chan et al. 1996), imperfect formation and revision of investor expectations in 
face of new information (Barberis et al., 1998; Daniel et al., 1998), a neglected firms’ effect due to low 
analyst coverage (Hong, Kubik and Solomon, 2000), and the disposition effect (Grinblatt and Han, 2005). 
Positive feedback trading – A trading strategy often related to momentum (e.g., Grinblatt, Titman 
and Wermers, 1995) and herding, trend chasing or positive-feedback trading was first described in 
DeLong et al. (1990b), who test whether it might induce the profitability of momentum strategies, and 
find trend chasers reinforce stock prices movements even in the absence of fundamental information. 
Nonetheless, Chan et al. (1996) suggest momentum is not entirely driven by positive feedback trading, 
as drifts in future returns are not subsequently reversed. Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) find 
evidence of positive-feedback trading among institutional traders for smaller stocks, but relatively little 
evidence in blue chips. Nofsinger and Sias (1999), on the contrary, find that institutional investors use 
positive feedback trading more often than individual investors. 
D. Herd behavior (‘herding’) 
Herding is a mutual imitation (Welch, 2000), the tendency of managers to follow the herd ―that is, to 
mimic the investment decisions of other managers. Hwang and Salmon (2004) define it as imitation and 
suppression of private information. Early literature includes Kraus and Stoll (1972a), who address the 
                                                 
129 Recent literature continues to provide empirical support to this anomaly. Examples are Lee and Swaminathan (2000), Hong, 
Lim and Steim (2000), Patro and Wu (2004), De Bondt and Wolff (2004), Bange and Miller (2004), Nijman, Swinkels and 
Verbeek (2004), Chen and De Bondt (2004), and Karolyi and Kho (2004). 
130 Rationalists (e.g., Conrad and Kaul, 1998) consider the return of winners in the holding period equal to their unconditional 
expected rates of return. Hence, the returns of the momentum portfolio should be positive after the holding period as well. 
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question of a parallel trading by institutions but find little evidence, Friend, Blume and Crockett (1970), 
who find mutual funds managers imitate successful funds, what leads to herding and positive-feedback 
trading, and Gwynne (1986), who documents herd behavior in banks’ lending policies. Herding is related 
to social contagion (Shiller, 2000a). Nonetheless, it might be rational from the perspective of managers 
who are concerned about their reputations in the labor market (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990). Incentives 
to herd may arise endogenously since agents herd to mimic their more skilled counterparts (Trueman, 
1994, Clement and Tse, 2005), they perceive it to be a safe course of action131 (Jegadeesh and Kim, 2010) 
or because they herd on non-informative signal (DeLong et al. 1990a). Prendergast and Stole (1996), on 
the contrary, suggest newcomers will exaggerate their differences with others to appear talented ―an 
anti-herding behavior that would be related to a cognitive dissonance reduction. 
The first authors to model herd behavior were Scharfstein and Stein (1990) and Banerjee (1992) 
―see Chapter 3. A classic approach includes some theoretical models that predict low-reputation 
analysts are more likely to herd. Some examples are Lakonishok et al. (1992), Grinblatt et al. (1995), 
Trueman (1994) and Clement and Tse (2005). Other articles conclude analysts herd towards consensus. 
Thus, Wermers (1999) finds evidence of herding in mutual fund trading of small stocks and by growth-
oriented funds. Hong et al. (2000) find experienced analysts are more likely to provide bold forecasts, 
while inexperienced analysts deviate less from consensus in order not to lose their jobs. Gallo, Granger 
and Jeon (2002) show agents conform to the macroeconomic consensus. Finally, Lamont (2002) notes 
agents produce more radical ―and generally less accurate― forecasts as they become more established. 
Welch (2000) criticizes the literature above, warning that without knowing the underlying information 
flow, one cannot determine whether similar reports are due to a similar underlying information or is 
caused by mutual imitation. Zitzewitz (2001) proposes a statistical inference across a set of observations 
to solve the problem and finds analysts do not herd, but rather that they exaggerate their differences. 
Bernhardt, Campello and Kutsoati (2006) and Chen and Jiang (2006) get similar results supporting an 
anti-herding behavior when they consider analysts may extract information from consensus forecasts. 
Jegadeesh and Kim (2010) take note of the criticism. First, they note the critique also has a flaw: 
it assumes consensus forecasts are unbiased, contrarily to empirical evidence.132 Then, they implement 
a test to see whether analysts herd around the consensus when they make stock recommendations, and 
find some results consistent with the herding hypothesis. First, recommendation revisions are partly 
driven by herding, with stronger effects for downgrades than for upgrades (analysts are more reluctant 
to stand out from the crowd when they convey negative information). Second, market reaction to 
revisions are stronger when revised recommendations move away from the consensus. Third, analysts 
from larger brokerages are more likely to herd, supporting the prediction by Prendergast and Stole 
                                                 
131 If their predictions turn out to be wrong when they herd, then their competitors would be wrong as well. 
132 Richardson, Teoh and Wysocki (2004) find consensus forecasts are initially optimistic, but gradually become pessimistic. 
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(1996). Four, analysts following stocks with small dispersion of opinions and those who make 
infrequent revisions are more likely to herd. Alternatively, Hwang and Salmon (2004) develop a new 
method to measure herding by investors: the cross-sectional evolution over time in factor sensitivities 
(e.g., CAPM betas) is analyzed, and deviations from equilibrium beliefs expressed in market prices 
quantified. Their study identifies that periods of market stress were critical turning points where herd 
behavior diminished and market efficiency was enhanced. 
E. Predictability of returns 
As we saw in Chapter 2, classic tests on EMH evidence stock returns may exhibit long-term predictability 
in time series, cross-sectional analysis and event studies. Regarding serial predictability, the classic 
approach focuses on dividend yields: for instance, Fama and French (1988b) find that the dividend-to-
price ratio explains part of the returns over the subsequent four years. Regarding cross-sectional 
averages, the size effect (Banz, 1981) and scaled-price ratios such as earnings-to-price (Basu, 1977), 
book-to-market (Stattman, 1980), and debt-to-equity (Bhandari, 1988) have shown to have some 
predictive power. Event studies include earnings announcements (e.g., Bernard and Thomas, 1989), 
stock repurchases (Ikenberry et al., 1995), stock splits (Ikenberry et al., 1996), dividend initiations and 
omissions (Michaely et al., 1995), and IPO-related pricing anomalies (Ritter, 1991), which Barberis and 
Huang (2008) explain using prospect theory and mental accounting.  
F. Financial puzzles 
Equity premium puzzle – The average return on stocks has historically far exceeded the average 
return on risk-free debt. Mehra and Prescott (1985) analyze the ninety-year period 1889–1978 and find 
the average real annual yield on the Standard and Poor’s 500 index was seven percent, while that on 
short-term debt was less than one percent. They show this differential cannot be explained by models 
in the Arrow–Debrew set up under the standard expected utility maximizing paradigm. This anomaly is 
known as the equity premium puzzle. Early models that explain the anomaly are DeLong et al. (1990a) 
and Epstein and Zin (1990). 
Currently, behavioral finance provides two interpretations of this puzzle (Barberis and Thaler, 
2003), one based on prospect theory and the other on ambiguity aversion. In regards to prospect theory, 
Benartzi and Thaler (1995) identify two factors that contribute to investors’ reluctance to bear the risks 
associated with equities: loss aversion and narrow framing ―a short performance evaluation period. 
When investors exhibit this combination, known as myopic loss aversion, the size of the equity premium 
is consistent, because under the presence of loss aversion, the aggregation rules of mental accounting 
are not neutral.133 A similar approach is in Barberis et al. (2001) and Barberis and Huang (2007). Models 
                                                 
133 Samuelson (1963) provides a classic example: He offered some colleagues to bet $200 to $100 that a side of a coin would 
not appear at the first toss. One of them replied he didn’t bet ‘because I would feel the $100 loss more than the $200 gain’ (i.e., 
loss aversion), but that he would bet ‘if you let me make 100 such bets’. Samuelson proves then a theorem: “a person whose 
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based on ambiguity aversion, instead, analyze how people react to ambiguity. Weitzman (2007) shows 
risk seems larger under structural uncertainty. One quantitative implication is that agents may have a 
reference probability distribution in mind, but they make decisions according to a ‘worst-case 
misspecification’ scenario. Maenhout (2004) shows that, if investors are worried about the possibility 
that their model of stock returns is misspecified, they will require a higher equity premium as a 
compensation for the ambiguity in the probability distribution. His results, nonetheless, suggest 
ambiguity aversion would only be a partial explanation for this puzzle. 
Stock market participation puzzle – Related to the equity premium puzzle, Barberis et al. (2006) 
define this puzzle as the fact that, even though stock markets have a high average return and a low 
correlation with other risks, many households are reluctant to allocate any money in it. They reckon 
Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) to be the first to study this puzzle. Barberis and Huang (2007) suggest 
narrow framing might predict what kinds of people are more likely to participate in stock markets. 
Forward premium puzzle – In currency markets, the forward premium ―the difference between 
the forward and the spot exchange rates― negatively forecasts changes in the exchange rate, an anomaly 
known as the forward premium puzzle (Burnside et al., 2011). Empirical studies (e.g. Hodrick, 1987) 
show that, when short-term nominal interest rates are high in one currency relative to other, the 
currency subsequently appreciates on average, which contradicts rational expectations models. Froot 
and Thaler (1990) claim the bias is due to expectation errors, not time-varying rational premia for 
systematic risk (Fama, 1984). Burnside et al. (2011) interpret the puzzle as a consequence of 
overconfident investors overreacting to a positive signal about the future money growth differential. 
Closed-end fund puzzle – A closed-end fund is a mutual fund that issues a fixed number of shares 
that are traded on the stock market. The closed-end fund puzzle is the empirical finding that closed-end 
fund shares typically sell at prices not equal to the per share market value of assets the fund holds. Lee, 
Shleifer and Thaler (1991) show that discounts of 10 to 20 percent have been the norm. The puzzle is 
often related to the existence of limits of arbitrage. For instance, Pontiff (1996) finds the market value 
of a fund is more likely to deviate from fundamentals when portfolios are difficult to replicate, funds pay 
smaller dividends, funds have lower market values, or when interest rates are high, consistent with 
noise trader models of asset pricing (e.g., DeLong et al., 1990a). 
                                                 
utility schedule prevent him from ever taking a specific favorable bet when offered only once can never rationally take a large 
sequence of such fair bets, if expected utility is maximized” (p. 109). However, things are different under prospect theory. If 
Samuelson’s colleague had a value function that exhibits loss aversion (e.g., V(x) = [x if x>0, 2.5x if x<0], where x is change in 
wealth relative to the status quo), he would turn down one bet but accept two or more as long as he did not have to watch the 
bet being played out. Indeed, one toss yield an expected value of ($200 * .5) – (2.5 * $100 * .5) = -$25 but, since the distribution 
of outcomes with two consecutive bets is [$400, .25; 100, .50; -$200, .25], the expected value is ($400 * .25) + ($100 * .5) – (2.5 
* $200 * .25) = $25. Hence, when decision-makers are loss averse, they will be more willing to take risks if they evaluate their 
performance infrequently. Benartzi and Thaler (1995) interpret the equity premium puzzle the same way: “The attractiveness 
of the risky asset will depend on the time horizon of the investor. The longer the investor intends to hold the asset, the more 
attractive the risky asset will appear, so long the investment is not evaluated frequently” (p. 75). 
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G. Anomalies in corporate finance 
Dividend puzzle – Firms paying dividends is the main puzzle behavioral corporate finance has 
tried to solve (Thaler, 1993). The Modigliani–Miller theorem (Modigliani and Miller, 1958, 1959; Miller 
and Modigliani, 1961) claims a dividend policy irrelevance: a stock that pays dividend should be similar 
to another that pays no dividend ―ignoring transaction costs and taxes― since the price of the dividend-
paying stock drops on the ex-dividend date by the same amount. The dividend policy of a company does 
not affect its value because the higher the dividend, the lower the capital appreciation (Black, 1976). 
However, Black notices a dividend puzzle: companies do pay dividends, and investors do care for them. 
Shefrin and Statman (1984) first suggested that the tendency of investors to favor cash dividends could 
be explained by behavioral and cognitive elements in terms of two new theories of choice at that time: 
the theory of self-control (Thaler and Shefrin, 1981) and the prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 
1979). Miller (1986) does not agree, finding the anomaly is a misinterpretation of the basic model. 
High rates of business failure – A classic empirical result is that most new businesses fail within 
a few years (Camerer and Lovallo, 1999). Examples are Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1988) and 
Baldwin (1995). Some standard features that explain the chances of business failure and survival are 
firm’s size and industry concentration (for a review, see Geroski, Mata and Portugal, 2010). However, 
this does not explain why so many entrepreneurs keep on trying to start new business and fail. The 
behavioral interpretation to this anomaly was provided by Camerer and Lovallo (1999). They set the 
hypothesis that the high rates of business failure are a result of excessive optimism about the future and 
overconfidence on relative abilities (i.e., the better-than-average effect). Camerer and Lovallo provide 
experimental evidence of this hypothesis. Rodrigues, Da Costa and Da Silva (2011) replicate the 
experiment by Camerer and Lovallo (1999) to consider managers as well as students, and find that 
managers are more prone to feature the overconfidence and excess entry relationship than students. 
High rates of M&A – As described in Chapter 3, a classic puzzle in corporate finance is the high 
rates of mergers and acquisitions observed, despite they do not allow acquiring firms to earn superior 
returns after the takeover. Roll (1986) suggested the hubris hypothesis of corporate takeovers, while 
Shleifer and Vishny (2003), on the contrary, suggest managers are rational and take advantage of market 
inefficiencies through merger transactions. CEO overconfidence is also a classic argument (Malmendier 
and Tate, 2008; Liu and Taffler, 2008). Other articles include Malmendier, Tate and Yan (2011). 
Corporate diversification – There is evidence that multi-segment firms trade at a discount 
compared with a portfolio of single-segment firms (Lang and Stulz, 1994). Hence, there is a debate on 
whether diversification destroys shareholder value (Andreou et al., 2012). Again, a classic behavioral 
interpretation is based on overconfidence: Malmendier and Tate (2008) find that overconfident CEOs 
overestimate their ability to generate returns and, as a result, tend to be more acquisitive, overpay for 
acquired firms and, on average, destroy shareholder value mainly through diversification deals. 
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4.3.2. Decision effects 
A second category of behavioral consequences are investor behavior anomalies ―we denote decision 
effects. Behavioral biases affect people in a way they cause effects not predicted by the classic paradigm. 
This is a most complex category to determine which topics should be included. Whether a particular 
behavior is a decision effect or, alternatively, a heuristic, a judgmental bias or a social factor is sometimes 
not clear. Some examples follow to illustrate. Authors like Rabin (1998) and Hens and Bachmann (2008) 
classify the endowment effect and the status quo bias as heuristics; others instead (e.g., Kahneman et al., 
1991; Novemsky and Kahneman, 2005) consider them effects of loss aversion (indeed Novemsky and 
Kahneman call the endowment effect a riskless loss aversion). Regret is an emotion that may be seen as 
a bias, or even an emotional factor related to social relations (do we feel regret because we made a bad 
choice or because other people know we made a bad choice?). However, since it is a feeling we feel after 
a decision has been made, it better fits as a decision effect.134 In addition, some concepts are clearly 
related to others already described, such as investors’ excessive trading and the excessive trading 
volume anomaly. Nonetheless, some other concepts, such as the investors’ preference for dividends, 
portfolio underdiversification or window dressing, are clear examples of effects that are a consequence 
of investor behavior. The main decision effects are summarized in Table 4.7 and reviewed below. 
TABLE 4.7 – Decision effects 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
                                                 
134  Nonetheless, before making a decision we may exhibit regret aversion ―i.e., a judgmental bias (e.g., Zeelenberg et al., 1996). 
DECISION EFFECTS
Related Effects 
and Concepts CAUSAL FACTORS Notes
ENDOWMENT EFFECT STATUS QUO BIAS Loss aversion
Endowment (Thaler, 1980); Status quo (Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988)
Some authors (Rabin 1998) consider them Heuristics. Most authors
(e.g., Tversky and Kahneman, 1991) consider them effects of loss aversion
DISPOSITION EFFECT Underreaction Loss aversion A.k.a. 'Try-to-break-even' effect, it explains underreaction to information
and profitability of momentum strategies (Grinblatt & Han, 2005)
Momentum Mental accounting Loss aversion and Mental accounting explain it (Shefrin and Statman, 1985)
REGRET COGNITIVE DISSONANCE Regret related to cognitive dissonance and prospect theory (Shiller, 2000a)
Psychological call option Regret aversion Hens and Bachmann (2008)
PORTFOLIO UNDERDIVERSIF. HOME BIAS - Local bias Familiarity Familiarity (Cao et al. 2011); Framing (Shefrin & Statman 2000); 
Home bias (French & Poterba, 1991); Prospect th. (Barberis & Huang 2008)
Naive diversification Framing, Prospec theory Naive diversification (Benartzi & Thaler 2001)
Money illusion Framing Kahneman et al. (1986a)
House money effect Mental accounting Thaler and Johnson (1990)
Disjunction effect Shiller (2000a)
Habit formation Hens and Bachmann (2008)
Window dressing Lakonishok et al. (1991)
Illusion of knowledge Overconfidence Barber and Odean (2002)
Omission bias Hirshleifer (2008)
Reference group neglect Camerer and Lovallo (1999)
Scapegoating and Xenophobia Hirshleifer (2008); Aronson et al. (2006)
Sensation seeking Grinblatt and Keloharju (2009)
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A. Endowment effect 
Thaler (1980) denominates endowment effect the increased value of a good when it becomes part of an 
individual’s endowment. It represents a consequence of loss aversion (Tversky and Kahneman, 1991), 
since the loss of utility when giving up a good is greater than the utility of receiving it. Kahneman et al. 
(1990) describe it as willingness to accept (WTA) being greatly larger than willingness to pay (WTP), a 
discrepancy the Coase theorem cannot explain.135 Knetsch and Sinden (1984) were the first to provide 
experimental evidence of this disparity between WTA and WTP. Two alternative explanations are a 
search for evidence of sustitability, a rational hypothesis,136 and the status quo bias ―a behavioral 
hypothesis.  Kahneman et al. (1990) confirm experimentally the endowment effect and status quo bias 
are manifestations of loss aversion. Horowitz and McConnell (2003) use WTA/WTP ratios from a 
dataset of 201 experiments to calculate the income effect ―defined as the change in WTP for the good 
in question when the income increases, ∂WTP/∂y― to conclude they are too high to be consistent with 
neoclassical preferences. 
Status Quo effect – In decision making, people often choose the status quo alternative: do nothing 
or maintain one’s previous decision (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988). Often referred as the status quo 
bias, we might have classified it in the heuristic-and-biases category, related to the familiarity bias (e.g., 
Hartman, Doane and Woo, 1991). However, most literature relate it to the endowment effect. Thus, 
Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) say an antecedent for status quo bias is endowment effect, and 
Kahneman et al. (1991) and Tversky and Kahneman (1991) show that one implication of loss aversion, 
as with the endowment effect, is that people have a strong tendency to remain at the status quo, because 
disadvantages of leaving it overcome advantages.137 
The effect was first demonstrated by Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988), who implemented a 
series of decision problems followed by a set of mutually exclusive alternative actions from which to 
choose. The alternatives were framed in two ways: under a neutral framing, a menu of potential options 
with no specific labels attached was presented; under a status quo framing, one of the options was 
placed in the status quo position and the other became alternatives to the status quo.138 The status quo 
                                                 
135 The Coase theorem (Coase, 1960) says traders who can transact at no cost should allocate resources independent of their 
initial property rights. Kahneman et al. (1990) show instead that if the marginal rate of substitution between two goods is 
affected by endowment, traders who have an initial property right will be more likely to retain it. 
136 Hanemann (1991) proves that the difference between WTP and WTA depends on the ratio ‘income elasticity of demand for 
the good to elasticity of substitution between the good and a composite commodity’. When the elasticity of substitution is low, 
the ratio will be large, and so the WTA/WTP ratio. 
137 The status quo may be seen as the reference point, so the individual would weigh potential losses from switching as well as 
potential gains. Since loss aversion determines losses are weighted heavier than gains, individuals would choose not to change. 
Notwithstanding, some other causes might induce a status quo bias in the absence of loss aversion. Samuelson and Zeckhauser 
(1988) explore some of them: rational decision making in the presence of transition costs and uncertainty, convenience, habit, 
policy or custom, regret avoidance, cognitive misperceptions (loss aversion, anchoring) and psychological commitment 
stemming from misperceived sunk costs, fear or innate conservatism, a drive for consistency, or even cognitive dissonance. 
138 In the first part of the questionnaire the status quo condition was framed by the wording of the decision problem made by 
the experimenters (i.e., the status quo was exogenously given). The second part, instead, involved sequential decisions where 
the subject’s initial choice determined the status quo for a subsequent choice. No significant differences were obtained. 
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framing was found to have predictable and significant effects on participants’ decision making. Other 
early works include Knetsch and Sinden (1984) and Knetsch (1989). Then, an initial attempt to study 
the bias in an economic context is in Hartman et al. (1991), who find empirical evidence of a status quo 
effect in consumer valuations of an unpriced product ―namely, the demand for residential electricity. 
Fernandez and Rodik (1991) suggest a status quo bias appears when the identities of gainers and losers 
from a reform cannot be determined beforehand. Finally, Roca et al. (2006) show the effect emerges 
when people prefer an ambiguous alternative in their possession than an unambiguous one ―a sort of 
ambiguity-seeking attitude that emerges with and without incentives. 
B. Disposition effect 
Coined by Shefrin and Statman (1985) and known as well as a try-to-get-even effect, it reflects the 
tendency of investors to sell winners (stocks whose price has increased) too early and ride losers too 
long ―in order not to recognize a loss. The disposition effect has been related to pricing phenomena 
such as the post-earnings announcement drift and stock price momentum (Grinblatt and Han, 2005), 
and helps explain the excessive trading volume observed in stock markets (Odean, 1999). Some articles 
that find evidence of the effect are in order. Odean (1998a) computes the proportion of gains realized 
(PGR) and the proportion of losses realized (PLR)139 and finds PGR = 0.148 significantly greater than 
PLR = 0.098 (with similar results for all months except December, when tax-motivated selling prevails). 
Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) observe the two major determinants for investors to sell a stock are 
reluctance to realize losses and tax-loss selling. Other determinants of trading are reference price effects 
and the smoothing of consumption according to the life-cycle hypothesis.140 Statman et al. (2006) find 
overconfidence and disposition effect are more pronounced in small-cap stocks. Frazzini (2006) shows 
that investors displaying the disposition effect induce a price underreaction to news announcements, 
leading to return predictability (post-earnings announcement drift). Finally, Chen et al. (2007) find a 
stronger disposition effect for Chinese investors than for Americans. 
The most plausible explanations for the disposition effect are prospect theory, particularly loss 
aversion, and mental accounting (Shefrin and Statman, 1985; Grinblatt and Han, 2005). Nonetheless, the 
evidence of a disposition effect is not universal. Shefrin and Statman (1985) suggest regret would 
explain why some individual investors do not display the effect, while self-control helps to explain how 
professional traders force themselves to realize losses. In addition, Barberis and Xiong (2009) extend 
Odean’s (1998a) methodology to investigate whether prospect theory predicts the disposition effect in 
                                                 
139 On any day an investor in the sample sells a share, every stock in the investor’s portfolio is classified into one of four 
categories: a realized gain or realized loss is counted if the stock was actually sold (at a gain or loss), and a paper gain or paper 
loss is counted for stocks that were not sold (but quote at a gain or loss from the purchase price). Then, the proportion of gains 
realized is defined as PGR = no. of realized gains / (no. of realized gains + no. of paper gains) and the proportion of losses 
realized as PLR = no. of realized losses / (no. of realized losses + no. of paper losses). 
140 Developed by Modigliani and Brumberg (1954), the hypothesis suggests rational agents should smooth their consumption 
by investing and borrowing based on expectations about their lifetime income (Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001). 
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all circumstances, and find surprising results. If prospect theory is defined over realized gains and losses, 
results are consistent with a disposition effect. However, if preferences are defined over annual gains or 
losses and investors are allowed to trade several times a year, the results actually predict the opposite.  
C. Regret 
Bell (1982) describes regret as the emotion caused by comparing a given outcome with the state of a 
foregone choice. Alternatively, it is the pain we feel when we realize we would be better off today had 
we chosen another option in the past (Barberis and Huang, 2009). Kahneman and Riepe (1998) highlight 
people feel more regret about things they did, but they feel regret of things they did not, too. This is 
called regret of omission, and people who exhibit this feeling have a tendency to take more risks. 
Gilovich, Medvec and Kahneman (1998) debate on whether people regret actions more in the short term 
and inactions in the long run ―something Kahneman disagrees. To solve the controversy, three 
empirical tests were performed and established some common ground.141 
Regret is related to cognitive dissonance and it is also embodied in prospect theory, in the notion 
of a kink in the value function at the reference point (Shiller, 2000a). Regret avoidance helps to explain 
the disposition effect. Inman and McAlister (1994) find regret influences coupon redemption patterns 
in the bond market. Regret has been also related to the psychological call option (Hens and Bachmann, 
2008) and narrow framing (Barberis and Huang, 2009). Finally, Pan and Statman (2010) suggest that 
investors’ risk tolerance assessed in hindsight amplifies regret: investors often claim, in hindsight, that 
advisors overstated their risk tolerance and they were induced to undertake unsuitable investments. 
Cognitive dissonance – When two simultaneously held cognitions are not consistent, it produces 
a state of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, Riecken and Schachter, 1956). This makes people feel internal 
tension and anxiety, so they will strive to reduce it either changing past values, feelings and opinions, or 
attempting to justify or rationalize their choice. According to a theory of self-perception, major cognitive 
dissonance phenomena may be seen as interpersonal judgments in which the observer and the observed 
happen to be the same person (Bem, 1967). Goetzmann and Peles (1997) argue cognitive dissonance 
would explain why investors switch to winning mutual funds more rapidly than they flow out of losers. 
A similar interpretation is in Ricciardi and Simon (2000), who highlight people tend to change their 
investment styles or beliefs to support their financial decisions. Finally, Daniel et al. (1998) relate 
cognitive dissonance and self-attribution bias. 
Psychological call option – Hens and Bachmann (2008) suggest investors may hire a financial 
advisor not (only) for advice, but because if their investments yield a satisfactory return the investors 
attribute it to their skills, but if it turns out to be wrong, they lower regret by blaming the advisor. 
                                                 
141 When we feel regret for something we did, hot emotions (anger, shame...) are elicited. Inaction regrets elicit wistful emotions 
(nostalgia) ―as Kahneman argues― as well as despair (misery) ―as Gilovich and Medvec suggest. 
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D. Portfolio underdiversification 
Many researchers have documented the investors’ tendency to hold portfolios made up of far fewer 
securities than necessary to eliminate idiosyncratic risk (e.g., Odean, 1999; Benartzi and Thaler, 2001; 
Goetzmann and Kumar, 2008). A number of papers, including Statman (1987) and Meulbroek (2005), 
show empirically this failure to diversify is costly in terms of the risk-return tradeoff achieved. All 
theoretical explanations for this behavior have a common link: the desire for upside potential is a driving 
factor (Mitton and Vorkink, 2007). These include a stronger preference for skewness (Arditti, 1967; 
Simkowitz and Beedles, 1978), framing (Shefrin and Statman, 2000), prospect theory (Polkovnichenko, 
2005; Barberis and Huang, 2008), investor overconfidence (Goetzmann and Kumar, 2008; Anderson, 
2012) and familiarity bias (Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001; Cao et al., 2011). Kumar and Lim (2008) 
predict investors that trade several times a day should exhibit weaker disposition effect and have better 
diversified portfolios. Benartzi and Thaler (2001) observe a naïve diversification: people do diversify but 
in a naïve fashion, like allocating 1/n of their savings amongst n investment options, no matter which 
they are or of which risk profile. Finally, home and local bias are a classical expression of this investor 
behavior. We see them next. 
Home bias – First reported by French and Poterba (1991), who show U.S., Japan and U.K. investors 
allocate 94%, 98% and 82% of their equity investments in domestic securities, the bias is suggested to 
stem from a familiarity bias (Cao et al. 2011) and ambiguity aversion (Hens and Bachmann, 2008). 
Ackert et al. (2005) provide experimental evidence of the familiarity bias interpretation. Evidence of a 
home bias in the banking industry is suggested by De Haas and van Horen (2011), who show banks with 
head offices farther away from their customers are less reliable funding sources during a crisis, and 
Presbitero, Udell and Zazzaro (2012a,b), who show the credit crunch in Italy was harsher in provinces 
with a large share of branches owned by distantly-managed banks.  
Local bias – An analog to home bias but within countries. Examples of this bias include Grinblatt 
and Keloharju (2001), who find evidence of it amongst Finnish investors, Cao et al. (2011), Ackert et al. 
(2005), and Huberman (2001), who provides evidence of a local bias using data on the geographical 
distribution of the shareholders of seven regional bell operating companies in the U.S. 
E. Other effects 
Money illusion – An effect derived from framing, it implies people pay more attention to nominal 
rather than real changes in economic variables such as wages or prices (Kahneman et al, 1986a). 
House money effect – Many investors, after making some money with their investments, tend to 
exhibit an increased risk seeking attitude (Thaler and Johnson, 1990). This leads them to increase their 
willingness to gamble with the money they have recently won (Hens and Bachmann, 2008), clearly an 
effect consequence of mental accounting. 
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Disjunction effect – Shiller (2000a) define it as the tendency to wait to make decisions until some 
information is revealed, even if it is not relevant and we would make the same decision regardless of the 
information. It represents a contradiction to the “sure-thing principle” of rational behavior (Savage, 
1954). Tversky and Shafir (1992) provide empirical evidence. 
Window dressing – The practice of adding winners and eliminating losers in professionally 
managed portfolios, especially at dates like year end, in order to remove embarrassments from reports. 
Lakonishok et al. (1991) find evidence of this practice in the fourth quarter and across small funds. 
Omission bias – Following Ritov and Baron (1990), it is the tendency to favor omissions (such as 
letting someone die) over otherwise equivalent commissions (such as killing someone). Omission bias 
would explain why students of economics find the concept of opportunity cost surprising. 
Reference group neglect – Camerer and Lovallo (1999) observe that self-selected subjects seem 
to neglect they are competing with a group of subjects who think they are skilled too. They compare it 
to the neglect of adverse selection that leads to a winner’s curse in bidding. 
Scapegoating and Xenophobia – People tend to prefer members of their own group to outsiders, 
a phenomenon called in-group bias (Hirshleifer, 2008). When this bias causes fear or hostility toward 
strangers or foreigners, we are dealing with xenophobia. Scapegoating refers to the tendency of 
individuals to look for someone to blame when things go wrong (Aronson, Wilson and Akert, 2006). 
Blame is generally laid upon some visible, disliked, and relatively powerless groups. 
Sensation seeking – First described by Zuckerman, Eysenck and Eysenck (1978), Grinblatt and 
Keloharju (2009) define it as a measurable psychological feature related to gambling, risky driving, risky 
sexual behavior, drug and alcohol abuse and others. It would be more frequent in men and decreasing 
with age (Zuckerman et al., 1978), and a motivator for trade in financial markets, according to Grinblatt 
and Keloharju, who obtain empirical evidence.142 
 
                                                 
142 In addition, many other biases and anomalies can be found in literature. The list would be endless, but a tentative list would 
include concepts such as bandwagon effect (Nadeau, Cloutier and Guay, 1993), barn door closing (Zeckhauser, Patel and 
Hendricks, 1991), bias blind spot (Pronin and Kugler, 2007), certainty effect (Tversky and Kahneman, 1986), default effect 
(Johnson and Goldstein, 2003), clustering illusion (Gilovich, 1991), denomination effect (Raghubir and Srivastava, 2009), 
disappointment aversion (Gul, 1991), egocentric bias (Greenberg, 1983), elicitation effects (which, according to Rabin (1998), 
would include framing effects, preference reversals and context effects), false consensus (Ross, 1977), false memory and 
suggestibility (Roediger and McDermott, 1995), habit (Raghubir and Ranjan Das, 1999), halo effect (Nisbett and Wilson, 1977), 
illusion of knowledge (Barber and Odean, 2002), illusory correlation (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974), magical thinking (Shiller, 
2000a) and quasimagical thinking (Shafir and Tversky, 1992), manias (Kindleberger, 1978), mood effects (Hirshleifer, 2008), 
motivated cognition (Kruglanski et al., 2012), negativity or pessimism bias (Mansour, Jouini and Napp, 2006), out-group bias 
(Aronson et al., 2006), outrage heuristic (Sunstein, 2005), panics (Ricciardi and Simon, 2000), persuasion effect (Petty and 
Briñol, 2008), regret aversion or regret avoidance (Zeelenberg et al., 1996), reward pursuit (Bijleveld, Custers and Aarts, 2012), 
salience and vividness (Hirshleifer, 2008), self-deception (Trivers, 2011), sign effect (Thaler, 1981), similarity heuristic (Rozin 
and Nemeroff, 2002), snake-bite effect (Thaler and Johnson, 1990), tallying (Marewski et al., 2010), unpacking effect (Van 
Boven and Epley, 2003), winner’s curse (Thaler, 1992) and many others. 
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4.4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
We have provided an extensive review of the main biases and anomalies in the literature. The main 
purpose of this review is to have a better criterion to select which will be the main lines of research in 
Part III of this thesis. In particular, we are in search of the psychological biases that have been attributed 
greater importance in the interpretation of investor and market anomalies. These are the main results 
we have obtained. 
First, we distinguish two broad categories: psychological biases and behavioral consequences. 
The former imply a predisposition toward error, while the consequences of those biases, either market 
anomalies or decision effects, are empirical results that are difficult to rationalize.  
Second, among the psychological biases, the taxonomy we provided differentiates four groups: 
heuristics and biases, framing, valuation and errors of preference, and social factors. Among them, 
representativeness, overconfidence, prospect theory and social contagion are perhaps the most 
recurrent. Surely, the leading role of prospect theory is beyond doubt, being the most relevant 
descriptive theory of decision making under uncertainty.  
Third, behavioral consequences may refer to decision effects (related to individuals) or to market 
anomalies. Again, the causal factors behind the most relevant effects and anomalies confirm the 
importance of representativeness and overconfidence in belief formation, and social contagion in herd 
behavior. Overconfidence, in particular, is one of the most relevant heuristic-driven biases which has 
been claimed to play a significant role in corporate management anomalies, as well as in significant 
market anomalies such as excessive trading volume, over and underreaction. 
In consequence, for the purposes of this thesis we will focus on overconfidence and prospect 
theory. Chapter 5 will provide deeper insight on these two areas of the literature, as well as an extended 
vindication of our choice, to finish Part II. 
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CHAPTER 5. PROSPECT THEORY AND OVERCONFIDENCE 
 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In Chapter 4 we offered a taxonomy, summarized in Table 4.1, of the main behavioral biases and 
anomalies identified in the academic literature. The former are classified into heuristics and biases, 
framing, valuation/errors-of-preference and social factors, and the latter may refer to decision effects 
or to market anomalies. Inside each category we may find dozens of biases and anomalies that challenge 
the basic tenets of traditional finance. Notwithstanding, in this thesis we will focus on two areas: 
prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) and overconfidence (Moore and Healy, 2008).  
The reason why we choose these two areas is threefold. First, they are two of the most-well 
studied areas in behavioral finance. Second, both concepts have been suggested to explain a risk-seeking 
behavior by market participants. Third, key concepts in prospect theory ―like loss aversion or 
diminishing sensitivity― as well as overconfidence might help explain how misperceptions by 
participants in the banking sector might have led them to engage in inappropriate credit policies. Both 
areas will be the basis for the theoretical and experimental research in Part III. In particular, the 
theoretical models in Chapter 9 assume the existence of at least one boundedly rational bank that is 
distorted by overconfidence, while the experimental research in Chapters 7 and 8 analyzes the effects 
that different risk profiles according to prospect theory, as well as different measures of overconfidence, 
may have over banks’ credit policies and performance. 
Thus, this chapter is devoted to provide further insight on overconfidence and prospect theory, 
with a focus on some aspects (different measures and calibration of parameters) that will be required 
later in the experimental research. Chapter 5 is organized as follows. Sections 5.2 to 5.4 are devoted to 
prospect theory: we firstly review the importance of prospect theory in the literature, then we provide 
an extensive insight on prospect theory and the parametric specifications we will use, finally we analyze 
how to elicit those parameters in a way we will do it in the experimental setting. Sections 5.5 to 5.7 are 
devoted to overconfidence: following a similar structure, we first review its importance in the literature, 
then we provide extensive insight into the theory of overconfidence by Moore and Healy (2008) and the 
three basic measures they suggested, while in the latter subsection we explain how the three measures 
of overconfidence are to be estimated, in order to use them in the experimental setting. 
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5.2. PROSPECT THEORY IN THE LITERATURE 
 
A common taxonomy in social sciences divides theories into normative and descriptive (a.k.a. positive). 
Normative theories set rules about the optimal behavior of individual decision makers (i.e., how should 
a rational agent behave), while descriptive theories are focused on identifying how real people actually 
behave. In the context of decision theory, the expected utility theory (EUT) is the most accepted 
normative model, while prospect theory (PT) is the most well-known descriptive theory. Understanding 
how prospect theory challenges EUT requires a background on several related concepts (such as axioms 
of rationality, risk measurement, stochastic dominance and risk-aversion). Therefore, we start with a 
review of the expected utility theory and continue with prospect theory afterwards. 
Expected utility theory 
Three postulates on which the main pillars of standard finance were built are rational expectations, the 
expected utility theory, and market efficiency. According to Barberis and Thaler (2003), standard 
finance’s rationality means two things: first, agents are Bayesian, meaning they update their beliefs 
when new information comes to the market according to the Bayes’ rule 
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where A and B are events and P(·|·) is a conditional probability. Second, agents’ choices are consistent 
with Savage’s notion of subjective expected utility (Savage, 1954). The EUT, for its part, was accepted as 
a normative model of rational choice under risk since the theorem of von Neumann and Morgenstern 
(1944). The theorem is derived from a set of axioms required to make rational decisions, namely, that 
preferences143 must be complete, transitive, continuous, and satisfy the independence axiom. The 
theorem states that a preference order that is complete, transitive and continuous can be represented 
by an expected utility function144 if and only if the preference order satisfies the independence axiom145.  
                                                 
143 Following Hens and Bachmann (2008), a preference is a binary relationship on a choice set X. Given two alternatives x, y ϵ X, 
a preference x ≽ y means alternative x is at least as good as alternative y, x ≻ y means x is strictly preferred, and x ~ y means 
both alternatives are equally good. A preference relation is complete if for all alternatives in the choice set the individual has a 
well-defined preference. Besides, it is transitive if for all x, y, z ϵ X, if x ≽ y and y ≽ z, then x ≽ z holds. Finally, preferences are 
representative of a rational choice, and a utility function exists such that it describes those preferences, if the preference 
relation on X is continuous: for all lotteries x, y and z, x ≻ y ≽ z there exists a coefficient α ϵ (0, 1) such that α·x + (1- α)·z ≻ y. 
That is, preferences do not exhibit erratic behavior like sudden jumps caused by minor changes in data, nor there are 
alternatives that are infinitely better or worse than others as to poison any compound alternative in which it is included. 
Completeness, transitivity and continuousness ensure a preference relation can be assigned numerical values (i.e., a utility 
function) to the outcomes of different alternatives in order to compare them. 
144 That is, a utility function satisfies that x ≽ y ↔ Eu (x) > Eu (y). 
145 The independence axiom is satisfied if for all lotteries (being a lottery a set of consequences and the probability thereof) x, y 
and z, and for all numbers 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, we have x ≽ y if and only if α·x + (1- α)·z ≽ α·y + (1- α)·z. That is, if one lottery is preferred 
to another, and we mix both with the same third one, the preference ordering is independent of the particular third lottery 
used. Then, if preferences ―besides being complete, transitive and continuous― satisfy the independence axiom, they can be 
represented by an expected utility function, where the expected utility of a lottery is the sum of utilities derived from each of 
the consequences the lottery offers, weighted with their probabilities.  
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Decision making under risk can be viewed as a choice between prospects or gambles. Thus, when 
describing decision making under risk we must analyze stochastic dominance.146 EUT defines utility in 
terms of total wealth, such that marginally increasing a person’s wealth always increases total utility 
(“more is preferred to less”), while it also uses variance as a risk measure, suggesting a rational decision-
maker should weight negative returns equally with positive returns. Then, a fifth axiom for rationality 
would be to consider that the simplest case, known as state dominance, should hold as well: a lottery 
dominates another if the former gives a better outcome than the latter in any state of the world. State 
dominance is a special case of first order stochastic dominance147 (FSD) that implies more is better and 
individuals should be indifferent to identical lotteries.  
FSD implies preference: every expected utility maximizer with an increasing utility function will 
prefer lotteries that are FSD. Hadar and Russel (1969) introduce a weaker condition: second order 
stochastic dominance (SSD), which holds whenever the area under one cumulative distribution is equal 
to, or larger than, that under the other cumulative distribution ―in which case the latter would dominate 
the former.148 FSD implies SSD, but not vice versa. One implication of SSD is that the dominant 
distribution has a mean at least as large as the other distribution, and the former is more predictable 
(that is, it has a lower variance). Hence, SSD allows for comparison between the moments of two or more 
distributions. Hence, for SSD risk aversion plays a determinant role: all risk-averse expected-utility 
maximizers prefer a lottery that dominates another in the SSD sense. Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT), 
for example, assumes all investors are risk averse so they never choose a portfolio that has larger 
variance with the same mean return. Since SSD is a weaker condition than FSD, it is capable of ordering 
a large set of distributions, but it requires assuming the expected utility function is concave. Thus, in 
order to understand what that means, we need some insight on degrees of risk aversion. 
Pratt (1964) and Arrow (1971) analyze utility functions and risk aversion. When comparing 
preferences, if an individual regards a certain payoff is as good as playing a lottery, such payoff is known 
as the certainty equivalent. The risk premium is the expected monetary value of the lottery minus the 
cash equivalent. Risk aversion measures this reluctance of a person to accept the lottery with the higher, 
but uncertain, payoff. Pratt measures local aversion to risk as the individual’s risk premium for a small, 
actuarially neutral risk, known as the Arrow–Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion (ARA): 
 𝐴𝑅𝐴(𝑤) = −
𝑢′′(𝑤)
𝑢′(𝑤)
 ,     (5.2) 
                                                 
146 Early literature on stochastic dominance would include von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), Markowitz (1959), Tobin 
(1958, 1965) and Hadar and Russell (1969), who provide a formal terminology. 
147 A prospect dominates another in the first order stochastic dominance sense if the value of the cumulative distribution of the 
preferred prospect never exceeds that of the inferior prospect (Hadar and Russell, 1969). 
148 If the random variable is continuous, then the following must hold:  
x
x
x
x
dyyFdyyG
1 1
)()(  for all x ϵ I, being I the closed 
interval x1 – xn of possible values taken by the random variable. 
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where w is total wealth, and u’’(·) and u’(·) are the second and first derivatives of the utility function, 
u(·).149 Pratt (1964) concludes that “the aversion to risk implied by a utility function u(·) seems to be a 
form of concavity, and one might set out to measure concavity as representing aversion to risk” (p. 127). 
The prevalence of risk aversion is the best known generalization regarding risky choices, and led early 
decision theorists to propose that utility is a concave function of money (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). 
An additional measure, relative risk aversion (RRA), was then introduced to solve a problem with ARA: 
RRA has the advantage that it is still a valid measure of risk aversion even if the utility function changes 
from risk-averse to risk-loving as wealth changes.150 It is obtained by multiplying ARA with wealth: 
𝑅𝑅𝐴(𝑤) = −𝑤 ·
𝑢′′(𝑤)
𝑢′(𝑤)
 .     (5.3) 
Finally, intertemporal decision making helps to understand how preferences among lotteries are 
determined. When a financial decision includes future variables, people compare the utility they expect 
to receive. Rational evaluation assumes exponential discounting: future utilities are discounted by a 
weight that is an exponentially declining function of time (Hens and Bachmann, 2008). This implies time 
consistency: if we prefer $100 now than $110 within a week, we should also choose $100 in 9 weeks 
than $110 in 10. If not, we would exhibit a preference reversal, inconsistent with inter-temporal rational 
expectations as here defined. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and further research by behaviorists came 
to highlight that, in practice, individuals do not behave as the EUT suggests,151 violating some of the 
axioms above. They also provided an alternative model for choice under risk, known as prospect theory. 
Prospect theory 
In a series of experiments in the 1970s, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky provided evidence that, 
when making decisions in a context of risk or uncertainty, most people show preferences that depend 
on gains and losses with respect to a certain reference point, and they form beliefs that do not 
correspond to the statistical probabilities ―that is, their perception of the risks associated with a 
decision may be biased. Following this evidence, the authors introduced prospect theory (Kahneman 
and Tversky, 1979), today the most well-known descriptive decision theory. Prospect theory has two 
phases: in phase I a given decision problem is framed so it can be evaluated next; then, in phase II, after 
the decision problem has been framed, it is now evaluated. The way we calculate the utility of a lottery 
under EUT or under PT is different. Consider a simple binary lottery with payoffs c1 < c2 in the two states 
                                                 
149 We can measure the degree of risk aversion by the curvature of the utility function. Thus, if it is concave, the higher the 
curvature the higher the risk aversion. We might use the second derivative u’’(·) for such purpose, but such measure would not 
be invariant under positive affine transformations of the utility function (Hens and Bachmann, 2008). The simplest way to solve 
that is to use the ratio u’’/u’. Now, if we change the sign we get the Arrow-Pratt measure of ARA.  
150 This way, if an agent has constant absolute risk aversion (CARA), she will not increase a single euro invested in risky assets 
as her wealth increases. On the contrary, an agent having constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) would increase the amount 
invested in risky assets as her wealth increases, so the share of wealth invested in risky assets remains constant. 
151 “The modern theory of decision making under risk emerged from a logical analysis of games of chance rather than from a 
psychological analysis of risk and value. The theory was conceived as a normative model of an idealized decision maker, not as a 
description of the behavior of real people” (Tversky and Kahneman, 1986, p. S251). 
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s=1 and s=2 of the world, and let p denote the probability of the first state. Then, the expected utility of 
this lottery will be given by 
𝑝 ∙ 𝑢(𝑊 + 𝑐1) + (1 − 𝑝) ∙ 𝑢(𝑊 + 𝑐2) ,    (5.4) 
where W is current wealth. Prospect theory, instead, changes both the way utility is measured 
―providing a value function v(·) that is defined over changes in wealth― and the way subjects perceive 
the probabilities of the different outcomes ―replacing p by some probability weightings w(p), as follows 
𝑤(𝑝) ∙ 𝑣(𝑐1) + 𝑤(1 − 𝑝) ∙ 𝑣(𝑐2) .    (5.5) 
Phase II evaluation problem is related to these value and probability weighting function. When 
individuals evaluate a prospect, they tend to (1) treat gains differently to losses, and (2) outcomes with 
smaller probabilities are over-weighted relative to more certain ones. In particular, Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979) presented several choice problems to highlight three effects inconsistent with the basic 
tenets of utility theory. These are the certainty, reflection and isolation effects: 
 Certainty effect: people overweight outcomes considered to be certain. When a choice 
between a prospect and a sure gain is modified, such that the second choice involves a 
similar scenario but with both prospects being uncertain, people tend to change their 
decision, violating EUT.152 For instance, given two choices 
 Choice 1: A ($100, 0.80)     vs. B ($75) 
 Choice 2:  C ($100, 0.20)    vs. D ($75, 0.25) 
people tend to choose prospects B and C, a decision that contradicts EUT.153  
 Reflection effect: the reflection of prospects around zero reverses the preference order. 
For instance, if we ask 
 Choice 3: A’ (-$100, 0.80)   vs. B’ (-$75) 
people tend to choose prospect A’. An important implication is that it explains why people 
may exhibit different risk profiles when facing gains or losses: risk aversion for gains and 
risk seeking for losses. In addition, the reflection effect eliminates aversion for uncertainty 
or variability as possible explanation for the certainty effect.154 Rather than that, it appears 
that certainty increases the desirability of gains as well as the aversion to losses. 
                                                 
152 This is a variation of Allais paradox (Allais, 1953) that exposes the certainty effect among the respondents. 
153 In particular, that decision contradicts the substitution axiom, which follows from the transitivity axiom. Prospect A should 
be preferred over C and B over D since they give the same outcome with greater probability (in fact, both cases in choice 1 were 
multiplied by the same probability p = 0.25 to obtain choice 2). If subjects choose B ≻ A, then it follows, substituting B ≻ D and 
A ≻ C, that D ≻ C when in fact they chose the opposite. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) provide here an empirical generalization: 
if (y, p·q) is equivalent to (x, p), then (y, p·q·r) should be preferred to (x, p·r) for any probabilities p, q, r, 0 < p, q, r < 1. 
154 The former example between choices 1 and 2 would be explained by Allais (1953) or Markowitz (1959) as people comparing 
expected values and risk (variance): choosing prospect B would imply one prefers the prospect with no variance though its 
lower expected value, whereas choosing C would mean the difference in variance might be insufficient to overcome the 
difference in expected value. The reflection effect invalidates this possibility, since the contrary happens for negative outcomes. 
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 Isolation effect: there is empirical evidence that people discard elements shared by all 
prospects and focus on those that distinguish them ―first analyzed by Tversky (1972). 
However, different decompositions may lead to different, inconsistent preferences. 
Consider for instance this sequential game: 
Nature moves first, with prob. p=0.75 you earn $0 and with (1-p) = 0.25 you go to a 
second stage where you must choose, before the game starts, between ($100, 0.80) 
and ($75) as in choice 1. What do you choose? 
This game and choice 2 above are equivalent, in the sense that probabilities of final states 
are identical. Nevertheless, most people that chose option C above now choose $75. This 
evidences a reversal of preferences: they ignored the first stage of the game, whose 
outcomes are shared by both prospects. 
Based on these observations, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) offer a theory (PT) that is able to 
predict individual choices even in cases where the expected utility is violated. In PT the utility function 
is substituted by a value function that is defined over changes in wealth rather than over the final wealth. 
Such value function has 3 essential characteristics: 
 Reference dependence: value is defined over gains and losses with respect to some 
reference point. 
 Diminishing sensitivity: the marginal value of gains and losses decreases with size, 
resulting in a value function that is concave in gains and convex for losses. 
 Loss aversion: the function is steeper for losses than for gains. 
The carriers of value are changes in wealth, rather than final states. This is related to a debate 
between standard and behavioral finance about how risk is to be measured: the former considers risk 
has a neutral meaning associated with the uncertain (positive or negative) outcomes of decisions, so it 
is measured with volatility; behavioral finance claims instead that individuals perceive risk as losses 
with respect to a certain reference point. Reference dependence implies two things: individuals think in 
terms of gains and losses rather than total wealth, and whether a certain outcome is a gain or a loss 
depends on her reference point. The reference point is often assumed to be the status quo, for instance 
the current wealth level, implying it is a flexible reference (it may change over time). Diminishing 
sensitivity implies a different attitude towards risk: prospect theory predicts risk aversion in the domain 
of gains and risk seeking in the domain of losses (that is, people are willing to gamble only to avoid losses, 
exhibiting an aversion to a sure loss). Finally, the third property implies individuals making a loss of $100 
need to gain more than $100 as compensation. Kahneman (2011) claims loss aversion is “the most 
significant contribution of psychology to behavioral economics” (p.300). 
These properties result in a value function that is kinked at the reference point, concave above, 
convex below, and steeper in the negative domain, as in Figure 5.1. 
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FIGURE 5.1 – The value function 
 
Source: Own elaboration, based on Tversky and Kahneman (1992) 
In addition, the objective probabilities are replaced by subjective decision weights. People usually 
do not treat probabilities linearly, but overweight rare events and underweight events with a higher 
probability. Hence, they evaluate risk using transformed rather than objective probabilities, where 
transformed probabilities are obtained by applying a weighting function, w(p), to the objective 
probabilities, such that low probabilities (close to 0 and 1) are over-weighted. It is important to notice 
the weighting function is not a subjective probability, but a distortion of a given probability: we know 
the probability of a fair coin landing on heads is 0.5, but in decision-making we might act as if probability 
were w(0.5). Figure 5.2 depicts a classic weighting function by Prelec (1998). 
FIGURE 5.2 – The probability weighting function 
 
Source: Own elaboration, based on Prelec (1998) 
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Experimental evidence confirmed a fourfold pattern of risk attitudes: risk aversion for gains and 
risk seeking for losses of moderate to high probability; risk seeking for gains and risk aversion for losses 
of low probability.155 The value and weighting functions suggested by Kahneman and Tversky are able 
to explain that fourfold pattern. However, prospect theory as initially defined by Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979) may lead to a violation of in-betweenness ―a counterintuitive effect where the certainty 
equivalent of a lottery is not in between the smallest and the largest possible payoff of the lottery. To 
avoid this, Tversky and Kahneman (1992) introduced cumulative prospect theory, CPT, which applies 
the probability weighting to the cumulative distribution function in a way Eq. (5.5) becomes 
𝑤(𝑝) ∙ 𝑣(𝑐1) + 1 − 𝑤(𝑝) ∙ 𝑣(𝑐2)     (5.6) 
for binary lotteries. Yet, Rieger and Wang (2008a) observe that not all properties of CPT correspond 
well with experimental data and that there are some descriptive reasons favoring the original 
formulation of PT (Hens and Rieger, 2010). In addition, the solution they offer allows to generalize 
prospect theory to non-discrete outcomes and to make it continuous. Their approach is computationally 
easier than the corresponding formula for CPT: it simply starts with the original formulation of prospect 
theory in (5.5), and fixes the violation of in-betweeness problem by simply normalizing the decision 
weights w(p) so that they add up to 1 and can be interpreted again as a probability distribution (Hens 
and Bachmann, 2008). The approach goes back to Karmakar (1978) where, for two-outcome prospects, 
the PT-values are normalized by the sum of the weighted probabilities. Thus, the normalized weights 
w*(p) are calculated as 
)1()(
)(
)(
pwpw
pw
pw

       (5.7) 
where w*(p) means normalized weights according to this so-called normalized prospect theory (NPT). 
NPT has some advantages. Firstly, it cures the violations of state-dominance in lotteries with two 
outcomes and avoids violations of in-betweenness completely (Hens and Bachmann, 2008). Secondly, it 
is shown that the normalized PT utility converges to a continuous distribution ―Rieger and Wang 
(2008a) call the resulting model smooth prospect theory (SPT). Thirdly, it is an easier approach to 
compute that, in particular, simplifies the computation of the loss aversion parameter in our 
questionnaires, as we will see. Consequently, rather than the cumulative prospect theory ―more 
frequently used in the literature― the normalized prospect theory, NPT, is the approach that we will 
follow for the purposes of this thesis ―see the scaling section later on. 
We must finally note that, since people’s risky choices are stochastic,156 the core of the PT model 
is often enhanced by adding a choice function: according to Stott (2006), this is often done by positing 
                                                 
155 The fourfold pattern of preferences is one of the core achievements of prospect theory (Kahneman, 2011). 
156 Following Stott (2006), decision-making under risk is stochastic because “when asked the same question multiple times, 
people often change their minds” (p. 104). 
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a transformation P(·) that yields f(·), the likelihood of picking prospect g1 given an alternative choice 
g2.157 However, we are going to obviate that alternative and use the deterministic NPT in what follows. 
Prospect theory, together with overconfidence, will be the basis for the experimental research in 
Part III. We vindicate our choice based on the evidence that the fourfold pattern of risk-averse and risk-
seeking attitudes, diminishing sensitivity and loss aversion have been extensively discussed in the 
academic literature, related to many market anomalies and managerial performance, and have been 
related to several other biases. In what follows we provide a short list, just to illustrate. Regarding 
prospect theory generally speaking, it allows to analyze what Tversky and Kahneman (1992) identify as 
the “five major phenomena of choice that violate the standard model (EUT) and set a minimal challenge 
that must be met by any adequate descriptive theory of choice” (p.298): namely, framing effects, nonlinear 
preferences, risk seeking, loss aversion and source dependence. Daniel Kahneman ―Amos Tversky died 
in 1996― was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences in 2002 “for having integrated insights 
from psychological research into economic science, especially concerning human judgment and decision-
making under uncertainty”.158 
Regarding loss aversion, there is a large empirical literature confirming its presence and relevance 
in individuals, from calibration tests performed by Fishburn and Kochenberger (1979), Tversky and 
Kahneman (1992), Schmidt and Traub (2002), Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt and Paraschiv (2007a) and many 
others, to the literature on the disparities between people’s maximum willingness to pay (WTP) and 
their minimum willingness to accept (WTA) observed by Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1990) et seq. 
The influence of loss aversion may explain many empirical findings. These include the endowment effect 
(Thaler, 1980), the disposition effect and higher levels of trade when prices are rising than when they 
are falling (Shefrin and Statman, 1985), the status quo bias (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988), and the 
equity premium puzzle (Benartzi and Thaler, 1995). Loss aversion has also been able to explain why 
consumers and managers would take fewer risks (Rabin, 2000), how the number of transactions in the 
market would be reduced (Knetsch, 1989), narrow framing (Barberis and Huang, 2001), asymmetric 
price elasticities (Hardie, Johnson and Fader, 1993), and downward-sloping labor supply (Goette, 
Huffman and Fehr, 2004). Finally, Thaler (1985) provided a model of consumer behavior based on 
mental accounting and loss aversion. Nonetheless, some limits of loss aversion were also identified (e.g., 
Novemsky and Kahneman (2005); McGraw et al., 2010), as described in Chapter 4. 
The literature on risk seeking is quite extensive, too. Tversky and Kahneman (1992) observe risk-
seeking choices in two types of decision problems: a favorite-longshot bias and the aversion to a sure 
loss ―when people prefer a substantial probability of a large loss than a smaller sure loss. Risk seeking 
is also suggested to explain the house money effect (Thaler and Johnson, 1990) and a biased decision 
                                                 
157 Formally,     2121 ,),|( gVgVPggf  , where θ is a parameter vector. 
158 Source: http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/2002/, the official website of the Nobel Prize. 
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making in corporate management (Shefrin and Cervellati, 2011). Finally, diminishing sensitivity has 
been related to several biases and anomalies. Thus, diminishing sensitivity in the weighting function 
could lead to irrational advice and the making of decisions that contradict the independence axiom 
(Hens and Bachmann, 2008), what may explain empirical anomalies in financial markets like the IPOs 
underpricing puzzle (see Chapter 2). In addition, among the biases related to loss aversion we may find 
the status quo bias (Tversky and Kahneman, 1991) and framing (Tversky and Kahneman, 1986).159 
 
5.3. PARAMETRIC SPECIFICATIONS 
 
We concluded in Section 5.2 that, for the purposes of this thesis, we are going to follow the deterministic 
NPT. Consequently, in what follows we tackle the specification of the value and probability weighting 
functions within the context of prospect theory. 
While the formulation of prospect theory in terms of a kinked utility function and an inverse S-
shaped probability weighting function is commonly accepted, a general preference-based method to 
elicit the utility for gains and losses simultaneously is not available (Abdellaoui et al., 2007). In order to 
measure loss aversion, utility must be determined completely,160 but prospect theory assumes people 
weight probabilities and such weighting may be different for gains than for losses. Consequently, when 
a parametric functional form is imposed on the value and weighting functions, all parameters must be 
determined simultaneously. This causes an interpretation problem at best, while things could even go 
worse if any parameter is misspecified. 
Two lines of discussion are relevant here. First, we must decide whether it is better to use 
parametric or non-parametric measurements. Second, if a parametric method is chosen, which of the 
many forms suggested for the value and weighting function we use. There are several advantages of 
non-parametric methods (Abdellaoui et al., 2007; Booij, van Praag and van de Kuilen, 2010). First, when 
using a parametric method we depend on the appropriateness of the selected functional forms, in the 
sense that we do not know whether the measures are driven by the data or by the imposed parametric 
model. Besides, the non-parametric approach provides a direct link between utilities and choices, 
allowing us to solve inconsistencies in utility measurement. Finally, a major drawback of parameter 
methods is that they suffer from a contamination effect: a misspecification of the utility function will also 
bias the estimated probability weighting function and vice versa (Abdellaoui, 2000). 
                                                 
159 Tversky and Kahneman (1986) suggest framing could be influenced by either loss aversion or diminishing sensitivity: a 
frame that highlights losses of a choice makes that choice less attractive, whereas a frame that makes losses appear small 
relative to the scales involved exploits diminishing sensitivity, making the choice more attractive. 
160 Meaning utility for gains and for losses must be determined simultaneously. 
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Notwithstanding, non-parametric measurements also have their flaws. First, they are generally 
more susceptible to response error. Besides, this approach requires data that have a chained nature 
which may introduce error propagation leading to less precise inference (Wakker and Deneffe, 1996; 
Booij et al., 2010). Stott (2006) also finds evidence supporting the use of parametric methods in the 
context of CPT.161 But perhaps the major drawback of non-parametric techniques for the purposes of 
our experimental tests in Part III is that they are less efficient, in the sense that more questions are 
needed (Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt and L’Haridon, 2008). Since one of our goals in the experiment will be 
to implement a test that is simple and with a short number of questions, using a parametric approach 
becomes more desirable to us. This is reinforced by the fact that we want to minimize the possible effects 
of response errors and misunderstanding by the respondents. Consequently, for the purposes of this 
thesis we will use a parametric approach. In what follows we determine the specifications of the value 
and probability weighting functions under a parametric approach. 
5.3.1. The value function 
As mentioned above, in prospect theory the utility function is substituted by a value function that is 
defined over changes in wealth rather than over the final wealth, satisfying three important properties: 
reference dependence, diminishing sensitivity and loss aversion. That results in a value function that (1) 
it is defined over gains and losses with respect to some reference point; (2) it is concave in gains and 
convex for losses; (3) the function is steeper for losses than for gains. There are several parametric 
specifications that satisfy those properties. For instance, the (piecewise) power function by Tversky and 
Kahneman (1992) 
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―where  x accounts for gains (if x ≥ 0) or losses (if x ≤ 0), 𝛼+ measures sensitivity to gains, 𝛼− does the 
same to losses, and β measures loss aversion― is the most widely used parametric family to represent 
the value function because of its simplicity and its good fit to experimental data (Wakker, 2008). Also 
known as the family of constant relative risk aversion (CRRA),162 the power function is used to fit the 
curvature of the value function for gains since it helps modeling risk aversion. Measurements of the 
shape of utility have generally confirmed PT’s assumptions of concave utility for gains and convex utility 
                                                 
161 According to Stott (2006), “the contention that non-parametric models are somehow preferable has been tempered. Whilst this 
parametric freedom may be necessary where the shape of the function is itself under investigation, this reasoning does not apply 
to other situations. In these cases it is explanatory power that counts. The current results show that parametric forms of CPT 
generally fit risky decision-making data better than non-parametric ones” (p.123). However, whenever some shape property is 
under investigation, the non-parametric form represents the only unbiased way of conducting a descriptive investigation. 
162 Booij et al. (2010) notice the power function could be referred to as CRRA only under EUT; under non-expected utility 
models such as prospect theory, this designation is no longer appropriate, because whether an agent is willing to pay a constant 
fraction of wealth to avoid risking a fair gamble over percentages of wealth depends as well on probability weights, whether 
the reference point changes over time, etc.  
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for losses, both at the aggregate and the individual level, with estimated power coefficients between 
0,70 and 0,90 for gains (𝛼+) and between 0,85 and 0,95 for losses (𝛼−) ―Abdellaoui et al. (2008).163 
Less frequently used parametric specifications ―see Table 5.1 below― are the exponential and 
expo-power utility functions164 and the quadratic function (Hens and Bachmann, 2008), which has 
played a prominent role in Finance.165 Stott (2006) tests eight value functions in combination with eight 
probability weighting functions and four choice functions; the value functions include power, 
exponential and quadratic, as well as linear (representing risk neutrality), logarithmic, a linear-plus-
exponential (labeled Bell after Bell and Fishburn, 2000), a HARA function (hyperbolic absolute risk 
aversion) and a non-parametric form. This combinatorial approach has the merit of trying to disentangle 
the above mentioned contamination effect of parametric measurements by testing each value function 
specification in conjunction with all the other possible configurations of weighting and choice functions. 
Stott’s results support the power function form when combined with Prelec-I weighting function and 
Logit stochastic choice function. 
TABLE 5.1 – Value and weighting functions in the literature 
 
Source: Own elaboration, based on authors named in the Table 
                                                 
163 Since Tversky and Kahneman (1992) obtained the same median estimation for the exponent (α+ = α- = 0.88), in their first 
estimation, some authors have used a single α parameter for simplification purposes ―see for instance Hens and Bachmann 
(2008). However, most empirical research support differences are significant, with concave utility for gains while for losses the 
evidence is mixed, and closer to linearity than for gains anyway (Abdellaoui et al. 2008; Booij et al. 2010). 
164 For further info, their properties are described in Abdellaoui, Barrios and Wakker, 2007b. 
165 A reason for this is that the quadratic utility is associated with the traditional measurement of risk. Stott (2006) explains 
that one property of the quadratic transformation is that its evaluation of a prospect can be restated in terms of the prospect’s 
statistical mean and variance. Hens and Bachmann (2008) explain that this parametric specification allows to make the choice 
of the behavioral investor compatible with the mean-variance framework for any return distribution. It is worth noting the 
poor performance of this function according to the results by Stott, who claims it would question the descriptive accuracy of 
mean-variance portfolio analysis ―variance does not seem to capture people’s risk aversion as well as other risk measures. 
Power Tversky & Kahneman (1992) Linear w(p) = p
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Logarithmic v(x) = ln (a + x) W&G'96 Wu & Gonzalez (1996)
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Finally, we should note that the second property required to any value function ―namely, that the 
function is concave for gains and convex for losses, reflecting the principle of diminishing sensitivity― 
applies to the weighting function as well. This way, in the context of the value function, diminishing 
sensitivity implies that both 𝛼+ < 1 and 𝛼− < 1 (Booij et al., 2010), such that the marginal effects in 
perceived well-being are greater for changes close to one’s reference level than for changes further away 
(Rabin, 1998). However, in prospect theory risk aversion and risk seeking must be determined jointly 
by the value and weighting functions. 
5.3.2. The probability weighting function 
As mentioned, in prospect theory the objective probabilities are replaced by subjective decision weights. 
Decision makers usually do not treat probabilities linearly, but overweight rare events and underweight 
events with a higher probability. Psychologically, the mathematical step from zero to a one percent 
probability is a huge step since it turns an impossible event into a possible one, and this is surely a larger 
psychological step than a change from 49% probability to 50% probability (Hens and Bachmann, 2008). 
Under prospect theory, people evaluate risk using transformed rather than objective probabilities, 
where transformed probabilities are obtained by applying a weighting function to the objective 
probabilities. The main effect of this transformation is the overweighting of the tails of the distribution 
it is applied to, an overweighting that does not represent a bias in beliefs: “it is simply a modeling device 
that captures the common preference for a lottery-like, or positively skewed, wealth distribution” (Barberis 
and Huang, 2008, p. 2066). 
Tversky and Kahneman suggest those weights may be calculated using a probability weighting 
function, denoted w(p), where low probabilities (close to both 0 and 1) are over-weighted. This would 
help to explain the classic financial puzzle of why a given person may simultaneously demand lottery 
and insurance: most people prefer ($5,000, 0.001) over a certain $5, and most also prefer a certain loss 
of $5 over (-$5,000; 0.001). There are several parametric functions that have been suggested that meet 
the required properties of a weighting function. The alternatives are basically two-parameter vs. one-
parameter functional forms. One-parameter specifications are a classic in the literature since Tversky 
and Kahneman (1992) suggested the form 
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       (5.9) 
where p is the objective probability and γ measures the curvature of the function. Again, two different 
gamma parameters could be used (𝛾+ and 𝛾−) ―whether we want to measure different weighting 
functions for gains and for losses― or just a single one. Tversky and Kahneman noted this form has some 
advantages: it has only one parameter (meaning it is easier to estimate), it encompasses an inverted S-
shaped weighting functions with both concave and convex regions and, most important, it provides a 
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reasonably good approximation to both aggregate and individual data. Notwithstanding, other authors 
suggest alternative one-parameter functional forms ―see Table 5.1― including Wu and Gonzalez (1996), 
the linear and power functions (Stott, 2006) and the Prelec-I function (Prelec, 1998).  
However, some authors (e.g., Goldstein and Eihorn, 1987; Prelec, 1998) provide two-parameter 
specifications that are able to explain two distinct properties that can be given a psychological 
interpretation (Gonzalez and Wu, 1999; Booij et al., 2010). One parameter measures the degree of 
curvature of the weighting function, while the other would measure its elevation. The psychological 
interpretation would be, on one hand, that the curvature would measure how the decision maker 
discriminates probabilities ―a property labeled discriminability, closely related to the notion of 
diminishing sensitivity, where the probability of 0 (impossibility) and 1 (certainty) serve as reference 
points. On the other hand, the elevation of the weighting function might be interpreted as how attractive 
the decision maker views gambling ―a property labeled attractiveness. 
Two classic versions of the one-parameter and two-parameter functional forms were provided by 
Prelec (1998), where the single parameter version, denoted Prelec-I, 
)))log((exp()( ppw   ,    (5.10) 
would be a particular case of the two-parameter form, denoted Prelec-II, 
)))log((exp()(  ppw   ,     (5.11) 
when δ = 1. Though Booij et al. (2010) note one-parameter forms cannot set curvature and elevation 
independently ―hence their estimates will lead to biased inferences if curvature and elevation do not 
co-vary accordingly― Stott (2006) finds the two-parameter functional forms are less attractive than the 
one-parameter versions. In particular, Stott finds Prelec-I would be preferred to Prelec-II, as well as to 
any other alternatives we may use when combined with the power value function. Consequently, for the 
purposes of this thesis, we will set the Prelec-I form as the specification-by-default for the weighting 
function, with decision weights w(p) being subsequently normalized to w*(p) following normalized 
prospect theory (NPT). 
5.3.3. Set of variables and attitudes towards risk 
To sum up, in subsections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2 we decided to use a parametric approach in the experimental 
research we will conduct in Part III, with the power value function ―Eq. (5.8)― and the Prelec-I 
weighting function ―Eq. (5.10)― as options by default. Therefore, we have five parameters (𝛼+, 𝛾+, 𝛼−, 
𝛾− and β) that we must estimate. These will be the factors in the experimental research related to 
prospect theory ―the other three are related to overconfidence, as we will see―, namely: 
 Risk aversion (𝛼+) over gains, which measures the concavity of the value function for gains. 
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 Risk aversion (𝛼−) over losses, a.k.a. aversion to a sure loss, measuring risk seeking 
(convexity of the value function for losses): “Just as the concavity of the value of gains entails 
risk aversion, the convexity of the value of losses entails risk seeking” (Kahneman and Tversky, 
1984, p. 342). 
 Loss aversion (β), measuring how steeper the value function is for losses than for gains ―i.e., 
people suffer a loss more acutely than enjoy a gain of the same magnitude (Shefrin, 2006). 
 Probability weights (𝛾+ for gains, 𝛾− for losses), which determine the probability weighting 
function ―that is, how people distort given probabilities. 
How the five factors are measured, calibrated and interpreted will be explained in Section 5.4. 
What is relevant here is to note that, though these five parameters synthetize the diminishing sensitivity 
and loss aversion properties in PT, when it comes to provide an interpretation to three different attitudes 
towards risk (risk aversion and risk seeking in the fourfold pattern of preferences, plus loss aversion), 
things are not that simple. In prospect theory we must be careful about the interpretation of the results 
we are to obtain, for two particular reasons. One is the more complex interpretation of concepts like risk 
aversion and risk seeking, concavity and convexity, under prospect theory. The other is in regard to 
debate about the definition of loss aversion and how to measure it, which represents one of the main 
challenges for prospect theory nowadays. In this subsection we deal with the first topic, while the 
problem with loss aversion is analyzed in subsection 5.3.4. 
Most empirical studies have confirmed the positive validity of the probability weighting function 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Camerer and Ho, 1994; Wu and Gonzalez, 1996; Gonzalez and Wu, 1999) 
and the concavity of the utility function for gains (Abdellaoui, 2000; Abdellaoui, Vossmann and Weber, 
2005). The evidence on the utility for losses is however less clear-cut (Abdellaoui et al., 2007). Most 
studies support the theoretical assumption of a convex utility for losses (e.g., Fishburn and 
Kochenberger, 1979), but concave and linear utilities are also observed (Abdellaoui et al., 2007). This 
would lead a naive reader to interpret that a risk averse behavior in the domain of losses is quite regular, 
but not so. Straightforward concepts in expected utility theory like risk aversion or risk seeking are 
tough to disentangle under prospect theory. Under EUT, the convexity of the utility function is 
equivalent to risk seeking; under PT, however, this equivalence no longer holds. For instance, 
Chateauneuf and Cohen (1994) prove a subject with a convex utility function can be risk averse if he is 
‘sufficiently pessimistic’, and vice versa. “For example, if a subject indicates that he is indifferent between 
a sure loss of €40 and the two-outcome prospect (-€100, 1/2; €0), then (...) this risk-seeking preference is 
consistent with a concave utility for money if w-(1/2) < 0,4” (Abdellaoui et al., 2007, p.1661).  
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Consequently, we must be aware that the fourfold pattern of preferences implies that risk 
aversion and risk seeking depend on, at least,166 two parameters. On one hand, subjects exhibit the 
higher risk aversion the lower both 𝛼+ and 𝛾+ coefficients for gains of moderate/high probability, and 
the lower 𝛾− for losses of low probability. On the other hand, subjects are the more risk seeking the 
lower both 𝛼− and 𝛾− coefficients for losses of moderate/high probability, and the lower 𝛾+ for gains of 
low probability. This is far more complex than capturing the risk-taking tendency only through the 
concavity of the utility function. Following Hens and Bachmann (2008), “prospect theory implies that 
risk-taking behavior is conjointly determined by (1) how people choose the reference point, (2) risk 
attitudes in gains and losses, (3) the degree of loss aversion, and (4) how people judge and weight 
probabilities. This is far more complicated than the standard expected utility theory which captures the 
risk-taking tendency only through the concavity of the utility function” (p.98). Hence, this is how the 
different attitudes towards risk should be interpreted under PT: 
i. Risk aversion. Subjects tend to be risk averse (1) for gains of moderate/high probability, 
and (2) for losses of low probability. (1) is measured with the coefficients 𝛼+ and 𝛾+: the 
lower both 𝛼+ and 𝛾+ coefficients, the higher risk aversion; (2) is measured with 𝛾− 
coefficient: the lower 𝛾−, the higher risk aversion. 
ii. Risk seeking. Subjects tend to be risk seeking (3) for losses of moderate/high probability, 
and (4) for gains of low probability. (3) is measured with the coefficients 𝛼− and 𝛾−: the 
lower both 𝛼− and 𝛾− coefficients, the higher risk seeking; (4) is measured with 𝛾+ 
coefficient: the lower 𝛾+, the higher risk seeking. 
iii. Loss aversion. It measures the asymmetry between gains and losses that is far too extreme 
to be explained by income effects or by decreasing risk aversion (Kahneman and Tversky, 
1984). It is measured through the β coefficient: the higher the β, the higher the loss aversion.  
Kahneman (2011) summarizes the above in two basic hypotheses he considers to be the essence 
of prospect theory. First, in bad choices, where a sure loss is compared to a larger loss that is merely 
probable, diminishing sensitivity causes risk seeking. Second, in mixed gambles, where both a gain and 
a loss are possible, loss aversion causes extremely risk averse choices.  
5.3.4. The problem with loss aversion 
In mixed gambles, where both a gain and a loss are possible, prospect theory predicts that loss aversion 
―the pronounced asymmetry of the value function― causes extremely risk averse choices (Kahneman, 
2011). As we saw in Section 5.2, there is an extensive empirical literature confirming the presence and 
relevance of loss aversion for most individuals. However important loss aversion is recognized, a major 
                                                 
166 We say at least because for two-parameter weighting functions the effect of δ+ and δ- parameters measuring the 
attractiveness of gambling should be considered, too. 
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challenge in the literature on prospect theory is that neither a generally accepted definition of loss 
aversion, nor an agreed-on way to measure it is available. 
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) defined loss aversion implicitly as 
)1(
)1(
u
u 
 , which might be 
seen as an approximation of the definition proposed by Köbberling and Wakker (2005), who 
characterized loss aversion as the ratio between the left and right derivatives of the utility function at 
zero, i.e., 
 
 0
0
'
'


U
U
 , where  0'

U  denotes the left and  0'

U  the right derivative of the utility function 
at 0. Köbberling and Wakker show that the CRRA family of functions (i.e., log-power) encounter 
difficulties when modeling loss aversion: the power function amounts to the implicit scaling convention 
that u(1) = –u(–1) = 1, what implies the formula for loss aversion by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) 
above mentioned. However, this scaling convention depends on the unit of payment167 which means 
that, at best, loss aversion can only be defined relative to the unit of money chosen. Thus, only when the 
curvature parameters in the power function (i.e., 𝛼+ and 𝛼− in our notation) are the same can loss 
aversion be a dimensionless quantity.168  
Other interpretations of loss aversion available are those by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), 
Wakker and Tversky (1993), Bowman, Minehart and Rabin (1999) and Neilson (2002). Kahneman and 
Tversky originally defined loss aversion as –u(–x) > u(x) for all x > 0, Wakker and Tversky made a 
stronger version given by u’(–x) ≥ u’(x) for all x > 0, while Bowman et al. made it stronger by suggesting 
loss aversion holds if u’(–x) ≥ u’(y) for all positive x and y.169 Finally, Neilson (2002) proposed to define 
loss aversion as u(–x)/x ≥ u(y)/y for all positive x and y. However, none of these definitions provide a 
straight index of loss aversion, but formulate it as a property of the utility function over a whole range 
(Booij et al., 2010). 
Some authors have provided some alternative solutions to elicit loss aversion (e.g., Abdellaoui et 
al. 2008; Booij et al. 2010), but the debate is still open. In consequence, we opt for a solution that is 
inspired by Booij et al. (2010) ―by picking up “all the questions around the zero outcome” (p.130)― and 
by empirical finding that utility is close to linear for moderate amounts of money (Rabin, 2000). First, 
questions in the experimental test designed to elicit loss aversion will ask for small amounts of money. 
Second, we will ask participants in our experiment for a few prospects with small amounts of money 
                                                 
167 This means for example that exactly the same data, expressed in dollars on one hand, or alternatively expressed in cents on 
the other, yields different measures of loss aversion (see Wakker, 2010). 
168 Köbberling and Wakker (2005) show constant absolute risk averse (CARA, i.e., linear-exponential) utility functions performs 
better in this regard, hence they propose as a solution a CARA utility function that does not have extreme derivatives at 0 ―as 
it happens with power functions whenever the power is not 1. However, the prevailing empirical finding is increasing relative 
risk aversion and decreasing absolute risk aversion (Arrow, 1971), which is between CRRA and CARA (Abdellaoui et al., 2007b). 
169 Note Wakker and Tversky (1993) definition implies the slope of the utility function at each loss is at least as large as the 
slope of the utility function at the absolutely commensurate gain; Bowman et al. (1999), instead, suggest the slope is 
everywhere steeper than the slope of the utility function for gains (Abdellaoui et al., 2007). 
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and assume 𝛼+ = 𝛼− = 1 to estimate β (as a mean or median). This solution will be explained more in 
detail in the next section. Nonetheless, we must be aware that ours is an arbitrary choice and serves only 
as an imperfect solution to a more complex problem, suggesting we have to be careful when comparing 
loss aversion estimates. In addition, Por and Budescu (2013) discuss some violations of the gain-loss 
separability which may limit the generalization of results from studies of single-domain prospects to 
mixed prospects. 
 
5.4. ELICITATION METHODS AND SCALING 
 
The purpose of this section is to determine how we will elicit the parameters in the value and weighting 
functions of a respondent, given we assume a piecewise power value function as in Eq. (5.8) and the 
Prelec-I weighting function ―Eq. (5.10)― as parametric functional forms under normalized prospect 
theory, NPT. Various elicitation procedures have been proposed for this purpose. The most common 
methods to elicit utility under EUT are the certainty-equivalent, the probability-equivalent, direct 
scaling and the lottery-equivalent methods (Wakker and Deneffe, 1996).170 In the context of PT, perhaps 
the most common is the elicitation of certainty equivalents (indeed it is the one Tversky and Kahneman 
(1992) used): we seek to obtain the cash equivalents to a series of prospects by asking the respondents 
a series of refined choice questions, then estimating the value and weighting functions using nonlinear 
regression, assuming a specific parametric functional form for each one (Wu and Gonzalez, 1996). 
In the design of the questionnaires in the experiment we follow Abdellaoui et al. (2008). In 
particular, the elicitation method requires three sets of questions. The first set involves only two-
outcome, positive prospects (i.e., a gamble where the respondent may win some positive quantity or 
zero, for instance “95% chance to win 1.000€ and 5% chance to win 0€”) devised to calibrate for each 
respondent the parameters 𝛼+ and 𝛾+ of the value and probability weighting functions in the positive 
domain. The second set of questions involves only two-outcome, negative prospects (i.e., the respondent 
may lose some money or zero otherwise), designed to calibrate 𝛼− and 𝛾− parameters in the negative 
domain. Finally, the utility of gains and losses are linked through a third set of questions, regarding the 
acceptability of mixed prospects (e.g., 50% chance to lose 100€ and 50% chance to win x), with the aim 
to measure loss aversion ―the β parameter in the value function. 
In the first set, for each prospect of the form (x, p; 0, 1-p) respondents are required to provide 
their certainty equivalent, c. That is, the sure payoff they should be given as to be indifferent between 
                                                 
170 Other methods include the trade-off method, introduced by Wakker and Deneffe (1996), which is robust to probability 
weighting when all outcomes are of the same sign, and the four-step method proposed by Abdellaoui et al. (2007), primarily 
based on the elicitation of certainty equivalents for utility midpoints (i.e., decision weights of 0.5). 
176 
 
gambling and being paid. Similarly, in the second set respondents are required to provide c, though now 
prospects are negative and consequently the alternative quantity is the sure loss the respondent should 
pay that makes her indifferent between gambling and paying. Denote c/x the ratio of the certainty 
equivalent of the prospect ―derived from observed choices by the respondent― to the nonzero outcome 
x. Plotting c/x as a function of p ―one function for positive and another for negative prospects― we 
obtain two smooth curves, interpreted as weighting functions assuming a linear value function.  
The calibration of parameters in the value and weighting functions require, henceforth, to be 
calibrated jointly using a nonlinear regression procedure separately for each subject. By definition, for 
each question the expected utility of the prospect should be equal to the utility of the certainty 
equivalent. Under NPT this makes 
)()()0())(1()()()( xVpwVpwxVpwcV    ,    (5.12) 
since all questions in the questionnaire are two-outcome prospects. We may solve equation (5.12) using 
the power function in (5.8) to have 
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for the positive domain, whereas for losses we get a similar result  
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Thus, the certainty equivalents provided by the respondent in the first set allow us to calibrate 𝛼+ 
and 𝛾+ for gains, while those in the second set allow us to do the same for 𝛼− and 𝛾− in the negative 
domain. Once we have calibrated 𝛼+ and 𝛾+ for gains, as well as 𝛼− and 𝛾− for losses, we check: (1) 
whether they are significantly below one ―meaning utility function is concave for gains and convex for 
losses― and (2) whether they are significantly different from each other ―that is, whether 𝛼 = 𝛼+ = 𝛼− 
and 𝛾 = 𝛾+ = 𝛾−. 
Finally we have to calculate β, the loss aversion parameter. In order to solve for it we have to 
compare mixed prospects, as to identify the different behavior of the respondent in the positive versus 
negative domain. Consequently, questions in the third set ask a classic in the literature (e.g. Hens and 
Bachmann, 2008, p. 120): “someone offers you a bet on the toss of a coin. If you lose, you lose €X. What is 
the minimal gain that would make this gamble acceptable?”, where X is a moderate amount of money (1 
to 100 euros, for instance). This way, all questions to calibrate loss aversion set probabilities of success 
and failure equal to 50%, p = 0.5. Consequently, since w*(0.5) = 0.5 under NPT, the answer provided by 
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the respondent makes the utility of a gain (V+) equivalent to the disutility of a loss (V-).171 For example, 
for the piecewise power utility function we have 
   LVGV   5,05,0   →        LG   →  
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 ,   (5.15) 
where G means gains, L losses, and loss aversion would be equal to the ratio G/|L| only in the particular 
case where 𝛼 = 𝛼+ = 𝛼−. That would be indeed the only particular case where β is not affected by 
changes of scale regarding units of payment (Köbberling and Wakker, 2005) and hence it would be well-
defined, as discussed in subsection 5.3.4. 
 
5.5. OVERCONFIDENCE IN THE LITERATURE 
 
The prevalence of overconfidence, i.e., the human tendency to overestimate our own skills and 
predictions for success (Ricciardi and Simon, 2000), is a classic in the behavioral finance. For instance, 
De Bondt and Thaler (1995) consider it the more robust finding in the psychology of judgment, while 
Plous (1993) asserts “no problem in judgment and decision making is more prevalent and more potentially 
catastrophic than overconfidence” (p. 217). Hence, we vindicate our choice for overconfidence based on 
the fact that overconfidence has been extensively discussed in the academic literature, related to many 
market anomalies and managerial performance, and has been related to several other biases. In what 
follows we provide a short list, just to illustrate. 
5.5.1. The prevalence of overconfidence 
Most academic reviews include overconfidence as one of the most relevant heuristic-driven biases, 
including Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky (1982), Shiller (2000a), Shefrin (2000), Barberis and Thaler 
(2003) and Hens and Bachmann (2008). Early literature may be traced back to the 1960s, like Oskamp 
(1965) and Alpert and Raifa (1969). Overconfidence has been suggested to be a consequence of several 
other biases, such as confirmation bias (Koriat, Lichtenstein and Fischhoff, 1980), hindsight bias 
(Fischhoff, 1982b), illusion of control (Barber and Odean, 2002) and self-attribution bias (Statman, 
Thorley and Vorkink, 2006). Besides, Keren (1987) and Griffin and Tversky (1992) suggest ambiguity 
of evidence is a relevant mediating factor in both overconfidence and confirmation bias. Research 
showing people tend to consider themselves above average includes, among many others, Fischhoff, 
Slovic and Lichtenstein (1977), Svenson (1981), Dunning, Meyerowitz and Holzberg (1989), Dunning, 
Heath and Suls (2004) and Williams and Gilovich (2008).  
                                                 
171 This is indeed one advantage, for the sake of simplicity, NPT introduces in the elicitation of the parameters in prospect 
theory: the elicitation of the parameter β for loss aversion becomes more tractable.   
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Experimental research has confirmed the role of overconfidence in areas as diverse as health, 
driving, insurance markets, job search (see review by Sandroni and Squintani, 2009) and consumer 
behavior ―e.g., the classic ‘paying not to go to the gym’ by DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006). Within 
financial markets, Biais et al. (2005) show overconfident traders experience poorer trading 
performance in an experimental setting. Experimental evidence also shows men tend to be more 
overconfident (Lundeberg, Fox and Punccohar, 1994) ―with gender differences being highly task 
dependent―,172 trade more frequently and exhibit more losses than women (Barber and Odean, 2001). 
Finally, Chen et al. (2007) also appreciated cultural differences, with Chinese investors appearing to be 
more overconfident than American.  
Many anomalies in financial markets are suggested to be a result from investors’ overconfidence. 
Investors are likely overstate their risk tolerance (Hirshleifer, 2001; Barberis and Thaler, 2003) 
fostering market anomalies such as excess volatility and return predictability (Daniel, Hirshleifer and 
Subrahmanyam, 1998), excessive trading (Kyle and Wang, 1997; Odean, 1998b, 1999; Hong, 
Scheinkman and Xiong, 2006; Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2009), the forward premium puzzle (Burnside et 
al., 2011), sensation seeking (Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2009), under-diversification (Goetzmann and 
Kumar, 2008), the favorite long-shot bias (Hens and Bachmann, 2008), and many others. Consequently, 
several authors have provided models based on investor overconfidence that explain the generation of 
asset bubbles (Scheinkman and Xiong, 2003) the wrong assessment of risk in insurance markets 
(Sandroni and Squintani, 2007), or how overconfident traders appear in a multi-period market when 
they can learn about their ability (Gervais and Odean, 2001). 
Finally, research is vast regarding managerial overconfidence ―indeed, executives appear to be 
particularly prone to display overconfidence (Moore, 1977).173 This includes Roll, 1986 (corporate 
takeovers), Camerer and Lovallo, 1999 (high rates of business failure), Heaton, 2002 (underinvesting if 
having to seek external funds), Malmendier and Tate, 2005a,b (high rates of M&A), Liu and Taffler, 2008 
(M&As), Malmendier and Tate, 2008 (corporate diversification), Deshmukh, Goel and Howe, 2010 
(lower dividend payout), Malmendier, Tate and Yan, 2011 (acquisitions), Huang, Lambertides and 
Steeley, 2012 (higher cash holdings), and Andreou, Doukas and Louca, 2012 (corporate diversification). 
A common signal of overconfidence among CEOs is that they tend not to exercise their stock-options 
early, given a sufficiently high stock price, as they should do (Hall and Murphy, 2000, 2002). 
5.5.2. Overconfidence vs Thurstonian and Brunswikian theories 
A branch of the behavioral finance suggests it is heuristics and cognitive biases what causes the 
overconfidence phenomenon. However, there are alternative views. Two relevant ones are the 
                                                 
172 Meaning men feel even more overconfident in tasks that are perceived to be ‘masculine’. 
173 Three factors would trigger overconfidence: the illusion of control, a high degree of commitment to good outcomes, and 
abstract reference points that make performance comparisons complex (Alicke et al., 1995; Malmendier and Tate, 2005a,b). 
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ecological and error models. Brunswikian or ecological models suggest overconfidence would be a result 
from a biased, even tricky, selection of items by researchers. According to this view, people are good 
judges of the reliability of their knowledge as long as such knowledge is representatively sampled from 
a specified reference class (Gigerenzer, Hoffrage and Kleinbölting, 1991). For example, overconfidence 
in tests of general knowledge might be a consequence of the procedures involved in the creation of 
traditional general knowledge items when they are “informally selected by human selectors instructed 
to select items that differentiate between more and less knowledgeable subjects”, rather than as the 
result of a cognitive bias (Juslin, 1994). When objects in the almanac items are selected randomly from 
a natural environment, people are well-calibrated and overconfidence disappears. Dawes and Mulford 
(1996) suggest a similar interpretation. Gigerenzer et al. (1991) also specified the conditions under 
which overconfidence and the hard-easy effect174 can be made to appear, disappear, and even invert. 
The name given to these theorists comes from the probabilistic functionalism of Brunswik (1952) that 
influenced these ecological models (Ayton and McClelland, 1997). 
Thurstonian or error models, on the other hand, start with the regression effects in the tradition 
of Thurstone (1927) noted by Erev, Wallsten and Budescu (1994): both over and underconfidence may 
be obtained from the same data set depending upon whether accuracy is conditioned on confidence or 
vice versa. This simultaneous feature of over and underconfidence can be attributed to the existence of 
a random error in well-calibrated probability judgments coupled with the method of analysis (Ayton 
and McClelland, 1997). Thus, because of the correlation between subjective and objective probabilities, 
when objective probabilities are plotted against subjective, the regression will most often contribute to 
overconfidence (Juslin, Winman and Olsson, 2000). Overconfidence would be merely an illusion, created 
by unrecognized regression. 
The ecological argument was dismissed by some authors claiming that the representative item 
selection was confounded with the hard-easy effect. Thus, Brenner et al. (1996) argue overconfidence 
cannot be explained as a selection bias and it is not eliminated by a random sampling of questions. 
Furthermore, Suantak, Belger and Ferrell (1996) provide experimental evidence that the biased choice 
of stimulus argument is not correct, concluding the most likely explanation of the hard–easy effect is in 
terms of response criteria. However, Juslin et al. (2000) claim there is very little support for a cognitive 
bias behind the hard-easy effect, which might indeed be near eliminated when there is control for scale-
end effects and linear dependency.175 
                                                 
174 Several authors highlighted situations where underconfidence was prevalent on easy tasks (for a list of references see Moore 
and Healy, 2008). This contradicted the mainstream view that overconfidence was prevalent. As we will describe in Section 
5.6., identifying the three different measures of overconfidence by Moore and Healy (2008) was determinant for the authors to 
propose a theory of overconfidence that could explain the hard-easy effect: on easy tasks, people tend to underestimate their 
performance but overplace themselves compared to others; hard tasks, instead, produce overestimation and underplacement.  
175 Scale-end effects refer to the fact that overconfidence scores ―defined as the difference between the mean subjective 
probability assigned to the chosen answer and the proportion of correct answers― is mathematically constrained: when the 
proportion of correct answers is 50% or less, the score can only be zero or positive (overconfidence), reaching its maximum 
180 
 
Some authors proposed a sort of integrative theories of Thurstonian and Brunswikian models. Soll 
(1996) models reported confidence as a function of the validity of information and a random error. He 
predicts greater overconfidence for question sets where informational cues are less valid (the hard-easy 
effect) and that unrepresentative design (ecological models) is a sufficient but not necessary condition 
for overconfidence. Dougherty (2001) describes a ‘multiple-trace memory model’ that integrates the 
ecological and error models and predicts overconfidence should decrease both with experience and 
improved encoding quality.  
Moore and Healy (2008) find these integrative theories useful since they show how the two 
perspectives are consistent with one another. However, these theories explain results from an item-
confidence paradigm, while Moore and Healy suggest perceptions of performance must be measured 
over a set of items. In addition, they consider their theory of overconfidence (see Section 5.6 next) 
consistent with a Thurstonian explanation for the hard-easy effect,176 but claim the random error in 
human judgment is not sufficient to produce systematically biased estimates. They cite empirical results 
(Moore and Small, 2008) that show the hard-easy effect persists even for tasks on which neither 
performance nor its measurement is bounded by floors or ceilings. Besides, they argue, Thurstonian 
theories are not able to explain overplacement, while their theory does. 
The debate continues today. Klayman et al. (1999) offer three experiments devised to separate 
psychological biases from statistically inevitable effects, and find an overconfidence bias particularly 
with subjective confidence intervals. Dunning et al. (2003) suggest poor performers are doubly cursed: 
if they lack the skills to produce correct answers, they are also cursed with an inability to know when 
their answers are right or wrong. Incompetence would lead poor performers to overconfidence. In 
addition, top performers would be miss-calibrated, too: they tend to have a good sense of how well they 
perform in absolute terms, but overestimate how well other people do ―they show underplacement. 
Benoit and Dubra (2011) argue the overplacement on simple tasks and underplacement on difficult ones 
in the hard-easy effect is consistent with rational Bayesian updaters.  
Contrariwise, Merkle and Weber (2011) find people show considerable overplacement as a 
consequence of a psychological bias that is inconsistent with rational information processing. Stankov 
et al. (2012) suggest that a more complex account of the miss-calibration effect is needed to incorporate 
both task characteristics and individual differences. Furthermore, Fellner and Krüger (2012) claim a 
discrepancy between models and measures of overconfidence exists. Finally, Merkle (2009) finds all 
types of judges exhibit the hard-easy effect in almost all realistic situations. Hence, he argues the effect 
                                                 
when the mean subjective probability is 100% (vice versa when the proportion of corrects is 100%). Because at the ends of the 
probability scale errors have only one way to go, response errors combined with the salient endpoints of the probability scale 
will produce a hard-easy effect. Linear dependency, on the other hand, refers to the fact that the proportion of correct answers, 
c, and the over/underconfidence score, x – c, are linearly dependent, which might contribute to the hard-easy effect. 
176 Their theory lies on the assumption that people make imperfect estimates of their own performances and predicts those 
who perform worst are more likely to overestimate their performances. 
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cannot help us distinguish between judges or to draw support for neither of the alternative explanations 
of its existence.  
 
5.6. A THEORY OF OVERCONFIDENCE 
 
When we delve a little into the concept of overconfidence, we find things are even more complex than 
we have already seen. Moore and Healy (2008) claim the bias had been studied in inconsistent ways. In 
particular, they identify three different measures of overconfidence that have been confounded in the 
literature before. Thus, following their approach, people may exhibit overconfidence: (1) in estimating 
their own performance (known as overestimation); (2) in estimating their own performance relative to 
others (known as overplacement or better-than-average effect); and (3) having an excessive precision 
to estimate future uncertainty (known as overprecision). The taxonomy helps Moore and Healy identify 
the three most notable ways overconfidence has been inconsistently studied in previous research: 
namely, confounding overestimation and overprecision, some evidence of underconfidence, and the 
inconsistency between overestimation and overplacement. Then, they provide then a model that 
represents the core of their work. People have imperfect information about their own performances, 
but even worse information about the performances of others. As a result, their post-task estimates of 
themselves are regressive, but their estimates of others are even more regressive. Thus, when people 
perform better (worse) than they expected, they under (over) estimate their results on average and over 
(under) place their performance relative to others. The main predictions are that overestimation 
increases with task difficulty but overplacement decreases with task difficulty, while overprecision 
would be a more systematic result. 
In the experimental research in Part III we will follow Moore and Healy (2008) for several reasons. 
First, the clarification of the three different ways the literature had studied overconfidence has been 
widely accepted since then. Second, they were able to make a synthesis of the previous debate between 
ecological and error models versus the cognitive bias interpretation,177 offering a model that applies the 
Bayesian principle of updating from prior beliefs based on data. Third, their model is able to predict 
both overconfidence and underconfidence in two of its different manifestations (estimation and 
placement) as well as the hard-easy effect. Finally, their tests are really simple, allowing us to implement 
a highly efficient test that requires only a few minutes to perform it. 
Moore and Healy’s model makes richer predictions about people’s overconfident behavior. People 
could either over or underestimate their performance, over or underplace them compared to others, 
                                                 
177 They implement frequency judgments since there is consensus that they are less prone to overconfidence, and suggest their 
theory is quite consistent with the Thurstonian view of the hard-easy effect ―though not being a straight Thurstonian model. 
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while they could exhibit overprecision too. This more complex pattern depends on the individual, the 
complexity and familiarity with the task, whether they are general knowledge questions or responses 
to perceptual tasks, or whether subjects have put themselves in the task or not, among other factors. 
Furthermore, authors like Soll (1996) find clear individual differences among subjects, some people 
appearing to have a bias towards reporting high levels of confidence while others in the direction of 
underconfidence. This will be relevant for our experimental section, since it is this more complex pattern 
―the differences across individuals in the three distinct measures of overconfidence― what we want to 
test there, in order to find out whether they might have some explanatory power over the credit policies 
participants implement in the strategy game ―described in Chapter 8. In what follows we analyze the 
three measures of overconfidence suggested by Moore and Healy (2008). 
5.6.1. Overestimation 
The first measure of overconfidence is overestimation: people overestimate their ability, performance, 
level of control or chance of success ―e. g., students that tend to overestimate their performance on 
exams. A typical question to identify overestimation across a population of individuals would be 
(Fischhoff et al., 1997) 
Which city has more inhabitants? (a) Hyderabad, (b) Islamabad 
How confident are you that your answer is correct? 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
Each subject would choose what she believes it is the correct answer and rate her confidence that 
the answer is correct. For a group of respondents, the experimenter counts how many answers in each 
of the confidence categories were actually correct. The typical finding is that when subjects said “I am 
X% confident that my answer is correct”, the relative frequency of correct answers was lower 
(Lichtenstein, Fischhoff and Phillips, 1982). 
Two discussions about these tests are in order. First, Gigerenzer (1991) claims that if after a set 
of questions we ask the subjects “how many of these questions do you think you got right”, comparing 
their estimated frequencies with actual frequencies of correct answers, overconfidence disappears. 
Brenner et al. (1996), however, find experimental evidence that judgments of conﬁdence at the item 
level and estimates of relative frequency were practically indistinguishable, both exhibiting substantial 
overconﬁdence and being highly correlated with independent judgments of representativeness. Moore 
and Healey (2008) relate this discussion to the vigorous debate over frequentistic versus probabilistic 
judgment, agreeing with Gigerenzer that there is a consensus that frequency judgments across a set of 
items are less prone to overconfidence than are judgments of correctness at the item-level (where 
participants are required to provide a probabilistic judgment). This may be consequence of the human 
mind being better adapted to reason frequentistically (Cosmides and Tooby, 1996). 
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The second discussion is about people overestimating their own skill on hard tasks but 
underestimating it on easy tasks. Authors agreeing this is a robust finding include Burson, Larrick and 
Klayman (2006), Moore and Cain (2007) and Grieco and Hogarth (2009). In order to account for these 
two discussions, Moore and Healy (2008) conduct their tests asking for frequency judgments across 
several sets of items of easy, medium and hard difficulty. We will do the same in the experimental section 
of this thesis. In Section 5.7 we describe in detail how we do it. 
5.6.2. Overplacement 
Also known as the ‘better-than-average effect’, overplacement refers to people considering themselves 
to be better than others. Perhaps the most frequently cited result is that 93% of a sample of American 
drivers and 69% of a sample of Swedish drivers considered themselves more skillful than the median 
driver in their own country (Svenson, 1981). Following that article, Shefrin (2001c) suggests a question 
to identify overplacement: 
Relative to people you know, how would you rate yourself as a driver? 
(a) Above average, (b) Average, (c) Below average 
Several articles analyze this bias. Just to illustrate, Zell and Alicke (2011) investigate whether 
overplacement is related to age, Williams and Gilovich (2008) whether better-than-average effects 
reflect mere hopes or self-presentation, Grieco and Hogarth (2009) who concentrate on the relationship 
between overestimation and overplacement, and Kuyper and Dijkstra (2009), who examine the effect 
among secondary school students during 3 years and find strong evidence that boys exhibit more 
overplacement than girls and that evaluations of liking are positively related to evaluations of ability. 
For a further review of ‘better-than-average’ literature see Alicke and Govorun (2005). Again, we will 
implement the tests for overplacement in the experimental setting of this thesis following Moore and 
Healy (2008). It is described in detail in Section 5.7. 
5.6.3. Overprecision 
Overprecision refers to the excessive certainty regarding the accuracy of one’s beliefs. According to 
Moore and Healy (2008), researchers examining this bias typically require participants answer 
questions with numerical answers (e.g., “how long is the Nile River?”) and then estimate 90% confidence 
intervals around their answers. Results show these intervals are often too narrow (containing the 
correct answer less of 50% of the time). Soll and Klayman (2004) call this technique interval estimates, 
as opposed to binary choices.178 Using binary choices causes overestimation and overprecision to be one 
and the same (Moore and Healy, 2008), because being excessively sure you got the correct answer from 
a choice of two reflects both overestimation of your performance and excessive confidence in the 
                                                 
178 In binary choices participants are given questions with a choice of two answers. Then they have to pick the correct answer 
and state his or her confidence: e.g. “who was born first, Charles Dickens or Charles Darwin?” “Dickens – 75% sure” ―Soll and 
Klayman (2004). 
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precision of your knowledge. Consequently, in our tests, in order to avoid confusing overestimation and 
overprecision, we study overestimation by measuring perceptions across a set of items, whereas 
overprecision is analyzed through a series of questions on interval estimates. We shall describe this in 
detail in Section 5.7. Some classic results are that overprecision is more persistent than the other two 
(Moore and Healy, 2008) though its presence reduces the magnitude of both overestimation and 
overplacement. Besides, interval estimates are prone to a great deal of overconfidence, much more than 
binary choice questions (Klayman et al., 1999; Juslin et al., 2000). Finally, Soll and Klayman (2004) find 
objective information does little to reduce overprecision. 
 
5.7. SET OF VARIABLES, ELICITATION AND SCALING 
 
Following the discussion above we will consider three factors in our experimental research, 
representing the three different measures of overconfidence that must be estimated. Namely: 
 Overestimation (E), measuring overconfidence in one’s performance.  
 Overplacement (P), measuring a subject’s overconfidence in her performance relative to 
the others. 
 Overprecision (M), measuring overconfidence in the accuracy of one’s beliefs. 
The section of the experiment devoted to elicit the overconfidence factors will consist of a set of 
trivial-like questions, devised to determine the degree of overestimation (E, in our notation) and 
overplacement (P) of each respondent, plus a set of additional questions where subjects are asked to 
provide some confidence interval estimations ―devised to determine the degree of overprecision (M, 
following notation by Soll and Klayman, 2004) of each respondent. In what follows we describe the 
general procedure to elicit and measure the three variables, and leave the description of the specific 
design of the tests to Part III. 
5.7.1. Elicitation 
Following Moore and Healy (2008), in order to elicit the parameters E and P of each respondent, 
participants are required to complete a set of T trivial-like games with n-items each one. In order to 
account for the hard-easy effect, one half of the T quizzes should be of easy difficulty and one half of hard 
difficulty ―though obviously this information should not be provided to participants. In each quiz, for 
each item participants have to mark the correct answer. Then, when they finish each quiz, they are 
required to estimate their own scores, as well as the score of a randomly selected previous participant, 
(RSPP). They repeat the same process for all the T rounds. 
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Overprecision (M) is analyzed in our tests through a separate set of questions where, rather than 
measuring perceptions across a set of items, participants are presented a series of m questions on 
interval estimates. Here we follow Soll and Klayman (2004) in spirit. Participants are asked to provide 
confidence intervals around the subjects’ answers. However, Soll and Klayman (2004) show 
overconfidence in interval estimates may result from variability in setting interval widths. 
Consequently, in order to disentangle variability and true overprecision, they define the ratio 
 M = MEAD/MAD,      (5.16) 
which represents the ratio of actual to ideal interval size ―being MEAD the mean of the expected 
absolute deviations implied by each pair of fractiles a subject gives, and MAD the observed mean 
absolute deviation. Thus, M represents the ratio of observed average interval width to the well-
calibrated zero-variability interval width. Consequently, a ratio M<1 indicates an overconfidence bias 
that cannot be attributed to random error. Soll and Klayman’s studies confirm interval estimates are 
prone to produce substantially more overconfidence than two-point estimates, that different domains 
of questions are systematically associated with different degrees of overconfidence (which highlights 
the risks of relying on any single domain), that post-task judgments are overconfident, but less so than 
item-by-item judgments, and that asking subjects for three fractile estimates (two boundaries and a 
median estimate) rather than two reduces overconfidence.179 
With these results in mind, the elicitation of M is implemented as follows. First, in each of the m 
questions participants are asked to specify a three-point estimate (median, 10% fractile and 90% 
fractile, so we have low and high boundaries for an 80% confidence interval).180 Second, the m questions 
are divided into d different domains, m/d questions each, in order to make an estimation of the ratio M 
on each domain.181 Most studies of confidence ask judges to draw information only from their 
knowledge and memory, asking traditional almanac questions (i.e., general knowledge questions on 
arbitrarily chosen topics: in which year a specific device was invented, mortality rates, etc.). Other 
alternatives are asking participants to make predictions based on objective cue values provided in the 
test (Soll, 1996) or including domains for which participants could draw on direct, personal experience 
(Soll and Klayman, 2004). No matter the domain, participants are required to provide a median estimate 
and an 80% confidence interval around their answers. 
                                                 
179 One might think that making the median estimate explicit could make the anchor more salient. On the contrary, Soll and 
Klayman find evidence that asking for an explicit median estimate increases the size of subjective intervals.  
180 Likewise Soll and Klayman, we pretend each judge has a particular subjective probability distribution function (SPDF) for 
each question, and the fractiles implied by their three-point estimates provide information about those SPDFs. Whenever the 
judge’s median estimate is midway between the two boundaries we may assume normality; however, asking subjects to 
provide explicitly their median estimate allows for the possibility that judges’ intervals are asymmetric. In such case, Soll and 
Klayman (2004) recommend to use beta functions to approximate the underlying SPDF because they can approximate a great 
variety of skewed distributions. We will use and compare both estimations ―see section ‘scaling’. 
181 However, in our tests, since we can only ask a few questions and the risks of relying on a single domain were emphasized, 
we will choose to make only a pair of questions on three different domains. This causes a problem regarding the statistical 
reliability of each M estimation that will be handled in the scaling section below. 
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5.7.2. Scaling 
We explain now how estimations E, P, and M for each respondent are calculated. 
 Overestimation (E), measuring participants’ overconfidence in their own performance, is 
calculated subtracting a participant’s actual score in each of the T trivia from his or her 
reported expected score, and then summing all T results. That is 
Overestimation = E[Xi] –xi    (5.17) 
where E[Xi] is an individual’s belief about her expected performance in a particular trivia 
test and xi measures her actual score in that test. We calculate (5.17) for each of the T trivia, 
and then sum all T results. A measure E>0 means the respondent exhibits overestimation, 
while E<0 means underestimation. Additional information on the hard-easy effect may be 
available if similar estimations are calculated separately for the hard and easy tasks, in 
order to see if E is negative on easy tasks and positive on hard ones. 
 Overplacement (P), measuring subjects’ overconfidence in their relative performance 
against others, is calculated taking into account whether a participant is really better than 
others. For each quiz we use the formula 
Overplacement = (E[Xi] – E[Xj]) – (xi – xj)  (5.18) 
where E[Xi] is an individual’s belief about his or her expected performance in a particular 
trivia test, E[Xj] is that person’s belief about the expected performance of the RSPP on that 
quiz, and xi and xj measure the actual scores of the individual and the RSPP.182 We calculate 
(5.18) for each of the T trivia, and then sum all T results. A measure P>0 means the 
respondent exhibits overplacement, while P<0 means underplacement. Again, additional 
information on the hard-easy effect may be available if similar estimations are calculated 
separately for the hard and easy tasks, in order to see if P is positive on easy tasks and 
negative on hard ones. 
 Overprecision (M), measuring subjects’ overconfidence in the accuracy of their beliefs, is 
calculated by having participants specify three-point estimates for each of the m questions, 
and then we calculate the estimator M = MEAD/MAD (see below how we do it). Here M = 1 
implies perfect calibration, and M < 1 overprecision, with the higher overprecision the lower 
M is. 
The procedure we implement to estimate M is as follows. Having a median estimate implies we 
should use a beta function to estimate the implicit SPDF. However, the assumption of normality serves 
                                                 
182 In Moore and Healy’s words, this measures the individual’s belief that she is better than others, and corrects that for the 
degree to which she is actually better than others. 
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as a good approximation for a wide array of functions (Soll and Klayman, 2004). Hence, we may calculate 
two alternative estimations of M, one for the implied beta functions and other under the assumption of 
normality. 
We need to estimate MEAD and MAD. First, for each question we calculate the expected surprise 
implied by the SPDF in order to calculate the expected absolute deviation (EAD) from the median.183 
Then, the mean of the EADs for all questions in a domain is obtained, denoted as MEAD. Second, for each 
question we calculate the observed absolute deviation between the median and the true answer, and 
then the mean absolute deviation (MAD) of all questions in a same domain. For M estimated with beta 
functions, since we have a median estimate provided by the participant, we measure MAD using that 
information.184 For M estimated assuming a (symmetric) Normal distribution, MAD is calculated using 
the midpoint between the boundaries given by the subject. Then we calculate the ratio M = MEAD/MAD 
for each domain. Consequently, we have so far d different estimations of the ratio (denote these m1, m2 
… md). M could then simply be calculated as either the average or the median of the d different 
estimations. That is, we will compute four measures of M: median and average estimations for beta 
distributions, and median and average estimations under the assumption of normality. 
 
5.8. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
We have seen how to elicit, for a given individual and through a set of psychological tests, a series of key 
measures in prospect theory and overconfidence, which are the two areas of behavioral finance that will 
be the basis for the research in Part III. In what follows we summarize our main findings. 
First, we have proposed a series of arguments in favor of setting prospect theory and 
overconfidence as the relevant areas of behavioral finance for our research in Part III. These include that 
they are two of the most-well studied areas in behavioral finance, that they are both concepts that have 
been suggested to explain a risk-seeking behavior, and that key concepts in prospect theory ―like loss 
aversion or diminishing sensitivity― as well as overconfidence could help explain how misperceptions 
by participants in the banking sector might have led them to engage in misleading credit policies. 
Second, we described prospect theory in detail, with a focus on the description of the different 
measures and how to calibrate them for a given individual through a set of simple questions. The 
measures include the risk aversion over gains, risk aversion over losses, and loss aversion for the value 
function, and the probability weights for the weighting function. The elicitation method seeks to 
                                                 
183 For instance, the EAD of the Normal distribution is equal to σ·√(2/π). For other distributions, such as the beta function, 
different expressions hold.  
184 This is what Soll and Klayman do in order to later calculate what they denote the M3 estimator. 
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calibrate the parameters through a simple questionnaire of three sets of questions, fifteen questions in 
total, based on the elicitation of certainty equivalents (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). 
Third, we followed Moore and Healy’s (2008) theory of overconfidence to describe and determine 
how to elicit three basic measures: overestimation, overplacement and overprecision. Again, we 
discussed the elicitation method for the three measures of overconfidence at the individual level, which 
is based on the implementation of two questionnaires based on Moore and Healy (2008) and Soll and 
Klayman (2004). 
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PART III. AN EXPERIMENTAL APPROXIMATION AND THEORETICAL 
MODEL OF THE CREDIT CYCLE 
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SUMMARY OF PART III 
 
The main goal of this thesis is to analyze the efficiency of the banking sector when granting credit to the 
economy. For such purpose, in Part I we reviewed a series of theories on three areas of research that 
revealed essential: how efficiency of the banking sector is analyzed; how efficiency is analyzed when it 
is referred to market-based systems; and how behavioral finance has come to defy the orthodoxy in 
regards to market efficiency. Part III is now devoted to provide a rationale for behavioral finance to 
challenge informational efficiency in bank-based systems as well. The analysis comes in three instances. 
First, in Chapter 6 we describe why the efficient market hypothesis as defined by Fama (1970) does not 
apply to bank-based financial systems. Then, we discuss how to extend the EMH to bank-based systems 
to analyze the informational efficiency in retail credit markets under the scope of behavioral finance. 
For such purpose, we suggest an alternative approach to test it that is based in the behavioral literature. 
This behavioral approach would be a plausible alternative to test the informational efficiency in retail 
credit markets, while it sidesteps the analysis of the allocative and operational efficiencies ―which in 
bank-based systems are often affected by imperfect competition and informational asymmetries. In 
addition, Chapter 6 ends with a research agenda to suggest various ways the stepwise approach might 
be tested. Of the suggestions there provided, in the subsequent chapters we focus on the effects of 
prospect theory and overconfidence.  
Second, Chapters 7 and 8 contribute with an experimental research performed to deal with the 
first step in the stepwise approach above mentioned. This experiment allows us to infer whether it is 
plausible to believe that participants in the banking sector may exhibit behavioral biases ―namely, 
overconfidence and prospect theory― and the effects those biases might have over the credit policies 
implemented. Thus, the existence of behavioral biases is analyzed in the experiment described in 
Chapter 7, while the effects those behavioral biases have over the credit policies implemented by the 
participants in a business simulation game is described in Chapter 8. The results suggest participants 
exhibited different degrees of overconfidence as well as most of the classic results in prospect theory. 
Then, we find extensive evidence that an aggressive behavioral profile, in terms of overconfidence and 
risk seeking, is correlated to riskier credit strategies, in terms of providing credit to low-quality 
customers at a lower price. In particular, higher overprecision and distortion of probabilities for gains 
would foster lower prices, higher volumes of credit, and reduce quality. 
Third, Chapter 9 offers a theoretical model that starts from the assumption, backed by our findings 
in the experimental research, that some banks in the industry are biased in terms of overconfidence and 
excessive optimism during the upswing of the economic cycle. In such circumstances, the second and 
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third steps in the stepwise approach outlined in Chapter 6 are analyzed: how would a duopoly of a 
rational and a biased bank compete when granting credit to the economy, whether herding strategies 
would appear, and whether limits of arbitrage in the industry are identifiable. Our model would 
contribute to explain how the credit cycle is amplified due to banking competition, and makes some 
predictions that are consistent with the empirical observation ―in particular, that the effects of the 
behavioral biases are more pervasive during upswings and in niche markets of low-quality borrowers.   
Part III is organized as follows. In Chapter 6 we introduce a behavioral framework to analyze the 
informational efficiency in retail credit markets, and provide a research agenda with various 
alternatives to test it in the future. Chapter 7 describes the behavioral tests we performed in an 
experimental setting in order to obtain a basic profile of each respondent’s risk attitudes and level of 
confidence. Chapter 8 introduces a business simulation game we devised to replicate an experimental 
credit market. The game is designed to replicate the basics of the decision-making process of a bank 
granting credit under conditions of uncertainty and risk, in order to test the relationship between the 
participants’ behavioral profile in Chapter 7 and their credit policies in the game. Chapter 9 is devoted 
to provide a theoretical model of the credit cycle that shows how rational banks would herd to follow 
their biased competitors to grant excess credit during economic upswings. Finally, the conclusions and 
future investigation, as well as the appendices are relegated to the end of the thesis. 
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CHAPTER 6. A BEHAVIORAL FRAMEWORK TO TEST EFFICIENCY IN 
RETAIL CREDIT MARKETS 
 
6.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The financial crisis that started in 2007 renewed attention on the role credit plays on economic cycles. 
Recent research suggests that credit booms are related to the business cycle. For instance, Jorda, 
Schularick and Taylor (2011) point out that higher rates of credit growth relative to GDP tend to be 
followed by deeper recessions and slower recoveries. Some explanations to this evidence that do not 
consider behavioral interpretations have been provided. These include incentives (Fahlenbrach and 
Stulz, 2011), securitization (Keys et al., 2010) and a risk-taking moral hazard by banks (Acharya and 
Naqvi, 2012). However, the behavioral literature may offer a simple but complementary interpretation. 
Since unsustainable credit and asset price booms are likely to occur in stable macroeconomic conditions 
(Borio and Shim, 2007), excessive optimism might had led economic agents to believe good times would 
last forever, revealing a financial sector unable to make a proper evaluation of demand for credit. 
Since much of this credit expansion was fostered by the banking sector, there is an increasing 
interest among researchers to analyze the efficiency of bank-based systems. In market-based systems, 
the classic approach to examine efficiency is the EMH (Fama, 1970) analyzed in Chapter 2. There we saw 
the EMH asserts that, in competitive markets where information is available to all market participants, 
prices fully reflect all information available. However, imperfect competition and informational 
asymmetries in bank-based systems leave this approach without content. Some alternatives emerged to 
provide an interpretation of what determines how much credit banks should grant to borrowers: 
namely, the power theories of credit (Townsend, 1979; Hart and Moore, 1994, 1998) and the 
information theories (Jaffe and Russell, 1976; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) we reviewed in Chapter 1. 
Notwithstanding, in this chapter we suggest behavioral finance offers a simple approach to analyze the 
efficiency of bank-based financial systems. In particular, we introduce a behavioral approach to analyze 
the informational efficiency (EMH) of retail credit markets that, to the best of our knowledge, has not 
been proposed before. The so-called behavioral approach consists of a stepwise procedure based on 
Shleifer (2000) that analyzes the informational efficiency of the banking sector considering the two 
elements that might challenge it: market sentiment and limited arbitrage. 
Along this chapter we discuss the conditions under which this approach may be easily adapted to 
analyze the informational efficiency of bank-based systems as well. We argue that a behavioral analysis 
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of retail credit markets may be achieved by extending the classic EMH analysis of financial markets to 
bank-based systems under specific circumstances. A plausible alternative is that informational 
efficiency may be analyzed at a macro level and using the stepwise behavioral approach by Shleifer 
(2000). In short, the information theories above mentioned consider that banks, in order to provide 
credit to their customers, analyze the information available on items such as the economic conditions, 
clients’ estimated solvency, and others. Thus, we may analyze the informational efficiency of such 
decisions ―i.e., whether through banking intermediation information is transmitted efficiently in the 
EMH sense― by determining three features. First, whether CEOs and employees in the industry exhibit 
beliefs that, based on heuristics and other forms of bounded rationality, could conform a market 
sentiment. Second, whether market sentiment could exhibit trends or predictable patterns. Third, 
whether there are limits of arbitrage in retail credit markets. 
In what follows we reproduce the original research where we developed this approach.185 Section 
6.2 offers a first insight to define this alternative approach. Then, Section 6.3 develops these insights on 
why the EMH is not applied to the banking system and how our approach would be useful to analyze the 
efficiency of credit policies in bank-based financial systems. Finally, Section 6.4 offers a research agenda 
where we suggest some alternatives to test banking efficiency following that approach.   
 
6.2. USING BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS TO ANALYZE CREDIT POLICIES IN THE BANKING 
INDUSTRY186 
 
Are private banks efficient when providing credit to the economy? Probably, in the last decades there 
has not been such a bitter debate in academic research as the one related to efficiency in financial 
markets. Hence, we will not find a unanimous answer to that question, but in the midst of the worst 
financial crisis since the Great Depression, it seems unavoidable to wonder how did all go wrong? 
Kindleberger (1978) provided what Shleifer (2000) named the “anatomy of a price bubble”: a 
process that starts with some good news that generate a profit in an asset, followed by a smart-money 
response where both the supply and the demand of such asset are encouraged by initial investors. The 
bubble is then sustained by the same investors, who “(...) stimulate positive feedback trading by (...) 
facilitating noise trader speculation” (Shleifer, 2000, p.172). That is, the same agents who are benefited 
in the early stages of the bubble generate a greater supply of the asset and encourage other actors to 
                                                 
185 In particular, Section 6.2 reproduces our first insights to define this alternative approach, which were presented in the 4th 
ICABE Conference in A Coruña, September 2010 (Peón and Calvo, 2010) and published as an article in 2012 by the European 
Research Studies Journal (Peón and Calvo, 2012a). Then, in Sections 6.3 and 6.4 we reproduce some excerpts of our dissertation 
presented in the 19th MFS Conference in Krakow, June 2012 (Peón and Calvo, 2012b). Since the second article extends our 
initial insights in the first one, we inform some similar contents are sometimes reproduced in both instances. 
186 Article published in the European Research Studies Journal, Volume XV, Issue (3) 
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participate, increasing the demand and sustaining asset prices until the market, eventually, collapses. 
Hens and Bachmann (2008) explain the anatomy of the financial bubble that led to our present crisis. 
They interpret the initial good news that rose prices on the real estate market as the speculative money 
coming into the house market after the dot-com bubble burst. Then, smart-money investors started the 
“packaging of mortgage risks in new securities (MBS) that are sold outsourced in special investment 
vehicles (SIV) and sold worldwide” (p.94). 
That approach focuses on the role that subprime mortgages had in the process that led to the 
crisis, but we want to delve a little deeper into the study of how the smart-money response promoted 
the credit growth in order to sustain the bubble. The financial meltdown highlighted significant 
shortcomings on procedures used by the banking sector when providing credit to the real economy for 
two reasons. First, a long period of indulgence granting personal loans and mortgages boosted the credit 
bubble all over the world, and second, after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, an era of suspicion within 
the banking sector precipitated the liquidity crunch and the credit squeeze to private agents. A 
traditional approach to analyze market efficiency is the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) by Fama 
(1970) applied to capital markets. Here we will first provide a brief outlook on several ideas that 
behavioral economics has presented when analyzing the EMH in the context of capital markets, and then 
we will apply that analysis to the study of retail banking sector ―both from a macro and a micro 
perspective― when granting credit to businesses and households. 
6.2.1. Behavioral finance and the EMH in capital markets 
The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) postulates market prices reflect the ‘true value’ of capital stock, 
given information available. Fama (1970) sees three categories in the EMH. Under the weak-form EMH, 
current stock prices fully reflect all currently available market information. Hence, past price and 
volume information would have no relationship with the future direction of security prices. The 
semistrong-form EMH assumes current stock prices adjust rapidly to the release of any market and non-
market information available to the agents. Finally, the strong-form EMH version implies that prices 
fully reflect all public and private information. The strong-form assumes perfect markets where 
information is cost-free and available to all market participants at the same time. 
Empirical data has challenged the EMH. Relevant examples are Shiller (1981), De Bondt and 
Thaler (1985), Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), Siegel (1998) or even Fama (1991) and Fama and French 
(1992), which evidence market anomalies inconsistent with market rationality. Empirical evidence 
against the weak form EMH include stock market volatility much higher than justified by the expected 
net present value of future dividends, extreme losers (worst performing stocks over long periods in the 
past) outperforming extreme winners in the short term ―a sign of overreaction and return to the mean― 
or, on the contrary, that for short term periods price movements over six to twelve months tend to 
predict future movements in the same direction ―known as momentum. Evidence against the semi-
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strong form EMH are small cap stocks earning higher returns than blue chips, or value investing (buying 
the cheapest stocks in terms of market to book ratios) historically outperforming growth investing. 
Finally, there is also evidence against the strong form EMH, particularly when markets move sharply 
without any apparent news. 
Behavioral finance may be defined as “the study of how psychology affects finance” (Shefrin, 2000, 
preface ix). Shleifer (2000) conducts an analysis of the efficiency of capital markets under a behavioral 
framing. He points out the EMH is supported by three arguments which rely on progressively weaker 
assumptions: “First, investors are assumed to be rational and hence to value securities rationally. Second, 
to the extent that some investors are not rational, their trades are random and therefore cancel each other 
out without affecting prices. Third, to the extent that investors are irrational in similar ways, they are met 
in the market by rational arbitrageurs who eliminate their influence on prices” (p.2). The logic of the 
analysis is as follows. First, several psychological topics are used to analyze how agents select and 
process information from the market, which are their attitudes toward risk, and whether they have 
sensitivity to the way market information is presented to them. Through this analysis we determine 
whether all (or at least most) market participants do behave rationally or not. If there is evidence of 
agents being affected by cognition and emotional biases, this would not necessarily mean markets are 
not efficient. The EMH considers that if some investors are not rational, their biases will be random and 
hence they will trade against each other without affecting prices. Hence, behavioral analysis must 
determine whether irrational investors trade randomly or not.  
Finally, if it is found that investors are irrational in similar ways, following some naive trends or 
in a correlated manner, there is a latter chance for EMH to hold. If there are rational arbitrageurs able 
to effectively make riskless profit from prices being out of their fundamental values, they will preserve 
efficiency on the market and the EMH will ultimately hold. 
Investor rationality 
Shleifer mentions three broad areas where people deviate from rationality ―attitudes toward risk, non-
Bayesian expectation formation and sensitivity to the framing of problems. However, we find more clear 
the approach that Shefrin (2000) used to determine that “a few psychological phenomena pervade the 
entire landscape of finance” (p.4). He distinguishes two main sources of psychological biases: heuristics 
(the process through which people try to find out relevant information from all news and market data) 
and framing biases (the fact that how a problem is presented, and not the data itself, could lead market 
participants taking irrational decisions). 
We complete this classification with that provided by Hens and Bachmann (2008), who classify 
behavioral biases as those that are committed when selecting information, when processing that data, 
and when deciding, where framing is just one of the biases in the second group. The idea behind all of 
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these terms is that people filter information through proxies (heuristics or rules of thumb), since market 
data is vast and changes every second, and that filtering process may be affected by cognitive or 
emotional biases. We will just mention some of them, since we later discuss in detail those that are 
relevant to our analysis. 
Heuristic biases: availability heuristic (tendency to pay attention to pieces of information that are 
easier to get or understand), representativeness (reliance on stereotypes) and gambler’s fallacy 
(tendency to see patterns in truly random sequences), overconfidence (and related concepts as illusion 
of control and long-shot bias), anchoring (being influenced by arbitrary ―even non informative― data) 
and conservatism (tendency to underreact to news consistent with one’s beliefs), and aversion to 
ambiguity (ambiguity introduces fear to the unknown). Framing biases: loss aversion (first mentioned 
by Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), mental accounting (problems analyzed in an isolated fashion), 
disposition effect (a consequence of loss aversion combined with mental accounting), house money 
effect (also a consequence from mental accounting), money illusion (paying attention to nominal values 
disregarding the effects of inflation), home bias (preference for domestic stocks), self-control and regret 
(two emotional biases that may affect in the decision making process). 
Random irrationality 
The EMH is not invalidated by the irrationality of investors: the second reasoning supporting market 
efficiency is that even when some investors are not rational, their trades may be random so they do not 
affect prices. If that is true, the strategies of the irrational investors should exhibit a lack of correlation. 
On the contrary, if we find some arguments supporting there is enough evidence that the cognition and 
emotional biases introduced above may result in a correlated behavior among irrational investors, then 
we might say there is odds for prices being driven out of their fundamental values. Shleifer (2000) claims 
that psychological evidence shows that people deviate from rationality mostly in the same direction. 
“This problem becomes more severe when the noise traders behave socially and follow each other’s 
mistakes by listening to rumors or imitating their neighbors” (p.12). 
This behavior affects not only common people, but professional investors, traders, dealers and 
mutual fund managers, too. Moreover, not only professional managers are subject to the same biases as 
individual investors, but since they manage other people’s money, their decisions could be severely 
affected by herd instinct. In capital markets and the asset management industry it is a frequent behavior 
to choose portfolios that resemble the benchmark the manager is evaluated against, or to recommend 
stocks according to what other analysts or market consensus believe, in order to avoid a bad relative 
performance. Herd instinct predicts, therefore, that due to imitation, following rumors, financial gurus 
and recommendations on media or many other biases that are shared among investors, irrational 
decisions are correlated and prices could potentially not fit their fundamental values. 
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Limits of arbitrage 
Even if irrational investors behave in a correlated manner and prices are driven out of their fundamental 
values, the EMH argues that the existence of arbitrageurs in the market helps correcting mispricing 
eventually. In capital markets there are indeed arbitrageurs that try to make a riskless profit in a market 
where correlated irrational investors drive prices out of their fundamental values. For that purpose, 
market participants having access to more complete sources of information, and through careful ―and 
rational― research, look for mispriced stocks and try to correct them for their own profit. The central 
argument of behavioral economics is that, in real world, arbitrage is actually risky and limited, so even 
arbitrageurs ―that are risk averse, have limited time period horizons and face agency problems- might 
not be able to ensure efficiency on markets. 
Here, our analysis of credit policies in retail banking will slightly differ from that research on limits 
of arbitrage in capital markets. In retail credit markets, contrariwise, our first question when analyzing 
how banks grant credit to private agents is who might play that role of arbitrageur inside the banking 
industry. After we identify who could play that role, we will then analyze the limits of arbitrage in that 
field the same way Shleifer did for capital markets. 
6.2.2. Applying BF to a new framework: Efficiency of credit policies in retail banking 
We are going to consider the possibility to extend Shleifer’s analysis of capital markets efficiency to a 
new framework: credit policies on retail banking. We delimit retail banking as the transactions from 
banking institutions to their customers, and credit policies as the personal loans, mortgages, credit 
accounts, credit cards and other credit instruments that commercial banks provide. 
We will also differentiate that the allocation of credit to the real economy takes place at two levels. 
First, from a macro perspective, managers decide the volume of resources that each bank is ready to 
grant in form of loans and mortgages, according to the cost of funding in the interbank market and the 
macro situation they perceive both for economic growth and expected demand for credit. Credit markets 
are likely more complex than markets of goods and services because price is not the only variable that 
counts to match supply and demand. Risk is the other feature that must be considered, so banks limit 
their bid for each level of interest rates, allocating credit among potential customers according to the 
creditworthiness perceived. 
Second, from a micro perspective, the decision whether to extend credit or not to each particular 
agent that demands it is up to both employees at commercial branches and risk analysis departments. 
Usually credit levels that are considered to be suitable from a macro point of view are passed down in 
form of commercial goals. Then, commercial success is often used as feedback when re-evaluating macro 
expectations. Our main purpose will be posing an alternative approach to the study of efficiency in retail 
credit markets and leave some open questions for future research. We will follow a three step process 
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like Shleifer: i) do banks (managers and employees) behave rationally when granting credit to the 
economy? ii) are irrational policies random? iii) how may arbitrageurs ensure the financial sector 
provides credit in an efficient manner? 
Analysis of rationality on credit policies of retail banking 
What does efficiency on retail credit markets mean? In financial markets, efficiency means markets are 
able to accurately assess all available information in order to provide an asset price that is equal to its 
fundamental value. Using that approach, what should we understand by efficiency in retail credit 
markets? What does it mean credit institutions are rational when providing credit to the market? 
The crucial role of agents in the credit market is to assess demand of credit, and with a potentially 
unlimited supply (under the fractional-reserve banking system, where most money in the economy is 
created by financial institutions, there are potentially no limits for the creation of new money other than 
the reserve requirements imposed by the Central Bank), decide which level of credit is supplied and 
who is given credit and who is not. Analyzing the rationality of retail banking when providing credit to 
the economy entails evaluating whether people involved in the selection process have emotional or 
cognitive biases, and whether these biases could make the banking sector feed speculative bubbles or 
provoke a credit squeeze. This debate about efficiency represents, therefore, a discussion on risk 
perception and prudence. Risk perception in the sense discussed above ―financial institutions and 
authorities not appreciating the risk of an eventual collapse in the real estate market, or overweighting 
risks when giving credit to creditworthy agents during economic recessions―, and prudence in the 
sense of determining, for a potentially unlimited supply, how much credit is given to the economy from 
a macro perspective, and which agents will receive credit and which not from a micro point of view. 
Thus, we may consider that banks analyze the credit market in two dimensions: at a macro level, 
they would analyze the economy and look for patterns in economic growth, its sustainability and the 
future demand for credit; at a micro level, it would require evaluating several aspects for credit analysis 
such as the candidate’s credit history, the ability to pay, capital available to respond for credit, the 
existence or not of collateral, etc. Under that approach, we will try to identify several cognitive and 
emotional biases that could be reasonable observed in credit policies of retail banking both from a macro 
and a micro perspective. Heuristics and framing biases that have been identified in financial markets 
would also be relevant in retail credit markets, since those are all emotional and cognitive biases that 
are common to everyone. Our concern here is to point out some of them that could have a greater effect 
over the amount of credit, the easiness and the rationality with which credit is granted to the economy. 
Obviously, having empirical evidence about it would require setting a quantitative study on this area. 
Shleifer (2000), for example, bases his model of investor sentiment in financial markets on two 
biases: conservatism and representativeness. In our opinion, conservatism could be determinant for our 
199 
 
analysis from a macro perspective. Conservatism “states that individuals are slow to change their beliefs 
in the face of new evidence” (p. 128) and it would explain, for example, the underreaction of bank 
managers and supervisor authorities to evidence of credit policies fostering real estate bubbles and their 
latter collapse. The influence of conservatism on the decision-making process by managers and 
supervisors would not be quite different from the effect that it has over investors on the stock market 
or professional fund managers. 
Representativeness, on the other hand, could be relevant from a micro point of view. Shleifer 
(2000) provides an idea of what representativeness means through an example: if a description of a 
person matches with the subject’s experiences with people of a particular profession, the subject tends 
to significantly overestimate the actual probability that the given person belongs to that profession. 
Applied to our framework, if an employee working at the branches of a retail bank has had good 
experiences giving credit, say, to several dentists, he might exhibit a tendency to consider suitable a new 
potential customer only because she is a dentist. So when it comes to analyze her economic situation 
and creditworthiness, he could exhibit a bias to overweight good data and underestimate risks. Hens 
and Bachmann (2008) also relate representativeness to the phenomenon of gambler’s fallacy (that is, 
the tendency to see patterns in truly random sequences). Applied to our example above, an employee 
working either at the branches or at the risk analysis department of a financial institution could consider 
that a company that exhibits very good results and a high growth in recent years (for example, a builder 
or a developer during the real estate bubble) will be able to maintain or even improve that performance 
in the future. 
Two other biases that might have a relevant effect over agents at a macro level are overconfidence 
and loss aversion (Shefrin, 2000). Overconfidence of bank managers and supervisor authorities would 
have a similar impact as it has in stock markets, for example, where some agents could be overestimating 
the accuracy of their predictions. In financial markets this would cause prices to overreact ―“if investors 
are overconfident, they may overestimate the precision of their private information, causing prices to 
overreact” (Hens and Bachmann, 2008, p.81)― the same way as in credit markets this could have led to 
a lower risk perception under a trending up real estate market. Hens and Bachmann (2008) also 
mention the possibility of those overconfident agents to exhibit an illusion of control. That is, judging an 
outcome as a consequence of their acts when in fact they have been simply lucky “(...) even if they know 
that success or failure depends on chance. The greatest satisfaction, or a feeling of competence, is achieved 
from being able to control the seemingly uncontrollable” (p.81). 
Whereas we could use overconfidence to analyze agents’ behavior when credit markets boost, loss 
aversion could be used to explain what happened next. That is, during recessions and due to suspicion 
and lack of confidence within the financial sector, bank managers become more sensitive to avoid loses 
than to profit from low-risk credit operations. As Kahneman and Tversky (1979) proposed in prospect 
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theory, variance of returns becomes not a satisfactory measure of risk when agents are more sensitive 
to avoid losses. “They find that a loss has about two and a half times the impact of a gain of the same 
magnitude” (Shefrin, 2000, p.24). Finally, it seems reasonable that biases such as availability, mental 
accounting, money illusion or anchoring, among others, could also have a noticeable effect on agents 
both on a macro and a micro perspective. 
Analysis of correlation 
We have seen there are several biases that might justify why some agents may be boundedly rational. 
In fact, one may think that believing that every single agent in the market behaves strictly rational would 
be indeed too naive. Anyway, the fact that many agents in the market may not behave strictly rational is 
not such a challenge for the EMH, because what it matters is whether that irrational behavior is 
correlated amongst agents or not. Could we expect agents in retail banking be irrational in a random 
fashion? That would imply that while some banks are understating risks, others may behave too 
prudently. That is, while the former would grant loans and mortgages to satisfy almost any sort of 
demand they face, the latter would impose stronger restrictions than rationally required. Otherwise, if 
that behavior is not random across agents in the market, then we might say there are odds for an 
inefficient credit market. 
Our objective will be to suggest some biases that could justify retail banks could sometimes exhibit 
correlated credit policies. We identify two different interpretations, at a macro and at a micro level. From 
a macro point of view, herd instinct could justify correlation. For instance, with the 2007–2008 world 
financial meltdown we became aware that almost every financial institution all over the globe had been 
trading on subprime mortgage backed securities. Another example, the stress tests by the Committee of 
European Banking Supervisors (CEBS, 2010) evidenced that about a 60% of the losses that the Spanish 
Savings Banks would experience under the worst scenario would come from real estate risks. 
It is not just a matter of banks not being able to detect when they are understating risks, it is a 
matter that maybe they are aware of them, but not following the trend would leave them out of the game. 
Following competitors’ behavior reduces risk of underperformance. Furthermore, those banks that are 
not willing to play the game (that would mean, for example, not increasing the level of credit provided 
to the market when all institutions are doing that) must be aware that their strategy would lead to a 
decline in their market share. It is quite tough for managers having to explain their shareholders why 
they are not making money when all the other banks in the market seem to be making it easily... 
An example is Goldman Sachs, which was sued for betting against synthetic products designed by 
the investment bank itself and sold to their customers. That might be an evidence of some market 
participants being aware that risks on the market could be relevant, but still they are not willing to lose 
market share. Another example, after several law changes, Spanish Savings Banks faced a new scenario 
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where they could compete against them all across Spanish market. In order to gain market share in 
venues away from their natural markets, many Savings Banks would probably had to take more risks 
during the housing boom, financing operations that local banks were not willing to finance. As this 
strategy would have been done by all entities willing to win market share out of their local markets, this 
would explain the results of the CEBS (2010) stress tests. 
From a micro point of view, Milgram’s behavioral studies of obedience to authority (Milgram 1963, 
1974) could provide an interpretation. In his famous experiment, psychologist Stanley Milgram 
suggested that most people were able to perform acts that violate even their deepest moral beliefs: 
people in the experiment were required to give fake (but they were unaware of it) electro-shocks up to 
450 volt to other participants in the experiment to the extent to cause them severe damages or even 
death. “I set up a simple experiment at Yale University to test how much pain an ordinary citizen would 
inflict on another person simply because he was ordered to by an experimental scientist” (Milgram, 1974). 
They were not compelled to do it under no coercive methods, only just asked to do it because it was 
supposed to be required for scientific purposes. He found out that relatively few people had the initiative 
needed to resist authority. 
How could the results of the Milgram experiment explain a correlated behavior in the retail 
banking industry? Bank managers assess market fundamentals from a macro perspective and then 
transmit those levels down to their branches in form of commercial goals. Employees at commercial 
branches are not only required to evaluate potential demand for credit to determine whether a loan or 
mortgage should be granted, but they are also required to commit to those commercial goals. Under this 
situation, it could happen that the decision-making process would be guided by feelings rather than by 
rational analysis. When an employee is set some commercial goals, it could become more important to 
achieve them than to carefully evaluate demand suitability. Meeting commercial goals involves a 
personal satisfaction of mission accomplished, whereas not fulfilling the targets could lead to disesteem 
or even to some kind of punishment. The more is needed to meet goals, probably the less strict analysis 
on the suitability of credit will be conducted. This behavior based on emotional factors would have a 
greater impact when a competition among employees of the same entity is set, such that it could happen 
that some of them, in order to be first, focus mainly on selling more mortgages and loans than their 
colleagues rather than assessing risks. The rest of their colleagues will then try to follow them in order 
not to underperform. 
Hence, a trend will be developed by the feedback effect of the commercial goals achieved: bank 
managers set commercial goals based on macro perspectives; employees fulfill those expectations by 
meeting commercial goals; and then managers evaluate again their objectives based on the belief that, 
since goals have been achieved, probably there is odds for more supply of credit, so new (higher) 
commercial goals are re-set, and the wheel keeps going on. Although it is true there is commonly a 
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separation between business and risk analysis departments, we have on one hand that those 
departments are usually also set targets, and on the other hand, that frequently banks may allow ―to 
some extent― the same people taking business decisions and evaluating risk analysis.  
Finally, agents’ bounded rationality may not only promote trends on credit policies, but also on 
the real economy. People on the market tend to trust market participants that are supposed to be better 
informed than average or having better resources and skills to assess the economic situation. When 
small investors see big companies making money in the real estate market, many of them would wonder 
whether to imitate them. So when they go to a bank to ask for credit and they see banks grant it without 
much problem, that reinforces their expectations. Thus, perhaps herd instinct in the financial sector fuels 
inefficiency not only on credit markets but also on the real economy, reinforcing overconfidence of 
market participants and causing further overreaction. 
The role of arbitrageurs 
Given market participants may sometimes be boundedly rational, and with the possibility that such 
behavior could be correlated across participants, there is yet one last chance for efficiency to hold in 
retail credit markets: finding rational arbitrageurs that are able to eliminate irrational behavior’s 
influence. In financial markets, Shleifer (2000) analyzes whether there could be close substitutes for a 
given security. An arbitrageur that sees an over demanded security ―say, a telecom stock― could sell 
that stock and buy a close substitute for that company ―i.e., another telecom stock that may be seen as 
a fundamentally identical asset― in order to try to benefit from the mispricing of the former security. 
In retail credit markets, instead, that arbitrage between close substitutes would require that a 
bank, after observing a mortgage that has been granted underestimating creditor risks, could make a 
profit by granting a new mortgage to other customer and ‘short-selling’ the former. That makes no sense. 
The risk assumed in every credit operation cannot be offset with the reduction of credit granted to any 
other agent in the market. Nonetheless, it might make sense to consider hedging at a macro level. That 
is, could we find agents in the market that will be able to rectify the excess credit provided by the banking 
system during credit bubbles ―and the opposite when they fail to give credit― for their own profit? That 
role in our economies is played by Central Banks, but their function has been limited to basically setting 
the official set of interest rates and act as a lender of last resort for private banks. The effectiveness of 
Central Banks promoting stability and economic growth has been challenged several times, like 
nowadays. Under the fractional-reserve banking system, Central Banks do not have direct control over 
most of the money supply in the economy: during periods of economic growth, they can regulate the 
amount of credit granted to the economy through monetary policy tools ―such as official interest rates, 
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open market operations or reserve requirements187― but during recessions their effectiveness is limited 
due to liquidity traps188 and pushing on a string189 situations. 
Could we find private agents able to play that role of arbitrageur at a macro level? We try to answer 
this question while going through an analysis of which properties should such an arbitrageur meet. As 
stated by Shleifer (2000) for financial markets, the main limit to arbitrage is that irrational effects of 
behavioral biases over market conditions may become much worse before they disappear. A private 
arbitrageur on the retail credit market would be exposed to suffer losses if market inefficiencies 
continue for a long time or even amplifies before they disappear. Arbitrageurs would be limited by their 
time horizon and their risk-aversion in a real world where arbitrage is actually risky. During periods 
when banks are making money by giving credit to any potential buyer, with overconfidence reigning in 
an apparently unbeatable economic environment, an arbitrageur should be willing not to win that easy 
money, quit from granting more credits and lose market share even to the point of providing no credit 
at all. The opposite should be done when banks stop granting credits either because they are acting 
irrationally or because they are trapped in a prisoner’s dilemma: an arbitrageur should be willing to give 
credit at a lower cost when the economic environment has worsen and probably the shareholders and 
the managers of such private entity acting as an arbitrageur would not be keen to do so. 
Since potential arbitrageurs would be commercial banks, they could also use their remuneration 
policy for deposits in order to arbitrage the credit market. During credit bubbles, an arbitrageur would 
need to raise the interest rate paid on deposits. This way, the other financial institutions in the market 
would be compelled to do the same, in order not to lose market share, so their cost of funding would 
raise and they will start imposing more stringent conditions on credit. Meanwhile, during recessions 
arbitrageurs should be careful with their policies on deposits. On one hand, they must pay enough to 
have funds sufficient to provide the credit required to the market, but on the other hand they must be 
aware not to tight the other banks’ cost of funding in order not to worsen the financial environment. 
Although we have not considered the influence of the interbank market, we might conclude 
arbitrage cannot be profitable: it would require paying for deposits more than required and not to be 
willing to earn an easy money during credit booms and the contrary during recessions. Hence, there is 
no incentive for private agents to do it and, even if they had the incentives, the resources needed would 
be enormous, because arbitrageurs should compensate the deviation that all the financial system would 
                                                 
187  A measure almost obsolete because “it is quite tough for economic authorities to regulate the money supply through the 
reserve requirements, because a mandate to increase them can be followed by a decision of the private bank to reduce its 
(voluntary) excess reserves, offsetting their effects” (Antelo and Peón, 2012, p.30) 
188 A ‘liquidity trap’ is a situation in which Central Bank`s monetary policies become ineffective. In Krugman words, “at an 
interest rate near zero the demand for money must become more or less infinitely elastic, implying that the leftmost parts of the 
LM curve must actually be flat. (...) Then changes in the money supply, which move LM back and forth, will have no effect on interest 
rates or output; monetary policy will be ineffective” (Krugman, 2000). 
189 Pushing on a string situations are related to liquidity traps. It suggests Central Banks` monetary policies are effective slowing 
economic growth (Central Banks may rise interest rates, so private banks are pulled to cut lending) but ineffective under severe 
recessions, because banks tend to accumulate excess reserves and Central Banks are unable to push them to lend. 
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exhibit away from rationality. Therefore, contrary to what happens in capital markets, where arbitrage 
can be executed by any well-informed for-profit private agent in the market, it seems that arbitrage of 
retail credit markets could only be reserved, at most, to non-profit public entities. In our opinion, this 
could imply that efficiency of credit policies by the retail banking sector cannot be ensured, or at most, 
there would be a lower chance for this sector to be ultimately efficient ―compared to capital markets― 
because there are no substitutes for arbitrage at a micro level, and at a macro level there would be no 
for-profit private agents willing to act as arbitrageurs. 
In the next section we discuss more in detail how to analyze the three step process ―rationality, 
correlation and limits of arbitrage- within retail credit markets. 
 
6.3. DISCUSSION: A BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS OF INFORMATIONAL EFFICIENCY IN BANK-BASED 
FINANCIAL SYSTEMS190 
 
In this section we discuss the obstacles to use the EMH to test the efficiency of bank-based financial 
systems. The EMH has been extensively tested in market-based systems, but not in retail credit markets. 
In what follows we comment the reasons for this, and discuss how to extend the analysis of the EMH to 
bank-based systems. 
6.3.1. The state of the art on credit markets and efficiency 
Chapters 1 and 2 reviewed the academic interpretations about how banks provide credit to the economy 
on one hand, and market efficiency on the other. In regards to the efficient market hypothesis, we saw 
that the main role of financial markets ―i.e., the allocation of ownership of the economy’s capital stock 
(Fama, 1970)― requires a pricing mechanism that prices capital resources efficiently, in a way it reflects 
its true value. In particular, for a financial market to be perfectly efficient it must be allocatively, 
operationally and informationally efficient. Then, since competitive markets are, generally speaking, 
allocatively and operationally efficient, the debate about EMH in financial markets is actually in regards 
to informational efficiency. However, in bank-based systems things are not that straightforward. First, 
a market is allocatively efficient if it is Pareto optimal (Bouchaud, Farmer and Lillo, 2008). The first 
fundamental welfare theorem states that, in absence of market failures, competitive financial markets 
are allocatively efficient. However, bank-based systems are often an oligopoly. The parametric methods 
of economic efficiency (e.g. the stochastic frontier approach) mentioned in Chapter 1 are indeed used to 
analyze whether banks optimally respond to changes in prices of inputs or outputs. 
Second, and regarding operational efficiency, a bank providing services at a price that reflects the 
real costs also depends on market power. Berger and Mester (1997) suggest the ‘alternative profit 
                                                 
190 Excerpt of the article presented at the 19th Multinational Finance Society Conference, Krakow, June 2012 
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efficiency’ measure might be helpful: “under conditions of market power, it may be appropriate to 
consider output levels as relatively fixed in the short run, and allow for efficiency differences in the setting 
of prices and service quality” (p.903). Third, the analysis of informational efficiency in the banking 
industry is far more complex. On one hand, retail credit markets may be constrained by asymmetric 
information (adverse selection, moral hazard, etc.). This is indeed the main paradigm in banking theory: 
“the theory of financial contracting under asymmetric information provides a general framework for 
understanding why smaller, information-intensive borrowers, rely on intermediaries” (Himmelberg and 
Morgan, 1995, p.20). Still, on the other hand, some authors (e.g., Diamond, 1984, 1991; Fama, 1985) see 
financial intermediaries as efficient in evaluating, screening and monitoring borrowers, in a way they 
are able to solve problems of asymmetric information. Hence, banks are believed to produce valuable 
information regarding borrower’s risk profile and quality (Godlewski, 2012). 
The complexity of applying EMH to bank-based systems is not a surprise. Indeed, a microeconomic 
theory of banks could not exist under the Arrow–Debreu paradigm of complete contingent markets, so 
alternative explanations for the existence of banks had to be provided. Two alternatives are the 
industrial organization approach, which considers banks compete to offer services in a context of 
product differentiation, and the incomplete information paradigm,191 which explains why financial 
markets cannot be complete (Freixas and Rochet, 1998). To sum up, allocative and operational 
efficiencies critically depend on the competitive structure of the banking industry. Thus, any analysis of 
the efficiency in bank-based systems must focus on the informational side of EMH ―that is, whether 
prices fully reflect available information (Fama, 1970)― since allocative and operational efficiencies 
may not hold. Nonetheless, the analysis of the informational efficiency of the credit policies in the 
banking sector is still a relevant issue if we consider that, as Bouchaud et al. (2008) reckon, “once we 
depart from neo-classical equilibrium a market might be informationally efficient yet allocatively 
inefficient” (p.67). 
The literature on the financial crisis has focused on informational asymmetries that might have 
made banks deviate from efficient results, including ex-ante (adverse selection), interim (moral hazard) 
or ex-post asymmetries (costly state verification). Here it is where our behavioral approach aims to 
provide a complementary element of analysis: even in a world with no asymmetric information,192 
behavioral biases might explain why bank-based systems may still not be informationally efficient. 
                                                 
191 The second approach stands on various interpretations: (i) the transaction cost approach (Benston and Smith, 1976), where 
banks are seen as coalitions of lenders or borrowers in order to exploit economies of scale and scope in the transaction 
technology; (ii) the liquidity insurance approach (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983), where banks would be pools of liquidity that 
provide households with insurance against liquidity shocks; (iii) the adverse selection paradigm (Leland and Pyle, 1977), where 
there is hidden information about the quality of the borrowers that may produce scale economies in the borrowing-lending 
activity; and (iv) the delegated monitoring approach (Hellwig, 1991), where monitoring could improve efficiency in a context 
of asymmetric information. 
192 This implies that either asymmetric information does not exist, banks are able to efficiently solve them, or they operate as 
if asymmetries don’t exist or are easy to overcome (see the power theories of credit in Chapter 1). In such case, the existence 
of banks would be justified by economies of scale (Benston and Smith, 1976). 
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6.3.2. Extending the EMH to retail credit markets: A discussion 
We suggest a behavioral analysis of the informational efficiency in retail credit markets may be achieved 
by extending the classical EMH analysis of financial markets to bank-based systems. To show it, we first 
analyze under which scope the informational efficiency of bank-based systems can be analyzed 
following the EMH paradigm. 
Capital markets are informationally efficient if asset prices fully reflect all information available 
and adjust immediately to any new information being published. Then, such pricing mechanism would 
be an unbiased predictor of an asset’s intrinsic value given information available. Likewise in Chapter 2, 
we denote this as )Ω( 1 ttPE  , where Ωt is the information set today and Pt+1 is the security price in the 
subsequent period. Thus, efficient markets would be a fair game where there is no systematic difference 
between the actual return and the expected return before the game is played ―see Eq. (2.1). In these 
circumstances price changes are i.i.d., so the best estimate of a security return tomorrow would be its 
return today, 11 )Ω(   ttt rrE , and market returns would follow a random walk ―see Eq. (2.3). 
Testing informational efficiency in bank-based financial systems should be akin, in some way, to 
EMH tests in fixed income markets. Indeed, when a bank lends money to a customer, just like when an 
investor buys a bond, credit is granted. However, a closer look shows most similarities end there. In 
primary markets, the agent in need of financing issues a family of securities, each one representing both 
the issuer’s debt with the buyer of the bond and the right of the holder to receive an interest payment 
until a specific maturity date. Then, the holder may go to secondary markets and trade the bond before 
maturity, if she is willing. Secondary markets provide both liquidity and continuous information about 
the expected value of these securities. Contrarily, non-marketable debt assets in bank-based financial 
systems are unique transactions (both in time and space193): no securities are ―generally― issued, 
information analysis about the creditor’s solvency goes before the bank provides the loan and, after 
credit is granted, the analysis of whether ‘prices adjust to new information entering the markets’ loses 
its meaning since there are no prices quoting. 
How could we interpret informational efficiency in retail credit markets? An alternative might be 
considering each family of credit instruments as a single security, such that changes in the price charged 
to a specific type of loan (for instance, the interest rate of 30-year mortgages granted to middle-income 
borrowers) would represent a similar flow of information as in a security price series. However, this 
scope seems to be limited and not very precise in financial terms. The debate could also be extended to 
securitization, though this market is beyond the purposes of this thesis. 
                                                 
193 We mean here that not only there are no secondary markets for non-marketable debt assets (they are ‘unique in time’), but 
that each loan or mortgage is a specific transaction between lender and borrower, not related to any other agent. In fixed 
income markets each bond represents an aliquot part of the whole issue by the borrower, so an identical transaction between 
lender and borrower occurs for every bond; contrarily, each loan represents a transaction ‘unique in space’. 
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A solution might emerge from the informational theories of credit outlined in Chapter 1. Banks 
gather and analyze information about the credit quality of their potential borrowers in order to 
determine whether they extend credit or not. Their goal is profit maximization given information 
available. At this point, the classical distinction between market efficiency from a micro perspective 
(that is, for the pricing of individual stocks) and from a macro perspective (for the aggregate market) 
becomes determinant: though tests of EMH are not applicable to bank-based systems on a borrower-
by-borrower basis,194 we could interpret informational efficiency here as how banks change their credit 
policies in face of new information entering the markets. It should be interpreted as follows. Would loans 
and mortgages granted by a bank in the past quote at a market, new information would be incorporated 
into prices just like in a bond market. Now, those prices are not observable, but what we may observe 
are the decisions banks make in response to this information. For instance, if the loan portfolio of a bank 
depreciates in value (reflecting a higher risk premium due to worsen economic conditions, lower credit 
quality of borrowers, a drop in real estate prices, etc.), changes in the bank’s credit policies that account 
for this new information available are expected. 
Those policy changes may affect three variables. First, a lower value of the credit portfolio 
generates potential losses that reduce capital. In order to maintain its capital ratio, a bank may issue 
new equity or alternatively reduce its assets. The second option would require a more conservative 
credit policy, reducing the volume of loans granted below the volume of existing loans being repaid. 
Hence, changes in value on the assets portfolio might induce changes in volume of new credit granted.195 
Second, new loans should be granted at ‘market prices’; that is, just like new bonds are issued at a price 
that reflects the value of equivalent bonds in secondary markets, banks should update their credit 
policies for new loans in terms of price (interest rate, commissions, etc.) in a way they ‘fully reflect the 
new information available at the market’. Third, since profit maximization also requires cost 
optimization, we might also observe changes in the bank’s policy in terms of costs (for instance, interest 
rates paid on deposits, resort to financing via securitization, etc.). 
                                                 
194 To illustrate, we may consider some of the classical tests of EMH analyzed in Chapter 2 and try to figure out how they should 
be applied to bank-based systems. Tests of the weak form EMH would include the analysis of serial correlation of returns and 
calendar anomalies, but they make no sense when applied to a context where no price series are available. Tests of the 
semistrong form EMH would include on one hand volatility tests, momentum versus contrary investing strategies, and the 
return predictability of financial ratios. All of them would require, again, a price series analysis. On the other, these test would 
include as well the size effect and event studies ―like anomalies after earnings and dividend surprises, stock splits, SEOs and 
M&As. In this case, most of the events we might consider in bank-based systems would obviously be different ―it does not add 
up now to talk about stock splits or dividend surprises, for instance― though it may make sense to analyze how events like 
changes in macroeconomic variables (e.g., official interest rates, GDP growth) or increases in the delinquency ratio or in 
household debt influence banks policies and the growth of credit within an economy. Nonetheless, those tests would only make 
sense from a macro perspective ―again, from a micro perspective, there would be no effect over each single loan already 
granted. Finally, tests of the strong form EMH traditionally include the analysis of excess returns obtained by groups of 
investors presumed to have access to insider information (namely mutual fund managers and chief executives of companies). 
Translated to the banking industry, this approach may resemble the analysis performed by the ‘information theories’ of credit 
outlined in Chapter 1. 
195 It is noticeable that some authors (e.g., Biais and Bossaerts, 1998) have suggested that efficiency tests might also consider 
volume, as well as prices, in the context of stock markets. 
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Hence, a plausible alternative may be replacing the scheme )Ω( 1 ttPE   of financial markets for a 
more general approach )Ω( 1 ttXE  , where Xt+1 represents all possible strategies (price, volume, costs) a 
bank may change to account for new information entering the markets. Obviously, the major drawback 
for this approach to be implemented is that it depends on non-directly observable information: while 
stock prices are public data, credit policies define a bank’s commercial strategy and hence we should 
expect them to be opaque. Beyond that, this would make any kind of time series analysis particularly 
unfeasible. That is why, beyond other alternative interpretations other researchers could provide here, 
we believe a behavioral approach could be a feasible and testable alternative for retail credit markets. 
The approach is based on two ideas. First, we must analyze macro efficiency for the reasons already 
discussed. Second, since the classic EMH tests applied to bank-based systems generally do not make 
sense, we will instead propose to perform this analysis under a behavioral approach, based on Shleifer 
(2000). We devote the next section to introduce this approach. 
6.3.3. A behavioral approach to test informational efficiency in retail credit markets 
We suggest that using the behavioral approach by Shleifer (2000) to test informational efficiency in 
retail credit markets could be a plausible alternative, while it avoids two impediments described. First, 
it does not require the analysis of allocative and operational efficiencies, which would depend on the 
market microstructure of the banking industry. Second, it largely avoids the dependence on non-directly 
observable information such as the commercial strategies of banks at any moment and on every credit 
product they sell. Instead, the analysis splits in determining whether behavioral biases influence CEOs 
and employees in that industry, conforming a market sentiment, whether such market sentiment could 
exhibit trends or predictable patterns, and whether there are limits of arbitrage in retail credit markets. 
This stepwise procedure goes further than simply identifying whether a market exhibits overreaction, 
a momentum strategy is profitable, or market participants are affected by one heuristic bias or another, 
but provides a comprehensive framework to test informational efficiency in bank-based financial 
systems, considering the two basic elements that could challenge it: market sentiment and limited 
arbitrage. 
 
6.4. APPLYING THE BEHAVIORAL APPROACH TO A NEW FRAMEWORK: A RESEARCH 
AGENDA196 
 
In this section we provide a research agenda to suggest some alternative ways to test banking efficiency 
following the approach introduced in the previous section.  
                                                 
196 Excerpt of the article presented at the 19th Multinational Finance Society Conference, Krakow, June 2012 
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Credit markets are likely more complex than markets of goods and services, since price is not the 
only variable that matters: risk must be considered, too. Banks limit their bid for each level of interest 
rates, allocating credit among potential customers according to the creditworthiness perceived. Thus, 
in order to extend the stepwise approach to test the informational efficiency of credit policies in retail 
banking we might consider two possibilities. One would a demand-side analysis: e.g., why clients ask for 
a loan, do they behave rationally, etc. The other possibility would be a supply-side analysis: why banks 
grant credit, at what price, how much credit and to whom. Since whether credit is finally granted or not 
is up to the financial institution, we consider the supply-side more relevant and thus that is the analysis 
we will perform in what follows.  
Under a supply-side analysis, the rationality of a bank granting credit to its potential customers 
depends on the role played by a series of participants. First, the rationality of the bank’s board of 
directors, who determine the credit targets in terms of volumes of credit and prices according to the 
cost of funding, macroeconomic situation, demand for credit, etc. Second, the rationality of employees 
at commercial branches and risk analysis departments, who analyze each client’s creditworthiness and 
determine its suitability.197 In addition, these two factors are usually linked: credit policies by the board 
of directors are passed down to employees in form of commercial goals, and the commercial success is 
used as feedback when reevaluating future credit policies. Finally, an additional factor might be the 
possibility that banks find it rational to follow their competitors, even when these are biased. Tracing a 
correlated behavior among banks would require to analyze aggregate market variables such as volume 
of credit granted by each bank compared to others, the relationship among volumes, prices and default 
rates in the industry, etc.  
In consequence, the behavioral approach we are introducing requires to identify which deviations 
from rationality may seem to be more plausible to explain a credit boom, following the 3-step process 
already described. First, do banks, managers and employees at branches behave rationally when 
granting credit to the economy? Second, are irrational policies random? Third, what is the role of 
arbitrageurs in order to ensure that the financial sector provides credit in an efficient way? The research 
agenda that follows tries to provide a guidance to such purpose.  
6.4.1. First step: Analysis of rationality 
The first step is to determine whether agents are fully rational or not. All the beliefs that, based on 
heuristics rather than Bayesian rationality, influence people’s behavior are known as investor 
sentiment. Hence, the test of EMH in retail credit markets would firstly require to determine whether 
behavioral biases affect the decisions of managers and employees. To such purpose, in Chapter 4 we 
provided a taxonomy of biases and anomalies where we differentiated two basic groups ―psychological 
                                                 
197  Analyzing the candidate’s credit history, ability to pay, capital available to respond for credit, the existence of collateral, etc. 
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biases and behavioral consequences. Psychological biases were classified into four categories, namely, 
heuristics and biases, framing, valuation/errors-of-preference and social factors, while behavioral 
consequences may refer to decision effects (related to individuals) or to market anomalies. In what 
follows we suggest some psychological biases and behavioral consequences that, in our opinion, might 
help explain to some extent how retail credit markets work. In each case, we provide as well a suggestion 
on how some tests could be performed. 
Psychological biases 
We identify four groups. The first group are biases that may affect how banks gather information about 
customers’ solvency, etc. (named information selection biases by Hens and Bachmann, 2008): 
Availability. It refers to the tendency to pay attention to pieces of information that are easier to 
get or understand. Limited attention, memory and processing capacities lead individuals to make 
decisions based on a subset of information, taking the probability of an event by the ease with which 
occurrences can be brought to mind (Kahneman and Tversky, 1973), selecting those that are easily 
available, more familiar or more salient. This bias is also related to attention anomalies (Shiller, 2000a) 
and hindsight bias (see decision evaluation biases). Tests in search of this bias in retail credit markets 
should be able to identify whether managers might have been unable to foresight the effects of a 
financial crisis, or employees of the eventual failure of many clients, just because those were highly 
unusual events, as Heath, Larrick and Klayman (1998) explain when they say availability effects are 
ubiquitous: “A particularly important form of missing information is the absence of experience with highly 
unusual events. Bank examiners rarely see a bank fail, nuclear technicians rarely see a meltdown, airline 
personnel rarely witness a crash” (p. 14). 
The second group are biases that might affect how banks process information (known as 
information processing biases): 
Overconfidence (and related concepts like illusion of control and self-attribution bias). As we 
described in Chapter 5, Moore and Healy (2008) identify three ways researchers define overconfidence: 
first, a person may be overconfident in estimating her own actual performance (overestimation); second, 
in estimating her own performance relative to others (overplacement or better-than-average effect); 
third, she may believe she has an excessive precision to estimate future uncertainty (overprecision). 
Applied to retail credit markets, if bank managers and supervisor authorities exhibit overconfidence it 
might lead to a lower risk perception under a trending up real estate market, for example, and tests 
should be designed to identify this possibility. Finally, overconfident agents could also exhibit in some 
cases an illusion of control ―i.e., judging an outcome as a consequence of their acts when in fact they 
have been simply lucky― and a self-attribution bias (see decision evaluation biases). 
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Excessive optimism. Overoptimists are those who underestimate the likelihood of bad outcomes 
over which they have no control (Kahneman and Riepe, 1998). A classic object of research are corporate 
managers, whose excessive optimism would be a result of both cognitive biases (e.g., anchoring) and 
organizational pressures (see obedience to authority), when not of hubris: they often fall victim of a 
planning fallacy (Lovallo and Kahneman, 2003), exaggerating benefits and underestimating costs, 
overestimating scenarios of success while overlooking the potential for mistakes and miscalculations... 
setting themselves for a future failure. Tests applied to retail credit markets should be akin to those 
performed by corporate behaviorists (for a review, see Shefrin, 2006) which provide evidence that large 
capital investments, mergers and acquisitions, or efforts to enter new markets are classic situations 
where optimism pervade managers decisions, explaining the high failure rates observed. 
Representativeness and gambler’s fallacy. Representativeness basically suggests people rely 
on stereotypes, estimating probabilities depending on their prior beliefs (Hens and Bachmann, 2008). 
This may be a relevant bias in credit markets as well: if an employee working at the branches of a retail 
bank has had good experiences giving credit, say, to several dentists, he might exhibit a tendency to 
consider suitable a new potential client only because she is a dentist. Representativeness is also related 
to the gambler’s fallacy (the tendency to see patterns in truly random sequences): that same employee 
might consider that a company exhibiting very good results and a high growth in recent years (for 
example, a builder or a land developer during the real estate bubble) will be able to maintain or even 
improve that performance in the future. 
Conservatism and anchoring-and-adjustment. Conservatism is the tendency to underreact to 
new information (Shleifer, 2000), while anchoring refers to people being influenced by arbitrary and 
even non informative data, causing an insufficient adjustment to new information, particularly when 
anchors are self-generated (Epley and Gilovich, 2001). Tests should be designed to identify whether 
both biases can explain why bank managers and supervisor authorities underreacted to the evidence of 
credit policies fostering real estate bubbles and their latter collapse. 
Narrow framing. It refers to the tendency to analyze problems in a specific context without 
broader considerations (Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003), so when people evaluate risks they evaluate them 
in isolation, apart from other risks they are already facing (Barberis and Huang, 2009). Employees and 
executives at financial institutions might have considered each new loan in an isolated fashion, without 
taking into account broader effects on the level of credit already granted or the evolution of default rates 
in the future, and tests should check this possibility. 
The third group are biases that could affect decision-making (known as decision biases): 
Aversion to a sure loss (risk seeking). First identified as a reflection effect by Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979), this bias suggests most people are risk loving in negative domains, that is, when facing 
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a sure loss if they do not gamble. Aversion to a sure loss is one of the biases with more empirical evidence 
in favor and, in our opinion, it might be one of the most relevant factors that explain what happened 
during the credit bubble: financial institutions might have preferred to ‘gamble’ (lending money to 
people with questionable creditworthiness) rather than assuming a loss of market share, because in that 
context the loans a bank chose not to grant were expected to be granted by any other institution. Loss 
aversion might also explain what happened next: during recessions, and due to suspicion and lack of 
confidence within the financial sector, bank managers became more sensitive to avoid any possible 
additional losses than to earn a profit from those low-risk credit operations. 
Mental accounting. Closely related to framing, mental accounting is the process by which people 
keep track of and evaluate their transactions, just like financial accounting serves for organizations 
(Thaler, 2008). It provides both ex ante (how decisions are made) and ex post (how they are 
subsequently evaluated) cost-benefit analyses, with a relevant result: people may have multiple risk-
tolerances among their various mental accounts. This might be an explanation for bank employees’ risky 
behavior: they only considered short term results. For instance, they may be willing to take risks in order 
to get higher bonuses, or get promoted, though they were aware such behavior could be harmful in the 
long term. The effects of such behavior may be more important if commercial goals induce on the 
employee a higher risk tolerance (“bosses know this business better than me”), or if being professionally 
successful and getting promoted implies the employee will not be responsible of his decisions in the past 
(“I don’t care if it is a risky decision, I won’t be here when it comes back”). 
Finally, the fourth group are of psychological biases are biases that might affect the ex-post 
decision evaluation (known as decision evaluation biases): 
Hindsight bias. Memories can be lost or distorted, or even induced for events that never 
happened, so human memory must work by reconstruction (Hoffrage and Hertwig, 1999). Hindsight 
bias results as a side-effect: once we known the outcome of an event we exaggerate what it could have 
been anticipated in foresight. Biases in hindsight may explain overconfidence (Fischhoff, 1982b), 
particularly in retail credit markets: once they observe the first mortgages are paid regularly and the 
economic situation remains strong, bankers might have seen confirmed in hindsight that they did 
correct, their risk aversion would fall and they would keep granting more credit. However, we are aware 
that evidence of hindsight bias might not be conclusive, since it may also justify credit markets 
efficiency: now, in hindsight, we all agree “we knew they behaved too risky when they granted those 
mortgages” when, indeed, almost none of us saw that in foresight. 
Biased self-attribution. It means individuals tend to attribute to their higher ability those events 
that confirm the validity of their actions, while evidence against it is attributed to external noise or 
sabotage. It has been related both to overconfidence and cognitive dissonance (Daniel, Hirshleifer and 
Subrahmanyam, 1998). 
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Behavioral consequences 
Status quo effect. An effect first demonstrated by Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) when they 
found individuals tend to choose, among several options, the alternative by default, that is, doing nothing 
or maintaining one’s previous decision. Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1991) say it is a consequence 
of loss aversion, because the disadvantages of leaving the former alternative overcome its advantages. 
Applied to retail credit markets, tests should be implemented to analyze whether executives and 
employees chose a status quo alternative: for example, during the credit boom that alternative might 
have been “to keep granting credit to anyone that asks for it” (and the opposite during recessions). 
Regret aversion (a.k.a. regret avoidance) and cognitive dissonance. Regret is the pain we feel 
when we realize we would be better off today had we chosen another option in the past (Barberis and 
Huang, 2009). Regret is related to cognitive dissonance ―the feeling of internal tension and anxiety 
when two simultaneously held cognitions are not consistent― and avoiding cognitive dissonance would 
be equivalent to regret avoidance. If one wishes to avoid the pain of regret, it might lead to an irrational 
behavior: because of regret avoidance, for example, many investors renounce to sell stocks that have 
declined in value (a result known as disposition effect). An equivalent interpretation applied to retail 
credit markets would be the employee that tries to avoid the feeling of remorse for not granting a 
mortgage that other bank would be willing to sell ―a behavior supported by Kahneman and Riepe’s 
(1998) finding that people feel regret of things they did not, too. 
Portfolio underdiversification and home bias. People tend to underdiversify their assets, with 
home bias ―the preference for domestic stocks― being the classic result. First reported by French and 
Poterba (1991) about U.S., Japan and U.K. investors allocating 94%, 98% and 82% of their equity 
investments in domestic securities, home bias has been suggested to stem from familiarity (Cao et al. 
2011). This is a bias easily observed in other contexts, when we observe for example that according to 
the European Banking Authority (EBA) 2011 stress-tests, 84% of Spanish government bonds were held 
by Spanish banks, 69% of Greek debt by Greek banks, 61% of Irish debt by Irish banks, and 63% of 
Portuguese bonds by Portuguese banks (EBA, 2011). Applied to credit markets, evidence of 
undiversification (for example, too much credit granted to the real estate sector) should be traced. 
6.4.2. Second step: Correlated behavior 
The second step analyzes whether credit market sentiment could exhibit trends, and their effect on the 
overall level and quality of credit granted to the economy. Can we expect agents in retail banking behave 
irrationally in a random fashion? That would imply that while some banks are understating risks, others 
may behave too prudently: some would grant loans and mortgages to satisfy almost any sort of demand 
they face, while others would impose stronger restrictions than rationally required. Otherwise, there 
would be odds for an inefficient credit market.  
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Regarding the procyclicality of credit, Borio and Shim (2007) say financial liberalization 
worldwide made credit booms and busts act as drivers of economic fluctuations, because an easier 
access to credit increases our sense of wealth and lowers risk perception. Thus, perceptions would be 
procyclical, reinforcing expansions and contractions, so regulation and incentive mechanisms should be 
implemented to correct it. Indeed, some models of bank lending take this effect into account when they 
consider ‘switching regimes’ in credit policies (see for example Azariadis and Smith, 1998; Kaufmann 
and Valderrama, 2008). Our purpose here is to analyze several biases that could explain why a 
correlated behavior in credit markets might occur.  
Psychological biases 
Correlated biases across the industry. The idea here is simple: if some of the biases in the first 
step happen to influence most market participants in the same direction, it would lead to a correlated 
credit market. We suggest this might be plausible for biases such as aversion to a sure loss, 
overconfidence, excessive optimism, or the status quo bias. For instance, aversion to a sure loss ―banks 
willing to gamble rather than losing market share― might have been a relevant bias during the credit 
boom. Then, were this behavior general across the industry, it might have generated a correlated 
behavior ―as it is now observed most banks participated in the credit bubble. 
Groupthink theory and collective confirmatory bias. Social contagion was first evidenced in 
Asch’s (1952) experiment, which shows the power of social pressure on individual judgment, suggesting 
people tend to think “so many people can’t be wrong” when a large group of people has a particular belief, 
even if it strongly contradicts evidence or their own reasoning. Related to social contagion are concepts 
like groupthink theory, communal reinforcement and obedience to authority. Groupthink, a term coined 
by Janis (1972), is the tendency of cohesive groups to reach consensus without offering, seeking or 
considering alternative hypothesis (Lunenburg, 2010). This bias leads groups to take excessive risks, or 
members imposing themselves a self-censorship to avoid appearing as a dissenter or even a traitor. As 
a consequence, a collective confirmation bias may appear: confirmation bias, one of the most relevant 
judgmental bias in risk perception (Rabin, 1998) means that once forming strong hypothesis, people are 
often too inattentive to new information contradicting them. Thus, groupthink would be a form of 
collective confirmation bias (Shefrin and Cervellati, 2011), and similar tests should be implemented to 
determine whether it might have been a relevant factor during the credit boom. 
Communal reinforcement. Related to the previous bias, early literature in social psychology 
about individual suggestibility, group pressure and diffusion of opinions has shown that individual 
opinions are influenced by others’ opinion, including Katona (1901) and Asch (1952). Similar tests could 
be designed to analyze individual suggestibility and its effects inside the banking industry, both among 
employees and boards of directors. 
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Obedience to authority. Stanley Milgram’s behavioral studies on obedience to authority 
(Milgram, 1963, 1974) may explain a correlated behavior among employees inside a bank. As we saw in 
Chapter 4, Milgram suggested most people were able to perform acts that violate even their deepest 
moral beliefs, finding that relatively few people had the initiative needed to resist authority. How could 
the results of the Milgram experiment explain a correlated behavior in the banking industry? Managers 
transmit commercial goals to employees at branches, who are not only required to evaluate each client 
to determine whether they can be given credit or not, but also to commit to the commercial goals they 
are set. Under this situation, it could happen that their decision-making process might be guided by 
feelings rather than by rational analysis: employees more concerned with meeting commercial goals 
than with carefully evaluating demand suitability. 
The staff turnover’s policy of a company based on fulfilling commercial goals might also represent 
a perverse incentive: some employees, in order to ‘be first’ and get promoted, might only focus on selling 
as many mortgages and loans as they can. If they succeed and get promoted, when default rates rise on 
those loans they will not bear the consequences, representing a moral hazard problem and perhaps 
inducing other colleagues to follow that same strategy in order not to underperform. A trend might then 
develop by the feedback effect of the commercial goals achieved: bank managers set commercial goals 
based on macro data; employees fulfill those expectations; managers re-set higher commercial goals 
based on the belief the business is going fine... and the wheel keeps going on, at least while default rates 
do not boost. Separation between business and risk analysis departments, as it is common inside banks, 
might help lessen the moral hazard problem; however, we must be aware that usually risk analysts are 
also set targets, and banks may even allow the same people taking business decisions at branches to 
evaluate and ―to some extent― to approve their own risk analysis. 
Culture. Culture are values that ethnic, religious, and social groups transmit across generations 
(Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2006; Statman and Weng, 2010). The way people perceive the most basic 
events is influenced systematically by culture (Levinson and Peng, 2007). In retail credit markets 
cultural differences across countries regarding people’s preference to own their homes rather than 
renting198 might have affected banks’ mortgage policies, reinforced by a bullish real estate market. 
Behavioral consequences  
A correlated credit market may appear in several instances, being the most relevant overreaction, 
momentum, herding and excessive volume. We analyze them next. 
Overreaction. De Bondt and Thaler (1985) define overreaction as people’s tendency to respond 
excessively to unexpected and dramatic events that could affect a security price. In the context of bank-
                                                 
198 In Spain, for example, there is a popular saying that goes “properties never fall!”, meaning real estate prices had traditionally 
rose, at least in recent decades. That idea might have supported the boom for some time. 
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based systems, overreaction might explain credit rationing the years following the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers. Most banks reacted the same way when the liquidity crisis started ―rationing credit to the 
economy― but the question is: did they overreact to some extent? Did they freeze credit just because 
fundamentals changed, or did they even stop credit to creditworthy individuals and firms because they 
overreacted to bad news? 
A first, but simple, approach to look for evidence of overreaction might be identifying judgmental 
biases that explain overreaction. Barberis and Thaler (2003) summarize the basics of the models that 
explain over and underreaction in three groups: beliefs (conservatism, representativeness and 
overconfidence), institutional frictions, and preferences (loss aversion, narrow framing). Beyond that 
approach, it would be better ―though rather complex― to suggest alternative ways to identify 
overreaction in retail credit markets, similar to the tests suggested for market-based systems. However, 
testing overreaction in retail banking requires further analysis: De Bondt and Thaler (1985), for 
instance, used past returns to predict future performance, focusing on stocks that experienced extreme 
capital gains (winners) or extreme losses (losers) over periods up to five years, to find evidence that 
losers tend to be future winners. How could we apply a similar analysis to loans? Should we test volumes 
rather than prices? Should we use past volumes to predict future default rates?  
Linking loan volumes, prices and default rates might be an alternative to test overreaction, using 
historical data to predict the performance of the three variables in the future. Indeed, there is literature 
supporting this suggestion. On one hand, in regards to financial markets, Lee and Swaminathan (2000) 
provide a theory to reconcile intermediate-horizon underreaction and long-horizon overreaction where 
past trading volume is the link between momentum and value strategies. On the other, regarding the 
literature on credit cycles (see Kaufmann and Valderrama, 2008, for a review) Bernanke and Blinder 
(1988) link credit aggregates and borrowers’ costs of finance, whereas Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) relate 
volumes and default rates. These models could be a starting point for tests of overreaction in retail 
markets, but a model is yet to be developed. 
Positive feedback (momentum). Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) provide evidence that markets 
exhibit momentum in short periods ―3 to 12 months― as opposed to the evidence by DeBondt and 
Thaler that markets overreact during long periods ―up to five years. Perhaps an equivalent scheme may 
be used to explain credit cycles: first, banks granted more credit year after year (positive feedback) 
while confidence in the economy was high, until eventually unexpected bad news came into the market 
(Lehman Brother’s default) and banks overreacted, causing the credit crunch. 
Once again, the devil is in the details: how shall we test momentum in retail credit markets? The 
simple alternative would be looking for evidence of biases that are said to cause a positive feedback 
effect (suggested in the previous point). If we wish to apply instead tests of momentum like those by 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), we would face the same problem as with overreaction: they used past 
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returns to predict future performance, forming portfolios buying past winners and selling losers that 
were able to generate positive returns over 3 to 12 month holding periods. How could we do the same 
in credit markets? Again, we suggest literature on credit cycles as a starting point, linking credit 
aggregates (volumes), cost of funding (prices) and default rates: momentum in credit markets might be 
modeled as ‘banks are giving credit at a moderate price and default rates are low, then higher levels of 
credit are predicted in the short term’, while overreaction might be modeled as ‘after longer periods of 
easy access to credit and high volumes of debt-to-GDP ratios accumulated, default rates are predicted to 
increase and, eventually, banks stop credit’.199 However, these ideas are yet to be worked out. 
Herding. Herding would be a mutual imitation (Welch, 2000), a tendency of investors to follow 
the herd, imitating other investors’ decisions. Incentives to herd could arise endogenously because 
analysts herd to mimic more skilled counterparts (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990) ―and so could do some 
banks in a follow-the-leader strategy― or because they perceive it to be a safer course of action 
(Jegadeesh and Kim, 2010): banks could have chosen to herd and give credit because they thought that 
strategy to be safer! 
Herding has been related to social contagion (Shiller, 2000a), so testing for groupthink, communal 
reinforcement, etc. across banks could be used to have a first evidence of herding in the industry. 
However, it would be better to apply tests alike to those proposed by Scharfstein and Stein (1990) or 
Banerjee (1992). The former provides a model, based on agency problems, that is valid for corporate 
investment decisions (perhaps it might be so for the banking industry): distortion in incentives plays an 
important role in generating herd behavior, and several propositions for equilibria with reputational 
concerns are provided. Banerjee’s (1992) sequential decision model settled the basis for future analysis 
of herding with no distortion in incentives (i.e., no agency problems). His model predicts that the 
equilibrium decision rule is characterized by extensive herding: doing what others are doing rather than 
using our own information is the optimal behavior, though the resulting equilibrium is inefficient. 
Analyzing herd behavior within the industry would be of interest, since it might explain the 2007–
2008 world financial meltdown: it is no coincidence that almost every financial institution traded 
subprime mortgage backed securities, or that the stress tests by the Committee of European Banking 
Supervisors (CEBS, 2010) shows that about a 60% of the losses the Spanish Saving Banks would 
experience would come from real estate investments. It is not just a matter of banks not being able to 
detect when they are understating risks, it is a matter that maybe they are aware of them, but not 
following the trend would leave them out of the game. Following competitors’ behavior reduces the risk 
of underperformance, and those that are not willing to play the game (not selling mortgages when all 
banks are doing so) must be aware that this strategy would lead to a declining market share. 
                                                 
199 Perhaps a correlation between failed mortgages and the period when they were granted could be traced (maybe the latter 
transactions were the worst ones, for example). 
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Excessive trading volume. Trading volume in stock markets has been suggested to be higher 
than it should be expected from rational investors trading for rebalancing and hedging needs (Odean, 
1999), with overconfidence and reluctance to sell-short among the plausible factors behind this 
anomaly. Applied to retail credit markets, the volume of credit granted by the industry during the credit 
boom might be an evidence of an inefficient market, supported by the fact that short-selling is impossible 
when we are talking about mortgages and loans... 
6.4.3. Third step: Limits of arbitrage 
Finally, the third step would be identifying the limits of arbitrage in financial markets. The central 
argument of behavioral finance is that arbitrage is risky and limited because: (i) it requires close 
substitutes to exist, but sometimes they cannot be found (particularly the impossibility to arbitrage 
aggregate markets); (ii) even with perfect substitutes mispricing could become worse before it 
disappears; (iii) if an arbitrageur is risk averse his interest in risk arbitrage will be limited; and (iv) 
because of agency problems that arise under a performance based arbitrage. 
In credit markets, arbitrage between close substitutes makes no sense from a micro perspective: 
since there are no securities, a bank observing a mortgage granted in the market that underestimates 
the creditor’s risk would only be able to make profit out of arbitrage if it were possible to grant a new 
mortgage to other customer and ‘short-sell’ the former somehow. Besides, the risk assumed in each 
credit operation cannot be offset with the reduction of credit granted to any other agent in the market. 
Therefore, hedging should be considered in retail credit markets only at a macro level: are there market 
participants able to rectify the excess credit provided by the banking system during credit bubbles ―the 
opposite with credit rationing― for their own profit? In our opinion, arbitrageurs would face the same 
limits as in financial markets: they would be exposed to suffer losses if market inefficiencies continue 
for a long time or even they amplify before they disappear, and this type of risk-arbitrage would be 
limited for arbitrageurs that are risk averse or in the presence of agency problems. 
However, the main drawback for arbitrage to be performed by private agents is the impossibility 
for this strategy to be profitable: i) during credit booms, when overconfident banks are making money 
by giving credit to anyone who demands it, an arbitrageur should be willing not to win that easy money 
―in that apparently unbeatable economic environment― and lose market share; and ii) the opposite 
should be done during recessions, when banks stop granting credit even to creditworthy individuals, an 
arbitrageur should be willing to give credit even when, globally, the sector is facing a higher risk of 
default. Furthermore, resources required in both situations would be enormous, because arbitrageurs 
should compensate for the deviation the whole financial system exhibits away from rationality. 
Alternatively, banks could also use their deposits for arbitrage purposes, but only with similar 
results: i) during credit bubbles, arbitrageurs (commercial banks) would need to raise the interest rate 
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paid on deposits ―forcing competitors to do the same― so the cost of funding rises and banks would 
impose more stringent conditions on credit; ii) during recessions, instead, arbitrageurs should be 
careful with the price they pay on deposits: they must pay enough to have the resources necessary to 
provide the credit required by the market, but not too high so they would tight the competitors’ cost of 
funding and worsen the financial environment. In both cases commercial banks trying to hedge the 
market would be playing against their own interests, which is nonsense. 
Arbitrage must be profitable at no risk or it does not work, but private banks will not have an 
economic motivation to hedge credit markets because that is only possible losing market share or even 
exposing themselves to lose money (higher default rates, higher costs of funding). Hence, the main 
drawback of bank-based financial systems compared to market-based ones would be that there is not a 
rationale for private banks to do arbitrage: ensuring informational efficiency would rely only on 
authorities ―through regulation, central banking, public banking or other forms of market intervention. 
And though a positive interpretation for bank-based systems is that authorities will always try to 
properly arbitrage credit markets ―that is, they will never behave like speculators, as it might occur in 
financial markets if rational investors choose to bet on the trend instead of arbitraging prices― it is also 
true that banks themselves could play that speculative role: the classic moral hazard problem that has 
been suggested to have represented a key factor in the recent crisis, specially by ‘too-big-to-fail’ entities 
(Bernanke, 2010). Therefore, a key conclusion of this analysis would be that limits of arbitrage might 
suggest bank-based systems are less likely to be informationally efficient than market-based ones. 
 
6.5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The goal in this chapter was to set an alternative way to analyze the informational efficiency of bank-
based systems. The EMH described in Chapter 2, being the classic approach to examine efficiency in 
market-based systems, requires markets to be fully competitive and information available to all market 
participants. However, bank-based systems may not satisfy those conditions, as they are often 
characterized by imperfect competition and asymmetric information. Some alternatives that emerged 
to provide an interpretation of what determines how much credit banks should grant to borrowers were 
reviewed in Chapter 1. Nonetheless, in this chapter we discuss how to extend the EMH to bank-based 
financial systems based on a behavioral approach. The main conclusions are in order. 
First, any analysis of the efficiency in bank-based financial systems must focus on the 
informational side of EMH, since allocative and operational efficiencies may not hold. This analysis is 
still of interest since, once we depart from neo-classical equilibrium, a market might be informationally 
efficient yet allocatively inefficient (Bouchaud et al., 2008). Thus, the behavioral approach we introduce 
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aims to provide a complementary element of analysis: even in a world with no asymmetric information, 
behavioral biases might explain why bank-based systems may still not be informationally efficient. 
Second, we argue that the extension of the EMH to bank-based systems makes no sense from a 
micro point of view ―i.e., on a borrower-by-borrower basis. We must analyze macro efficiency instead, 
interpreted ―likewise the information theories described in Chapter 1― as how banks, in face of new 
information entering the markets, change their credit policies, which may be described in terms of price, 
volumes and costs ―likewise the efficiency measures in Chapter 1, too. However, a major drawback for 
such alternative to be implemented is that prices, volumes and costs define a bank’s commercial 
strategy, hence it depends on non-directly observable information. 
Third, here the behavioral approach based on Shleifer (2000) could be a feasible and testable 
alternative for retail credit markets. The approach, described for financial markets in Chapter 2, may be 
adapted to retail credit markets as follows. We may analyze changes in credit policies and whether 
through banking intermediation information is transmitted efficiently in the EMH sense in three steps. 
First, whether CEOs and employees in the industry exhibit beliefs that, based on heuristics and bounded 
rationality, could conform a market sentiment. Second, whether market sentiment could exhibit trends 
or predictable patterns. Third, whether there are limits of arbitrage in retail credit markets. 
Fourth, the chapter ends with a research agenda to suggest various ways the stepwise approach 
might be empirically tested, following the taxonomy of biases and anomalies provided in Chapter 4. In 
the remainder chapters of the thesis, we will focus on two of those suggestions, namely, prospect theory 
and overconfidence, to develop a formal implementation of the stepwise approach. In particular, the 
first step is analyzed through an experimental research described in Chapters 7 and 8: the former 
analyzes the presence of behavioral biases for participants in the experiment, while the latter describes 
the effects those biases have over the credit policies implemented by the participants in a business 
simulation game. Then, steps two and three are analyzed through a theoretical model of banking 
competition described in Chapter 9: how would a duopoly of a rational and a biased bank compete when 
granting credit to the economy, whether herding strategies would appear, and whether limits of 
arbitrage in the industry are identifiable.  
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CHAPTER 7. EXPERIMENTAL TESTS OF BEHAVIORAL BIASES 
 
7.1. OBJECTIVE 
 
The experimental research that follows in Chapters 7 and 8 aims to test the first step in the stepwise 
approach introduced in Chapter 6. In particular, we focus on two relevant areas of the literature on 
behavioral finance, namely, prospect theory and overconfidence, described in Chapter 5, to determine 
two questions. First, whether the existence of these behavioral biases among a series of participants in 
an experimental test are identifiable, which is described in this Chapter 7.200 Second, whether these 
biases could feed, among that same set of respondents, a risk-seeking behavior in a simulated credit 
market ―which is analyzed in the subsequent Chapter 8. 
For that purpose, we organized a series of five experimental sessions that took place in the Faculty 
of Business and Economics (University of A Coruna, UDC) during October, 2013. A group of students 
from different levels and degrees was selected. To make the call, which was open to the target groups, 
we got in direct contact with students during their classes ―we thank several UDC teachers that helped 
during this process― to explain what the experiment would consist of, the date and time of the sessions, 
that they would be invited to a coffee during the performance of the tests, and that one of the tests they 
had to complete would consist of a game where one of the participants per session would win a prize of 
60 euros.  
In total 126 volunteers, all of them undergraduate and postgraduate students at the University of 
A Coruna, participated in the experiment divided in five sessions. All sessions took place in the computer 
room of the Faculty of Business and Economics at UDC. Participants in the same session completed all 
tests at the same time, each respondent in a separate computer. The experiment was divided in two 
parts. The first part was a set of questions devised to determine the psychological profile (based on 
prospect theory and overconfidence) of each participant. The second part was a strategy game designed 
to replicate, in an experimental setting, how banks grant credit to borrowers, in order to obtain 
information about how much credit and at what price different subjects would grant under conditions 
of uncertainty and risk. The outline of the experimental research that is described in Chapters 7 and 8 
is summarized in Figure 7.1. 
                                                 
200 This chapter reproduces an unpublished paper at the time of the writing of this thesis, available as a working paper at MPRA 
– Munich Personal RePEc Archive (Peón, Calvo and Antelo, 2014). 
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FIGURE 7.1 – Outline of the experimental research 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
Chapter 7 deals with the left-hand side of the outline above: the study of priors and psychological 
biases in order to obtain a basic profile (based on PT and overconfidence) of the participants in the 
experiment. This includes the description of the behavioral tests in the experiment, how they were 
designed, variables to be measured, hypotheses to be tested (regarding the effect of several priors over 
those variables), participants in the experiment, data and results obtained. In Chapter 8 we deal with 
the right-hand side of the outline above: the strategy game designed to infer how the same participants 
would behave when granting credit to the economy. This includes how the experiment was designed, 
the basics of the game, the hypotheses to be tested (regarding the effect of the behavioral variables over 
the outcomes of the game), how the experiment was implemented, data and results obtained. 
Participants in the experiment were required to provide some basic information regarding age, 
working experience, etc. that was used as priors in the hypothesis testing. Some tests were then 
performed to obtain a basic profile of each respondent’s overconfidence and risk profile. Finally, all 
participants competed for a prize in a simulation game where they played the role of a bank granting 
credit to customers. The strategies they implemented resulted in three types of indicators (price, 
quantity and quality of credit) for the hypotheses to be tested. Examples of documentation that were 
collected during the experiment sessions are attached in the Appendix. These include several 
application forms: (i) a participation form per session that was used to gather volunteers for the 
experiment; (ii) an identification form signed by all volunteers eventually participating; and (iii) an 
individual consent form that was required to comply with Spanish regulations in terms of privacy policy 
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(LOPD).201 The 300€ in prizes (60€ per session) was funded by Grupo de Investigación en Regulación, 
Economía e Finanzas (GREFIN), application 6170109062 541A 64900. 
The methodology we followed includes the behavioral tests devised to obtain the parameters 
describing the prospect theory (PT) and overconfidence (OC) profile of each respondent, univariate 
statistics (normality tests, interquartile range, etc.), bivariate statistics (correlations, ANOVAs, simple 
regressions) and multivariate statistics: multiple linear regressions (MLR), principal component 
analysis (PCA), cluster analysis, ANOVA and correspondence analysis. Supplementary statistical 
information is provided in the Appendix, too. 
Chapter 7 is organized as follows. In Section 7.2 we describe the behavioral tests: how they were 
designed and variables to be measured. Section 7.3 analyzes the data obtained and compares it with 
results in the literature. Section 7.4 introduces the hypotheses to be tested and the results obtained. 
Finally, Section 7.5 concludes.  
 
7.2. BEHAVIORAL TESTS 
 
Participants in the experiment had to complete three different questionnaires. Firstly, some 
demographic information regarding age, gender, academic background and work experience. Secondly, 
a set of trivial-like games, devised to determine the three basic measures of overconfidence according 
to Moore and Healy (2008). Thirdly, a set of choices between some risky prospects and a riskless 
alternative, devised to determine each subject’s risk-profile according to prospect theory (Kahneman 
and Tversky, 1979).  
In what follows we provide a detailed explanation of how the questionnaires were devised and 
the literature that supports our choices. One goal for test design was to reduce the number of items 
required to estimate a specific parameter. Since participants had to complete several behavioral tests 
and the strategy game in Chapter 8, trying to replicate the original tests available in the literature in all 
its extension would be unfeasible.202 Thus, we first discussed (see Chapter 5) the minimum number of 
questions to replicate the original tests to an acceptable degree. Consequently, once we obtain the data, 
it will be determinant to assess the quality of data we obtained by comparing our results with the 
average results in the literature. This will be done in Section 7.3. In what follows we describe the 
questionnaires. 
                                                 
201 Ley Orgánica 15/1999 de Protección de Datos de Carácter Personal, LOPD. 
202 To illustrate, Tversky and Kahneman (1992) mention that each subject in their experiment “participated in three separate 
one-hour sessions that were several days apart” (p.305) in order to complete a set of 64 prospects, while participants in the 
experimental test by Moore and Healy (2008) spent “about 90 minutes in the laboratory” to complete 18 rounds of 10-item 
trivia quizzes. 
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7.2.1. Priors 
Participants were asked to start the experiment filling a simple set of questions regarding their (a) 
gender, (b) age, academic background ―about (c) level and (d) degree― and (e) professional experience. 
Table 7.1 summarizes these priors and the values they may take. A sample of the questionnaire for priors 
is also available in the Appendix (Table A.1). 
TABLE 7.1 – Summary of priors 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
7.2.2. Overconfidence 
The second questionnaire was designed to measure the participants’ OC based on what Grinblatt and 
Keloharju (2009) would call a standard psychological assessment. In particular, it was devised to obtain, 
for each respondent, an estimation of the three basic measures of overconfidence we described in 
Chapter 5, namely, overestimation (E), overplacement (P) and overprecision (M). In order to estimate E 
and P we follow Moore and Healy (2008), asking participants to complete a set of four Trivial-like games. 
Alternatively, to estimate M we follow Soll and Klayman (2004), posing six questions where subjects are 
required to provide confidence interval estimations. Table 7.2 summarizes some relevant information 
about how to calculate and interpret all variables in the experiment, including these three measures of 
overconfidence. 
The set of trivial games follows Moore and Healy (2008) in spirit. Indeed, several questions were 
taken from the original tests by the authors.203 Answers to questions involving general knowledge tend 
to produce overconfidence, while responses to perceptual tasks often result in underconfidence 
(Stankov et al., 2012). Following this, we devised our tests asking questions of general knowledge under 
a time-constrained situation (150 seconds per trivial), to have a somehow mixed scenario. 
                                                 
203 We would like to thank the authors for providing their tests online, they have been really helpful for the performance of our 
tests. We would like to be equally helpful to other researchers: a sample of the trivial tests is provided here in Table A2 of the 
Appendix, while the complete set is freely available at the website www.dpeon.com/documentos 
Variable Measure
Gender Nominal 1 = woman; 2 = man
Age Scale # of years
Level Scale
Faculty * Ordinal
→  Skills  ** Nominal 1.0 = "Others"; 2.0 = "Economics and Business"
Experience *** Ordinal
* Values 4.0 = "Business and Economics (USC)" and 5.0 = "Philology" were initially considered but eventually deleted as we had no observations
** This prior was not directly asked for in the questionnaires but codified using information from 'Faculty'
*** "Ocassional employment" was codified in the questionnaire as working experience with salary lower than 1,000 eur, and "regular employment" otherwise
Values
P
ri
o
rs 1.0 = "1st year"; 2.0 = "2nd year"; … ; 6.0 = "6th year"; 7.0 = "Master of Science, MSc"
1.0 = "Business and Economics (UDC)"; 2.0 = "Computing"; 3.0 = "Education"; 6.0 = "Law"
1.0 = "no experience"; 2.0 = "university trainée"; 3.0 = "occasional employment"; 4.0 = "regular employm."
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TABLE 7.2 – Summary of variables in the experiment 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
Variable Measure Values Interpretation Calculation Literature
E Scale E  > 0 → Overestimation; E  < 0 → Underestimation ↑ E  → higher overconfidence Trivia tests → E  = Ʃ 4 tests [ E[X i ] – x i  ] Moore and Healy (2008)
P Scale P  > 0 → Overplacement; P  < 0 → Underplacement ↑ P  → higher overconfidence Trivia → P  = Ʃ 4 tests [ (E[X i ] – E[Xj]) – (x i  – xj) ] Moore and Healy (2008)
M med Scale M  > 1 → Underprecision; M  < 1 → Overprecision ↓ M  → higher overconfidence I.C. → m i  = MEAD / MAD → M med  = median 3 domains Soll and Klayman (2004)
M avg I.C. → m i  = MEAD / MAD → M avg  = average 3 domains
α + Scale α
+ >1 → convex utility, α + <1 → Concave util. (GAINS) ↑ α+  → higher risk seeking (GAINS)
α - Scale α
- >1 → concave utility, α - <1 → Convex util. (LOSSES) ↓ α-  → higher risk seeking (LOSSES)
γ + Scale γ
+  ≤ 1 → distortion of probabilities (GAINS) ↑ γ+ (gains of high prob.) → higher risk seeking
γ - Scale γ
-  ≤ 1 → distortion of probabilities (LOSSES) ↑ γ- (losses of low prob.) → higher risk seeking
β med Scale β > 1 → Loss aversion ↑ β → higher loss aversion observed certainty equivalent → median 3 questions
β avg observed certainty equivalent → average 3 questions
P avg Scale average price across 6 niche clients
P vol Scale volume-weighted average price across 6 niches
VCC ind Scale VCCind* → min 0 - max 500 average volume of credit granted (6 niches)
VMAX ind Scale VMAX ind  ≤ 1 where VMAX ind  = 1 → full credit at P* VMAXind = VCCind / ( Ʃ 6 niches [Vmax | P*] )
NPL Scale % of non-performing loans (min 0%) ↑ NPL → higher risk strategy average ex post  NPL ratio across 6 niche clients
Q avg Scale Qavg < 1 → lower P  to risky niches (Opt.expost Qavg = 1.119) average prices to costumers of high vs. low qualities
Q vol Scale Idem (Opt.expost Qvol = 1.117) idem, volume-weightedC
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↓ Price → higher risk strategy
↑ Volume → higher risk strategy
↓ Quality → higher risk strategy
P*  → min 10.0% - max 20.0%
Defining the relevant indicators 
of the game:
Berger and Mester (1997)
Design and measurement of 
indicators:
own elaboration
226 
 
In each of the four rounds, respondents took a 10-item trivia quiz. A sample of questions from 
those quizzes is provided in Table A.2 in the Appendix. A pair of quizzes had a topic on ‘cinema, music 
and sports’ and the other pair on ‘geography, history and science’ (this information was given to 
participants), while each topic included one easy and one hard difficulty quiz ―though this information 
was not provided to them. At the start of the questionnaire, participants were provided the following 
information. “In what follows you will respond to a series of tests similar to the classic Trivial game. You 
will have to complete 4 Trivial of 10 questions each, two on topics ‘cinema…’ and two about ‘geography…’. 
Important: the goal of the test is not to measure your knowledge, but to measure the ability of people to 
maximize their abilities and knowledge under stressful situations, and to self-evaluate their performance. 
For such purpose, each of the four tests will be performed under a time limit of 150 seconds, at the end of 
which, when time is over, you will be asked to self-evaluate your performance.” 
Obviously the purpose of the test was not “to measure the ability of people to maximize their 
abilities and knowledge under stressful situations” but to measure the participants’ overconfidence. To 
foster this perception, they were recommended to respond first to the questions they think they knew 
better, because they might run out of time to complete the entire test. Prior to solving the trivia, 
participants were asked to answer a practice question to familiarize with the experimental setting. Then 
they took the actual quizzes. In each quiz, for each item they had to mark the correct answer. Then, when 
the time was over, they were required to estimate their own scores, as well as the score of ‘a randomly 
selected previous participant’ (RSPP).204 Finally, they repeated the same process for all the other three 
rounds in the questionnaire. 
After the four trivia tests were completed, participants were asked six additional questions (see 
Table A.3 in the Appendix), where they had to provide some confidence interval estimations. These six 
questions have been devised to determine their degree of overprecision following Soll and Klayman 
(2004) in spirit. We implemented this test as follows. First, in each of the six questions we ask 
participants to specify a three-point estimate (median, 10% fractile and 90% fractile, so we have low 
and high boundaries for an 80% confidence interval).205 Second, Soll and Klayman ask a set of several 
questions per domain to make an estimation of M on each domain. However, since we can only ask a few 
questions and the risks of relying on a single domain were emphasized in Chapter 5, we choose to make 
only a pair of questions on three different domains. This causes a problem regarding the statistical 
reliability of each M estimation that was discussed in Chapter 5. 
                                                 
204 They were required to estimate ‘the average score of other students here today and in similar experiments with students of 
this University’. 
205 Just like Soll and Klayman, we pretend each judge has a particular subjective probability distribution function (SPDF) for 
each question, and the fractiles implied by their three-point estimates provide information about those SPDFs. Whenever the 
judge’s median estimate is midway between the two boundaries we may assume normality; however, asking subjects to 
provide explicitly their median estimate allows for the possibility that judges’ intervals are asymmetric. In such case, Soll and 
Klayman (2004) recommend to use beta functions to approximate the underlying SPDF because they can approximate a great 
variety of skewed distributions. We will use and compare both estimations ―see section ‘scaling’. 
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The six questions of this set are provided in Table A.4 in the Appendix. Questions 1 to 4 are 
traditional almanac questions ―i.e., general knowledge questions on arbitrarily chosen topics― on two 
different domains. The first domain consisted of two questions about ‘the year in which a device was 
invented’, the second one about mortality rates ―a classic question in the literature regarding shark 
attacks (see Shefrin, 2008b) plus another one regarding road accidents in Spain.206 Questions 5 and 6 
try an alternative approach. Most studies of confidence ask judges to draw information only from their 
knowledge and memory. Soll and Klayman introduce two variations: the first one by Soll (1996), in 
which participants are asked to make predictions based on objective cue values provided in the test; the 
second variation, they include domains for which participants could draw on direct, personal 
experience. We choose the second one to ask questions 5 and 6, again inspired by Soll and Klayman, on 
‘time required to walk from one place to another in A Coruña at a moderate (5 km/h) rate without 
interruption’. Participants were required in all six cases to provide a median estimate and an 80% 
confidence interval around their answers. 
With the answers provided in the trivia tests and confidence interval questions we may compute 
an estimation of E, P and M for each participant. How to do those estimations was explained in Chapter 
5. In brief, overestimation (E) of a given participant is calculated subtracting her real score in each trivia 
from her reported expected score and summing all 4 results, following Eq. (5.17). Overplacement (P) is 
calculated following (5.18), which takes into account the participant’s beliefs about her expected 
performance compared to the others, as well as the actual scores of both the individual and the RSPP.  
Finally, overprecision (M) is defined as M = MEAD/MAD following Eq. (5.16). We calculate an 
estimation of M for the beta functions implied by the 3-point estimation provided by the respondent.207 
We proceed as follows. For each question we calculate the expected absolute deviation (EAD) from the 
median and the observed absolute deviation (AD) between the median and the true answer. Then, for 
each pair of questions per domain we compute MEAD as the mean EAD, MAD as the mean AD, and M = 
MEAD/MAD. Consequently, we have three different estimations m1, m2 and m3. M could then simply be 
calculated as either the average or the median of the three estimations. 
We want to compare median and average estimations for the following reason. Notice we use only 
two questions per domain (Soll and Klayman used twelve). This may generate distortions: if a judge 
happens to provide an answer to a question that is very close to the true answer, MAD ≈ 0 and M → ∞, 
which would distort our mean estimation M across domains. Consequently, a key analysis in Section 7.3 
will be to compare these and other measurement alternatives and to discuss whether it would be 
necessary to include more questions per domain in future research. 
                                                 
206 The Spanish Dirección General de Tráfico, DGT, provides the statistics of road accidents in Spain at the website 
http://www.dgt.es/portal/es/seguridad_vial/estadistica/accidentes_24horas/evolucion_n_victimas/ 
207 Additional measures of M were estimated assuming normality. Further information in subsection 7.3.1. 
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7.2.3. Prospect theory 
The purpose of the third questionnaire is to measure the value and weighting functions, according to 
prospect theory, for each respondent. Recall in Chapter 5 we chose to use a parametric approach with a 
power value function ―Eq. (5.8)― and Prelec-I weighting function ―Eq. (5.10)― where decision weights 
are normalized according to NPT. Hence, we have five parameters (𝛼+, 𝛾+, 𝛼−, 𝛾− and β) that we must 
estimate per respondent. Our method merges some characteristics of Tversky and Kahneman (1992)’s 
approach to elicit certainty equivalents and Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt and L’Haridon (2008)’s proposal to 
make an efficient test with a minimum number of questions. In particular, the methodology we use is 
based on the elicitation of certainty equivalents of prospects involving just two outcomes ―a classic 
approach by Tversky and Kahneman (1992). To obtain the cash equivalents, we ask respondents a series 
of refined choice questions. Following Abdellaoui et al. (2008), the elicitation method consists of three 
stages, fifteen questions in total: six questions involving only positive prospects (i.e., a chance to win 
some positive quantity or zero) to calibrate 𝛼+ and 𝛾+, six questions for negative prospects to calibrate 
𝛼− and 𝛾− and three questions regarding the acceptability of mixed prospects, in order to estimate β. 
Some aspects were considered in all three stages. First, utility measurements are of interest only 
for significant amounts of money (Abdellaoui et al., 2008) while utility is close to linear for moderate 
amounts (Rabin, 2000).208 Hence, prospects devised to calibrate 𝛼+, 𝛾+, 𝛼− and 𝛾− used significant, 
albeit hypothetical, amounts of money of 500, 1.000 and 2.000 euros ―with all outcomes in euros and 
multiples of 500 euros to facilitate the task (Abdellaoui et al., 2008). Second, only the three questions 
devised to estimate β used small amounts of money for reasons already described ―see the problem 
with loss aversion in Chapter 5. Consequently, with the aim of preventing the possibility that asking the 
larger amounts in first order might affect the perception of the smaller amounts in the β elicitation, those 
three questions were asked in first order. Finally, prior to solving any trial, respondents were asked to 
answer a practice question to familiarize them with the experimental setting. Instructions emphasized 
there were no right or wrong answers (Booij, van Praag and van de Kuilen, 2010), but that completing 
the questionnaire with diligence, always providing objective and honest answers, was a prerequisite to 
participate in the strategy game (Chapter 8) where they would compete for a prize.  
The first three questions, regarding the acceptability of a set of mixed prospects, were then 
provided to participants in sequential order. Specifically, respondents were asked “someone offers you a 
bet on the toss of a coin. If you lose, you lose X euro. What is the minimal gain that would make this gamble 
acceptable?”,209 where X took the values 1 euro, 10 euros and 100 euros in the first, second and third 
iterations, respectively. Posed this way, all questions to calibrate loss aversion set probabilities of 
                                                 
208 This is consistent with the results we obtained in our pre-test: we used amounts of money of about 1.000 euros that we felt 
significant enough for students; however, when tests were implemented to university professors, some of them told us they 
felt the amounts were quite low and hence they could exhibit a riskier-than-normal behavior. 
209 Inspired by Hens and Bachmann (2008), p. 120. 
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success and failure equal to 50%, p = 0.5. In the second stage a set of six questions involving only positive 
prospects was provided, again in sequential order. Figure 7.2 shows one of the six iterations participants 
had to answer. Participants had also time to practice a sample question. 
FIGURE 7.2 – A sample question with positive prospects 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
In every iteration participants had to choose between a positive prospect (left-hand side) and a 
series of sure positive outcomes (right-hand side). Information was provided in numerical and graphical 
form. Every time the subject answered whether she preferred the prospect or the sure gain, a new 
outcome was provided. This process was repeated until the computer informed the respondent that the 
question was completed and she could continue with another prospect. The probabilities of success in 
all 6 prospects were different (two questions with probability 50% and one question with probabilities 
of success 99%, 95%, 5% and 1% each), which was emphasized to participants to avoid wrong answers. 
The series of sure outcomes per prospect were removed from two sets, following Tversky and 
Kahneman (1992) in spirit: the first set logarithmically spaced between the extreme outcomes of the 
prospect; the second one linearly spaced between the lowest accepted amount and the highest rejected 
in the first set. Table A.4 in the Appendix summarizes both sets for all questions in the questionnaire. 
All sure outcomes were rounded to a multiple of 5 to facilitate the task. Following Abdellaoui et al. 
(2008), to control for response errors we repeated the last sure outcome of the first series at the end of 
each trial, allowing to check the reliability of the responses.210 The certainty equivalent of a prospect 
was then estimated by the midpoint between the lowest accepted and the highest rejected value in the 
second set of choices. Tversky and Kahneman (1992) assert this procedure allows for cash equivalents 
to be derived from observed choices, rather than assessed by the subject. 
                                                 
210 Abdellaoui et al. (2008) repeated two iterations: “the first iteration after the final iteration” for all questions, and “the third 
iteration” of 2 questions for gains and 2 for losses, chosen randomly. They obtain 96% reliability for the first iteration, 66% for 
the third one, and claim them to be satisfactory. We repeat the last outcome in the first series (somehow similar to a ‘third 
iteration’) of all questions for gains and losses. Hence, having similar results (66% to 96%) will be considered reliable. 
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Finally, the third stage included a set of six questions involving only negative prospects, designed 
to calibrate 𝛼− and 𝛾− parameters. We proceeded similarly. Figure 7.3 shows one of the iterations.  
FIGURE 7.3 – A sample question with negative prospects 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
Participants had time to practice a sample question. We emphasized prospects and sure outcomes 
were now in terms of losses, and that probabilities were in terms of probabilities of losing, which may 
be change along prospects (similar probabilities were provided, namely 1%, 5%, 50%, 50%, 95% and 
99%). Certainty equivalents were now estimated as the midpoint between the lowest (in absolute 
terms) accepted value and the highest (in absolute terms) rejected value in the second set of choices. 
 
7.3. ASSESSING DATA QUALITY 
 
The behavioral tests we devised follow some previous tests in the literature. However, most of them 
were very large in duration required to complete them. Considering we needed participants in our 
experiment to complete both types of behavioral tests, plus the experimental game in Chapter 8, shorter 
versions were required. Consequently, the main motivation of this section is to assess the reliability of 
the behavioral parameters that were estimated with our method. We do this in two instances. First, we 
conduct a preliminary analysis of data for a raw data matrix description, estimation of some basic 
univariate statistics, and detection of outliers and extreme values. Second, we conduct an analysis in 
order to determine the goodness of the results obtained compared to regular results in the literature.  
Table A.5 in the Appendix shows the raw data we obtained given all the participants’ responses, 
whereas Table A.6 shows the estimations that result (priors, OC measures and PT parameters) 
according to the estimation procedures described in Chapter 5. First thing to note, using the frequency 
tables about priors summarized in Table 7.3, are some pros and cons of our experimental group.  
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TABLE 7.3 – Frequency tables for priors 
 
  
Source: Own elaboration 
Frequency Table
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative 
Percent
Female 60 47.6 47.6 47.6
Male 66 52.4 52.4 100.0
Total 126 100.0 100.0
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative 
Percent
Economics & Business 105 83.3 83.3 83.3
Computing 18 14.3 14.3 97.6
Education 1 .8 .8 98.4
Law 2 1.6 1.6 100.0
Total 126 100.0 100.0
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative 
Percent
No experience 64 50.8 50.8 50.8
University trainee 29 23.0 23.0 73.8
Occasional employment 23 18.3 18.3 92.1
Regular employment 10 7.9 7.9 100.0
Total 126 100.0 100.0
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative 
Percent
Others 21 16.7 16.7 17.5
Economics & Business 105 83.3 83.3 100.0
Total 126 100.0 100.0
Gender
Valid
Faculty
Valid
Skills
Valid
Valid
Experience
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative 
Percent
17,0 1 .8 .8 .8
18,0 11 8.7 8.7 9.5
19,0 12 9.5 9.5 19.0
20,0 11 8.7 8.7 27.8
21,0 18 14.3 14.3 42.1
22,0 22 17.5 17.5 59.5
23,0 22 17.5 17.5 77.0
24,0 14 11.1 11.1 88.1
25,0 5 4.0 4.0 92.1
26,0 3 2.4 2.4 94.4
27,0 3 2.4 2.4 96.8
28,0 2 1.6 1.6 98.4
31,0 1 .8 .8 99.2
53,0 1 .8 .8 100.0
Total 126 100.0 100.0
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative 
Percent
1st year 19 15.1 15.1 15.1
2nd year 24 19.0 19.0 34.1
3rd year 8 6.3 6.3 40.5
4th year 33 26.2 26.2 66.7
5th year 1 .8 .8 67.5
6th year 6 4.8 4.8 72.2
MSc 35 27.8 27.8 100.0
Total 126 100.0 100.0
Level
Valid
Valid
Age
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On the positive side, the group is balanced in terms of gender, as well as in terms of age and 
academic year within the bounds of our selection (see Figure 7.4). Besides, we introduced a subgroup 
of 21 students that have no degree in economic or financial studies to serve as contrast. 
FIGURE 7.4 – Participants. Age to academic year (‘level’) 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
On the negative side, all participants are students from UDC, what makes the experimental group 
limited in terms of age (98.4% of them were between 17 and 28 years old). Besides, in subsection 7.4.2 
we will see that age, academic year (level) and professional experience are correlated in this group. 
Moreover, level is not a good proxy for education: in the literature, it is intended to measure levels such 
as ‘no education’, ‘primary education’, ‘secondary education’, and so on; however, our selection consists 
only of university students, hence level measures only university studies and is highly correlated with 
age. These problems will be a drawback for our hypothesis testing in Section 7.4. 
TABLE 7.4 – Descriptive statistics of the behavioral variables 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
0
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
A
ge
Academic year
N Range Minimum Maximum Mean
Std. 
Deviation Variance
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. Error Statistic Std. Error
Age 126 36.00 17.00 53.00 22.15 3.72 13.825 4.704 .216 37.433 .428
Level 126 6.00 1.00 7.00 4.04 2.22 4.918 .155 .216 -1.400 .428
E 126 28.00 -8.00 20.00 2.93 4.76 22.643 .790 .216 1.529 .428
P 126 27.00 -13.98 13.02 -2.71 4.69 21.959 .302 .216 .785 .428
Mmed 125 1.50 0.00 1.50 0.34 0.26 .066 1.841 .217 4.902 .430
Mavg 125 1.32 0.07 1.38 0.46 0.29 .085 1.310 .217 1.837 .430
alpha + 126 2.43 0.24 2.67 1.02 0.46 .213 1.513 .216 2.482 .428
alpha - 126 2.24 0.05 2.29 0.52 0.31 .098 2.320 .216 9.199 .428
gamma + 126 0.95 0.05 1.00 0.64 0.26 .065 -.163 .216 -.700 .428
gamma - 126 0.95 0.05 1.00 0.53 0.28 .077 .183 .216 -1.147 .428
βmed 126 9.40 0.60 10.00 3.01 1.97 3.897 1.599 .216 3.182 .428
βavg 126 26.00 0.67 26.67 3.64 3.57 12.750 3.978 .216 20.157 .428
Descriptive Statistics
Skewness Kurtosis
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In what estimations for the behavioral variables is concerned, Table 7.4 summarizes the basic 
univariate statistics. We may see overprecision measures Mmed and Mavg have only 125 observations. 
This is due to missing responses by one participant at that test, as it will be explained in subsection 7.3.1.  
Most variables (all but overplacement at 5% significance) do not satisfy the hypothesis of 
normality, as it may be observed in Table 7.5 below. This is not a surprise for two reasons. First, the 
group comprised students at UDC of all ages and levels. Hence, these two priors are more likely to 
resemble a uniform, rather than a normal, distribution. Second, with the only exceptions of E and P, most 
behavioral indicators are bounded (to 0 all of them, and also to 1 the gammas) and some of them are 
expected to be asymmetric ―as underprecision or loss aversion range from 1 to infinite, for instance.211 
TABLE 7.5 – Normality test for the behavioral variables 
  
Source: Own elaboration 
Such boundaries and asymmetries must be considered when analyzing outliers. Table A.8 in the 
Appendix provides a normal Q-Q plot and a box-and-whiskers plot for all variables. According to this, 
we proceed as follows. First, we will consider only to exclude extreme values, not outliers.212  However, 
we will only exclude them when the normality tests suggest these values may indicate experimental 
error rather than high kurtosis. Second, we will use these refined estimations for the hypotheses testing 
in Section 7.4. In the analysis below we have considered all variables without exclusion as the purpose 
of this section is to analyze the goodness of the tests implemented. These rules being considered, four 
observations have been removed from two variables: one extreme value for age and three for loss 
aversion (βavg). Besides, in subsection 7.3.2 we will discuss some individual observations that might 
represent experimental errors in the elicitation of PT parameters. 
                                                 
211 For further interpretation, Table A.7 provides the histograms of all variables in the experiment. 
212 The box plots in Table A.8 in the Appendix use SPSS statistics, which identify outliers as data beyond the whiskers of the 
plot (which represent 1.5 times the height of the box), and extreme values as data beyond three times the height of the box. 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig.
Age .190 126 .000 .666 126 .000
Level .187 126 .000 .859 126 .000
Overestimation .133 126 .000 .955 126 .000
Overplacement .079 126 .054 .979 126 .047
Overprecision 1 .134 125 .000 .854 125 .000
Overprecisión 2 .127 125 .000 .891 125 .000
alpha + .197 126 .000 .861 126 .000
alpha - .134 126 .000 .821 126 .000
gamma + .126 126 .000 .940 126 .000
gamma - .090 126 .013 .949 126 .000
loss aversion 1 .203 126 .000 .832 126 .000
loss aversion 2 .217 126 .000 .606 126 .000
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction
Tests of Normality
Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk
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Finally, regarding the goodness of tests, we intend to assess the reliability of the results in this 
experiment compared to the regular results in both the theoretical and empirical literature. Indeed, the 
concern to design tests that are shorter and more efficient is a classic in the behavioral literature (e.g., 
Abdellaoui et al., 2008), since they would enhance the scope for application of concepts like prospect 
theory or overconfidence. We conduct this analysis separately for each section. 
7.3.1. Goodness of tests on overconfidence 
We analyze the goodness of tests devised to estimate E and P on one hand, and M on the other, as we 
used different tests in both instances.  
Trivial tests (indicators E and P) 
Participants completed the four trivia in about 15 minutes, instructions included. There were no 
relevant incidents in any of the five sessions: respondents declared a perfect understanding of 
instructions, all responses were coherent and there were no missing values of any kind. Finally, the 
results obtained regarding the estimations on indicators E and P support the tests were designed 
satisfactorily for the following reasons. 
First, participants on average exhibited overestimation (clearly) and underplacement. Thus, the 
average respondent overestimated her performance in the trivia by 2.9 right answers (out of 40 
questions in total). This bias was also persistent in both easy and hard tests. In addition, the average 
respondent considered herself below average by -2.7 correct answers, with the bias being mostly 
attributable to an underplacement in hard tasks. These findings are consistent with most literature 
supporting a general bias towards overestimation of one’s abilities (e.g., Lichtenstein, Fischhoff and 
Phillips, 1982; De Bondt and Thaler, 1995; Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam, 2001) except on easy 
tasks or in situations where success is likely or individuals are particularly skilled (Moore and Healy, 
2008), as well as towards underplacing one’s performances relative to others on difficult tasks (Moore 
and Small, 2007) or being generally pessimistic about winning in difficult competitions (Windschitl, 
Kruger and Simms, 2003). Table 7.6 summarizes average data in the experiment. 
TABLE 7.6 – Overestimation and overplacement 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
T1 T2 T3 T4 ALL Easy Hard
self estimation (average) 6,6 2,7 3,8 5,9 Overestimation 2,9 1,5 1,4
self estimation (median) 7,0 2,5 4,0 6,0 Overplacement -2,7 -0,3 -2,4 
estimation of others (average) 6,4 4,0 4,8 6,4
estimation of others (median) 6,0 4,0 5,0 6,0
right answers (average) 5,40 2,29 2,75 5,58
right answers (median) 5,0 2,0 3,0 5,0
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Also relevant is the strong correlation that appears between variables E and P (see Figure 7.5 
below). That is, though the biases along the experimental group are towards overestimation and 
underplacement, participants that exhibited the highest overestimation tend to consider themselves 
above average (or, at least, featured a lower underplacement) and vice versa. This would support the 
interpretation of overestimation and overplacement as “interchangeable manifestations of self-
enhancement” (Kwan et al., 2004; Moore and Healy, 2008). 
FIGURE 7.5 – Correlation between E and P 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
Finally, the trivia tests were indeed devised to control for the hard–easy effect. However, that 
design did not work well enough as the results suggest we failed to propose a couple of easy tests that 
participants find them as easy as we expected. We may see in Table 7.6 above that trivia tests T2 and T3 
had average (median) correct answers of 2.29 (2.0) and 2.75 (3.0) out of 10 questions. Considering 
correct answers attributable only to good luck would represent a coefficient of 2.0,213 it shows 
participants found these tests hard indeed. Trivia tests T1 and T4, instead, were expected to yield correct 
answers of 7.0 to 8.0 on average,214 but respondents only hit the right answer 5.4 (5.0) and 5.58 (6.0) 
out of 10 questions on average (median). This would represent a couple of tests of a medium ―rather 
than an easy― difficulty for respondents. In any case, we find results are good for hard tests and coherent 
with literature for easy (medium) tests, since overplacement reduces from -2.4 in hard tests to about 
zero in easy ones, while overestimation does not increase (supporting the finding that a general bias 
towards overestimation is appreciated). Figure 7.6 next helps to appreciate this effect more clearly. 
                                                 
213 Each test consisted of ten questions with five possible answers each. Hence, participants had a probability of 20% to hit the 
right answer by chance, making it 2.0 right answers out of 10.  
214 Those were the results obtained in a pre-test with similar questions performed by several volunteers. We attribute the 
eventual differences between the experiment and the pre-test to differences in age and experience between both samples (for 
instance, volunteers in the pre-test included teachers as well as students, and elder people might had better clues for a right 
answer in questions about events that happened decades ago). Otherwise, readers may also attribute it to researchers’ 
overconfidence. 
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FIGURE 7.6 – The hard–easy effect 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
As we may see, most observations for the hard tests ―graph on the right-hand side of Figure 7.6― 
meet the mentioned tendency towards overestimation, underplacement, or both. For tests with a 
medium difficulty ―graph on the left-hand side of Figure 7.6― the general drift upwards is noticeable 
(meaning that lower levels of underplacement for easy tests are general along the group), while 
overestimation is similar on average but with less observations towards higher levels. Furthermore, it 
is also clear that the correlation between overestimation and overprecision mentioned above exists in 
both instances. 
To sum up, we consider that a test similar to those implemented by Moore and Healy (2008) but 
with only four trivia sets (two hard and two easy) of 10 questions each and 5 possible answers per 
question is satisfactory in terms of simplicity (low time-consuming, only about 8 minutes per indicator) 
and efficiency (quality of results in accordance to academic literature) to provide individual measures 
of overestimation and overplacement. Nonetheless, two features might be improved in future research. 
First, a better design of easy tests such that they meet the required standards for a hard-easy effect. 
Second, the general drift towards overestimation in the experiment might be lessened introducing 
questions on abilities and perceptual tasks (Stankov et al., 2012), as the time constraint and a couple of 
questions on mathematical logic introduced as a variation from Moore and Healy (2008)’s original tests 
seem not enough for that purpose. 
Test on confidence intervals (indicator M) 
Participants completed the six questions on confidence intervals to infer their individual degree of 
overprecision (estimator M) in about 6 to 8 minutes, instructions included. Though test results show a 
vast tendency towards overprecision ―perhaps the most evident result of all in the experiment― that is 
supported by most empirical findings in the literature (e.g., Jemaiel, Mamoghli and Seddiki, 2013), we 
are concerned about the reliability of the estimations obtained at the individual level. We will later 
explain why; for now let us analyze the main results obtained. 
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First, judges were significantly overconfident. The aggregate results show a strong tendency to 
overprecision: the 80% confidence intervals contained the correct answer only 38.3% of the time. This 
is much higher than the 14% overconfidence observed by Soll and Klayman (2004) for three-point 
estimates and about the same level than for a range estimate. Overconfidence varied across domains as 
it was expected: the lowest degree of overprecision corresponds to the domain where participants could 
draw on personal experience (time to walk from one place to another). However, they were still 
overconfident: 80% intervals hit the right answer 62.0% of the time. When the M ratios are estimated 
to account for the effects of variability, overprecision becomes even more prevalent: almost 75% of 
respondents exhibit overprecision (M < 1) in the domain with the lowest level of overconfidence (‘time 
to walk’) and 97.6% in the highest (‘how many deaths’). Finally, when these results are added up to 
calculate a single ratio M per judge we have between 93.6% and 97.6% of them exhibit overprecision, 
whether we use average or median estimates, respectively. Table 7.7 summarizes all the results. 
TABLE 7.7 – Overprecision  
 
Source: Own elaboration 
Two classic results are that overprecision is more persistent than the other two types of 
overconfidence (Moore and Healy, 2008), though its presence reduces the magnitude of both 
overestimation and overplacement. Our results are in accordance with the first regularity, while the 
second one will be tested in Section 7.4. With this general drift towards overprecision, suffice to say that 
this bias is clear for both genders and different ages (again, more information is provided in Section 7.4). 
Finally, we use Soll and Klayman (2008)’s alternative refinement215 to estimate M to see overprecision 
is mainly attributable to narrow size intervals. As we may see in Table 7.7, when ratio M is estimated 
                                                 
215 The original refinement is the one we seen: doing the estimates of MEAD and MAD based on more flexible representations 
of participants’ SPDFs (i.e., the beta function that better fits the three estimations provided by the respondent). Alternatively, 
Soll and Klayman (2004) suggest we may measure MAD assuming the median is in the middle of the distribution ―using only 
the two endpoints and assuming a symmetric distribution). The authors denoted M3 the first measure and M2 the second one. 
Domain Hit rate* M "M 2 "
Invention dates Invention dates
Q1 12.0% median 0.28 0.26
Q2 51.2% average 0.36 0.37
Average 31.6% M < 1 (%) 94.4% 94.4%
Number of deaths Number of deaths
Q3 17.6% median 0.10 0.10
Q4 24.8% average 0.21 0.17
Average 21.2% M < 1 (%) 97.6% 99.2%
Walk times Walk times
Q5 66.4% median 0.64 0.58
Q6 57.6% average 0.82 0.81
Average 62.0% M < 1 (%) 74.4% 79,2%
MEDIAN M < 1 (%) 93.6% 98.4%
AVERAGE 38.3% M < 1 (%) 97.6% 96.8%
* Answers that exactly matched an endpoint were counted as correct
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assuming the median is in the middle of the distribution rather than using the participant’s response 
(denoted M2 in the authors’ notation) overprecision slightly increases. This means most participants 
with an asymmetric SPDF tended to provide median estimates that reduced the errors (at least to some 
extent). This result is coherent with Soll and Klayman’s empirical finding that three-point estimates 
reduce overconfidence. 
Although results on aggregate seem to be consistent with empirical literature, we are concerned 
about the reliability of the estimations obtained at the individual level. In particular, we are concerned 
for several reasons. First, there is evidence that several participants did not understand the instructions. 
Since we did not expect this section to be particularly problematic, the computer application was not 
prepared to avoid missing values or incoherent responses.  
In the first season we had several incidents: a respondent did not complete all three answers per 
question; some had problems to interpret that questions of the type “I find it equally probable that it is 
higher or lower than…” were asking for a median value; others had problems to correctly interpret that 
“more than (after year)…” and “less than (before year)…” were asking for a minimum and a maximum 
interval bound. Consequently, we had observations where minimum and maximum boundaries were 
swapped, where answers were provided in some particular order (e.g., lower – medium – higher value) 
when responses were presented (and recorded) as median – lower – higher, or where the median 
estimation was identical to any of the boundaries. 
In following seasons we tried to avoid these incidents by emphasizing in the instructions that all 
three questions were required and providing a fictitious example of what we were asking for. Though 
things improved significantly (we did not have more missing values and the percentage of respondents 
that exhibited some kind of error clearly declined) we still had some incoherent answers. Fortunately, 
we could contact participants by e-mail days after the tests were performed to ask them to confirm their 
answers. This way, errors of the kind swapped boundaries or responses in a particular order could be 
amended. Others instead, like missing values or median estimations identical to any boundary, were not 
modified as it would represent an alteration of the experiment results. 
In order to avoid these incidents in future research, we suggest to enhance Soll and Klayman 
(2004)’s approach with two modifications. First, by setting the order of estimates in terms of lower 
bound – median – upper bound. According to the authors, “if order of estimates has effects, they are 
complex ones” (p.311), which supports our suggestion that a specific order will not bias the results but 
helps respondents to better understand the task.216 Second, we believe a picture or a table would help, 
such that participants are required to fill three boxes in the specific order ―as in Table 7.8. 
                                                 
216 In addition, we might consider the possibility to clearly state we are asking for a median estimate (we are not sure whether 
Soll and Klayman avoided this intentionally), though this option might introduce an asymmetry as it would represent a better 
clue for those respondents more familiar with statistics. 
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TABLE 7.8 – A suggestion to avoid incidents in future research 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
A test enhanced with these suggestions should help to confirm whether the general bias towards 
overprecision observed in the experiment is correct. In any case, we claim this bias does not emerge 
from a misunderstanding by participants of the concept ‘confidence interval’ or what the purpose of the 
tests was: instructions clearly stated and emphasized that these questions were intended to “assess your 
ability to make estimations with a high degree of confidence” and that minimum and maximum answers 
should be provided “in order to be 90% sure that you hit the right answer”. Consequently, rather than 
having a problem with results on aggregate, the main problem we find with the test is in the reliability 
of individual estimations, summarized in Table 7.9.  
TABLE 7.9 – Reliability of individual M estimations 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
This reliability problem comes from the evidence that individual estimations of ratio M depend on 
the refinement method used to estimate M and whether indicators are computed as the median or the 
average of the mi values across domains. In particular, we compare three different refinement methods 
(the two already described and a third one where both MEAD and MAD computations assume a normal 
In which year was the telegraph invented?
I am 90% sure that the year is after I think the year is as likely to be after this year as before it I am 90% sure that the year is before
lower bound median estimate upper bound
Mmed Mavg Mmed Mavg Mmed Mavg
range 0.0 - 1.5 0.07 - 1.38 0.0 - 1.59 0.05 - 3.08 0.02 - 4.89 0.08 - 19.68
median 0.31 0.40 0.3 0.38 0.40 0.51
average 0.34 0.46 0.34 0.45 0.51 0.94
variation*
threshold**
change sign***
variation*
threshold**
change sign***
* measured as the median of the individual variations
0.09
2.4%
0.09 0.12
0.10 0.09
** percentage of individuals for which the difference (in absolute terms) between median and
          average estimation of M are larger than 0.10
*** percentage of individuals for which ratio M  ranks the same individual as being both over- and
          underconfident depending on whether we use median or average estimations
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distribution for each participant’s SPDF),217 and for each of them we computed the individual indicator 
M as either the mean or median of the ratios across domains. We get the results in Table 7.9. First, the 
last refinement method that assumes normality yields the most extreme results. We will later explain 
this effect is not a problem of this method in particular but an evidence of the weakness of the test itself. 
Second, indicators that are computed as the average of ratios across domains are higher. This happens 
as mean estimations are highly dependent on extreme values when the items (only three domains here) 
are very few. Third, if we compare how many individuals have an estimator that varies substantially218 
whether we use medians or averages, we find about half of the individuals would have an indicator that 
is highly sensible to the estimation method. This effect is particularly pervasive when M ratios yield 
qualitative results that are conflicting: i.e., when we have the same individual could exhibit 
overprecision (M<1) or underprecision (M>1) depending on the method we consider. This happens to 
4% of participants in the standard refinement of M and up to 9.6% in the worst case. Finally, if we do 
this comparison across refinement methods219 (instead of median vs. average) we obtain similar results.  
This reliability problem is particularly puzzling for the hypothesis testing in Chapter 8, since there 
we will be using M indicators as independent variables that are not robust to different methods of 
estimation. Why this happened? Basically, because in our search for a simplicity–efficiency equilibrium 
we heeled heavily over simplicity: we designed the tests with only two questions per domain and this 
revealed to be not enough. When only having two questions per domain, providing an answer to a single 
question that is close to the true response strongly affects the eventual estimation of M.220 Besides, given 
the nature of the reliability problem, average estimations tend to be less reliable than median 
estimations. Though this effect is more palpable in the case of the refinement method that assumes 
normality, this only happened by chance. In particular, there were a few respondents (basically only 
four) for which the middle point of their inferred symmetric SPDF for a particular question happened to 
be very close to the true answer. Would this happen instead with the median answer provided by the 
judges, the effect would be more palpable for the original M indicator we are using as option-by-default. 
In future research some amendments will be required for a test of this kind to be a short one 
without prejudice to obtain efficient results. Having more questions per domain will be essential, but 
with the restriction of devising a test that is not highly time-consuming for a single indicator. A 
                                                 
217 The two methods already described are the option-by-default, which uses MEAD and MAD from the inferred individual SPDF 
fitted with a beta function, and estimator M2, where MAD assumes a symmetric distribution. 
218 We consider a ‘substantial variation’ of 0.10 in absolute terms between median and average estimations. Since median 
estimations of M in the different methods are about 0.40, a variation of 0.10 would represent an estimation that varies about 
25% depending on the method we use ―which we consider a variation that is substantial enough. Given this variation is 
basically equivalent to the median variations observed along the experimental group for the three refinement methods (0.09 – 
0.10 according to Table 7.9), it is not a surprise that we had in all cases about half the individuals affected by a sensible measure. 
219 Given we have three different refinement approaches, we have done this comparison across methods by analyzing the 
minimum and maximum estimations we get for each individual using any of the three methods. 
220 If median estimation and true answer are close, AD will be near to zero. When only having two questions per domain, the 
estimator mi = MEAD / MAD for that domain will be strongly biased upwards. Consequently, since we have only considered 
three domains, median and (particularly) average estimations of the individual’s indicator M will be severely affected. 
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sensibility analysis may be performed to a list of 3 to 5 questions per domain to calibrate which option 
would better balance the simplicity–efficiency tradeoff. Besides, given our results support the regular 
evidence that domains where participants can draw on personal experience exhibit the lowest degree 
of overconfidence, it may be preferable to ask questions on one additional domain. This way we would 
have two domains on almanac questions and two on personal experience to equilibrate. This should also 
be helpful to balance individual M estimations when they are computed as a median or an average across 
domains. Given participants in our tests required about 5 minutes (plus instructions) to complete a test 
of 6 questions, asking 16 questions would require about 15 minutes in total, which we consider a limit 
for a test for only one indicator to be brief enough. 
Finally, another interesting option for future research is to repeat similar (enhanced) tests with 
the same group of participants as in this experiment. We mean not only to compare results for M, but 
for E and P indicators in the trivia tests as well. This would contribute to the literature on debiasing. 
With that goal in mind, we should first explain to participants what was the purpose of these tests, what 
were their answers and biases they exhibited in this experiment, and then let them perform the new 
tests. How will they behave? Will participants correct their biases? Will they overreact? 
7.3.2. Goodness of tests on prospect theory 
This section analyzes the goodness of our method to measure the value and weighting functions of each 
respondent. Based on the elicitation of certainty equivalents of prospects involving just two outcomes 
under a normalized prospect theory approach (Rieger and Wang, 2008a; Hens and Bachmann, 2008) 
for the scaling of parameters, and assuming parametric specifications that are widely supported in the 
literature, our method merges some characteristics of Tversky and Kahneman (1992)’s approach to 
elicit certainty equivalents and Abdellaoui et al. (2008)’s proposal to make an efficient test with a 
minimum number of questions. In order to fit all properties of the value and weighting functions, fifteen 
questions were asked ―three per parameter. Fifteen questions seem hard to be reduced: the elicitation 
requires some questions to estimate beta, others to estimate the distortion of probabilities close to 0 
and 1, for probabilities about 50% to obtain further information on utility curvature, and in any case a 
mix of questions for positive and negative domains is required. Participants in our experiment 
completed the fifteen questions in about 20 minutes, instructions included, and there were no relevant 
incidents in any of the five sessions. 
Though the empirical validity of prospect theory has been largely tested, how to elicit the value 
and weighting function for a given individual does not come without controversy, as we discussed in 
Chapter 5. Moreover, the controversy exacerbates if estimations are made imposing specific parametric 
functions and the number of questions are minimized. However, the results of this experiment evidence 
our tests replicate the main findings on prospect theory. In particular, we support the validity of our 
method based on several analyses, both at the individual and aggregate level: (i) properties of the value 
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and weighting functions; (ii) the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes; (iii) iteration and fitting errors; (iv) 
anomalies detected at the individual level. We explain these analyses in detail in what follows. 
Value and weighting functions 
Table A.5 in the Appendix shows all participants’ responses to the fifteen questions in the test. Table A.6 
in the Appendix shows the estimations that result for individual parameters 𝛼+, 𝛾+, 𝛼−, 𝛾− and β. Results 
obtained at the aggregate level are described with four measures: the average and median of parameters 
estimated at the individual level, and the parameters estimated for the average and median participant. 
Table 7.10 provides the results at the aggregate level. 
TABLE 7.10 – PT parameters at the aggregate level 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
We also compare our results in Table 7.10 against some classic results in the literature.221 Most 
empirical estimations of utility curvature support prospect theory’s assumption of concavity for gains 
(𝛼+ from 0.7 to 0.9 in most studies) and convexity for losses (𝛼− from 0.7 to 1.05),222 with more recent 
studies tending to provide empirical estimations that are closer to linearity in both instances (Booij et 
al., 2010). Our results reiterate these findings for gains, while risk seeking in the negative domain seems 
to be much higher (this assertion will be later qualified). The percentage of individuals with alpha 
measures below one are 59.5% (𝛼+) and 93.7% (𝛼−). 
                                                 
221 Results provided for comparison include Tversky and Kahneman (1992), Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt and Paraschiv (2007a), 
Abdellaoui et al. (2008), Wu and Gonzalez (1996), Stott (2006), Bleichrodt and Pinto (2000), Donkers, Melenberg and van Soest 
(2001) and Booij et al. (2010). More information about other authors, as well as results for other parametric specifications, are 
available in extensive summaries provided by Stott (2006) and Booij et al. (2010).   
222 Note these pieces of evidence would be equivalent to risk aversion for gains and risk seeking for losses if weighting function 
is linear, but more complex risk profiles may arise when the curvature of both functions are taken together (see Chapter 5). 
median average median average
α+ 0.93 1.02 0.96 0.91
  - T&K'92: α+ = 0.88
  - Abd'08 review: 0.70 to 0.90
  - Abd'08 results: α+ = 0.86
  - Abd'07: α+ = 0.72
  - W&G'96: α+ = 0.48
  - Stott'06: α+ = 0.19
  - Donk'01: α+ = 0.61
  - Booij'10: α+ = 0.86
α- 0.44 0.52 0.43 0.50
  - T&K'92: α- = 0.88
  - Abd'08 review: 0.85 to 0.95
  - Abd'08 results: α- = 1.06
  - Abd'07: α- = 0.73
  - Donk'01: α- = 0.61
  - Booij'10: α- = 0.83
γ+ 0.63 0.64 0.60 0.52
  - T&K'92: γ+ = 0.61**
  - Abd'08: γ+ = 0.46 - 0.53
  - W&G'96: γ+ = 0.74
  - Stott'06:  γ+ = 0.94
  - B&P'00: γ+ = 0.53
  - Donk'01: γ+ = 0.413
γ- 0.50 0.53 0.58 0.40
  - T&K'92: γ- = 0.69**
  - Abd'08: γ- = 0.34 - 0.45
  - Donk'01: γ- = 0.413
βmed 2.00 3.01 2.00 3.04
βavg 2.67 3.64 2.33 3.51
** These research articles imposed a different parametric specifications other than Prelec-I for the weighting function
* Authors mentioned: T&K'92 (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992); Abd'08 (Abdellaoui et al., 2008); Abd'07 (Abdellaoui et al., 2007);
          W&G'96 (Wu and Gonzalez, 1996); Stott'06 (Stott, 2006); B&P'00 (Bleichrodt and Pinto, 2000); Donk'01 (Donkers et al., 2001);
          Booij'10 (Booij et al., 2010)
individual parameters idealized participant
Main results in the literature*
  - T&K'92: β = 2.25
  - Abd'08 review: 2.24 to 3.01
  - Abd'08 results: β = 2.61
  - Abd'07: β = 2.54
  - Booij'10 review: 1.38 to 1.63
  - Booij'10 results: β = 1.6
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We observe a significant degree of probability weighting in both domains ―with higher 
distortions in the negative side― and quantitative estimations (about 𝛾+ = 0.6 and 𝛾− = 0.5) are in 
consonance with literature. By using Prelec-I function we are imposing the classic inverse S-shaped 
weighting function observed in most studies (that is, the non-linear regressions set the restrictions γ ≤ 
1). Notwithstanding, there seems to be no debate here since aggregate indicators are significantly below 
one and most individual observations (78% for gains, 91% for losses) fitted better for gamma values 
below one (here we computed all respondents with 𝛾+, 𝛾− < 0.95).  
Parameters 𝛼− and 𝛾− suggest a strong risk seeking behavior in the negative domain by most 
participants. There may be two interpretations that are not mutually exclusive. First, the main drawback 
of experimental tests is that gains and losses are hypothetical. Though instructions emphasized the 
importance of trying to imagine situations as real, the results might suggest most participants were 
unable to fully interpret the consequences of playing a game in the negative domain. In particular, 
several participants were strongly biased in terms of probability weighting (the minimum observation 
is 𝛾− = 0.05 and one third of the sample is below the lower bound in the literature, 0.35) and most of 
them exhibited a utility curvature 𝛼− below 0.50. Second, this biased profile by some individuals suggest 
they might be better described with a weighting function that accounts for elevation as well as 
curvature, like Prelec-II (see ‘anomalies at the individual level’ for more information). Besides, since 𝛼− 
and 𝛾− are fitted simultaneously using data in the negative domain, this might also affect 𝛼− estimations 
―which are below regular results in the literature, as we noted above. 
FIGURE 7.7 – Correlation of parameters 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
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Figure 7.7 plots the correlation across participants of some parameters in the value and weighting 
functions. Red dots in all graphs are the parameters estimated for the median respondent. Graph at the 
top-left shows there seems to be a negative correlation between alpha parameters (hence, individuals 
that are more risk seeking in the positive domain tend to be risk seeking in the negative domain as well). 
Graph at the top-right shows no apparent correlation between 𝛼+ and β. Finally, there seems to be a 
positive correlation between alpha and gamma parameters, particularly significant in the positive 
domain. Section 7.4 provides complete results of statistical tests for these and additional correlations. 
Finally, our beta estimations are in consonance with classic results in the literature (a loss 
aversion higher than 2) compared to more moderate estimations reported by Booij et al. (2010). The 
percentage of individuals with beta measures above two are 73.0% for βmed (65.7% of individuals if β is 
estimated as the respondent’s average answer) and only 14.3% have β ≤ 1 (7.9% using βavg).  
The fourfold pattern of risk attitudes 
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) analyze the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes by plotting, for each 
positive prospect of the form (x , p ; 0 , 1-p), the ratio of the certainty equivalent c of the prospect to the 
nonzero outcome x, c/x, as a function of p. We do the same in the negative domain, so we get two different 
graphs of c/x over p. Figure 7.8 provides these plots for the certainty equivalents provided by the 
average (idealized) participant. 
FIGURE 7.8 – Risk attitudes of the average participant 
  
Source: Own elaboration 
Should we estimate two smooth curves, one per domain, they would be interpreted as weighting 
functions assuming a linear value function. The fourfold pattern of risk attitudes in prospect theory 
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predicts people tend to be risk seeking for gains of low probability (which we consider to be 1% and 5% 
in our test) and losses of medium and high probability, while we tend to be risk averse for gains of 
medium and high probability and losses of low probability. The pattern is clearly observable for the 
average respondent, with the nuance of an about risk neutrality for gains of medium probability. Results 
for the median respondent are quite similar.  
Now, we may extend the analysis above to the individual level and obtain the results summarized 
in Table 7.11.223 The risk attitudes predicted by prospect theory in the positive domain are generally 
satisfied, with about 2/3 of the elicitations being risk seeking for low probabilities and risk averse 
otherwise. In the negative domain the bias towards risk seeking is more evident, making results for low 
probabilities mixed. 
TABLE 7.11 – The fourfold pattern at the individual level 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
Iteration and fitting errors 
We determine the validity of participants’ responses based on two kinds of errors. The first type, 
iteration errors, refers to the reliability of the iterative questions we asked to respondents to control for 
response errors. The second type, fitting errors, refers to those obtained in the non-linear regressions 
implemented for parameter estimation assuming the pre-specified parametric forms. 
In regards to the iteration errors, Abdellaoui et al. (2008) argue that one of the main strengths of 
their model is that by allowing for response error during the elicitation process, the number of questions 
required to measure the value function is minimized. In particular, they repeated two types of iterations 
(see section 7.2 above) to obtain 96% reliability for the first replication and 66% for the second one, 
which they claim satisfactory. Using a similar approach, we repeated one iteration per question (with a 
somehow similar interpretation than Abdellaoui et al. (2008)’s second replication) for all twelve 
                                                 
223 For risk-neutrality in Table 7.11 we report the percentage of elicitations that revealed a certainty equivalent that was the 
closest possible to the expected value of the game.  
p = .01 p = .05 p = .50 p = .50 p = .95 p = .99 p = .01 p = .05 p = .50 p = .50 p = .95 p = .99
risk seeking 63.5% 65.1% 30.2% 21.4% 0.0% 0.0% 47.6% 42.1% 84.1% 88.9% 89.7% 100%
risk neutral 10.3% 16.7% 34.1% 32.5% 15.9% 0.0% 14.3% 19.0% 11.9% 8.7% 10.3% 0.0%
risk averse 26.2% 18.3% 35.7% 46.0% 84.1% 100% 38.1% 38.1% 4.0% 8.7% 0.0% 0.0%
risk seeking
risk neutral
risk averse 38.1% 3.2%
13.5%
22.2%
20.6%
66.5%
low medium - high
16.7%
low medium - high
64.3% 44.8% 90.7%12.9%
7.7%
low medium - high
GAINS LOSSES
low medium - high
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questions in the positive and negative domains. The results were highly satisfactory: on aggregate, only 
5.6% of responses were contradictory (94.4% reliability). Furthermore, 65.4% of participants made not 
a single response error, 81.7% had one error at most, and only 2 out of 126 participants made more 
than three. These results confirm that the experiment design (graphics, instructions and practice 
questions) was helpful for participants to correctly understand the task. Whether some risk profiles are 
not ‘regular ones’ (as it happens for instance with 𝛼− and 𝛾− estimations noted above) might hence be 
attributed to the difficulties for some participants to imagine hypothetical losses as real, but not to a 
misinterpretation of data. 
In what fitting errors is referred, the high quality of the R2 coefficients obtained to estimate the PT 
parameters for most individuals are both an additional confirmation that participants understood the 
task, as well as an indicative that the parametric specifications and scaling method we used were 
satisfactory. In addition, for those respondents whose coefficients were low, this in most cases might 
only indicate that with other value and weighting functions the fit quality would improve. Nonetheless, 
in section ‘anomalies at the individual level’ below we analyze some results at the individual level that 
are difficult to rationalize and that might reveal some mistakes or confusion by the respondent. In such 
case we will discuss whether they should be removed from data or not. Table 7.12 summarizes the R2 
coefficients obtained. 
TABLE 7.12 – Coefficients of determination 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
We may see that results are slightly better in the positive domain, with about 80% and 65% of the 
individual regressions being satisfactory and only three observations (2.4%) in the positive domain and 
one (0.8%) in the negative domain being really weak. 
Anomalies at the individual level 
The coefficients of determination R2 are helpful to identify some results at the individual level that are 
difficult to put in consonance with the basic predictions of prospect theory. We highlight eight cases 
whose risk attitudes (plotting of c/x over p) are described in Figure 7.9 next. These individuals show the 
lowest fitting accuracy either on any of the two domains of both. As an additional piece of evidence, all 
but one of these individuals made at least one iteration error, for an average of 1.75 errors per 
respondent, statistically higher (p < 0.01) than 0.61 of all the other participants, which might suggest 
these profiles correspond to participants that had more problems to understand the task. 
positive
domain
negative
domain
R2 ≥ 99 19.8% 19.0%
R2 ≥ 90 79.4% 65.1%
R2 < 50 2.4% 0.8%
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FIGURE 7.9 – Risk attitudes of eight individual anomalies 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
In some cases it seems difficult not to agree that some answers reveal a response error. Just to 
illustrate, p = 0.99 in the positive domain of case 4 or the same probability in the negative domain of 
case 6. Other examples reveal profiles that are hard to rationalize. Take for instance case 7 in the positive 
domain (the one with the lowest coefficient of determination of all participants, R2 = 0.05), where the 
respondent required 355 euros for not accepting a prospect to win 1,000 euros with 5% probability, but 
a lower amount (342.5 euros) for not accepting 2,000 euros with 95% probability. Similar situations 
appear when comparing responses for p = 50% with high and low probabilities (e.g., case 1 in the 
negative domain or 8 in the positive one). 
R2 = 0.53 R2 = 0.63 R2 = 0.74 R2 = 0.58
R2 = 0.88 R2 = 0.52 R2 = 0.30 R2 = 0.70
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0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Positive prospects
.00
.200
.400
.600
.800
1.00
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Negative prospects
.00
.200
.400
.600
.800
1.00
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Positive prospects
.00
.200
.400
.600
.800
1.00
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Negative prospects
.00
.200
.400
.600
.800
1.00
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Positive prospects
.00
.200
.400
.600
.800
1.00
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Negative prospects
.00
.200
.400
.600
.800
1.00
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Positive prospects
.00
.200
.400
.600
.800
1.00
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Negative prospects
R2 = 0.97 R2 = 0.51 R2 = 0.86 R2 = 0.40
R2 = 0.05 R2 = 0.88 R2 = 0.29 R2 = 0.59
Case 7 Case 8
Case 5 Case 6
.00
.200
.400
.600
.800
1.00
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Positive prospects
.00
.200
.400
.600
.800
1.00
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Negative prospects
.00
.200
.400
.600
.800
1.00
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Positive prospects
.00
.200
.400
.600
.800
1.00
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Negative prospects
.00
.200
.400
.600
.800
1.00
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Positive prospects
.00
.200
.400
.600
.800
1.00
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Negative prospects
.00
.200
.400
.600
.800
1.00
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Positive prospects
.00
.200
.400
.600
.800
1.00
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Negative prospects
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However, other cases show a risk profile that is too aggressive or unusual, but not necessarily a 
response error. Take for instance case 3 in the negative domain, which features a high risk seeking 
profile, or cases 2 and 6 in the positive domain, which might reveal that the inverse-S shaped weighting 
function is not suitable for them. Hence, we conclude we cannot detect anomalies based solely on R2. 
Furthermore, removing some of these individuals on a case by case basis might be misleading, for two 
reasons. First, though we believe our reasons are well grounded, some may say it introduces a subjective 
criteria by the experimenter. Second, there may be other anomalies that are not so evident in terms of a 
low R2 value, what would require analyzing the whole experimental group on a case by case basis. 
Henceforth, given the conclusions of our analysis at the individual level we decide not to remove 
any observations for any of the PT parameters. However, we think lessons can be learned for future 
research. Some improvements can be made to our tests that do not affect its goodness of fit. The idea is 
to ask only six questions per domain as option-by-default, but setting the computer application to ask 
additional questions when an individual provides an answer that might be interpreted as a response 
error. Two examples of answers that would trigger a check question could be some pairs of questions224 
that are given responses which are different up to pre-specified levels, and c/x ratios for questions with 
probabilities p = 0.5 that are below (above) ratios at low (high) probabilities. This scheme would be 
helpful to confirm answers that discard response errors, while it only requires additional questions (and 
time to complete the tests) to some participants. 
We leave two open questions in search for additional improvements that can be made to our tests. 
First, regarding loss aversion, we made three questions to estimate βmed and βavg under the assumption 
that utility is linear for small amounts of money. Both measures lose information when estimations are 
made from only three questions, but median estimations worked better. This is attributed, in most cases, 
to the evidence that answers to the higher amount (100 euros) tend to be affected by the curvature of 
the value function.225 One might suggest that posing three questions with values like 1, 5 and 10 euros, 
or 1, 10 and 20, might be a better option to assume linearity of the utility function. However, we should 
be careful as the sensibility of the value function to higher or lower amounts of money varies across 
individuals. For instance, samples of older individuals or with higher income levels might reveal 
insensitivity to such low amounts of money ―hence eliciting loss aversion levels that are closer to 1.  
A second open question is in regard to how to foster more realistic answers by participants in the 
experiment. This problem is universal in experimental economics, where we require participants taking 
roles on bona fide but in hypothetical situations. A classic solution is to implement a set of incentives. 
                                                 
224  In our tests the pairs of questions would be both questions for p = 0.5, questions for p = 0.01 and p = 0.05, and questions 
for p = 0.95 and p = 0.99. 
225 Table A5 in the Appendix shows median answers to questions with 1 euro and 10 euros exhibit a loss aversion of 2.0, but 
with 100 euros it increases to 3.0. If we compare average answers, loss aversion increases but the effect is observed anyway: 
3.0 for 1 and 10 euros, but 4.85 for 100 euros. We could also estimate a truncated average at 5% to exclude extreme values 
from average estimations to get the same effect: 2.6 and 2.8 for 1 euro and 10 euros, but 3.9 for 100 euros. 
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However, we observed this unrealistic behavior particularly in the negative domain, where participants 
are exposed to potential losses. In this scenario, the incentive solution is implausible as it would require 
a sample of individuals willing to participate in an experiment where they are offered to lose real money. 
 
7.4. HYPOTHESIS TESTING AND RESULTS 
 
7.4.1. Hypotheses 
Once the validity of the questionnaires has been confirmed, we now use the estimated parameters to 
test two types of hypotheses: the effect of priors over variables, and the relationship among variables. 
We leave the second type to the end of this section. Regarding the first effect, we review the literature 
to posit several hypotheses regarding the effects of priors over the variables in our tests. 
Gender. Lundeberg, Fox and Punccohar (1994) show men are more overconfident. Barber and 
Odean (2001) show men trade more frequently and exhibit more losses than women, and attribute it to 
male overconfidence. Kamas and Preston (2012) investigate whether gender differences in choosing to 
enter competitive tournaments are due to women’s lower taste for competition or differences in 
confidence, with mixed results. Kuyper and Dijkstra (2009) examine the better-than-average effect 
among secondary school students during 3 consecutive years and find strong support on the hypothesis 
that boys exhibit more overplacement than girls. Following this research, we set the next hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1 
H0: Men are more overconfident than women 
1a – H0: Men are more overconfident in terms of overestimation (higher E) 
1b – H0: Men are more overconfident in terms of overplacement (higher P) 
1c – H0: Men are more overconfident in terms of overprecision (lower M) 
Schmidt and Traub (2002) find female subjects exhibit both a more frequent occurrence and a 
larger extent of loss aversion. Booij et al. (2010) find females are more risk averse than males due to 
probability weighting and loss aversion. On the contrary, Abdellaoui et al. (2008) find no gender effect 
on loss aversion. Hence, we suggest the next hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2 
H0: Women exhibit a larger degree of loss aversion than men 
2a – H0: Women exhibit a higher βmed 
2b – H0: Women exhibit a higher βavg 
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Booij et al. (2010) find the weighting function for gains varies with gender and age, while for losses 
it seems unrelated to any background variables. Contrariwise to earlier studies that ascribed the higher 
risk aversion of women solely to differences in the degree of utility curvature, their results show this 
gender difference is driven by probability weighting and loss aversion. Abdellaoui et al. (2008) also find 
no significant gender-dependent difference in utility curvature for either gains or losses. Hence, we want 
to test which parameters explain the higher risk aversion observed for women, either the curvature of 
the utility (𝛼+ and 𝛼−) or the weighting (𝛾+ and 𝛾−) functions. The first case is easy to test, simply 
stating the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3 
H0: Women are more risk averse in terms of utility curvature 
3a – H0: Women exhibit lower α+ 
3b – H0: Women exhibit higher α- 
It is important to note once again that, here and in section results, whenever we say something 
like “women are more risk averse in terms of alpha”, we are ignoring the effect of probability weightings. 
Indeed, the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes requires to discuss risk aversion and risk seeking in terms 
of value and weighting functions simultaneously. 
The second case, that is, the hypothesis that risk aversion is explained by the curvature of the 
weighting function, must be qualified. Given the properties of one-parameter weighting functions like 
Prelec-I, the lower 𝛾+ (the higher 𝛾−) the higher risk aversion, but only for gains (losses) of moderate 
to high probability. For gains and losses of low probability, the risk profile is the opposite. Consequently, 
we test the following: 
Hypothesis 4 
H0: Women are more risk averse in terms of curvature of the weighting function 
4a – H0: Women exhibit lower γ+ (for gains of moderate/high probability only) 
4b – H0: Women exhibit higher γ- (for gains of moderate/high probability only) 
Age. Regarding the effects of age on overconfidence, results are mixed. Crawford and Stankov 
(1996) review the literature to find a tendency of greater caution with increasing age, such that the older 
the person the lower the overconfidence. However, it is also widely accepted that most abilities spanned 
by typical tests of mental ability show a decline with increasing age through adulthood. The general 
finding is that working on recall prediction tasks “there is a fairly consistent tendency for older adults to 
show greater overconfidence in their performance predictions” (p. 89). Other authors supporting the idea 
that overconfidence increases with age include Hanson et al. (2008) in intuitive confidence intervals 
(i.e., overprecision), though it may be compensated by an age-related increase in knowledge. 
251 
 
On the contrary, Sandroni and Squintani (2009) find young adults (18 to 24 years old) are less 
likely than any other risk class to buy health or motorist insurance, and assert that established 
experimental evidence finds overconfidence is particularly pervasive among young adults. Zell and 
Alicke (2011) also investigated whether overplacement is related to age, finding a better-than-average 
effect in people of all ages, but particularly relevant for young and middle-aged adults on dimensions for 
which older people have clear deficiencies (i.e., athleticism, physical attractiveness). Finally, Grinblatt 
and Keloharju (2009) don’t find consistent results to suggest age is able to explain the higher trading of 
overconfident traders, nor the gender gap in trading between men and women. Hence, we choose to 
shed some light on this debate by testing the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 5 
H0: The younger the person, the more overconfident he/she is  
5a – H0: The younger, the higher the overestimation (higher E). 
5b – H0: The younger, the higher the overplacement (higher P) 
5c – H0: The younger, the higher the overprecision (lower M) 
Education. Booij et al. (2010) find education ―defined as having a higher academic degree― does 
not affect utility curvature, nor it is associated with a more linear weighting of probabilities. They find 
this result surprising: if we view expected utility as the rational choice of model under risk, one would 
expect higher educated individuals to weight probabilities more linearly. However, they do find 
education to be associated with a lower degree of loss aversion, suggesting that the reduction in risk 
aversion with years of schooling observed in empirical research (e.g., Donkers et al., 2001) stems mainly 
from lower sensitivity to losses. Hence, we want to check two hypotheses… 
Hypothesis 6 
H0: The higher the education (academic degree), the more linear probability weighting 
6a – H0: The higher the education, γ+ closer to 1 
6b – H0: The higher the education, γ- closer to 1 
Hypothesis 7 
H0: The higher the education (academic degree), the lower the degree of loss aversion 
7a – H0: The more education, the lower loss aversion (lower βmed) 
7b – H0: The more education, the lower loss aversion (lower βavg) 
…plus one additional hypothesis in terms of academic experience having a positive effect over subjects’ 
ability to be more objective in terms of overconfidence. 
Experience. We interpret working experience in the same sense as education. Thus, we interpret 
experience could have a positive effect over subjects’ ability to be more objective in their estimations 
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learning how to weight probabilities more linearly, and moderating both under- and overconfidence. 
Hence we want to test three sets of hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 8 
H0: The more experience the more linear probability weighting 
8a – H0: The more experience, γ+ closer to 1 (higher γ+) 
8b – H0: The more experience, γ- closer to 1 (higher γ-) 
Hypothesis 9 
H0: The more experience, the lower the degree of loss aversion 
9a – H0: The more experience, the lower loss aversion (lower βmed) 
9b – H0: The more experience, the lower loss aversion (lower βavg) 
Hypothesis 10 
H0: The more experience, the more objective estimations in terms of confidence 
10a – H0: ... |E| in absolute terms is closer to 0. 
10b – H0: ... |P| in absolute terms is closer to 0. 
10c – H0: ... |M| in absolute terms is closer to 1. 
Skills (in finance). Most participants are students of some degree related to finance (business and 
economics). However, we included a subgroup of students in computing, law and others, what allows us 
to test the effects of financial skills over risk attitudes and overconfidence. In particular, we want to test 
the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 11 
H0: Skills in finance reduce overconfidence 
11a – H0: Skills in finance reduce overestimation (lower E). 
11b – H0: Skills in finance reduce overplacement (lower P) 
11c – H0: Skills in finance reduce overprecision (higher M) 
Hypothesis 12 
H0: Skills in finance increase loss aversion 
12a – H0: Skills in finance exhibit a higher βmed 
12b – H0: Skills in finance exhibit a higher βavg 
Hypothesis 13 
H0: Skills in finance increase risk aversion 
13a – H0: Skills in finance exhibit a lower α+ 
13b – H0: Skills in finance exhibit a higher α- 
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Hypothesis 14 
H0: Skills in finance induce a more linear probability weighting 
14a – H0: Skills in finance exhibit a higher γ+ 
14b – H0: Skills in finance exhibit a higher γ- 
A second set of hypotheses may be posed to test the relationship among the behavioral variables, 
rather than the effect of priors over the variables. For instance, as we saw in Section 7.2, a classic result 
is that overprecision is more persistent than the other two types of overconfidence (Moore and Healy, 
2008), though its presence reduces the magnitude of both overestimation and overplacement. 
Consequently, we are interested in testing the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 15 
H0: The higher the overprecision the lower overestimation and overplacement 
15a – H0: The lower M, the lower E 
15b – H0: The lower M, the lower P 
Additional hypotheses could be posed by an exploratory analysis of correlations among 
overconfidence and PT parameters to see, for instance, if more risk seeking individuals are correlated 
with those that are more overconfident.  
7.4.2. Results 
We conduct an analysis at the variable level and a factorial analysis. We analyze them separately. 
Variable analysis 
First thing to note is that three priors are strongly correlated: age, level (education) and (working) 
experience. Table 7.13 summarizes the correlations and statistical significance. Correlations with age 
hardly vary when outliers are excluded, denoted age (r) in the table. These correlations may affect the 
results in the hypothesis testing, particularly when using regressions ―as multicollineality might 
appear. In addition, a generic way to set the hypothesis testing is to obtain the correlation matrix among 
priors and behavioral variables. Table 7.14 summarizes the results we obtain. The only significant 
correlation between priors and variables appears between level (education) and loss aversion (βmed at 
barely 5%, βavg for p < 0.05), but with a positive sign (rejecting the null hypothesis in test 7a). Despite 
these results, remember we declared level in our experimental group to be a bad proxy for education, 
so we would take the interpretation that education increases loss aversion only carefully.226 
                                                 
226 Some other relationships between priors and variables go in the same direction as the null hypotheses tested, but with no 
statistical significance. First, age reduces overconfidence: older students exhibit lower overestimation and overplacement 
(with no statistical significance) as well as of overprecision, with a statistical significance that improves for both measures, but 
only to about 20%. Second, educated (level) and more experienced individuals (working experience) weight probabilities more 
linearly, but only in the positive domain (γ+). Third, working experience reduces both measures of loss aversion. 
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TABLE 7.13 – Correlations among priors 
  
Source: Own elaboration 
TABLE 7.14 – Correlation matrix. Priors and variables 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
Age (r) Level Exper.
Pearson Correlation 1 ,616** ,403**
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000
N 125 125 125
Pearson Correlation ,616** 1 ,210
*
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .018
N 125 126 126
Pearson Correlation ,403** ,210
* 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .018
N 125 126 126
Age Level Exper.
Pearson Correlation 1 ,497
**
,409
**
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000
N 126 126 125
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Experience
Correlations
Age
Correlations
Age (r)
Level
Age (r) Level Exper. E P Mmed Mavg alpha + alpha - gamma + gamma - βmed βavg (r)
Pearson Correlation 1 ,616** ,403** -.030 -.065 .111 .114 .070 .033 .056 -.035 .042 .090
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .738 .474 .221 .208 .439 .714 .532 .699 .643 .324
N 125 125 125 125 125 124 124 125 125 125 125 125 122
Pearson Correlation ,616** 1 ,210* -.024 .047 -.027 .041 -.001 -.029 .018 -.054 .174 ,209*
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .018 .790 .598 .764 .647 .987 .746 .842 .551 .051 .020
N 125 126 126 126 126 125 125 126 126 126 126 126 123
Pearson Correlation ,403** ,210
* 1 .151 .046 .035 -.060 .077 -.094 .054 -.105 -.036 -.002
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .018 .091 .611 .700 .508 .394 .294 .548 .244 .690 .980
N 125 126 126 126 126 125 125 126 126 126 126 126 123
Pearson Correlation -.030 -.024 .151 1 ,690** -.123 -.166 -.055 .165 .055 -.025 -.065 -,199*
Sig. (2-tailed) .738 .790 .091 .000 .173 .064 .544 .065 .537 .782 .468 .027
N 125 126 126 126 126 125 125 126 126 126 126 126 123
Pearson Correlation -.065 .047 .046 ,690
** 1 -.039 -.144 -.122 .096 .104 .069 -.010 -.089
Sig. (2-tailed) .474 .598 .611 .000 .664 .109 .174 .285 .246 .441 .913 .325
N 125 126 126 126 126 125 125 126 126 126 126 126 123
Pearson Correlation .111 -.027 .035 -.123 -.039 1 ,672** -.121 .008 .032 .165 .052 .087
Sig. (2-tailed) .221 .764 .700 .173 .664 .000 .180 .932 .723 .066 .564 .339
N 124 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 122
Pearson Correlation .114 .041 -.060 -.166 -.144 ,672** 1 -.095 .041 -.021 .144 .122 ,193*
Sig. (2-tailed) .208 .647 .508 .064 .109 .000 .293 .653 .812 .110 .175 .033
N 124 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 122
Pearson Correlation .070 -.001 .077 -.055 -.122 -.121 -.095 1 -,211* ,597** -.133 -.036 -.040
Sig. (2-tailed) .439 .987 .394 .544 .174 .180 .293 .018 .000 .139 .687 .658
N 125 126 126 126 126 125 125 126 126 126 126 126 123
Pearson Correlation .033 -.029 -.094 .165 .096 .008 .041 -,211
* 1 -.093 ,326
**
,294
** ,308**
Sig. (2-tailed) .714 .746 .294 .065 .285 .932 .653 .018 .301 .000 .001 .001
N 125 126 126 126 126 125 125 126 126 126 126 126 123
Pearson Correlation .056 .018 .054 .055 .104 .032 -.021 ,597
** -.093 1 ,250
** -.068 -.097
Sig. (2-tailed) .532 .842 .548 .537 .246 .723 .812 .000 .301 .005 .450 .287
N 125 126 126 126 126 125 125 126 126 126 126 126 123
Pearson Correlation -.035 -.054 -.105 -.025 .069 .165 .144 -.133 ,326
**
,250
** 1 -.035 .008
Sig. (2-tailed) .699 .551 .244 .782 .441 .066 .110 .139 .000 .005 .698 .926
N 125 126 126 126 126 125 125 126 126 126 126 126 123
Pearson Correlation .042 .174 -.036 -.065 -.010 .052 .122 -.036 ,294** -.068 -.035 1 ,918**
Sig. (2-tailed) .643 .051 .690 .468 .913 .564 .175 .687 .001 .450 .698 .000
N 125 126 126 126 126 125 125 126 126 126 126 126 123
Pearson Correlation .090 ,209* -.002 -,199* -.089 .087 ,193* -.040 ,308** -.097 .008 ,918** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .324 .020 .980 .027 .325 .339 .033 .658 .001 .287 .926 .000
N 122 123 123 123 123 122 122 123 123 123 123 123 123
βavg (r)
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
alpha +
alpha -
gamma +
gamma -
βmed
Mmed
Mavg
Experience
E
P
Age (r)
Level
Correlations
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In regards to the statistical correlation among behavioral biases, more significant results appear. 
First, there is clear evidence that overestimation and overplacement are highly correlated (p < 0.01). 
However, our results don’t support Moore and Healy (2008)’s assertion that overprecision reduces both 
overestimation and overplacement. On the contrary, it increases both E and P, though the correlations 
are only barely significant for Mavg. A second set of correlations may be traced among PT parameters. 
We find very interesting results. First, risk seeking comes together in both domains: 𝛼+ and 𝛼− are 
correlated (note the negative sign) with statistical significance (p < 0.05). Second, an objective weighting 
of probabilities also come together in both domains: 𝛾+ and 𝛾− are positively correlated with high 
statistical significance (p < 0.01). Additionally, 𝛼+ and 𝛾+ as well as 𝛼− and 𝛾− are correlated with high 
significance (p < 0.01), but this may be only a result of both pairs of parameters being estimated 
simultaneously. Finally, there is strong evidence that loss aversion and risk aversion in the negative 
domain come together as well. We must be careful with this result, as we noted in subsection 7.3.2 that 
our measures of loss aversion (particularly βavg) may be affected by utility curvature. However, two facts 
support the reliability of this correlation. First, the median indicator shows the best results. Second, the 
positive relationship between 𝛼− and βavg works better when outliers are excluded (p < 0.01). 
Finally, we may observe the relationship between OC and PT parameters. We find only significant 
positive correlations (at 10%) between 𝛼− and E and between 𝛾− and M. These correlations are harder 
to interpret, as they suggest individuals with a more aggressive profile for losses (higher risk seeking 
and distortion of probabilities) would be correlated with lower levels of overconfidence (in terms of 
overestimation and overprecision). However, this result might also be consistent with Kahneman and 
Lovallo’s (1993) suggestion that biases can cancel out. 
Some hypotheses require alternative testing solutions other than correlations. These include tests 
for gender and skills, which are nominal variables, and the Hypothesis 10, which requires an alternative 
procedure. In the first case, we implement an ANOVA test (difference of means test). Results are 
summarized in Table A.9 in the Appendix. Regarding gender, significant differences (p < 0.05) appear in 
terms of Mavg , 𝛼+, 𝛼− and 𝛾−, and in terms of Mmed (p < 0.1). This implies women are significantly more 
overconfident than men in terms of overprecision (contrary to Hypothesis 1), more risk seeking in terms 
of utility curvature both in the positive and negative domains (contrary to Hypothesis 3) and with a 
higher distortion of probabilities in the negative domain. Regarding skills, the results obtained suggest 
skills in finance increases objectivity reducing probability distortion (p < 0.01) and reduces risk 
aversion (p < 0.1), both in the positive domain. The first result supports Hypothesis 14, the second one 
goes against Hypothesis 13.227 
                                                 
227 Several other relationships go in the same direction as the null hypotheses to be tested, but with no statistical significance 
at all. Regarding gender these include men are more overconfident in terms of M and P, while women are more risk seeking 
(both domains) in terms of utility curvature but more loss averse. Regarding skills in finance, these include reducing 
overestimation and increasing loss aversion (βmed). 
256 
 
In the second case, Table 7.15 summarizes the correlations between level and experience on one 
hand, and the absolute deviations of the OC measures with respect to neutrality (i.e., the absolute values 
of E and P, and the absolute deviations of M with respect to 1).228 Contrary to our hypotheses, we obtain 
significant evidence that experience reduces objectivity in terms of estimation of self-performance. 
TABLE 7.15 – Correlation matrix for objectivity 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
Finally, we conduct a regression analysis of behavioral biases over priors, where gender and skills 
are dummy variables.229 Since multicollineality appears among age, level and experience we perform a 
stepwise procedure for variable selection. Results are summarized in Table 7.16. More complete 
information about the regressions is available in Table A.10 in the Appendix. 
TABLE 7.16 – Regression models. Behavioral biases to priors 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
                                                 
228 For simplicity we report only M in absolute terms using Mmed observations. 
229 Dummy variables were defined as (0 = woman; 1 = man) for gender and (0 = other skills; 1 = skills in finance) for skills. 
Level Exper. Eabs Pabs Mabs
Pearson Correlation 1 ,210
* -0.0334 -.083 -.027
Sig. (2-tailed) .018 .710 .353 .764
N 126 126 126 126 125
Pearson Correlation ,210
* 1 ,222
* .136 .035
Sig. (2-tailed) .018 .012 .130 .700
N 126 126 126 126 125
Pearson Correlation -0.03 ,222
* 1 -.023 -.144
Sig. (2-tailed) .710 .012 .799 .108
N 126 126 126 126 125
Pearson Correlation -.083 .136 -.023 1 .169
Sig. (2-tailed) .353 .130 .799 .060
N 126 126 126 126 125
Pearson Correlation .052 -.029 .118 -,198* 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .562 .751 .190 .027
N 125 125 125 125 125
Correlations
Level
Experience
Eabs
Pabs
Mabs
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
1 2 3 4 5 6
Dependent 
variable
Mavg α+ α- γ
+ γ- βavg 
Constant 0.406 1.127 0.463 0.504 0.468 2.429
Gender 0.108 -0.197 0.111 -       0.109 -       
(s ignific .) 0.039 0.016 0.045 0.027
Age -       -       -       -       -       -       
(s ignific .)
Level -       -       -       -       -       0.186    
(s ignific .) 0.020
Skills -       -       -       0.167    -       -       
(s ignific .) 0.005
Experience -       -       -       -       -       -       
(s ignific .)
R2 0.034 0.046 0.032 0.062 0.039 0.044
adj. R2 0.026 0.038 0.024 0.054 0.031 0.036
Model
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We obtain results that are coherent with the correlations above. In particular, they predict women 
exhibit more overprecision (lower Mavg), higher risk seeking in terms of utility curvature (higher 𝛼+ and 
lower 𝛼−) and higher distortion of probabilities in the negative domain (lower 𝛾−). Skills in finance 
would explain a more objective weighting of probabilities (higher 𝛾+) while the more education (level) 
the higher loss aversion (βavg). The explanatory power of these models is very low in all instances, but 
significantly different from zero in any case. 
Factorial analysis 
We conduct a factor analysis of overconfidence measures on one hand, and prospect theory on the 
other.230 Results are summarized in Table 7.17. 
TABLE 7.17 – Factorial analysis. Overconfidence and PT 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
We may observe that the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) provides quite intuitive results. On 
one hand, it suggests all overconfidence variables may be synthetized into a single factor, which from 
now on we denote as OC. The sign of each bias is coherent with their interpretation: E and P are 
positively related to overconfidence, while M is negatively related to it. Prospect theory parameters, on 
the other hand, are assembled into three factors that separate the risk profile for gains, the risk profile 
for losses, and loss aversion. The rotated component matrix suggests the first factor would correspond 
to the risk profile for gains (𝛼+ and 𝛾+), hence we will denote it GAINS. Both variables load positively 
on this factor, implying the higher the GAINS factor the more risk seeking.231 The second factor would 
symmetrically correspond to the risk profile for losses (𝛼− and 𝛾−), which we denote LOSSES. Since 
both variables load positively on it, now this factor should be interpreted as higher LOSSES implying 
                                                 
230 For simplicity, for overprecision and loss aversion in the factorial analysis we have only considered the median measures, 
Mmed and βmed respectively.  
231 Note that higher γ+ implies more risk seeking only for medium/high probabilities. 
.497 .424
Approx. Chi-Sq 82.247 Approx. Chi-Sq 112.082
df 3 df 10
Sig. .000 Sig. .000
Component
1 1 2 3
Overestimation .919 gamma + .891 .246 -.086
Overplacement .907 alpha + .888 -.229 .013
Overprecision Mmed -.208 gamma - .082 .922 -.090
alpha - -.199 .608 .559
βmed .011 -.065 .933     a. 1 components extracted.
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis
Rotation Method. Varimax Normalization with Kaiser.a
     a. Rotation converged in 4 iterations.
Component
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis
Bartlett's Test
of Sphericity
Bartlett's Test
of Sphericity
Component Matrix
a
Rotated Component Matrix
a
KMO and Bartlett's Test KMO and Bartlett's Test
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure
     of Sampling Adequacy
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure
     of Sampling Adequacy
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more risk aversion (again, higher 𝛾− implies more risk aversion only for medium/high probabilities). 
Finally, the third factor basically corresponds to loss aversion (βmed) with some additional effect by risk 
aversion to losses (𝛼−). Both variables load positively on this factor, suggesting that the higher loss 
aversion (and risk aversion to sure losses), the higher the factor. Hence, we denote this factor 
LOSSAVERSION.  
We may reproduce similar analyses based on ANOVA tests and regressions as we did before, but 
now using factors instead of behavioral variables. The ANOVA tests for gender and skills ―summarized 
in Table A.11 in the Appendix― provide additional support on the hypotheses that women exhibit a 
higher aversion to a sure loss (a risk seeking profile since LOSSES is significantly lower for them than 
for men) and that skills in finance reduces risk aversion in the positive domain (GAINS). Finally, 
regression results provide identical support to both findings, summarized in Table 7.18.  
TABLE 7.18 – Regression models. Behavioral factors to priors 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
 
7.5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
We introduced a set of tests to elicit the three measures of overconfidence as well as the complete set of 
parameters of value and weighting functions in prospect theory. We also provide extensive evidence 
that the experimental research implemented to validate our tests confirm they are broadly efficient to 
replicate the standard results in the literature. In particular, the results obtained are in order. 
First, with only four trivia similar to those by Moore and Healy (2008) we obtain satisfactory 
results in terms of simplicity (it requires only about 8 minutes per indicator) and efficiency to provide 
individual measures of overestimation and overplacement. 
1 2
Dependent 
variable
GAINS LOSSES
Constant -0.489 -0.283
Gender -       0.540    
(s ignific .) 0.002
Age -       -       
(s ignific .)
Level -       -       
(s ignific .)
Skills 0.593    -       
(s ignific .) 0.011
Experience -       -       
(s ignific .)
R2 0.051 0.073
adj. R2 0.043 0.066
Model
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Second, a test of fifteen questions in about 20 minutes revealed effective as well to replicate the 
main findings of prospect theory, considering the properties of the value and weighting functions, the 
fourfold pattern of risk attitudes, iteration and fitting errors, and anomalies at the individual level. 
Third, our test for overprecision, instead, revealed to be unable to obtain individual estimations 
that are stable for different refinement methods. In future research, having more questions per domain 
will be necessary, while it would also be desirable to ask additional questions on personal experience to 
balance domains.  
Fourth, the chapter also contributes to provide additional evidence about how gender, education 
and skills in finance affect overconfidence and risk aversion. In particular, our analysis enhances the 
scope for empirical application of prospect theory and overconfidence by using the same group of 
respondents in the experimental analysis ―something that, to the best of our knowledge, was not done 
before. This allows us to provide new insight on the relationship between these two relevant areas in 
the behavioral literature. 
Additional enhancements for future research might be introducing questions on abilities and 
perceptual tasks (Stankov et al., 2012) in the trivia test to moderate the general drift towards 
overestimation, and setting the computer application in the PT test to refine answers that might be 
interpreted as a response error by asking an additional questions. Finally, two open questions in the PT 
test are how to improve loss aversion estimations, since sensibility of the value function to lower 
amounts of money varies across individuals, and how to foster more realistic answers, particularly in 
the negative domain as incentives would be an implausible solution as it would require a sample of 
individuals willing to participate in an experiment where they are offered to lose real money.  
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CHAPTER 8. CREDIT POLICIES IN AN EXPERIMENTAL SETTING 
 
8.1. OBJECTIVE 
 
We continue the experimental research in Chapter 7 to determine whether the behavioral biases 
identified among a series of participants in the experiment could feed, among that same set of 
respondents, a risk-seeking behavior in a simulated credit market. We design an original business 
simulation game and organized a series of five experimental sessions with students described in Chapter 
7 to test the effects that different levels of overconfidence and risk profile according to prospect theory 
have on the credit policies the participants implemented in the experiment. Thus, in Chapter 8 we 
describe how the experimental game was designed and the results that were obtained.232 
Following the outline described in Figure 7.1, in Chapter 7 we obtain a behavioral profile of each 
participant in the experiment. Now, Chapter 8 deals with the right-hand side of that outline: the design 
of a strategy game that replicates how banks grant credit to customers, in order to obtain information 
about how much credit and at what price different subjects would grant, under conditions of uncertainty 
and risk about the economic environment. In short, the game is designed to obtain specific information 
about how different players (the same 126 participants that completed the behavioral tests in Chapter 
7) behave when granting credit to the economy, in order to test the possible relationships between 
behavioral profile and risk attitudes in the game. 
In what follows we explain how the experiment was implemented in two instances. In Section 8.2 
we explain the design of the experiment: we briefly review the literature on business simulation games 
and recall our discussion on banking efficiency and credit markets in Chapter 1 to propose a set of 
dependent variables, representative of the credit policies, to be tested against the behavioral profiles of 
the respondents. Then, in Section 8.3 we explain how the experiment was conducted; instructions given 
to participants and procedures they were told to implement in order to set their optimal credit policies. 
The chapter is organized as follows. First, in Section 8.2 we explain the experiment design. Section 
8.3 describes the basics of the game and variables to be measured. Section 8.4 analyzes the data matrix 
that resulted. Section 8.5 provides the hypotheses to be tested and the results we obtain. Finally, Section 
8.6 concludes.  
                                                 
232 The remainder of this Chapter 8 reproduces a manuscript in the third round of revision in a JCR ranked journal at the time 
of the writing of this thesis. 
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8.2. EXPERIMENT DESIGN 
 
Our goal is to implement an experimental design that sets participants in a situation where they play 
the role of a bank having to grant credit to a series of customers, provided a set of information about 
clients’ solvency and macroeconomic perspectives. With that goal in mind, in this section we make a 
short review of the literature on business simulation games, banking efficiency and credit markets. This 
will lead us to define the basic approach to the game design, as well as the variables representative of 
the credit policies by participants in the experiment we want to test. 
8.2.1. Literature on business simulation games 
Experimental economics ―the use of experimentation to address economic questions (Loewenstein, 
1999)― is a growing field. Controlled laboratory experimentation came to help economists to solve a 
major empirical challenge: going beyond correlational analysis to provide insights on causation (List, 
2009). Furthermore, since the experimental model of the physical sciences revealed a good method to 
understand human behavior (Levitt and List, 2009), the success of the experimental approach is 
particularly relevant in behavioral economics. A brief review of literature on experimental economics 
and, in particular, on business simulation games, will be essential to describe the type of research we 
are about to conduct and the main characteristics it must incorporate. 
Harrison and List (2004) define what might be better called an ideal experiment: the one that “is 
able to observe a subject in a controlled setting but where the subject does not perceive any of the controls 
as being unnatural and there is no deception being practiced.” They consequently classify controlled 
experiments in laboratory and field experiments ―the latter being either artefactual, framed or 
natural.233 Framed field experiments have the advantage of avoiding some shortcomings of social 
experiments such as randomization bias, attrition bias and substitution bias (Levitt and List, 2009).234 
However, a classic problem is in regards of their external validity:235 the fact that subjects are in an 
environment where they are aware that their behavior is being monitored, recorded, and subsequently 
scrutinized, might cause generalizability to be compromised (Levitt and List, 2007). The incorporation 
                                                 
233 We may recall our description of controlled experiments, provided in Chapter 2. Thus, artefactual field experiment is the 
most minor departure from the typical laboratory experiment, in the sense that it mimics a lab experiment except that it uses 
‘non-standard’ subjects. A framed field experiment would be the same as an artefactual field experiment, except that it 
incorporates important elements of the context of the naturally occurring environment. Finally, natural experiments are those 
completed in cases where the environment is such that the subjects naturally undertake these tasks and where they do not 
know they are participants in an experiment. (Harrison and List, 2004; Levitt and List, 2009). 
234 Experimental research involves the generation of a random sequence by which to assign subjects: the randomization 
sequence must be adequately protected so subjects are not aware of the upcoming assignment (Viera and Bangdiwala, 2007). 
Attrition is a type of selection bias caused by loss of participants, due either to missing data or dropouts (Graham, 2009).  
235 Most empirical research by psychologists discuss the tension of internal and external validity. Internal validity refers to the 
ability to draw confident causal conclusions from one’s research. External validity refers to the ability to generalize from the 
research context to the settings that the research is intended to approximate (Loewenstein, 1999). 
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of markets, repetition and incentives would improve their validity, but perhaps not completely solve the 
problem.236 Consequently, we will discuss the external validity of our experiment in the conclusions to 
this chapter. 
Lab and field experiments have been used to test a wide variety of economic issues, including 
auction, the private provision of public goods, preference elicitation, competitive market theory, and 
information assimilation among traders (see Levitt and List, 2009, for further details). Our experiment 
is designed to explore retail credit markets in terms of the last genre, i.e., informational assimilation. In 
particular, we conduct a simulation of a retail credit market for such purpose. 
A simulation is an evolving case study of a particular social or physical reality in which the 
participants take on bona fide roles with well-defined responsibilities and constraints (De Freitas and 
Oliver, 2006; Gredler, 2004). Three basic elements any experiment in economics must incorporate are 
an environment defining the payoffs, an institution defining the language and rules, and behavior (Smith, 
2001). More specifically, Gredler (2004) defines four important characteristics of simulations: (i) a 
model that permits the students to interact with a complex real-world situation; (ii) a defined task and 
role for every participant involved; (iii) an environment that allows students to execute a range of 
strategies; and (iv) the presence of a feedback system for participants in order to create a change of 
strategies in them. 
To sum up, for our experimental setting to be satisfactory two types of elements must be correctly 
addressed. First, the four characteristics of simulations outlined above must be considered. Second, the 
definition of performance indicators must be specified. In particular, these indicators must be able to 
synthetize the relevant results in this simulated retail credit market that we want to test against the 
participants’ behavioral profile. To this purpose is devoted the literature review in subsection 8.2.2 next. 
8.2.2. Searching for performance indicators in our game 
Our main concern is to design a strategy game that helps us to identify how different players would 
behave in a retail credit market. The key point is to obtain a set of indicators, meant to be the dependent 
variables in the experiment, that are in accordance with what academic literature says about how credit 
markets operate and banking efficiency. We recall here the review of literature we made on these two 
topics in Chapter 1. 
Regarding the literature on credit markets, two broad views on what determines how much 
private credit a financial system would extend (Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer, 2005) are the power 
theories and the information theories of credit. The informational approach is closer to the scope of our 
analysis in the experiment. In short, this view of credit markets considers it essential to estimate the 
                                                 
236 Loewenstein (1999) considers that “despite their incorporation of markets, repetition and incentives, EEs have not, in my 
opinion, been able to avoid the problem of low external validity that is the Achilles heel of all laboratory experimentation.” 
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ability of borrowers to repay their debts (which depends on the expected future income of their assets 
and collateral pledged), and consequently the ability of lenders to screen good borrowers from bad 
borrowers, in order to implement the credit policies that maximize their profits adjusted by risk. 
A classic field inside information theories is the literature on business failure, where financial 
statement analysis plays an essential role. However, would information in the game be given in terms of 
financial data that participants have to analyze, it would introduce an asymmetry among participants 
where the more skilled ones would be expected to outperform. Rather than that, the goal of the 
experiment is to disentangle whether different risk profiles and overconfidence levels would produce 
predictable patterns when all participants are given the same, objective information. Consequently, we 
want information provided to participants to be given in the form of confidence intervals (average, high 
and low boundaries) of objective pieces of information such as expected GDP growth, Euribor rates, or 
clients’ expected default rates. 
Regarding the literature on banking efficiency, several measures of cost and profit efficiency are 
available (recall the discussion in Chapter 1). Berger and Mester (1997) provide a list of variables to be 
used to test cost and profit efficiencies (recall Table 1.3 in Chapter 1), which includes costs, prices, loan 
volumes and environmental variables such as nonperforming loans over total loans. 
This provided, we proceed as follows in the experiment. First, information to be provided to 
participants about macroeconomic perspectives and client’s expected solvency will be objective, 
presented in the form of confidence intervals, and updated period by period. Second, the cost structure 
of the banks will be an input, provided to participants as a given variable. Respondents may 
consequently implement their strategies in terms of loan prices and volumes granted. Finally, we control 
for the risky behavior of participants by measuring two ex post variables: their average ratio of NPL to 
total loans, as well as the ratio between prices granted to customers of high versus low qualities. 
Consequently, the experiment that is described next in Section 8.3 was designed to make 
participants decide how much credit and at what price they would grant to a series of clients, given 
information available about their expected solvency and macroeconomic perspectives. The hypotheses 
to be tested seek to trace evidence of the effects that different risk profiles, in terms of prospect theory 
and overconfidence, might have over the policies participants implement. Consequently, we put special 
emphasis in several aspects of the game. First, we always provide subjects with objective information 
about economic perspectives and expected solvency, mostly in the form of confidence intervals. Second, 
we give them clear instructions of how variables in the game are interrelated and how to set their 
strategies. Finally, we implement a multi-period game where information is to be updated, as to reflect 
a business cycle that might either improve or worsen, in order to let participants’ expectations play a 
relevant role ―hence, perhaps, prospect theory and overconfidence effects might be traced. 
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8.3. BASICS OF THE GAME 
 
In this section we explain the experiment in detail. This comes in three instances. First, subsection 8.3.1 
deals with the basics of the game. Second, we explain how the experiment was conducted. This includes 
instructions provided to participants and recommendations they were given to help them setting their 
strategies. Finally, in subsection 8.3.3 we describe the indicators that describe how participants played, 
in accordance to our discussion in subsection 8.2.2. These indicators will be the dependent variables to 
be tested against the behavioral profile of each participant in Section 8.4. In what follows we explain the 
basics of the game. 
8.3.1. The game 
Each participant runs a bank that grants credit to customers. All participants play a similar game, facing 
identical situations and being given the same information set. However, they play individually with no 
reciprocal effects (a player’s strategies don’t affect other players’ results). Nonetheless, they do play 
competitively: the objective of the game is to see which participant implements the best strategy in 
terms of profit maximization. The winner ―the participant that earns the highest profit at the end of the 
game― of each session gets a prize of 60 euros. Five rounds with students were conducted for this 
experiment, about 20 to 30 pupils each one, for a total of 126 participants. 
We devised a multi period game (6 periods) where at each stage the bank has access to a niche of 
clients (a different niche every period) asking for a 3-year loan. At each stage, participants have to decide 
how much credit and at what price they are willing to grant to that niche, given information available. 
Information provided to participants includes (a) the niches’ expected default rates in the form of 
confidence intervals;237 (b) macroeconomic perspectives (about GDP growth and Euribor_1Y rates), also 
presented in the form of confidence intervals; (c) calculations of (ex ante) expected profits and 
delinquency ratios given the participant’s strategy, as well as (ex post) real profits and default rates after 
strategies have been set and information was updated. 
Figure 8.1 shows a screenshot of the computer application for the game at period 1. Information 
provided includes macroeconomic perspectives (above), niche default rates and player strategies (to 
the left) and expected, as well as historical, profits and portfolio delinquency ratios (to the right). All 
these pieces of information are analyzed in what follows. 
                                                 
237  Confidence intervals are given in three-point format: average values, high and low boundaries. Boundaries are explicitly 
said to be absolute limits that cannot be exceeded. That means, for instance, that if the expected default rate of a niche is (15%, 
5%, 1%), the highest (lowest) default rate in all possible states of the world is 15% (1%). That also means, for instance, that if 
in period 1 we say the expected GDP growth for period 5 may range between (-1%, 1%, 3%), updated information in periods 2 
to 4 cannot say that the expected GDP growth for period 5 may go higher than 3% or lower than -1%.   
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FIGURE 8.1 – Screenshot of the game at period 1 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
Macroeconomic data. At the beginning of each stage participants are given information about 
the economic perspectives, regarding expected GDP growth and Euribor_1Y rates, in terms of confidence 
intervals. Both numerical and graphical information are provided for periods 1 to 8 (it is a 6-period 
game, but at every period a 3-year loan is granted). Graphics allow for a more intuitive interpretation of 
the economic situation, particularly when information is updated in the following periods: confidence 
intervals use different colors, a thin line represents the last year estimation, a dotted line the initial one 
(period 1), and shadowed areas represent past periods, as we may see in Figure 8.2 for period 3. 
FIGURE 8.2 – Updated macro information at period 3 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
Numerical data also provides information of changes in economic perspectives: positive and 
negative variations in average estimations for GDP growth and Euribor rates between two consecutive 
periods are highlighted in blue and red code, as we may see in Figure 8.2 above. 
Information not given to participants. GDP growth rates were designed to range from -1.5% to 
6.0% with an average of 2.5%. Boundaries widen the farther the estimation from the current period. On 
average, the amplitude of the intervals would be about 1% for a next year estimation, 1.75% two years 
ahead, 2.5% three years ahead, and so on ―though actual ranges may vary to some extent. Euribor rates 
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were designed to vary, intuitively, in accordance with GDP perspectives, with lower (higher) rates being 
correlated with weak (stronger) GDP perspectives. Since participants would play a simulated game first 
for practice, and then the ‘real game’ where prizes were distributed, we devised 2 alternative economic 
scenarios. They are summarized in Figure 8.3 by the ex post economic data at the end of the game. 
FIGURE 8.3 – Scenarios of the simulated and real games at period 8 
Simulated game 
 
Real game 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
As we may see, we designed a scenario for the real game where the macroeconomic perspectives 
tended to improve ―as it would happen during the upswing of the economic cycle. 
Niche default rates. Information about the expected default rates of the niche clients at each stage 
was given in terms of confidence intervals. Table 8.1 summarizes the intervals provided for all 6 niches. 
TABLE 8.1 – Expected default rates of all niche clients 
  
Source: Own elaboration 
Participants were only said that maximum, minimum and average default rates are related with 
the weakest, strongest and average GDP performance, but that the explicit mathematical relationship 
between GDP growth and delinquency was unknown. In addition, players were advised, when setting 
their price and credit volume strategies, to infer the expected default rate of that niche client given the 
information provided for that niche and for economic perspectives. As a starting clue, and only for 
max mean min
A C1 14% 6.5% 0.5%
B C2 10% 5% 2%
B C3 9% 4% 1%
A C4 16% 7% 0%
A C5 18% 7.5% 1%
B C6 11% 5% 1%
% expected default rate
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period 1, explicit information about the true default rate of the niche client in the previous period 
(period 0, before the game started) is provided. For the subsequent periods that information is not 
provided, since players may learn the real (ex post) default rates of their portfolios once economic 
scenarios are updated. 
Information not given to participants. The six niche clients in the real game are of two types, 
according to their expected default rates. Type A niches are riskier than Type B, both because they 
exhibit wider intervals and because downside risk is substantially higher. Real ex post default rates were 
estimated given GDP performance. In particular, reference GDP growth rates were estimated as 2/3 the 
current (ex post) rate + 1/3 the previous year rate. Then, real default rates were set to fall at the 
equivalent point in the interval as the reference GDP rate within the (-1.5%, 2.5%, 6.0%) interval above 
mentioned. For instance, for niche C1 when the real ex post GDP growth rate at period 1 happened to be 
-0.1% and the previous year rate was 1.0% we have: 
𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 =
2
3
(−0.1%) +
1
3
(1.0%) = 0.267%.   (8.1) 
Since 0.267% lies in the bottom half of the interval, (-1.5%, 2.5%), we set the real ex post default 
rate for period 1 to lie at the (linearly) equivalent point within the bottom range (14%, 6.5%) ―see data 
in Table 8.1― which is equivalent to compute 
𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 = 14% + 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜(0.267% − 2.5%),   (8.2) 
where ratio = (14% - 6.5%) / (2.5% - (-1.5%)) = -1.88 measures the effect an increase of one percent in 
the GDP rate reduces the default rate. That makes the real (ex post) default rate of client C1 in period 1 
equal to 10.69% in our example. 
Strategy: At every period, participants must analyze the information available and determine 
their strategy. Strategies are defined in terms of two variables: the PRICE at which they are willing to 
grant credit to that niche of clients, and the volume of credit granted, VCC, to that niche. For such 
purpose, they are helped with automatic calculations ―right-hand side of the screenshot in Figure 8.1― 
of the expected profits they ought to maximize (see ‘profit calculations’ below). Participants were told 
to proceed as follows. First, have an initial guess of the expected default rate for that niche market (cell 
‘your guess’ in Figure 8.1) and then set a PRICE. They were required to set a price that ranges within 
10.0% and 20.0%. For such price, they are given the maximum volume demanded by the niche market, 
Vmax, which follows a linear demand function238 for credit of the type 
𝑉𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 1,000 − 5,000 ∙ 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸,   (8.3) 
hence credit volumes may range from 0 to 500 euros. Finally, participants must decide whether they are 
willing to grant the maximum volume of credit demanded, that is, VCC = Vmax, or they prefer to be more 
                                                 
238 The demand function was not provided to subjects, but they were obviously given the outcome Vmax. 
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conservative to set a V such that 0  V < Vmax. This allows us to measure which participants are being 
more conservative in terms of volume, too ―rather than having PRICE as the single decision variable. 
Thus, we observe two variables per participant, PRICE and VCC, that may not clear the market 
(whenever VCC < Vmax). In instructions they were advised to do so depending on “how sure you are your 
strategies are going to be profitable”, since setting VCC = 0 makes fixed costs equal to zero as well (saving 
3 euros per niche, see ‘profit calculations’ next for further information).239 
Profit calculations. To help participants set their strategies, the computer application provides 
ex ante estimations of profits and portfolio default rates. Players were also given information, before the 
game starts, of the mathematical expression for the profit function (income minus costs) used to derive 
those values, though they were said this was only given for their better understanding of the game and 
were advised to follow the calculations instead. The (expected) revenue function was set as 
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 = 𝑉𝐶𝐶 ∙ 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸 ∙ (1 − 𝑚𝑒) − 𝑚𝑒 ∙ 𝑉𝐶𝐶,   (8.4) 
where me is the expected default rate of the niche (provided by the player or the estimation by default 
otherwise).240 The cost function is 
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 = 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 + (𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑜𝑟 + 𝑣𝑐) ∙ 𝑉𝐶𝐶.   (8.5) 
That is, the bank faces 3 types of costs: (a) a fixed cost (fixed) of 3 euros per period and number of 
niche clients active (i.e., those for which a volume VCC ≠ 0 was granted during the last 3 years); (b) a 
variable cost (Euribor) equal to the (expected) Euribor_1Y rate provided (representing the cost of the 
deposits needed to fund credit granted); and (c) another variable cost (vc) of 2.0%, interpreted as the 
cost of managing a higher volume of credit. 
From (8.4) and (8.5) the expected profit function is 
𝐸𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇𝑆 = [(1 − 𝑚𝑒) ∙ 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸 − (𝑚𝑒 + 𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑒 + 2.0%)] ∙ 𝑉𝐶𝐶 − 3,  (8.6) 
whereas the real (ex post) profits observed are simply 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇𝑆 = [(1 − 𝑚) ∙ 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸 − (𝑚 + 𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑜𝑟 + 2.0%)] ∙ 𝑉𝐶𝐶 − 3,  (8.7) 
where m and Euribor replace the ex ante expectations me and Euribore. 
Finally, on the right hand side of the screen, participants were also given information about the 
delinquency ratios of their portfolios. Regarding expected delinquency, subjects may make their own 
                                                 
239 For indicators estimation (see section ‘indicators’), when a subject sets VCC = 0 we make PRICE = 20% ―i.e., the price that 
should be offered to have zero demand― disregarding the actual value the participant has set. We do so in order to have 
indicators that are homogeneous across participants: judges set VCC = 0 after they tried different prices (sometimes even 
providing no data for PRICE), so the last price they set may be not representative. This correction does not apply to any other 
case since, as explained, we want to observe both price and volume strategies that might not clear the market. 
240 That income function makes two implicit assumptions. First, a default means the bank recuperates neither interests nor 
capital from that proportion me. Second, for simplicity we assume the total credit granted to a niche in all three years the credit 
is active is equal to the initial VCC granted. That may be interpreted as a line of credit to a niche of clients that is renewed 
annually with independence of the default rate incurred in previous year(s). Participants were informed of both assumptions. 
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estimations (cell ‘your guess’ in Figure 8.1). Otherwise, if that cell is blank, the computer sets an expected 
default rate by default: in period 1, the real default rate of the niche in period 0; in subsequent periods, 
the real default rate of his or her current portfolio of clients. The real (historic) default rates are also 
provided. They are computed simply as the weighted average (weighted by VCC) of the observed default 
rates of all active niche clients in the participant’s portfolio. 
Optimal (ex post) strategies. We may compare the participants’ strategies with what would be 
the optimal ex post strategies (i.e., once we know in period 8 how the economy actually performed). We 
compute them as follows. Setting VCC = 1,000 – 5,000 · PRICE in equation (8.7) and deriving with respect 
to PRICE we have the optimal strategy 
𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸∗ =
1,000+(5,000−1,000)∙?̅?+5,000∙(𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑜𝑟̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ +2.0%)
2∙5,000∙(1−?̅?)
,   (8.8) 
where ?̅? and 𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑜𝑟̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ are the average values of the default and Euribor rates, respectively, during the 
three years the loan to that niche client was operative. Table 8.2 summarizes the optimal ex post 
strategies for all six niches in the game. 
TABLE 8.2 – Optimal ex post strategies for all niche clients 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
These computations are helpful to confirm that type A clients should be granted a higher price, 
given their riskier profile, but taking the economic perspectives into account, too. The average optimal 
price for niches of type A is higher than for type B (16.4% vs. 14.7% in both average ―blue― and volume-
weighted average ―green― data), as expected. The price ratio suggests an optimal price to type A clients 
that is a 12% higher (in relative terms, for a price ratio of about 1.12) than to type B. This information 
will be used as a benchmark for a ‘quality indicator’ later on (see section ‘indicators’). 
8.3.2. Instructions to participants 
Participants were instructed how to play the game in three steps. Firstly, they were given an extensive 
explanation of the game described above. Secondly, after being provided a set of written instructions 
that summarized all that information, participants had time to play a simulated version of the game, the 
whole six periods, for practice. Finally, after all participants confirmed they understood the game and 
m1 m2 m3 m4 m5 m6 m7 m8 average PRICE* VCC*
A C1 10.7% 10.6% 8.4% 9.9% 17.0% 149.6
B C2 7.8% 6.3% 4.9% 6.3% 15.0% 248.3
B C3 5.3% 3.9% 3.6% 4.2% 14.3% 282.6
A C4 6.7% 6.1% 6.1% 6.3% 16.1% 197.1
A C5 6.7% 6.6% 6.0% 6.4% 16.3% 186.2
B C6 4.5% 4.0% 3.4% 4.0% 14.7% 264.3
type A 16.4% 16.4%
type B 14.7% 14.7%
price ratio 1.119 1.117
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felt ready, they completed the strategy game where a series of prizes for winners in terms of maximum 
profits were granted as an incentive to play. 
In regards to the game structure, participants were also instructed how to play this multi-period 
game. The first screen they see shows how the game starts in ‘year 1’, where players must set their 
strategy for that niche given information available. Since in every period a 3-year loan is granted, 
participants are provided with an estimation of EPROFITS for the subsequent three periods (years 1, 2 and 
3). After they set their strategies, they move on to a second screen where (i) macroeconomic information 
is updated, and (ii) ex post profits and delinquency ratios are computed and shown to participants. Now 
in ‘year 2’ a new niche client is available, so participants must decide a new strategy, PRICE and VCC, for 
granting a 3-year loan to the new niche, given the updated information available.241 Then they move on 
to a third screen, where macroeconomic information is updated, ex post profits and delinquency ratios 
are computed… and so on until ‘year 6’, the last one for which participants have to set their strategies. 
Finally, participants were given these instructions to help them setting their strategies: “First, in 
order to set your strategy (PRICE, VCC) at each stage, always follow this sequence: (1) guess a delinquency 
rate of the niche based on the information available; (2) set a PRICE between 10.0% and 20.0%; Vmax will 
be consequently updated and the computer will provide the EPROFITS for the expected default rate, PRICE 
and Vmax; (3) set VCC; again, the EPROFITS will be updated; you must decide whether you grant credit to that 
niche or not and, if you do, whether you set VCC = Vmax or a lower volume; (4) finally, repeat steps 1 to 3 as 
many times as you need it to set your definitive strategy (PRICE, VCC). Second, please note the computer 
application helps you to calculate EPROFITS given the inputs being set (me, PRICE, VCC). Be aware these are 
the EPROFITS that you set; this expectation may fulfill or not depending on whether (a) the economic scenario 
follows the path you anticipated; and (b) the strategy you consequently implemented is indeed optimal. 
Therefore, please be advised when setting your strategies that EPROFITS are just an aid. On one hand, not 
granting credit (VCC = 0) when you think a niche may not generate profits allows you to save a fixed cost 
of 3 euros. On the other hand, if you decide to grant credit, granting VCC = Vmax or a lower volume should 
depend on how sure you are this niche client is going to render you profits rather than losses.” 
8.3.3. Indicators – dependent variables 
At the end of the game, each participant has provided 6x2 decision variables: that is, a pair (PRICE, VCC) 
they were willing to grant credit to each of the six niche clients. As described in subsection 8.2.2, based 
on this information we want to trace differences across participants regarding three types of indicators: 
their different strategies in terms of (i) prices and (ii) volumes, as well as controlling for their risky 
behavior by computing some (iii) quality indicators. These are explained in what follows: 
                                                 
241  Now players have more information: the expected default rates of the new niche and macroeconomic perspectives as before, 
but the real default rate of clients in their portfolio and how the macroeconomic situation is evolving through time, too. 
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 Price indicators. We compute two estimators to trace differences in price strategies: Pavg, 
the average price across the 6 niches; and Pvol, the volume-averaged price across the niches. 
We compute the volume-averaged indicator as well because two subjects that set the same 
price to a give niche may not grant the same volume of credit as we allowed VCC < Vmax. 
 Volume indicators. We trace differences in volume strategies by computing two additional 
estimators, denoted for simplicity as ‘VCC and VMAX indicators’. On one hand, VCCind sums 
all VCCs granted to the niches (i.e., VCCind = ΣVCC). On the other hand, VMAXind compares 
the volumes actually granted by the player with the demand faced for the PRICE she set. 
Thus, we compute VMAXind as the ratio between VCCind and the sum of all Vmax that would be 
demanded by each niche given the PRICEs the respondent had set. 
 Quality indicators. We control for the risky behavior of participants by computing two 
types of indicators. First, the NPL indicator measures the average ratio of non-performing 
to total loans. Second, we compare the prices granted to customers of low (type A) versus 
high (type B) qualities. Likewise we did with price indicators, we obtain two indicators for 
this purpose: Qavg is simply the ratio of the two averaged prices (average price to type A 
over average price to type B), while Qvol sets a similar ratio but for volume-weighted average 
prices. Table 8.2 sets a benchmark to these quality indicators: the optimal ex post strategies 
entail the quality ratios 1.119 and 1.117 for mean and volume-average data, respectively. 
Hence, when indicators Qavg and Qvol of a given participant are well below those levels it may 
be attributed to an aggressive pricing strategy implemented to low-quality borrowers. 
Table 8.3 summarizes all these seven indicators, which are meant to be the dependent variables 
in the hypothesis testing (Section 8.5). 
TABLE 8.3 – Summary of game indicators 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
 
Variable Values Interpretation Calculation Literature
P avg average price across 6 niche clients
P vol volume-weighted average price across 6 niches
VCC ind VCCind* → min 0 - max 500 average volume of credit granted (6 niches)
VMAX ind VMAX ind  ≤ 1 VMAXind = VCCind / ( Ʃ 6 niches [Vmax | P*] )
where VMAX ind  = 1 → full credit at P*
NPL % of non-performing loans (min 0%) ↑ NPL → ↑ risk strategy average ex post  NPL ratio across 6 niche clients
Q avg Qavg < 1 → lower P  to risky niches mean prices to costumers of high vs. low qualities
 (Opt.expost Qavg = 1.119)
Q vol Idem idem, volume-weighted
(Opt.expost Qvol = 1.117)
P*  → min 10.0% - max 20.0% ↓ Price → ↑ risk strategy
Defining relevant indicators 
of the game:
Berger and Mester (1997)
Design and measurement 
of indicators:
own elaboration
↓ Quality → ↑ risk strategy
↑ Volume → ↑ risk strategy
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8.4. DATA 
 
The same 126 participants that completed the behavioral tests in Chapter 7 competed in the 
experimental game. Table A.12 in the Appendix shows the raw data of direct responses provided by the 
subjects. Besides, Table A.13 in the Appendix shows the estimations that result for the game indicators 
(price, volume and quality indicators). Table 8.4 summarizes the basic univariate statistics of the game 
indicators that resulted. The respective histograms are also provided in Table A.14 in the Appendix. 
TABLE 8.4 – Descriptive statistics of game indicators 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
Some variables provide a first intuition on how aggressive participants played on average. Thus, 
the volume ratio (VMAXind) is close to one, implying that they generally granted the maximum volume 
at a given price, and the quality ratios are both about 1.0, which means they did not differentiate low 
and high quality borrowers, especially if we compare this with the optimal ex post benchmark ratio 1.12. 
Average price, total volume and NPL satisfy the hypothesis of normality, as we may see in Table 8.5.242 
TABLE 8.5 – Normality test for the game indicators 
  
Source: Own elaboration 
                                                 
242 For further interpretation, Table A.7 in the Appendix provides the histograms of all variables in the experiment. 
N Range Minimum Maximum Mean
Std. 
Deviation Variance
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. Error Statistic Std. Error
Average Price 126 5.67% 12.75% 18.42% 16.05% 0.0104 1.082 -.306 .216 .083 .428
Weighted Price 126 5.49% 12.19% 17.68% 15.40% 0.0109 1.190 -.457 .216 .029 .428
Volume 126 1459 371 1830 1103 269.10 72417.180 -.013 .216 .243 .428
Volume ratio 126 0.78 0.22 1.00 0.94 0.10 .011 -3.721 .216 19.528 .428
Non-performing loans 126 2.00% 5.11% 7.11% 5.95% 0.0033 .111 .144 .216 1.021 .428
Quality Ratio 126 0.70 0.69 1.39 1.02 0.11 .012 .491 .216 1.417 .428
Weighted Quality Ratio 126 0.69 0.74 1.42 1.02 0.10 .010 .390 .216 2.083 .428
Descriptive Statistics
Skewness Kurtosis
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig.
Average Price .066 126 ,200* .990 126 .515
Weighted Price .089 126 .015 .982 126 .087
Volume .040 126 ,200* .996 126 .963
Volume ratio .286 126 .000 .595 126 .000
Non-performing loans .069 126 ,200* .983 126 .110
Quality Ratio .084 126 .029 .974 126 .015
Weighted Quality Ratio .078 126 .056 .970 126 .006
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction
Tests of Normality
Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk
*. This is a lower bound of the true significance.
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The only variable that is strongly rejected to be normal in both tests (p < 0.01) is volume ratio 
(VMAXind), not surprisingly since this indicator is bounded to 1. At p < 0.05 weighted price and quality 
ratio would not satisfy normality either.243  
Finally, for analysis and exclusion of extreme values we proceed as in Chapter 7. Table A.15 in the 
Appendix provides a normal Q-Q plot and a box-and-whiskers plot for all variables. We will exclude only 
extreme values, not outliers, and only when normality tests suggests they indicate experimental error 
rather than high kurtosis. These rules being considered, four observations have been removed from two 
variables for a second re-test. These are three extreme values for VMAXind and one more for volume-
weighted quality ratio (Qvol). 
 
8.5. HYPOTHESIS TESTING AND RESULTS 
 
The purpose of the experimental research is to test whether more aggressive profiles in terms of 
behavioral biases are correlated with more risky credit strategies in the game. Consequently, we first 
describe what an aggressive profile and a risky strategy are in terms of the independent and dependent 
variables in our model. Then it will be easier to interpret the hypotheses to be tested.  
We define an aggressive profile as having at least one of the following features: a risk seeking 
profile, low loss aversion, and high degree of overconfidence. The second and third features are easy to 
trace: loss aversion is measured by the β parameter in the value function (the lower β the riskier the 
behavioral profile of the subject), while overconfidence is higher the higher E and P, and the lower M.  
A risk seeking profile, however, could manifest itself through more complex instances. Regarding 
the utility function, we have two cases: (i) a convex utility in the positive domain (𝛼+ > 1), hence the 
higher 𝛼+ the more risk seeking (ceteris paribus for similar probability weights); and (ii) a convex utility 
in the negative domain (𝛼− < 1), hence the lower 𝛼− the more risk seeking (again, ceteris paribus). 
However, when it deals with the probability weighting function, things get more complex. The lower 𝛾+ 
implies the higher risk seeking behavior for gains of low probability only, but a risk averse behavior for 
gains of moderate and high probability. Likewise, the lower 𝛾− implies the higher risk seeking behavior 
for losses of moderate/high probability, but a risk averse behavior for losses of low probability.  
Hence, how should we disentangle a risk seeking behavior according to the weighting function? 
We know the outcome of participants’ strategies strongly depend on the clients’ expected delinquency 
ratio that is provided in terms of a confidence interval. Besides, we set the highest probability of default 
of all 6 niches in the game to be below 20%. Consequently, a key assumption henceforth is that the 
                                                 
243 However, for 126 observations the Central Limit Theorem ensures the validity of subsequent results. 
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probabilities we will consider relevant in terms of probability weighting are moderate and high for 
gains and low probabilities for losses. Hence, we define a risk seeking behavior also as (iii) the higher 
𝛾+ (for gains of high probability) and (iv) the higher 𝛾− (for losses of low probability). 
Finally, we define a risky strategy as the one that sets lower prices (Pavg and Pvol), higher volumes 
of credit (VCCind and VMAXind), higher NPL ratios and lower quality ratios (Qavg and Qvol) ―since these 
ratios are defined in terms of low to high quality clients.  
8.5.1. Hypotheses 
Given the description above of more aggressive profiles and riskier strategies, it is now easier to 
interpret the hypotheses to be tested in terms of three features: a risk seeking behavior, loss aversion 
and overconfidence. 
Risk seeking. As described in Chapter 4, risk-seeking choices are observed in two types of 
decision problems (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992): the favorite-longshot bias and the aversion to a sure 
loss. Risk seeking has been claimed to explain several anomalies. For instance, the house money effect 
(Thaler and Johnson, 1990) and the status quo bias (Tversky and Kahneman, 1991). Framing has been 
claimed to make use of either loss aversion or diminishing sensitivity (Tversky and Kahneman, 1986). 
Probability weighting may lead to irrational advice, which helps explaining the favorite-longshot bias 
and the IPOs underpricing puzzle (Hens and Bachmann, 2008). Several authors have also related 
aversion-to-a-sure-loss to corporate management, including Shefrin (2008) and Shefrin and Cervellati 
(2011). Finally, Barberis and Huang (2008) explained that portfolio underdiversification would be a 
result from investors’ overweighting the probabilities of extreme outcomes. Consequently, we want to 
test whether a risk seeking behavior could have a predictable effect over credit policies. We test the 
following set of hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1 
H0: The more risk seeking, the lower the price charged to clients 
1a – H0: The higher α+ the lower Pavg 
1a* – H0: The higher α+ the lower Pvol 
1b – H0: The lower α- the lower Pavg 
1b* – H0: The lower α- the lower Pvol 
1c – H0: The higher γ+ the lower Pavg 
1c* – H0: The higher γ+ the lower Pvol 
1d – H0: The higher γ- the lower Pavg 
1d* – H0: The higher γ- the lower Pvol 
1e – H0: The higher the risk seeking behavior (aggregate factor) the lower Pavg 
1e* – H0: The higher the risk seeking behavior (aggregate factor) the lower Pvol 
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Hypothesis 2 
H0: The more risk seeking, the higher the volume granted to clients 
2a – H0: The higher α+ the higher VCCind 
2a* – H0: The higher α+ the higher VMAXind 
2b – H0: The lower α- the higher VCCind 
2b* – H0: The lower α- the higher VMAXind 
2c – H0: The higher γ+ the higher VCCind 
2c* – H0: The higher γ+ the higher VMAXind 
2d – H0: The higher γ- the higher VCCind 
2d* – H0: The higher γ- the higher VMAXind 
2e – H0: The higher the risk seeking behavior (aggregate factor) the higher VCCind 
2e* – H0: The higher the risk seeking behavior (aggregate factor) the higher VMAXind 
Hypothesis 3 
H0: The more risk seeking, the higher the NPL ratio 
3a – H0: The higher α+ the higher NPL 
3b – H0: The lower α- the higher NPL 
3c – H0: The higher γ+ the higher NPL 
3d – H0: The higher γ- the higher NPL 
3e – H0: The higher the risk seeking behavior (aggregate factor) the higher NPL 
Hypothesis 4 
H0: The more risk seeking, the lower the quality ratios 
4a – H0: The higher α+ the lower Qavg 
4a* – H0: The higher α+ the lower Qvol 
4b – H0: The lower α- the lower Qavg 
4b* – H0: The lower α- the lower Qvol 
4c – H0: The higher γ+ the lower Qavg 
4c* – H0: The higher γ+ the lower Qvol 
4d – H0: The higher γ- the lower Qavg 
4d* – H0: The higher γ- the lower Qvol 
4e – H0: The higher the risk seeking behavior (aggregate factor) the lower Qavg 
4e* – H0: The higher the risk seeking behavior (aggregate factor) the lower Qvol 
Loss aversion. The second group of hypotheses refers to the effect of loss aversion over the game 
indicators. As described in Chapter 4, loss aversion has been claimed to explain anomalies in decision-
making, like the endowment effect (Thaler, 1980), the disposition effect (Shefrin and Statman, 1985), 
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the status quo bias (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988), the equity premium puzzle (Benartzi and Thaler, 
1995), how the number of market transactions would be reduced (Knetsch, 1989) or why consumers 
and managers would take fewer risks (Rabin, 2000). We could summarize the effects of loss aversion to 
be tested following Kahneman (2011): “in mixed gambles, where both a gain and a loss are possible, loss 
aversion causes extremely risk averse choices” (p.285). Consequently, we want to infer whether those risk 
averse choices have a predictable effect over credit policies by testing the following set of hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 5 
H0: The lower the loss aversion the lower the price charged to clients 
5a – H0: The lower βavg the lower Pavg 
5a* – H0: The lower βavg the lower Pvol 
5b – H0: The lower βmed the lower Pavg 
5b* – H0: The lower βmed the lower Pvol 
Hypothesis 6 
H0: The lower the loss aversion the higher the volume granted to clients 
6a – H0: The lower βavg the higher VCCind 
6a* – H0: The lower βavg the higher VMAXind 
6b – H0: The lower βmed the higher VCCind 
6b* – H0: The lower βmed the higher VMAXind 
Hypothesis 7 
H0: The lower the loss aversion the higher the NPL ratio 
7a – H0: The lower βavg the higher NPL 
7b – H0: The lower βmed the higher NPL 
Hypothesis 8 
H0: The lower the loss aversion the lower the quality ratios 
8a – H0: The lower βavg the lower Qavg 
8a* – H0: The lower βavg the lower Qvol 
8b – H0: The lower βmed the lower Qavg 
8b* – H0: The lower βmed the lower Qvol 
Overconfidence. This bias has been claimed to explain anomalies like excess volatility, under and 
overreaction (Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam, 1998), excessive trading (Odean, 1998, 1999), 
asset bubbles (Scheinkman and Xiong, 2003), the forward premium puzzle (Burnside et al., 2011), and 
sensation seeking (Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2009). Research on corporate finance suggests executives 
appear to be prone to display overconfidence (Moore, 1977), and helps explain the high rates of business 
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failure (Camerer and Lovallo, 1999), high rates of M&A (Roll, 1986; Malmendier and Tate, 2005a,b), a 
lower dividend payout (Deshmukh et al., 2010) and higher cash holdings (Huang, Lambertides and 
Steeley, 2012). Finally, overconfidence has been related to the confirmation bias (Koriat, Lichtenstein 
and Fischhoff, 1980), the hindsight bias (Fischhoff, 1982b), the illusion of control (Barber and Odean, 
2002), the self-attribution bias (Statman, Thorley and Vorkink, 2006) and portfolio underdiversification 
(Goetzmann and Kumar, 2008). Since we are using three different measures of overconfidence (Moore 
and Healy, 2008), we will test whether each measure or a combination of them are able to explain a 
riskier behavior by participants in the experiment. We state the following set of hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 9 
H0: The higher the overconfidence, the lower the price charged to clients 
9a – H0: The higher overestimation (higher E) the lower Pavg 
9a* – H0: The higher overestimation (higher E) the lower Pvol 
9b – H0: The higher overplacement (higher P) the lower Pavg 
9b* – H0: The higher overplacement (higher P) the lower Pvol 
9c – H0: The higher overprecision (lower M) the lower Pavg 
9c* – H0: The higher overprecision (lower M) the lower Pvol 
9d – H0: The higher the overconfidence (aggregate factor) the lower Pavg 
9d* – H0: The higher the overconfidence (aggregate factor) the lower Pvol 
Hypothesis 10 
H0: The higher the overconfidence, the higher the volume granted to clients 
10a – H0: The higher the overestimation (the higher E) the higher VCCind 
10a* – H0: The higher the overestimation (the higher E) the higher VMAXind 
10b – H0: The higher the overplacement (the higher P) the higher VCCind 
10b* – H0: The higher the overplacement (the higher P) the higher VMAXind 
10c – H0: The higher the overprecision (the lower M) the higher VCCind 
10c* – H0: The higher the overprecision (the lower M) the higher VMAXind 
10d – H0: The higher the overconfidence (aggregate factor) the higher VCCind 
10d* – H0: The higher the overconfidence (aggregate factor) the higher VMAXind 
Hypothesis 11 
H0: The higher overconfidence, the higher the NPL ratio 
11a – H0: The higher the overestimation (the higher E) the higher NPL 
11b – H0: The higher the overplacement (the higher P) the higher NPL 
11c – H0: The higher the overprecision (the lower M) the higher NPL 
11d – H0: The higher the overconfidence (aggregate factor) the higher NPL 
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Hypothesis 12 
H0: The higher overconfidence, the lower the quality ratios 
12a – H0: The higher the overestimation (the higher E) the lower Qavg 
12a* – H0: The higher the overestimation (the higher E) the lower Qvol 
12b – H0: The higher the overplacement (the higher P) the lower Qavg 
12b* – H0: The higher the overplacement (the higher P) the lower Qvol 
12c – H0: The higher the overprecision (the lower M) the lower Qavg 
12c* – H0: The higher the overprecision (the lower M) the lower Qvol 
12d – H0: The higher the overconfidence (aggregate factor) the lower Qavg 
12d* – H0: The higher the overconfidence (aggregate factor) the lower Qvol 
The whole set of hypotheses may be summarized in Figure 8.4, which includes not only the twelve 
hypotheses in this chapter, but the relationship among priors and behavioral variables that were tested 
in Chapter 7. Note RSG, RSL, LA and OC in Figure 8.4 below stand for risk-seeking for gains, risk-seeking 
for losses, loss aversion and overconfidence, respectively. 
FIGURE 8.4 – Summary of the hypotheses tested 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
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8.5.2. Results 
We conduct three types of analyses: variable analysis, factorial analysis and clusters. We analyze these 
results separately. 
Variable analysis 
The first way we test the hypotheses above is through a correlation analysis among behavioral variables 
and game indicators. Table 8.6 below summarizes the results.  
TABLE 8.6 – Correlation matrix. Variables and indicators 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
In terms of price and volume, which are the decision variables to participants in the game, a few 
significant correlations are observed, all of them providing evidence that more aggressive profiles are 
correlated with more risky credit strategies. In particular, we observe: (i) 𝛾− is positively correlated 
with VMAXind (p < 0.01), suggesting that more risk seeking participants tend to be more aggressive in 
Pavg Pvol VCCind VMAXind (r) NPL Qavg Qvol (r)
Pearson Correlation -.040 -.055 .075 -.109 .075 .002 -.021
Sig. (2-tailed) .656 .542 .405 .232 .406 .982 .816
N 126 126 126 122 126 126 125
Pearson Correlation -.131 -.162 .127 -.069 .002 .096 .071
Sig. (2-tailed) .143 .071 .156 .451 .980 .285 .429
N 126 126 126 122 126 126 125
Pearson Correlation .105 .057 -.030 .126 -.040 .117 ,198
*
Sig. (2-tailed) .244 .527 .741 .170 .656 .193 .028
N 125 125 125 121 125 125 124
Pearson Correlation ,184* .127 -.110 .120 -.007 .055 .043
Sig. (2-tailed) .040 .159 .224 .191 .935 .545 .634
N 125 125 125 121 125 125 124
Pearson Correlation -.113 -.030 .021 -.082 .087 -,242** -.169
Sig. (2-tailed) .210 .738 .816 .368 .334 .006 .060
N 126 126 126 122 126 126 125
Pearson Correlation .120 .160 -.076 .079 -.001 .073 .004
Sig. (2-tailed) .182 .073 .398 .385 .988 .416 .962
N 126 126 126 122 126 126 125
Pearson Correlation -.122 -.088 .110 .169 ,192* -,258** -,216*
Sig. (2-tailed) .173 .325 .221 .062 .031 .004 .015
N 126 126 126 122 126 126 125
Pearson Correlation .061 .077 .119 ,297
**
,219
* .052 -.060
Sig. (2-tailed) .500 .394 .186 .001 .014 .566 .509
N 126 126 126 122 126 126 125
Pearson Correlation -.042 -.060 .022 -.055 -.065 -.071 -.085
Sig. (2-tailed) .640 .502 .804 .547 .470 .427 .349
N 126 126 126 122 126 126 125
Pearson Correlation .021 .003 -.031 -.020 -.056 -.012 .005
Sig. (2-tailed) .817 .974 .734 .825 .537 .898 .955
N 123 123 123 119 123 123 122
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
alpha +
alpha -
gamma +
gamma -
βmed
βavg (r)
Correlations
E
P
Mmed
Mavg
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terms of volume ratios granted (Hypothesis 2d* is satisfied); and (ii) Mavg is positively correlated with 
Pavg (p < 0.05), suggesting overconfidence ―in terms of excessive precision to estimate future 
uncertainty― induces a more aggressive price policy (it reduces price, satisfying Hypothesis 9c). At p < 
0.1 we also observe: (iii) P is negatively correlated to Pvol (the more overplacement the more aggressive 
price strategy, satisfying Hypothesis 9b*); (iv) 𝛼− is positively correlated to Pvol (again more aggressive 
price policies are associated to more risk seeking profile to avoid sure losses, satisfying Hypothesis 1b*); 
and (v) 𝛾+ is also positively correlated with VMAXind (hence satisfying Hypothesis 2c*). 
Notwithstanding, it is in terms of quality where we obtain the more relevant results. First, the risk 
profile for gains has the most powerful ability to predict quality performance. On one hand, 𝛾+ is 
correlated (vi) positively with NPL (p < 0.05); and (vii) negatively with Qavg (p < 0.01) and (viii) with Qvol 
(p < 0.05), satisfying Hypotheses 3c, 4c and 4c*. On the other hand, 𝛼+ is also negatively correlated (ix) 
to Qavg (p < 0.01) and (x) to Qvol (p < 0.10), satisfying Hypotheses 4a and 4a*. Second, additional evidence 
of a behavioral profile that is correlated with quality performance is obtained in terms of (xi) Mmed is 
positively correlated with Qvol (p < 0.05), suggesting overprecision reduces quality performance, and 
(xii) 𝛾− is positively correlated with NPL (p < 0.05). 
To sum up, we find twelve pieces of evidence that an aggressive behavioral profile (more risk 
seeking, higher overconfidence) is significantly correlated to riskier credit strategies, particularly in 
terms of providing credit to low-quality customers at a lower price. On the contrary, we did not find a 
single piece of evidence in the opposite direction. Only mention we could not trace evidence of loss 
aversion, a classic in the behavioral literature, being able to explain credit policies in any sense.  
Finally, we conduct a regression analysis with a stepwise procedure for variable selection. Results 
are summarized in Table 8.7 ―more complete information is available in Table A.16 in the Appendix. 
We see the results support the main findings of the correlation analysis above. First, higher 
overprecision (lower Mavg or Mmed) causes a more aggressive pricing policy (reduces Pavg) and reduces 
quality (Qvol). Second, higher 𝛾− (which implies a risk seeking behavior for losses of low probability) 
causes a more aggressive volume policy (in terms of VMAXind) and increases default ratios (NPL). Third, 
higher 𝛾+ (which implies a risk seeking behavior for gains of medium and high probabilities) reduces 
the quality performance (both indicators Qavg and Qvol) of the credit policy implemented. 
We find these results strongly consistent with what the game design was intended for: with all 
relevant information provided in terms of confidence intervals (macroeconomic information, expected 
default rates) and probabilities of default, both correlation and regression analysis evidence that an 
excessive precision to estimate future uncertainty and distortion of probabilities do bias credit policies 
by decision makers. Moreover, they do so in the expected direction: higher overprecision and a risk 
seeking profile cause more aggressive price–volume policy and reduce quality performance. Obviously, 
the explanatory power of these models is very low since we are leaving aside alleged key factors such 
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as expected GDP growth and default rates, but the fact that R2 is significantly different from zero in any 
case highlights the effect that behavioral biases have on credit policies implemented. 
TABLE 8.7 – Regression models. Game indicators to behavioral biases 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
Factorial analysis 
We conduct a factor analysis of all seven game indicators. In a first stage we obtain the results in Table 
8.8. The Principal Component Analysis (PCA) posits two factors. The second one is easy to be given an 
intuitive meaning: all indicators that determine the quality profile of the credit policy are synthetized 
into a factor we denote QUALITY. The intuition is correct about how the indicators load on it: NPL is 
negatively related to QUALITY while Qavg and Qvol are positively related. The first factor, instead, requires 
further interpretation. Here, price and volume indicators are clustered together. Price and volume are 
the variables that determine a participant’s strategy, and by the way they load on this factor ―price 
indicators positively and VCC moving in the opposite direction― we may interpret that the higher the 
factor value, the more conservative (higher price, lower volume) the participant’s strategy. However, 
the fact that VMAXind loads positively goes against this interpretation.244 
                                                 
244 Participants with lower VMAXind ratios granted less credit than the maximum volume demanded by the market at that price. 
Consequently, lower VMAXind ratios evidence a more conservative policy in terms of volume. However, for a factor defined as 
the higher the more conservative, this would require a negative load in Table 8.8, rather than positive. 
1 2 3 4 5
Dependent 
variable
Pavg VMAXind NPL Qavg Qvol 
Constant 15.743 0.920 5.812 1.091 1.047
E -       -       -       -       -       
(s ignific .)
P -       -       -       -       -       
(s ignific .)
Mmed -       -       -       -       0.075    
(s ignific .) 0.021
Mavg 0.655    -       -       -       -       
(s ignific .) 0.043
α+ -       -       -       -       -       
(s ignific .)
α- -       -       -       -       -       
(s ignific .)
γ+ -       -       -       -0.108 -0.082 
(s ignific .) 0.004 0.012
γ- -       0.068    0.263    -       -       
(s ignific .) 0.001 0.015
βmed -       -       -       -       -       
(s ignific .)
βavg -       -       -       -       -       
(s ignific .)
R2 0.034 0.088 0.048 0.066 0.089
adj. R
2
0.026 0.080 0.040 0.059 0.073
Model
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TABLE 8.8 – Factorial analysis. Game indicators – First stage 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
Consequently, we move forward to a second stage by excluding VMAXind from the factorial 
analysis. We obtain the results summarized in Table 8.9. 
TABLE 8.9 – Factorial analysis. Game indicators – Second stage 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
Now the KMO measure improves significantly, with the first factor integrating prices and volumes 
in a coherent way. We denote this factor STRATEGY (since it is prices and volume what determines a 
participant’s strategy), which is interpreted as the higher the factor, the more conservative strategy. 
.489
Approx. Chi-Sq 962.204
df 21
Sig. .000
1 2
Pavg .980 .086
Pvol .945 -.020
VCC -.909 -.100
VMAXind (r) .410 -.045
NPL .088 -.704
Qavg .061 .886
Qvol (r) .094 .901
     a. Rotation converged in 3 iterations.
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis
Rotation. Varimax Normalization with Kaiser.a
Component
Bartlett's Test
of Sphericity
Rotated Component Matrixa
KMO and Bartlett's Test
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure
     of Sampling Adequacy
.660
Approx. Chi-Sq 511.610
df 15
Sig. .000
1 2
Pavg .964 .056
Pvol .936 .009
VCC -.904 -.065
NPL .078 -.739
Qavg .071 .900
Qvol (r) .158 .907
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis
Rotation. Varimax Normalization with Kaiser.a
     a. Rotation converged in 3 iterations.
KMO and Bartlett's Test
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure
     of Sampling Adequacy
Bartlett's Test
of Sphericity
Rotated Component Matrix
a
Component
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These factors being considered, we may again conduct both a correlation and regression analysis 
against behavioral factors and variables in Chapter 7 to test the hypotheses above. The correlation 
analysis is summarized in Table 8.10. Additional information is provided in Table A.17 in the Appendix. 
The regression analysis yields similar results, provided in Tables 8.11 and Table A.18 in the Appendix. 
TABLE 8.10 – Correlations among factors 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
TABLE 8.11 – Regression models. Game factors to behavioral factors and variables 
   
Source: Own elaboration 
On one hand, in regards to the correlations in Table 8.10, when we analyze the correlations among 
factors we again obtain clear evidence that the risk profile for gains affects the quality performance of 
the credit policy implemented. In particular, this traces evidence that the more risk seeking for gains the 
OC Gains Losses Loss_av
Pearson Correlation -.097 -.096 .071 .018
Sig. (2-tailed) .284 .288 .428 .845
N 124 125 125 125
Pearson Correlation -.012 -,266** -.069 -.040
Sig. (2-tailed) .897 .003 .445 .657
N 124 125 125 125
Correlations
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Strategy
Quality
1 2
Dependent 
variable
Strategy Quality
Constant -       -0.016
OC -       -       
(s ignific .)
Gains -       -0.261 
(s ignific .) 0.003
Losses -       -       
(s ignific .)
Loss Aversion -       -       
(s ignific .)
R2 -       0.071
adj. R
2
-       0.063
Model
1 2
Dependent 
variable
Strategy Quality
Constant -       0.645
E -       -       
(s ignific .)
P -       -       
(s ignific .)
Mmed -       -       
(s ignific .)
Mavg -       -       
(s ignific .)
α+ -       -       
(s ignific .)
α- -       -       
(s ignific .)
γ+ -       -1.029 
(s ignific .) 0.003
γ- -       -       
(s ignific .)
βmed -       -       
(s ignific .)
βavg -       -       
(s ignific .)
R2 -       0.072
adj. R2 -       0.064
Model
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lower the quality performance (i.e., the more risky price strategy to low-quality customers), coherent 
with our predictions.245 On the other, regarding the regression models in Table 8.11, we may see in the 
table on the left-hand side ―which provides the regressions among factors― that the more risk seeking 
for gains causes a lower quality performance (i.e., a riskier price strategy to low-quality). In particular, 
the table on the right-hand side ―which provides the same information on game factors to behavioral 
variables― shows this causality is due to 𝛾+ in particular.246 
Cluster analysis 
We end the statistical analysis of the experimental results with a cluster analysis. Different clustering 
alternatives were analyzed, considering different methods and analyses for both variables and factors. 
The results that revealed easier to interpret were a clustering in terms of game factors,247 Strategy and 
Quality, where six different clusters were obtained. Results are summarized in Figure 8.5. 
FIGURE 8.5 – Cluster analysis 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
                                                 
245 We also extend this analysis (see Table A.13 in the Appendix) for two types of correlations: one between behavioral variables 
and credit factors, the other between behavioral factors and credit indicators. On one hand, we find evidence that it is both α+ 
and γ+ which feed this behavior, since they are significantly and negatively correlated to Quality. This way, participants that 
were less risk averse (due to either a utility curvature that is closer to linearity or a lower distortion of probabilities) were 
willing to grant credit to low-quality borrowers at a lower price. On the other hand, there is also evidence that the risk profile 
for GAINS is significantly correlated (p < 0.01) with the three individual measures of quality (for NPL, p < 0.10). Hence, 
Hypotheses 3e, 4e and 4e* would be satisfied for the aggregate factor GAINS. 
246 Table A.14 in the Appendix also provides the regressions of game indicators to behavioral factors. There we may see an 
apparent contradiction: there is a causality effect of LOSSES on VMAXind and NPL that is positive, whereas in Chapter 7 we 
defined higher LOSSES imply more risk aversion; hence, the regression results would say “the more risk aversion, the higher 
VMAXind and non-performing loans”, contrary to our Hypotheses. However, we saw in Chapter 7 as well that it is only true that 
higher γ- implies more risk aversion for medium/high probabilities. For low probabilities instead, which are the relevant ones 
in our game, the interpretation would be the opposite. Then, the results are coherent with the Hypotheses and results on 
correlations (Table 8.6) and regressions (Table 8.7) at the variable level. 
247 We will work with 125 observations because one outlier was excluded from variable Qvol, which loads on Quality factor. 
Additionally, one more observation is lost for OC factor, since we had a missing value for M values from the beginning. 
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We may observe the largest cluster is centered both in terms of Strategy and Quality, while the 
minor groups represent sparser credit policies. Table 8.12 summarizes the descriptive statistics (mean 
value and standard error of the mean) for each cluster in terms of the six behavioral and game factors. 
TABLE 8.12 – Cluster analysis. Descriptive statistics 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
FIGURE 8.6 – Cluster analysis. Dispersion diagrams for mean values 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
In addition, Figure 8.6 provides a series of dispersion diagrams that use these mean values to have 
an intuition on how the different behavioral profiles of each cluster might affect the credit strategies 
Cluster N Mean
Std. 
Error Mean
Std. 
Error Mean
Std. 
Error Mean
Std. 
Error Mean
Std. 
Error Mean
Std. 
Error
1 90* .008 .108 -.114 .099 .024 .105 -.079 .105 .073 .074 -.035 .069
2 11 -.302 .196 -.218 .323 -.155 .282 .398 .330 1.676 .125 .422 .178
3 6 -.215 .411 .104 .396 .101 .468 -.415 .210 .175 .136 2.320 .184
4 8 -.008 .491 .945 .491 -.453 .415 .172 .313 -1.922 .135 -.267 .115
5 9 .324 .277 .515 .269 .252 .337 .400 .402 -.790 .241 -1.925 .188
6 1 -.184 -.342 -.224 -.657 -1.461 2.110
* Data for OC includes 89 observations
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they set. However, we emphasize this interpretation should be carefully considered as any statistical 
analysis based on correlations or causality effects are unsound at this level.248  
A first apparent result based on this interpretation is that the largest cluster (cluster 1) would not 
only include participants that exhibited a neutral strategy and quality factors, but that these participants 
were generally neutral as well in terms of any of the four behavioral factors that summarize 
overconfidence and risk profile. Consequently, it is the behavior of the smaller groups what needs to be 
explained: what happens when a group of participants is biased? Will their strategies and quality vary 
in a predictable manner? To answer that question we conduct an ANOVA test for differences of means 
across clusters, to find significant evidence (p < 0.05) that the clusters are different in terms of risk 
seeking for gains, GAINS. 
 
8.6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
We designed an original business simulation game that replicates the basics of the decision-making 
process of a bank granting credit to customers under conditions of uncertainty and risk. In order to test 
whether overconfidence and prospect theory are able to explain the excessive lending by retail banks, 
we organized a series of sessions where 126 under and postgraduate students participated in an 
experiment that was divided in two parts. The first part consisted of some short tests to measure the 
participants’ level of overconfidence and risk profile according to prospect theory, with the results 
described in Chapter 7. The second part was the experimental implementation of the simulation game 
itself, which was described in this Chapter 8. Several hypotheses about the effects of risk seeking, loss 
aversion and overconfidence were tested. In what follows we summarize the main results obtained. 
First, we found large evidence that aggressive behavioral profiles ―high levels of overconfidence 
and risk seeking― are correlated to riskier credit strategies, particularly in terms of providing credit to 
low-quality customers at a lower rate. We do not find a single piece of evidence in the contrary direction, 
neither we are able to trace evidence that loss aversion has any effects on credit policies implemented. 
Second, the results are consistent with what the game design was intended for: participants were 
given information in terms of confidence intervals and probabilities of default, and the results obtained 
suggest that higher overprecision and the risk profile for gains (mostly attributable to distortion of 
probabilities) foster lower prices, higher volumes of credit, and reduce quality. The most consistent 
result is that of distortion of probabilities fostering lower loan prices to low-quality customers. 
                                                 
248 Having only six observations (clusters) invalidates the statistical significance of any correlations or regression analyses. 
Moreover, much information is lost when we use average values as representative of all individual observations in a cluster. 
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Third, the effects of behavioral biases over credit quality are also the most significant in terms of 
the external validity of the results. Participants in the experiment were aware their strategies were to 
be measured and scrutinized in terms of credit prices and volumes. Hence, their strategies might 
particularly be affected by a strategic behavior: when a given participant was behind in the game (losing 
in terms of profits), she might make weird decisions because she had nothing to lose. However, 
participants were not aware that their behavior in terms of quality was also scrutinized (Levitt and List, 
2007). This is good news, since the most significant results of the experiment are the effects of 
overprecision and probability distortion over quality performance. 
This research represents a first effort to explore the potential effects of behavioral biases over 
credit policies. Time constraints to implement both a series of psychological tests and the simulation 
game imposed the requirement in this experiment that only one repetition of the game was to be 
performed.249 Therefore, the external validity of the results might be improved in future research if 
several rounds of the game with randomized economic scenarios are implemented. This would help 
mitigate the effects of a strategic behavior and avoid any randomization bias (Viera and Bangdiwala, 
2007), also introducing the possibility to test the debiasing effects of learning and experience. 
Finally, some other limitations of the experiment could be considered for future replications 
―they follow in order. Firstly, it would be interesting to extend the way we tested the behavioral biases 
of the participants to other tests and elicitation methods available, such as cumulative prospect theory, 
non-parametric methods, and others. Secondly, a strong result we obtain in the experiment is in terms 
of the effects of overprecision, but in Chapter 7 we found that the overprecision measures were unstable 
at the individual level for different refinement methods ―thus, the validity of the results depend on 
future re-tests with enhanced methods. Finally, the incentives in the game and the absence of penalties 
for excessive risk taking might have biased the results. This is a common drawback in any kind of 
experimental research, and future versions of this game should try to solve it. Notwithstanding, we may 
argue two reasons in favor of the results obtained: on one hand, the strongest results in the experiment 
were in terms of quality, a variable participants were not aware of; on the other, the combination in the 
game of incentives and moral hazard when costs are not to be borne resembles the alleged behavior of 
CEOs at banks during the recent financial crisis. 
  
                                                 
249 Participants in the experimental sessions spent an average time of three hours to complete the tests on overconfidence and 
prospect theory, and the simulation game, instructions included.  
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CHAPTER 9. A BEHAVIORAL MODEL OF THE CREDIT CYCLE 
 
9.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The purpose of the theoretical analysis in this chapter is to follow the second and third steps in the 
stepwise approach in Chapter 6 to determine how a duopoly of banks would compete to grant credit. 
The model starts from the assumption, backed by our findings in the experimental research in Chapters 
7 and 8, that some banks in the industry might be biased in terms of overconfidence and excessive 
optimism ―particularly during the upswing of the economic cycle. 
Unsustainable credit and asset price booms are likely to occur in stable macroeconomic conditions 
(Borio and Shim, 2007), and excessive optimism and overconfidence might be plausible explanations to 
that evidence. Following this intuition, a recent line of research offers a few behavioral models of credit 
cycles. These include Keen (2011) on a monetary macroeconomic model of the financial instability 
hypothesis (Minsky, 1982a,b, 1992); Rötheli (2012a,b), who proposes a model of oligopolistic banking 
competition where a minority of boundedly rational banks are enough to aggravate the credit cycle; and 
Boz and Mendoza (2014), who provide a model on the effects of financial innovation and overconfidence 
to amplify the credit cycle. Some antecedents are Lewis (2010) and Leiser, Bourgeois-Gironde and 
Benita (2010), who trace some effects of social psychology on financial cycles, and Niu (2010), who 
offers some empirical evidence that banks managed by overconfident CEOs take more risk. 
In this chapter we extend that literature with two developments. In the first one we examine how 
credit booms are fueled by the banking sector. To such purpose we follow the stepwise approach in 
Chapter 6 to analyze how a duopoly of a rational and a biased bank would compete to grant credit to the 
economy, whether herding strategies would appear, and whether limits of arbitrage in the industry are 
identifiable. We build a model of duopoly competition among banks to show that behavioral biases by 
participants in the industry explain how a credit bubble is fueled. According to it, biased banks would 
lead the industry and unbiased banks herd under conditions we derive, what generates a credit boom 
of loans of low quality. Finally, we describe the limits of arbitrage that are implicit in the model. 
Our results are in line with Rötheli (2012a,b) and Boz and Mendoza (2014) in the sense that their 
models predict that overconfidence generates a bubble. However, our model provides a more intuitive 
interpretation of how bank competition may aggravate credit booms: overconfident banks always 
follow their priors while there is a rationale for rational banks to herd. This key finding emphasizes the 
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potential pervasiveness of behavioral biases. In addition, the model suggests bank-based systems are 
less likely to be informationally efficient than market-based ones: first, the mere presence of a biased 
bank leads the banking sector to grant excess credit ―this also supports Rötheli’s (2012a) results that 
the amplifying effect of bounded rationality persists when only a fraction of banks are biased; besides, 
the limits of arbitrage that allow price inefficiencies to survive are implicit, as private banks have not an 
economic motivation to hedge credit markets given the assumptions in our model. 
The second development of our model contributes to explain how the credit cycle is amplified due 
to banking competition. For such purpose, we first model the economic cycle following Rötheli (2012b) 
where boundedly rational banks overestimate probabilities of success during booms and underestimate 
them during recessions. Then, we extend the model to consider the effects of underconfidence and 
pessimism in the recessive periods of the credit cycle, in order to determine whether symmetry exists 
regarding the effects over and underconfidence induce in retail credit markets. We find pessimism 
would not be a powerful driver of credit cycles. Rather than that, our model supports it is euphoria 
during large upswings what seeds the next crunch. This disputes the alternative interpretation in 
models like Rötheli (2012a), where the interest rate decisions of a minority of boundedly rational banks 
induce the more rational competitors to aggravate the credit cycle during both booms and recessions. 
Other authors, like Boz and Mendoza (2014), also interpret pessimism has amplification effects on debt, 
but our opposite results are not comparable to theirs, because they assume all agents are boundedly 
rational and because they consider the effects of financial innovation on cycles. 
Finally, we offer a dynamization of our model to provide further insight on how boundedly 
rational competition would amplify the credit cycle. We offer four additional insights. First, the effects 
are relevant particularly during upswings. Second, the conditions for a herding behavior to appear in 
both booms and recessions are determined. Third, only for high levels of pessimism some amplification 
effects over the cycle would be observed. However, in such case simply cut rates would be a powerful 
tool for economic authorities to soften the recession, in contradiction with episodes like the recent 
recession. Fourth, excessive optimism as a driver of a credit boom is shown to be a plausible explanation 
particularly the lower the quality of the niche markets.  
In the remainder of this chapter we develop this model.250 Section 9.2 formalizes the behavioral 
model of herding and limits of arbitrage in retail credit markets. In Section 9.3 we extend the model to 
consider the effects of pessimism and underconfidence. Then, Section 9.4 offers a dynamization of the 
model all over the boom-bust cycle. Finally, Section 9.5 concludes. The proof of the main results is 
relegated to an Appendix. 
                                                 
250 In what follows we reproduce the original research where we developed this model. Thus, Section 9.2 reproduces an article 
published in Studies in Economics and Finance (Peón, Antelo and Calvo, 2015), whereas in Sections 9.3 and 9.4 we reproduce 
two excerpts from a manuscript in the second round of revision in a JCR ranked journal at the time of the writing of this thesis. 
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9.2. A BEHAVIORAL MODEL OF THE CREDIT BOOM251 
 
We deal with an oligopolistic model of banking and focus only on the informational side of EMH to show 
that even in a world with no asymmetric information behavioral biases may explain why bank-based 
systems may still not be informationally efficient. To such purpose, assume the economy consists of the 
banking sector, savers and potential borrowers. Banks may be of two types, type A and type B, the first 
being an unbiased bank and the second a biased bank.252 In particular, a bank of type B is boundedly 
rational in terms of excessive optimism (perhaps fostered by overconfidence too), so we often refer to 
it as an optimistic or overconfident bank. There are no agency problems between shareholders and 
managers, and no information asymmetries. 
The only business banks run are taking deposits and granting loans. For tractability purposes, we 
assume the following: (i) deposits can only be invested in loans, i.e., there is no interbank market or 
rates are zero there, (ii) deposits are hold until maturity (banks face no liquidity restrictions, so no 
fraction of the deposits are hold as liquid reserves, R=0), (iii) the Central Bank requires no reserves, and 
(iv) bankruptcy effects are not considered. Banks receive deposits from savers, who have other 
investment alternatives that pay a competitive rate of return, r, r≥0. There is an unlimited source of 
deposits available, hence we assume that banks take the rate r as given and set a volume of deposits Di, 
i=A,B, equal to the volume of loans they grant, as to finance them.253 Banks are risk-neutral and compete 
in Cournot fashion by setting, independent and simultaneously, the volume of loans. The cost function 
of the banks, C(D,L), where D stands for deposits and L for loans, is linear and is defined as C(L)=cL, c>0, 
given that they set a volume of loans equal to the volume of deposits. 
In the market there are two types of borrowers, high-quality and low-quality borrowers. A high-
quality customer, which is denoted by subscript h, is a client that fully repays a loan more likely than a 
low-quality client, which is referred by subscript l. Thus, banks are confronted with two downward 
sloping demand functions for loans, one for each type of borrower. We assume that both demands are 
the linear functions L(rh)=α–βrh and L(rl)=α–βrl, being α>0 and β>0. The (gross) rates of return on loans 
are rh and rl, respectively, with rl>r and rh>r. Both banks are able, after a costless screening process, to 
correctly assign any new potential borrower to the type she belongs to. Each type of borrower is 
associated to a probability of success 𝜃ℎ and 𝜃𝑙, 0 < 𝜃𝑙 < 𝜃ℎ < 1, which are the probabilities that a loan 
                                                 
251 Article forthcoming in Studies in Economics and Finance, Volume 32, 2015 
252 Obviously, this is a simplification of language: banks are neither biased nor unbiased; who may be biased are executives, 
employees, and procedures for decision-making inside those banks. 
253 When there are no liquidity restrictions and banks are not competing for deposits (given they are paying a competitive rate 
r and there is an unlimited amount of deposits available), there is no reason to accumulate (and pay interests for) a volume of 
deposits higher than necessary. 
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of each type is fully repaid, while whenever the borrower defaults the bank gets zero. Key to our model 
is the assumption of rational and overly optimistic banks in terms of these probabilities. Formally, 
Assumption 1. 𝜃ℎ
𝐵 = 𝜃ℎ
𝐴 and 𝜃𝑙
𝐵 > 𝜃𝑙
𝐴. 
That is, if a bank is of type A, then it observes the true probabilities of success given information 
available254 of both types of borrowers; conversely, a bank of type B estimates an unbiased probability 
for high-quality borrowers, but a lower probability of default by low-quality borrowers than a bank of 
type A. Assumption 1 sets overestimation of probabilities of success by low-quality borrowers as the 
main driver of the model. From now on, we will use the notation 𝜃𝑙
𝐴 ≡ 𝜃𝑙 and 𝜃𝑙
𝐵 ≡ 𝜃𝑙
𝑂 (superscript O 
denotes overconfident), being 0 < 𝜃𝑙 < 𝜃𝑙
𝑂 < 𝜃ℎ < 1.  
Assumption 2. The parameters of the model are such they satisfy 
O
l
O
lcr



)1( 
 . 
Assumption 2 imposes a restriction on the demand size for loans. It states that the size of the 
market needs to be sufficiently large to guarantee that interest rates are well defined in equilibrium, 
meaning they are neither negative nor they exceed the maximum possible value α/β in the equilibrium. 
Under this setup we analyze informational efficiency following the behavioral approach described 
in Chapter 6; namely, do banks behave rationally when granting credit to the economy? (subsection 
9.2.1), may biased strategies be correlated across the banking industry? (subsection 9.2.2), and are there 
limits of arbitrage in the banking industry? (subsection 9.2.3). 
9.2.1. Analysis of rationality 
The goal of this section is to identify whether banks behave rational or biased and what would be the 
effects over credit aggregates. Consider the particular case of two banks competing in the economy. How 
would this duopoly be characterized if both banks are unbiased? And what if one of them or both are 
excessively optimistic? We model this market following the Monti–Klein approach of an oligopoly,255 
where the banks’ decision variables are the volumes of loans, namely Lh in the niche formed by high-
quality borrowers and Ll in the niche formed by low-quality borrowers. Banks analyze the borrowers’ 
quality and decide how much credit to grant.  
Having two banks in the industry, we may face three different situations: (i) both banks are 
unbiased; (ii) one bank is boundedly rational; or (iii) both banks are biased. Next, we examine the 
                                                 
254 That is, banks correctly infer whether a borrower is of a good or a bad quality, where of course chances of default are higher 
for bad borrowers. However, we consider that, given information available, rational banks are able to correctly calibrate the 
probabilities of success of both good and bad borrowers; optimistic banks, instead, believe bad-borrowers’ chance of success 
is higher than they should have rationally presumed. 
255 See Freixas and Rochet (1998) for a detailed description. 
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outcome of each one of them. First, if both banks are of type A (we refer to this as a rational duopoly), 
we have symmetric Cournot competitors solving the problem 
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where i,j=A,B; ij, and superscript * denotes equilibrium value. The solution of (9.1) renders 
h
B
h
A
h
cr
LL


3
)1(
3



              (9.2) 
and 
l
B
rDl
A
rDl
cr
LL


3
)1(
3
,,



  ,                (9.3) 
where 𝐿𝑙,𝑟𝐷
𝑖∗  denotes the volume granted by each bank i, i=A,B, to low-quality borrowers in a rational 
duopoly market (denoted by subscripts rD). Finally, the corresponding clearing interest rates are 
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We may see that the decision problem for high and low-quality markets is separable; namely, 𝐿ℎ
∗   
and 𝐿𝑙
∗ are independent. This makes that the relevant results will be found only in market niches where 
at least one bank is biased.  
Second, what would happen if there is an asymmetric duopoly where one bank is unbiased in both 
markets (type A) and the other is biased when analyzing the probability of success of low-quality 
borrowers (type B)? Since markets are separable, volumes of loans and interest rates in the high-quality 
market are identical to the results above see (9.2) and (9.4), respectively. By contrast, in the low-
quality market we get  
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where 𝐿𝑙,𝑎𝐷
𝑖∗  denotes the volume of loans provided by bank i to low-quality borrowers in an asymmetric 
duopoly (denoted by subscript aD). In this case, the interest rate for low-quality borrowers that clears 
the market is 
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Thus, the consequence of having a biased bank in the industry is that the rational bank reduces 
the amount of credit granted to low-quality borrowers256 with respect to the situation in which there is 
no biased bank, while the boundedly rational bank chooses a larger volume. In fact, it may happen that 
a bank of type A ends up driven out of the market of low-quality borrowers. Setting 𝐿𝑙,𝑎𝐷
𝑖∗ = 0 in (9.6) 
and solving for 𝜃𝑙, we define the cut-off value 𝜃𝑙
𝑀 
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being 0 < 𝜃𝑙
𝑀 < 1, for which a monopoly condition 𝜃𝑙 ≤ 𝜃𝑙
𝑀 emerges. Thus, when 𝜃𝑙 > 𝜃𝑙
𝑀, the volume 
of credit that a bank of type A grants to low-quality borrowers is strictly non-negative; hence, the market 
becomes an asymmetric duopoly. Contrariwise, if 𝜃𝑙 ≤ 𝜃𝑙
𝑀, there would be a monopoly formed by (the 
boundedly rational) bank B, which solves 
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which affords 
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as the volume of loans granted to low-quality borrowers (subscript M stands for monopoly). 
Consequently, the interest rate to be paid by the these borrowers when there is a monopoly by bank B 
in that niche would amount to 
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Finally, we may have a market where both banks are of type B (the so-called biased duopoly). 
They would be symmetric Cournot competitors solving a similar problem as in (9.1), but where the 
probability of success of low-quality borrowers is now replaced by 𝜃𝑙
𝑂. In this case, the level of loans 
                                                 
256 Indeed, it is easy to see that the credit volume in (9.3) is larger than in (9.6). 
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granted in the high-quality market is that given in (9.2), whereas the interest rate these borrowers have 
to pay is that given in (9.4). In turn, for low-quality borrowers we have the volume of loans  
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granted by each bank and 
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as the interest rate to be paid by these borrowers in a biased duopoly (denoted by subscript bD). We can 
easily establish the following result. 
Lemma 1. The following holds as a function of 𝜃𝑙: 
(i) If 𝜃𝑙 > 𝜃𝑙
𝑀, then *,
*
,
*
, rDlaDlbDl LLL  .  
(ii) If 𝜃𝑙 ≤ 𝜃𝑙
𝑀, then *,
*
,
*
, rDlMlbDl LLL  . 
Proof. See Appendix. 
Lemma 1 shows that either the biased or the asymmetric duopoly (or the monopoly when the 
monopoly condition holds) generate a credit boom in the low-quality market above what it would be 
informationally efficient, with the largest credit boom coming in a duopoly market where both banks 
follow the biased strategy. 
9.2.2. Herd behavior 
The goal of this section is to determine whether the biased strategies might be correlated across banks, 
even to the point that unbiased participants follow their biased competitors. To this end, we consider 
that the banking sector is formed by two banks, one is unbiased (bank A) and the other is biased (bank 
B). Assume for a while that the no-monopoly condition 𝜃𝑙 > 𝜃𝑙
𝑀 does hold. We would expect this market 
is described by (9.2), (9.6) and (9.7), with correspondent interest rates stated in (9.4) and (9.8), as we 
saw in subsection 9.2.1. 
Consider now that banks are able to observe their competitor’s estimated probabilities. Though 
each bank considers its own estimations as ―by definition― unbiased, a key feature of the model is that, 
when banks of a different nature compete, they consider an ex-ante analysis of strategies to determine 
whether it is more profitable to them playing rational or biased (regardless of their true nature), given 
the possible alternatives the opposite bank may follow, and assuming that both banks move 
simultaneously. This may be summarized as the game in Table 9.1. 
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TABLE 9.1 – Possible market configurations of the low-quality niche 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
For instance, if bank A considers that bank B will follow its own priors (playing biased or 
optimistic), bank A compares whether it is better to determine how much credit to grant using its own 
probabilities (playing unbiased or rational, hence we have an asymmetric duopoly) or imitating the 
optimistic bank to share one half of the market in a biased duopoly. Considering all the alternatives, the 
possible market configurations are: a rational duopoly when both banks play unbiased (regardless of 
their true nature), a biased duopoly when both play biased, an asymmetric duopoly when they follow 
their own convictions, or an inverted asymmetric duopoly where bank B plays unbiased and bank A 
plays biased, both playing against their own true nature.257 
The volumes of loans and interest rates of each possible market configuration would be those 
analyzed in subsection 9.2.1. Nonetheless, in order to determine the Nash equilibria concerning the 
market configuration, we must estimate the expected profits banks have in each possible scenario, but 
using their own priors 𝜃𝑙 (bank A) and 𝜃𝑙
𝑂 (bank B), since those are the probabilities they truly observe. 
The following results are obtained. 
Lemma 2. Playing biased is a dominant strategy for bank B. 
Proof. See Appendix. 
Lemma 2 leads to the following result. 
Lemma 3. Bank A herds whenever 𝜃𝑙 > 𝜃𝑙
𝑇, where 
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Proof. See Appendix. 
Lemma 3 shows that there may be market conditions where even unbiased participants would 
follow their biased competitors. In particular, there is a threshold bias 𝜃𝑙
𝑂 − 𝜃𝑙
𝑇 such that when bank B 
is not too biased, bank A herds to grant credit as if it had biased expectations. When 𝜃𝑙 ≤ 𝜃𝑙
𝑀, the no-
                                                 
257 Similar volumes of loans and interest rates apply when we have an inverted asymmetric duopoly, but with (9.6) applying to 
bank B (which now would play rational) and (9.7) applying to bank A (which now would play biased). Were this market a 
monopoly (i.e., when the no-monopoly condition is not satisfied) bank A would be the monopolist instead of bank B. 
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monopoly condition does not hold and the cut-off value becomes 
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in the Appendix that in this situation 𝜃𝑙
𝑇 > 𝜃𝑙
𝑀, hence when the asymmetric market of low-quality 
borrowers is a monopoly formed by bank B, it always becomes the equilibrium (since bank A chooses to 
play rational). 
Proposition 1. If a rational and a biased bank compete, the following occurs in the niche of low-
quality borrowers: 
(i) When 𝜃𝑙 is sufficiently large as such 𝜃𝑙
𝑀 < 𝜃𝑙
𝑇 < 𝜃𝑙, a biased duopoly where bank A herds 
holds; 
(ii) When 𝜃𝑙 is moderate as such 𝜃𝑙
𝑀 < 𝜃𝑙 < 𝜃𝑙
𝑇, an asymmetric duopoly where both banks use 
their own prior assessments emerges; 
(iii) When 𝜃𝑙 is sufficiently low as such 𝜃𝑙 ≤ 𝜃𝑙
𝑀 , a monopoly formed by the biased bank B holds. 
Proof. See Appendix. 
Figure 9.1 below provides a graphic interpretation of Proposition 1, where 𝜃𝑙
𝑂 has been set to be 
𝜃𝑙
𝑂 = 0.9 and 𝜃𝑙 varies all along the dotted line.258 
FIGURE 9.1 – Possible equilibrium configurations in the low-quality niche 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
                                                 
258 We have also considered r=0.1, c=0.05, and α=β=1 in this example. 
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We may note the kinked feature of 𝜃𝑙
𝑇 (when 𝜃𝑙 ≤ 𝜃𝑙
𝑀 the expression for 𝜃𝑙
𝑇 in Lemma 3 simplifies 
to 
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 , insensitive to 𝜃𝑙; hence horizontal). Since 𝜃𝑙
𝑇 > 𝜃𝑙
𝑀 is satisfied, as the bias 
𝜃𝑙
𝑂 − 𝜃𝑙 increases (as we move down the dotted line in Figure 9.2) we may have the three different 
possible market configurations of equilibrium. Namely, in this example, a biased duopoly emerges for 
0.789 < 𝜃𝑙 < 0.9, an asymmetric duopoly for 0.702 < 𝜃𝑙 < 0.789 and a monopoly whenever 𝜃𝑙 ≤ 0.702. 
Remark 1. In all the three possible equilibrium market configurations a credit boom of loans of low 
quality at a lower-than-rational rate is generated, with the largest credit boom following when the 
unbiased bank herds. Further, this credit boom increases the welfare of low-quality borrowers. 
Proof. See Appendix. 
A numerical example 
Consider a base case of a duopolistic banking sector where the demand for loans of each type of 
borrowers are L(rh)=1–rh and L(rl)=1–rl, the cost function is C(L)=0.05·L for both banks, and the interest 
rate of deposits is r=0.1. In addition, assume that 𝜃ℎ = 0.95, 𝜃𝑙 = 0.7 and 𝜃𝑙
𝑂 = 0.75. Then, the 
equilibrium values for credit volumes, interest rates and expected profits for each bank are summarized 
in the base model (case 1) of Table 9.2. 
TABLE 9.2 – Case analysis 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
Model θh θl θl
O α β r c A2 θl
Μ A B A B A B A B A B A B A B θl
T boom
L 0.263 0.263 0.119 0.119 0.083 0.192 0 0.233 0.192 0.083 0.233 0 0.156 0.156
1. Base 0.95 0.7 0.75 1 1 0.1 0.05 0.533 0.651 r
EΠ 0.0757 0.0862 0.0706 0.0935 0.0769 0.0777 0.0708 0.0839 0.698 30.7%
L 0.263 0.263 0.119 0.119 0.051 0.256 0 0.281 0.256 0.051 0.281 0 0.188 0.188
2. Base_asym 0.95 0.7 0.8 1 1 0.1 0.05 0.438 0.669 r
EΠ 0.0757 0.0967 0.0676 0.1182 0.0749 0.0761 0.0634 0.0939 0.719 28.8%
L 0.263 0.263 0.119 0.119 -0.003 0.362 0 0.361 0.362 -0.003 0.361 0 0.241 0.241
3. Base_monop 0.95 0.7 0.9 1 1 0.1 0.05 0.278 0.702 r
EΠ 0.0757 0.1177 0.0658 0.1832 0.0648 0.0658 0.0448 0.1179 0.757 51.7%
L 1.596 1.596 1.452 1.452 1.416 1.525 0 2.233 1.525 1.416 2.233 0 1.489 1.489
4. Demand (α) 0.95 0.7 0.75 5 1 0.1 0.05 0.533 0.305 r
EΠ 3.8979 4.1227 3.8246 4.1665 3.9332 4.0412 3.8589 4.0839 0.497 2.5%
L 0.228 0.228 -0.048 -0.048 -0.117 0.092 0 0.033 0.092 -0.117 0.033 0 0.022 0.022
5. Demand (β) 0.95 0.7 0.75 1 2 0.05 0.05 0.933 0.742 r
EΠ 0.0255 0.0218 0.0247 0.0251 0.0227 0.0247 0.0233 0.0249 0.73 ∞
L 0.175 0.175 0 0 -0.044 0.089 0 0.067 0.089 -0.044 0.067 0 0.044 0.044
6. High-cost 0.95 0.7 0.75 1 1 0.1 0.3 0.867 0.724 r
EΠ 0.0292 0.0292 0.0292 0.0326 0.0261 0.0292 0.0265 0.0307 0.724 ∞
L 0.316 0.316 0.19 0.19 0.159 0.254 0 0.333 0.254 0.159 0.333 0 0.222 0.222
7. No-cost 0.95 0.7 0.75 1 1 0 0 0.333 0.600 r
EΠ 0.1201 0.1356 0.1124 0.1431 0.1230 0.1250 0.1145 0.1318 0.677 16.7%
high-quality rational Duop asymm. Duop inverted Duop biased DuopMonopoly invert. Monop
0.689
0.474 0.762 0.693 0.719 0.693 0.719 0.625
0.474 0.762 0.725 0.767 0.725 0.767
0.519
1.807 2.095 2.059 2.767 2.059 2.767 2.022
0.474 0.762 0.640 0.639 0.640 0.639
0.478
0.649 1.000 0.956 0.933 0.956 0.933 0.911
0.272 0.548 0.513 0.483 0.513 0.483
0.5560.368 0.619 0.587 0.667 0.587 0.667
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In the base case, Assumption 2 imposes a minimum market size α>0.533 for an equilibrium to 
exist. The no-monopoly condition requires 𝜃𝑙 > 𝜃𝑙
𝑀 = 0.651, which is satisfied; hence, the four possible 
market configurations in the niche for low-quality borrowers are rational, asymmetric, inverted and 
biased duopolies (volumes and rates in the monopolies are shadowed since they would not apply here). 
We may know in advance which one will be the equilibrium by checking 𝜃𝑙 > 𝜃𝑙
𝑇 = 0.698: bank A will 
herd to compete in a biased duopoly. One may easily check in Table I that would be indeed the Nash 
equilibrium, generating a credit boom of low-quality loans of a 30.7% (total volume 0.311 versus 0.238) 
at a lower rate (0.762 versus 0.689) compared to what a duopoly of unbiased banks would set. 
Were bank B more biased, the herding condition would not be satisfied and bank A would choose 
to play unbiased in an asymmetric duopoly. That happens in the second case, denoted ‘Base_asym’, 
where we set 𝜃𝑙
𝑂 = 0.8. Were bank B more biased (case 3 ‘Base_monop’, where we set 𝜃𝑙
𝑂 = 0.9) it may 
happen that the no-monopoly condition is not satisfied. In this third model we have 𝜃𝑙 < 𝜃𝑙
𝑀 = 0.702; 
hence the monopoly becomes the equilibrium market structure. Finally, cases 4 to 7 analyze the effects 
of changes in demand (α and β) and cost (r and c) parameters of the model. We conclude that herding 
conditions are more likely to exist the larger the market size and the lower the costs. In any case, as long 
as 𝜃𝑙
𝑂 is strictly larger than 𝜃𝑙, bank B will find it profitable to play biased. 
Therefore, we have shown that it is rational for a bank, under specific circumstances, to move out 
of the rational price for low-quality credit. Thus, a mix of overconfident and unbiased banks competing 
for loans generates a higher demand for (low-quality) loans that are provided at a lower-than-rational 
price, i.e. a credit boom may emerge that, eventually, might collapse. 
9.2.3. Limits of arbitrage 
In this final step we examine whether there are limits of arbitrage in the banking industry. In credit 
markets, arbitrage between close substitutes makes no sense from a micro perspective: since there are 
no securities, a bank observing other bank granting a loan that underestimates the creditor’s risk would 
only be able to make profit out of arbitrage if it were possible to grant a new loan to a perfect substitute 
(other customer) and short-sell the former somehow. In addition, the risk assumed in a credit 
transaction cannot be offset with the reduction of credit granted to any other agent in the market. 
Therefore, hedging should be considered in retail credit markets only at a macro level: Are there market 
participants able to rectify the excess credit provided by the banking system during credit bubbles the 
opposite with credit rationing for their own profit? 
However, the main drawback for arbitrage in the aggregate credit market to be performed by 
private agents refers to the impossibility for this strategy to be profitable. During credit booms, when 
optimistic banks are making money by giving credit to anyone who demands it, an arbitrageur should 
be willing not to win that easy money and lose market share. Rather than that, we have seen that 
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whenever 𝜃𝑙 > 𝜃𝑙
𝑇 an unbiased bank will be willing to fuel the credit boom to low-quality borrowers. 
Besides, we should neither expect the rational banks to be willing to reduce the loans granted to high 
quality borrowers (in order to compensate in aggregate terms for the higher volume of credit they grant 
to low quality borrowers) because that would make them lose money, too. On the other hand, banks 
could also use deposits for arbitrage purposes, but only with similar results: during credit bubbles, 
arbitrageurs (commercial banks) might raise the interest rate paid on deposits to a higher rate r+δ, δ>0, 
forcing competitors to do the same. This way, the cost of funding rises and banks would impose more 
stringent conditions on credit: they would be willing to reduce deposits (hence loans) to optimize their 
expected profits. However this strategy is not profitable for bank A, since it could only be done by paying 
more on its existing deposits hence reducing its expected profits. The following result can be stated. 
Proposition 2. In retail credit markets there would be no rationale for private banks to correct 
mispricing. 
The ultimate set of arguments for efficient markets is that, as long as there are a sufficient number 
of rational arbitrageurs making profit out of the mispricing (Fama, 1970), efficiency is guaranteed. 
Instead, our model suggests that in retail credit markets the only presence of a biased bank is a sufficient 
condition for a bubble to be generated. Arbitrage must be profitable at no risk or it does not work, but 
private banks will not have an economic motivation to hedge credit markets given the assumptions in 
our model. Furthermore, banks themselves could, rather than hedge the market, play a speculative role: 
the classic moral hazard problem that has been suggested to be a key factor in the recent crisis, 
especially by too-big-to-fail entities (Bernanke, 2010). Therefore, a key conclusion would be that limits 
of arbitrage suggest bank-based systems are less likely to be informationally efficient than market-based 
ones,259 even when informational asymmetries don’t exist or are easy to overcome. 
 
9.3. THE EFFECTS OF UNDERCONFIDENCE AND CHANGES ALONG THE CYCLE260 
 
In order to take our model to a dynamic setup, three theoretical elements are necessary. First, how a 
duopoly of banks would compete in a static setup when one of them is biased in terms of excessive 
optimism and overconfidence. Here we follow the analysis described in Section 9.2. Second, how the 
same duopoly would compete if the boundedly rational bank is biased instead in terms of pessimism 
                                                 
259 Shleifer (2000) would agree in support of central banking: “[I]t is easy to see how [fire sales] lead to chains of liquidations, 
and to financial distress of many market participants. When these market participants are financial intermediaries, they may 
curtail their lending to firms, thereby engendering a recession. (...) Financial panics can thus have severe real consequences. This 
model [Shleifer and Vishny, 1997] provides a potential justification for the Central Bank or another institution becoming the lender 
of last resort that can step in at the time of crisis and stop the chain of liquidations (Bagehot 1872, Kindleberger 1978). In this 
model, such intervention would improve the efficiency of financial markets. In a more general model, it can perhaps preserve the 
integrity of the financial system as well, and even prevent an economic rather than just a financial meltdown” (p. 107). 
260 Excerpt from a manuscript in the second round of revision in a JCR ranked journal at the time of the writing of this thesis. 
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and underconfidence. This is analyzed in subsection 9.3.1. Third, we need to examine how optimism and 
pessimism evolve along the business cycle. Here we borrow Rötheli’s (2012a,b) theoretical and 
empirical description of the stylized dynamics of credit risk assessment to model how boundedly 
rational expectations and rational expectations on probabilities of success change all over the business 
cycle. This is described in subsection 9.3.2 below. 
9.3.1. Pessimism and underconfidence in recessive periods 
We now examine the effects of pessimism during recessions. For clarity of exposition we will only 
highlight the main differences observed when the boundedly rational competitor is biased in terms of 
pessimism/underconfidence rather than excessive optimism. Thus, if in Section 9.2 we defined 
overconfidence as overestimation of probabilities of success ―i.e., the probability that a loan is fully 
repaid― during the upswing of the business cycle, fed by excessive optimism, now underconfidence 
means underestimation of probabilities of success, fed by pessimism during the economic crises. 
This way, rather than having unbiased (type A) and overconfident (type B) banks, now we have 
an unbiased and an underconfident bank. The simplest way to tackle this is to note that we defined 
unbiased and overconfident banks in terms of bad borrowers’ probabilities of success, 𝜃𝑙
𝑂 > 𝜃𝑙, that now 
change to 𝜃𝑙
𝑈 < 𝜃𝑙 (superscript U stands for underconfidence). Hence, assumptions 1 and 2 become 
Assumption 1a. 𝜃ℎ
𝐵 = 𝜃ℎ
𝐴 , 𝜃𝑙
𝐵 > 𝜃𝑙
𝐴      
and, if 𝜃𝑙
𝐴 is labelled as 𝜃𝑙
𝑈 and 𝜃𝑙
𝐵 as 𝜃𝑙, it follows that 0 < 𝜃𝑙
𝑈 < 𝜃𝑙 < 𝜃ℎ < 1. 
Assumption 2a. The parameters of the model are such they satisfy 
 
l
lcr





1
 . 
Assumption 1a sets underestimation of probabilities of success as a key factor, while Assumption 
2a may be proved to be the condition that ensures the size of the market is large enough to guarantee 
interest rates are well defined in the possible equilibria. Hence, we may go back and simply replace 𝜃𝑙
𝑂 
by 𝜃𝑙 and 𝜃𝑙 by 𝜃𝑙
𝑈 in all formulae, such that notation A refers now to the underconfident bank, and 
notation B to the unbiased bank. This way, no additional calculations are required.  
The most important finding is that it is now the unbiased player who leads the market. On one 
hand, playing rational is a dominant strategy for the unbiased bank B, as it comes from a symmetrical 
interpretation of the results above. On the other, a condition for the pessimistic bank to herd depends 
on a threshold bias 𝜃𝑙 − 𝜃𝑙
𝑈𝑇, where  
 
    lUlUll
U
llUT
l
cr
cr



231
16


    (9.15) 
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such that when bank A is not too pessimistic (𝜃𝑙
𝑈 above 𝜃𝑙
𝑈𝑇 for a given 𝜃𝑙) it herds to grant credit as if it 
had rational expectations. This herding condition would not apply when the no-monopoly condition 
𝜃𝑙
𝑈 > 𝜃𝑙
𝑈𝑀 is not satisfied, where the cut-off value 𝜃𝑙
𝑈𝑀 is now defined as 
 
   cr
cr
l
lU
l
U
l


 
1
12


    (9.16) 
This way, whenever the possible asymmetric market is a monopoly by the rational bank B, bank 
A chooses not to herd and the monopoly becomes the equilibrium. Consequently, there are also three 
possible equilibria in a recessive market: a rational duopoly, an asymmetric duopoly where both banks 
follow their own priors, and a monopoly by the unbiased bank B (when the no-monopoly condition does 
not hold). This result may be recorded as follows. 
Proposition 3. Pessimism is not as pervasive as excessive optimism. 
When rational and overoptimistic banks compete, the biased bank drives the industry and a credit 
boom of loans at a lower-than-rational rate is generated, as we saw in Section 9.2. On the contrary, when 
boundedly rational banks are bounded in terms of pessimism (underestimation of probabilities of 
success), rational banks lead the market. Pessimism might only partially explain the credit crunch, since 
the unbiased bank would never herd.  
We find this result appealing for two reasons. First, we offer an alternative interpretation to Rötheli 
(2012a) for recessive markets. He suggests the cycle is amplified by boundedly rational behavior on 
both booms and recessions. We on the contrary predict pessimism is not a powerful driver. Second, our 
model predicts it is the euphoric economy developed during large upswings what seeds the fragility of 
the industry during the forthcoming recession. Put it other words, it would make sense to say financial 
crises are seeded during upturns, with excessive optimism driving markets, while credit rationing 
during recessions would be a consequence of past excesses (increased non-performing loans, 
undercapitalization, bank defaults, etc.) rather than a situation where banks are in good shape but cut 
down credit because of an excessive prudence.261 
9.3.2. Dynamics of credit risk assessment 
We are now in need of examining how optimism and pessimism evolve along the business cycle. Here 
we borrow from Rötheli’s (2012a,b) setup, who shows how risk attitudes often change along the 
economic cycle. Rötheli (2012b) investigates the dynamics of banks’ expectations as a mechanism that 
can give rise to inefficient lending cycles. Bayesian learning and the experience structure of banks could 
influence the loan-loss expectations and, therefore, the economic cycle. Following Rötheli (2012a), “a 
model of boundedly rational credit risk assessment can be built based on the assumption that bankers have 
                                                 
261 This intuition was in Rötheli (2012b) when he agrees “excesses in lending during good times eventually, when projects fail 
and creditors default, bring about a financial crisis and a downturn in economic activity” (p. 731). 
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a limited experience span and thus, in their Bayesian learning, overestimate the risk of default in recessions 
and underestimate this risk as the upswing continues for several years (p. 2).262  
Rötheli (2012b) empirically calibrates the transition probabilities of the Markov chain process 
that governs the business cycle probabilities using data from the U.S. economy. He looks at a stationary 
economy that can be either on ‘good times’ with a low level of loan losses or ‘bad times’ with a high level 
of loan losses. The transition between these two states follows a Markov chain with probabilities p (good 
times follow good times), q (bad times follow bad times), 1−p (good times are followed by bad times) 
and 1−q (bad times are followed by good times).  
Bankers form their default rate expectations on the correct assumption that the state of the 
economy follows a Markov process, but they do not know the objective transition probabilities of this 
stochastic process. Instead, Rötheli (2012b) assumes that they look back in time and estimate these 
probabilities through a Bayesian estimate of probabilities p and q by using a limited historical data 
sample. It is this limitation of the memory (or experience) span that makes bankers’ behavior boundedly 
rational. It is worth to note here that Rötheli (2012a,b) works his model out of an interpretation similar 
to Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis that the high risk aversion in the beginning of the upswing is 
consequence of the memory of a recent financial failure, while risk aversion starts to decline as things 
gradually improve in the short term (Keen, 2011). 
According to his empirical estimations, credit defaults in recessions in the U.S. are about three 
times higher than during upswings, the average duration of a cycle is 24 quarters (70 months), with the 
average recession lasting 4 quarters (11 months) and the average expansion 20 quarters (59 months). 
Rötheli (2012a) summarizes the stylized dynamics of credit risk assessment as follows. On one hand, 
rationally assessed credit default risk (probability of success) rises (falls) during recession and falls 
(rises) during the upswing. On the other, during the recession and the early stages of the upswing 
boundedly rational risk assessment is overly pessimistic, while during the later stages of the upswing 
boundedly rational banks form an overly optimistic assessment of credit risk. Based on these 
observations, Rötheli (2012a) replicates the paths derived from the simulations with Bayesian learning 
as described by  
 dddd REtREtBREt  677.0       (9.17) 
and 
     4181211 10906.081.0 dddddddd REtREtREtREtREtREt    ,  (9.18) 
                                                 
262 Nonetheless, the assumption that recessions drive banking practices is questionable, since it might be very well the other 
way round (e.g. a single, but decisive event á la Lehman leads banks to contract credit leading to fall in the prices of collaterals). 
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where 𝑑𝑡
𝐵𝑅𝐸 , 𝑑𝑡
𝑅𝐸  and ?̅? stand for boundedly rational default expectations, rational default expectations, 
and average default over the cycle, respectively. 
 
9.4. A DYNAMIC MODEL OF THE CREDIT CYCLE263 
 
Here we extend our model to a dynamic setup. We proceed in two stages. First, we project different 
paths for the unbiased and boundedly rational (both overly optimistic and pessimistic) expected 
probabilities of success along the economic cycle. Then, introducing those projections in our model, we 
solve for volumes in equilibrium. For simplicity and a better understanding of the results, we work with 
particular demand and cost functions that will be given below. With the aim of highlighting different 
market configurations that might result from this analysis, we will provide two different examples. They 
are detailed in subsections 9.4.1 and 9.4.2. 
We project the dynamics of 𝜃𝑙, 𝜃𝑙
𝑂 and 𝜃𝑙
𝑈 following Rötheli (2012a,b) in spirit. Two remarks about 
(9.17) and (9.18) are in order. First, the empirically estimated bias suggests excessive optimism and 
pessimism amplify the cycle by two thirds (0.677) above and below the average default rate. This gives 
us a good benchmark for the examples provided below. Second, Eq. (9.18) fits the stylized features of 
the empirical findings in Rötheli (2012b) where the default rate in good times would be 0.7345% and 
in bad times 2.6365%. However, when trying to replicate different default rates, different estimations 
should be used.264 We solve this below by providing alternative stylized estimations of the dynamics of  
𝜃𝑙, 𝜃𝑙
𝑂 and 𝜃𝑙
𝑈 that satisfy the average duration of a cycle, the about three times higher default rates in 
recession, and the dynamics of credit risk assessment as predicted by Rötheli. 
9.4.1. Standard scenario: Credit boom by a biased duopoly 
Figure 9.2 describes the paths probabilities 𝜃ℎ, 𝜃𝑙 and 𝜃𝑙
∗ (which denotes the biased probabilities 𝜃𝑙
𝑂 or 
𝜃𝑙
𝑈 depending on the cycle phase) would follow in this first example. We consider an average default 
rate of 1% for high-quality borrowers (𝜃ℎ = 0.99), an average default rate of 10% for low-quality 
borrowers (𝜃𝑙 = 0.90), and boundedly rational default expectations described as in (9.17).265 
 
 
                                                 
263 Excerpt from a manuscript in the second round of revision in a JCR ranked journal at the time of the writing of this thesis. 
264 Note Rötheli (2012b) estimates the empirically observed default rates for the whole credit market in the US. However, in 
our model we separate different niche markets according to borrower qualities. Given this, we may be interested in estimating 
the paths for virtually any probabilities 𝜃ℎ , 𝜃𝑙  , 𝜃𝑙
𝑂  and 𝜃𝑙
𝑈  in the range [0,1]. 
265 Here we stylized rational default expectation as        41
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FIGURE 9.2 – Probabilities of success, from quarters 1 to 24, in the first example 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
We may see in Figure 9.2 how unbiased probabilities 𝜃ℎ and 𝜃𝑙 fall during recessions and rise 
during upswings, as to replicate a credit cycle of 24 quarters where credit default rates in recessions 
would be about three times higher than during upswings, as empirically observed. Besides, the biased 
probability 𝜃𝑙
∗ increasingly deviates from the rational estimation 𝜃𝑙, such that during good times 
boundedly rational risk assessment is overly optimistic, while during the recession and the early stages 
of the upswing a biased bank would make a pessimistic assessment of credit risk. 
Consider this numerical example.  The demand for loans are L(rh) = 1 – rh, and L(rl) = 1 – rl, for 
high and low-quality borrowers, the cost function of both banks is C(L) = 0.05 · L, and the interest rate 
of deposits amounts to r = 0.1.266 Introducing the projected probabilities 𝜃ℎ, 𝜃𝑙 and 𝜃𝑙
∗ in our model, and 
solving for the volumes in equilibrium along the cycle, the paths depicted in Figure 9.3 are obtained.  
FIGURE 9.3 – Loan volumes in a credit boom generated by a biased duopoly 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
                                                 
266 The interest rate on deposits of 0.1 we have set is clearly high. This deserves an explanation. First, we are opportunely using 
a high rate in order to emphasize the effects that can be observed when the monetary authorities reduce the cost of money to 
a large extent (see subsection 9.4.2). Second, no matter the choice it does not affect the generality of the results: the interest 
rate of deposits always appears in all credit volumes and interest rates of all possible market outcomes (see Table 1) in terms 
of the kind (1+r+c). This way, in the example we could set instead r = 0.05 and c = 0.1, for instance, and no results would change. 
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We may see how, during good times, loan volumes granted increasingly deviate from the volumes 
a duopoly of unbiased banks would grant. This occurs because the threshold bias 𝜃𝑙
𝑂 − 𝜃𝑙
𝑇 determined 
in Lemma 3 is never exceeded, so the rational bank follows the biased during the optimistic phase ―the 
equilibrium market here is a biased duopoly. During bad times, the bias 𝜃𝑙 − 𝜃𝑙
𝑈 determined in Eq. (9.15) 
is always narrow enough for the pessimistic bank to herd, so the equilibrium market is a rational 
duopoly. Finally, the market of high-quality borrowers follows the regular trend as in this model the 
decision problem between high- and low-quality markets is separable, with both banks having unbiased 
expectations for this type of customers. This example features how a standard credit market would most 
often behave. To see why, we must first be aware of the following lemma. 
Lemma 4. The bias required for a bank not to follow the leader is the larger 
(i) the larger the size of the market, α; 
(ii) the lower the marginal cost of the bank; 
(iii) the lower (higher) the true probability of success 𝜃𝑙 during optimistic 
(pessimistic) times.  
Proof. See Appendix. 
Lemma 4 gives a clue on why, given the assumed values of the numerical example for costs (c = 
0.05, r = 0.1), market size and a bias coefficient of 0.677, the value 𝜃𝑙
𝑂 = 0.9 is too large to yield a 
monopoly. We may change the parameters to get alternative market configurations, but we will face two 
problems. First, we know from Assumptions 2 and 2a that the higher the costs c and r, the minimum 
market size required for interest rates to be well-defined also increases. Second, we have seen that the 
empirical research by Rötheli (2012b) evidences average default rates about 1% and optimism and 
pessimism amplifying the cycle by a coefficient of 0.677 as we assumed. Therefore, scenarios with larger 
market sizes, higher probabilities of success and bounded rationality coefficients about those 
empirically observed by Rötheli (2012a,b) will yield the larger credit booms during good times and 
rational duopolies during recessions (i.e., no effects of underconfidence). For alternative market 
configurations to arise, market sizes must be narrower (and we are bounded here), the qualities of the 
niche markets lower, and bounded rationality coefficients must be much larger than empirically 
observed. This is illustrated in the next example. 
9.4.2. A stressed scenario 
Consider now a second numerical example by assuming an average default rate of 1 percent for high 
quality borrowers (𝜃ℎ = 0.99), of 25 percent for low-quality borrowers (𝜃𝑙 = 0.75) and a boundedly 
rational default expectations described as: 
 dddd REtREtBREt  5.1  .    (9.19) 
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That is, in this second example we have more than doubled the effects of excessive pessimism and 
optimism. Figure 9.4 describes the paths probabilities would follow in this case.267 
FIGURE 9.4 – Probabilities of success, from quarters 1 to 24, in the second example 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
The interpretation of Figure 9.4 would be similar to that of Figure 9.2, but where now default rates 
in the low-quality market are much higher and where the deviation of boundedly rational probabilities 
with respect to the unbiased estimation is also much larger. 
Finally, consider this stressed scenario to be characterized also by the cost function C (L)= 0.15 · 
L for both banks and the interest rate of deposits r = 0.1. In this case, the minimum market size for 
interest rates to be well defined would be α = 0.67; hence we cannot reduce the market size really much. 
To illustrate, we set demand for loans L(rh) = 0.85 – rh and L(rl) = 0.85 – rl. Introducing the projected 𝜃ℎ, 
𝜃𝑙 and 𝜃𝑙
∗ in the model, and solving for the optimal volumes of loans in equilibrium along the cycle, the 
amount granted to low-quality borrowers depicted in Figure 9.5 holds. 
We may see how, under this stressed scenario, market dynamics would be quite erratic. Volumes 
granted during the upswing rapidly deviate from the volumes a duopoly of rational banks would grant 
because of the larger effects of bounded rationality assumed in this example. Then, when the threshold 
bias 𝜃𝑙
𝑂 − 𝜃𝑙
𝑇 is exceeded ―which here occurs in quarter 5― the rational bank chooses not to keep on 
herding. Volumes fall as the market becomes an asymmetric duopoly, until in later in the downturn the 
bias falls again below the threshold level and the rational bank chooses to herd once again (quarter 11).  
In the second phase, the biased bank rapidly changes its mood from optimistic to pessimistic as 
the recession hits. The rational bank now guides the market, which is now a rational duopoly only in 
quarter 13, an asymmetric duopoly in quarter 14, and a monopoly by the rational bank afterwards.268 
Volumes granted are close to zero, as these stressed conditions are close to qualities and market sizes 
                                                 
267 Rational default expectations for low-quality borrowers have been stylized here as following the process 
   dddddd REtREtREtREtREt   1211 075.004.1  , for REtl d1 . 
268 The no-monopoly condition is not satisfied during most part of the downturn, from quarters 15 to 22. 
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that would make this type of borrowers not profitable for a rational lender. Hence, the credit crunch 
observed is of small size. 
FIGURE 9.5 – Loan volumes in a stressed scenario 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
The dynamization of the model shows further evidence of the finding stated in Proposition 3. On 
one hand, excessive optimism may be a good explanation for the credit boom. The model predicts an 
erratic behavior for markets only under extreme conditions (low quality niches, small markets, and 
bounded rationality larger than empirically observed). On the other, excessive pessimism performs 
worse as an explanation for the credit crunch; only for high levels of pessimism some amplification 
effects over the cycle would be observed: the biased bank would not herd and the equilibrium would be 
a monopoly of the rational bank. An additional evidence of this second fact is illustrated in Figure 9.6. 
FIGURE 9.6 – Monetary policy would end a recession 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
Figure 9.6 illustrates that not only the conditions for pessimism to have amplification effects over 
the cycle and a herding behavior not to appear would be quite extreme, but in such case economic 
authorities would have a powerful tool to soften the recession: relaxing monetary conditions. Assume 
that, in quarter 16, authorities try to help solving the crisis by reducing the cost of money. Now banks 
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may finance at r = 0.02 rather than 0.1. Though the equilibrium in this stressed scenario would still be a 
monopoly by the rational bank, the market recovery is appreciable. However, this contradicts the 
empirical evidence these days where central banks all over the world ―and particularly in the Euro 
zone― are facing strong difficulties to solve the credit crunch (see Eichengreen, Prasad and Rajan, 2011, 
for a discussion on the drawbacks of central banking). 
Proposition 4.  Low-quality niche markets are more exposed to potential pervasive effects of 
bounded rationality on credit markets. 
Our behavioral explanation of the credit cycle suggests it is excessive optimism what drives the 
boom and generates the conditions for the crunch. However, on one hand Lemma 4(iii) shows that, for 
optimistic markets, the lower 𝜃𝑙 the higher the required bias for an unbiased bank not to herd. On the 
other, probabilities are bounded to [0, 1]. Hence, there is a cap for the pervasive effects during optimistic 
times: the closer probability 𝜃𝑙 is to 1, the lower the potential damage of bounded rationality. 
 
9.5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The theoretical model we introduced follows the behavioral approach in three steps described in 
Chapter 6 to show excessive optimism by participants in the banking sector suffices to explain credit 
bubbles. We built a model of duopoly competition among banks to show how a rational bank would herd 
to follow the biased one. Then we compared the effects of optimism and pessimism, and offered a 
dynamization of the model to determine how the credit cycle is amplified, as well as we when and where 
(particularly, in which market niches) effects are expected to be more pervasive.  
Five are the main results we obtain. First, overconfident banks always follow their priors and lead 
the industry, while rational banks herd under some conditions we derive. In particular, we show that 
there is a threshold bias such that when the biased bank is not too biased, the rational bank herds to 
grant credit as if it had biased expectations.  
Second, a credit boom of loans of low quality at a lower-than-rational rate is generated in all 
possible equilibrium market configurations that may emerge. Any of such booms are welfare increasing 
for low-quality borrowers, while for high-quality borrowers there are no welfare effects.  
Third, there would be no incentives for rational banks to correct the misallocations of their biased 
competitors. Limits of arbitrage suggest bank-based systems are less likely to be informationally 
efficient than market based ones. Informational efficiency, therefore, would rely solely on authorities. 
Fourth, we find pessimism is not a powerful driver of credit cycles: during recessions, rational 
banks lead the market. Pessimism might only partially explain the credit crunch, as unbiased banks are 
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not predicted to herd in any case. Consequently, the model predicts it would make sense to say financial 
crises are seeded during upturns, with excessive optimism driving markets, while the credit rationing 
observed during recessions would be a consequence of past excesses (increasing volume of non-
performing loans, banks being under-capitalizated, defaults, etc.) rather than a situation where banks 
cut down credit because of an excessive prudence. 
Finally, the fifth finding suggests that bounded rationality is expected to be more pervasive the 
lower the quality of the niche markets, since it is excessive optimism what drives the boom and, for 
optimistic markets, the lower the probability of loan repayment, 
l , the higher the required bias for an 
unbiased bank not to herd.269 
We are aware of the limitations of our model. For example, there are no financial systems that are 
solely bank-based or market-based. In addition, we would need a holistic view of the financial system 
and its links to macroeconomy (Borio and Shim, 2007), considering the effects of informational 
asymmetries and adverse selection. The model is a simple one to describe how banks would compete 
and the effects behavioral biases among the industry could induce. Further extensions should try to 
overcome this simplicity by considering the effects of informational asymmetries and adverse selection, 
alternative models of banking competition, the effects of bankruptcy costs, etc. Finally, another 
limitation of the model relies on the fact that it does not offer an endogenous explanation of the 
economic cycle. Rather than that, we take an exogenous (empirically observed) economic cycle to 
determine what the effects of over and underconfidence would be. Further extensions of the model 
might introduce complementary explanatory variables for the optimism of the banking sector (e.g. 
collaterals, total amount of debt, past bankruptcies) besides the overall economic development and their 
rival agents’ behavior to endogenize the cyclical behavior of the economy with this setup. 
In spite of these limitations, our work may be a relevant contribution to the literature in two 
aspects. First, we introduce an alternative approach to analyze informational efficiency in the banking 
industry that, to the best of our knowledge, had not been raised so far. Second, our model shows how 
behavioral biases might guide retail credit markets and why limits of arbitrage would be more pervasive 
in bank-based financial systems than in market-based ones. This is, we believe, an important 
contribution to the current debate on macroprudential regulation. 
  
                                                 
269 As a consequence of having assumed linear cost functions, markets are separable and no externalities are expected in niche 
markets where all banks are rational. This also validates our assumption, for tractability purposes, that different niche markets 
have identical demand functions. However, these results no longer hold if we assume convex costs. On one hand, externalities 
of bounded rationality on markets where all participants are rational would appear. On the other, a further analysis of these 
externalities would require, nonetheless, to consider different demand functions for borrowers of a different nature. 
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SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
 
The object of study in this thesis was the efficiency of bank-based financial systems when granting credit 
to the economy, with the aim of testing the informational efficiency of retail credit markets through a 
behavioral approach. The research we offered has succeeded, overall, to set an alternative way to 
implement such efficiency test, and to provide both an experimental evidence and theoretical rationale 
for behavioral biases to help explain credit booms. In what follows we summarize the main results of 
our theoretical and experimental research.  
In Chapter 6 we introduced a behavioral framework to analyze the informational efficiency in 
retail credit markets, and provided a research agenda with various alternatives to test it in the future. 
The goal was to set an alternative way to analyze the informational efficiency of bank-based systems. 
The EMH by Fama (1970) described in Chapter 2, being the classic approach to examine efficiency in 
market-based systems, requires markets to be fully competitive and information available to all market 
participants. However, bank-based systems may not satisfy those conditions, as they are often 
characterized by imperfect competition and asymmetric information. Some alternatives that emerged 
to provide an interpretation of what determines how much credit banks should grant to borrowers were 
reviewed in Chapter 1. Now, in Chapter 6 we discussed how to extend the EMH to bank-based financial 
systems based on a behavioral approach. The main conclusions are in order. 
1. Any analysis of the efficiency in bank-based financial systems must focus on the informational 
side of EMH, since allocative and operational efficiencies may not hold. This analysis is still of 
interest since, once we depart from a neo-classical equilibrium, markets may be 
informationally efficient yet allocatively inefficient (Bouchaud, Farmer and Lillo, 2008). Thus, 
the behavioral approach we introduce aims to provide a complementary element of analysis: 
even in a world with no asymmetric information, behavioral biases might explain why bank-
based systems may still not be informationally efficient. 
2. We argued that the extension of the EMH to bank-based systems makes no sense from a micro 
point of view (on a borrower-by-borrower basis). Macro efficiency must be analyzed instead, 
interpreted as how banks, in face of new information, change their credit policies ―likewise 
the information theories described in Chapter 1. Such policies may be described in terms of 
prices, volumes and costs ―likewise the efficiency measures outlined in Chapter 1, too. 
However, a major drawback for such alternative to be implemented is that prices, volumes 
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and costs define a bank’s commercial strategy, hence they depend on non-directly observable 
information. 
3. At this point, a behavioral approach based on Shleifer (2000) could be a feasible and testable 
alternative for retail credit markets. The approach, described for financial markets in Chapter 
2, may be adapted to retail credit markets as follows. We may analyze changes in credit 
policies and whether through banking intermediation information is transmitted efficiently 
in the EMH sense in three steps. First, whether CEOs and employees in the industry exhibit 
beliefs that, based on heuristics and bounded rationality, could conform a market sentiment. 
Second, whether market sentiment could exhibit trends or predictable patterns. Third, 
whether there are limits of arbitrage in retail credit markets. 
4. Chapter 6 ended with a research agenda to suggest various ways the stepwise approach might 
be empirically tested, following the taxonomy of biases and anomalies provided in Chapter 4. 
Then, in the last chapters of the thesis we developed a formal implementation of the stepwise 
approach. In particular, the first step is analyzed through an experimental research described 
in Chapters 7 and 8, while steps two and three are analyzed through a theoretical model of 
banking competition described in Chapter 9. 
Chapter 7 described the behavioral tests we performed in an experimental setting to obtain a basic 
profile of each respondent’s risk attitudes and level of confidence. We firstly introduced a set of tests to 
elicit the three measures of overconfidence as well as the complete set of parameters of value and 
weighting functions in prospect theory. Then, we organized a series of sessions where 126 students 
participated in an experiment that was divided in two parts. In the first part, they completed the tests 
to measure their individual levels of confidence and risk profile. The second part was the experimental 
implementation of a simulation game ―described in Chapter 8. Finally, we confirmed the tests were 
broadly efficient to replicate the standard measures in the literature. The results obtained are in order: 
5. With four trivia similar to those by Moore and Healy (2008) we obtain satisfactory results to 
obtain individual measures of overestimation and overplacement. 
6. A test of fifteen questions revealed effective as well to replicate the main findings of prospect 
theory, considering the properties of the value and weighting functions, the fourfold pattern 
of risk attitudes, iteration and fitting errors, and anomalies at the individual level. 
7. Our test for overprecision, instead, revealed incomplete to obtain estimations that are stable 
for different refinement methods. Having more questions per domain revealed necessary. 
8. We also contributed with additional evidence about how gender, education and skills in 
finance affect overconfidence and risk aversion. In particular, the experimental analysis of all 
measures of overconfidence and prospect theory using the same group of respondents is 
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something that, to the best of our knowledge, was not done before. This allowed us to provide 
new insight on the relationship between these two relevant areas in the behavioral literature. 
Chapter 8 introduced then a business simulation game devised to replicate the basics of the 
decision-making process of a bank granting credit to its customers under conditions of uncertainty and 
risk. This help us to tes the relationship between the participants’ behavioral profile in Chapter 7 and 
their credit policies in the game. Several hypotheses about the effects of risk seeking, loss aversion and 
overconfidence were tested. In what follows we summarize the main results obtained: 
9. We obtained extensive evidence that aggressive behavioral profiles ―defined as high levels 
of overconfidence and risk seeking― are correlated to riskier credit strategies, particularly in 
terms of providing credit to low-quality customers at a lower rate. We did not find a single 
piece of evidence in the contrary direction, neither we were able to trace evidence that loss 
aversion had any effects on credit policies implemented. 
10. The game design helped to reveal some results: participants were always given information 
in terms of confidence intervals and probabilities of default, and the results suggest that 
higher overprecision and risk seeking for gains (mostly attributable to probability weighting) 
foster lower prices, higher volumes of credit, and reduce quality. The most consistent result 
was distortion of probabilities fostering lower loan prices to low-quality customers. 
11. The effects over credit quality were also the most relevant in terms of the external validity of 
the results. Participants knew their strategies were to be measured and scrutinized in terms 
of credit prices and volumes ―hence their strategies might particularly be affected by a 
strategic behavior. However, they were not aware that their behavior in terms of quality was 
also tested (Levitt and List, 2007). This is good news, since key results in the experiment were 
the effects of overprecision and probability distortion over quality performence. 
Nonetheless, we must be aware that the experiment has some limitations as well, which ought to 
be considered in future replications. They follow in order. 
12. First, the results can only be considered robust if similar effects were observed for different 
individual measures of overconfidence and prospect theory obtained through other tests and 
elicitation methods available ―cumulative prospect theory, non-parametric methods, etc.  
13. Second, a strong result was in terms of the effects of overprecision, but in Chapter 7 we found 
that the overprecision measures were unstable at the individual level for different refinement 
methods. Thus, the validity of the results depend on future re-tests with enhanced methods.  
14. Finally, the incentives in the game and the absence of penalties for excessive risk taking might 
have biased the results. This is a common drawback in any experimental research, and future 
versions of this game should try to solve it. Notwithstanding, we argue two reasons in favor 
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of the results obtained: on one hand, the strongest results in the experiment were in terms of 
quality, a variable participants were not aware of; on the other, the combination in the game 
of incentives and moral hazard when costs are not to be borne resembles the alleged behavior 
of CEOs at banks during the recent financial crisis. 
Finally, Chapter 9 was devoted to provide a theoretical model of the credit cycle that shows how 
rational banks would herd to follow their biased competitors to grant excess credit during economic 
upswings. The theoretical model introduced follows the behavioral approach in three steps described 
in Chapter 6 to show excessive optimism by participants in the banking sector suffices to explain how 
banks foster credit bubbles. We first built a simple model of duopoly competition among banks to show 
how a rational bank would herd to follow the biased one. Then we compared the effects of optimism 
during upswings and pessimism in recessions. Finally, we offered a dynamization of the model to show 
how the credit cycle is amplified, as well as when and in which market niches over and underestimation 
effects are expected to be more pervasive. Five additional results were obtained:  
15. Overconfident banks always follow their priors and lead the industry, while rational banks 
herd under some conditions we derive: there is a threshold bias such that when the biased 
bank is not too biased, the rational bank herds to grant credit as if it had biased expectations. 
16. We showed that a credit boom of loans of low quality at a lower-than-rational rate is 
generated in all possible equilibrium market configurations that may emerge. Any of such 
booms are welfare increasing for low-quality borrowers. 
17. A stronger result is that there would be no incentives for rational banks to correct the 
misallocations of their biased competitors. Hence, limits of arbitrage suggest bank-based 
systems are less likely to be informationally efficient than market based ones. 
18. We found pessimism is not a powerful driver of credit cycles. When rational and boundedly 
rational banks compete, pessimism might only partially explain the credit crunch, as unbiased 
banks are not predicted to herd in any case. Thus, the model predicts financial crises are 
seeded during upturns, while the credit rationing observed during recessions would be a 
consequence of past excesses. 
19. Finally, the effects are more pervasive the lower the quality of the niche market, since it is 
overoptimism what drives the boom and, for optimistic markets, the lower the probability of 
loan repayment the higher the required bias for an unbiased bank not to herd. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF THE THESIS AND FUTURE INVESTIGATION 
 
The purpose of this doctoral thesis was to broaden the alternatives available to analyze the efficiency of 
banking systems when granting credit to the economy. In particular, we suggested how the way 
behavioral finance tests market efficiency in the context of financial markets could be applied to analyze 
the efficiency of bank-based systems as well. For such purpose, Part I and Part II provided an extensive 
literature review in order to lay the foundations for a better understanding of the main contributions of 
this thesis, which were presented in Part III.  
In Part I we reviewed the main theories that study the efficiency of the financial system generally 
speaking, and of the banking industry in particular. These are the theories of credit and banking 
efficiency, the efficient market hypothesis (EMH), and behavioral finance. Thus, we firstly defined retail 
credit markets and reviewed the main theories of credit and banking efficiency. Then, we described the 
theoretical foundations of the EMH in financial markets and how behavioral finance challenges them. 
The review of the behavioral literature continued in Part II, where we firstly reviewed the myriad of 
biases and anomalies that dispute the efficiency postulates of standard finance, with a focus on two 
particular areas: prospect theory and overconfidence. 
Then, Part III provided a rationale for behavioral finance to contradict the informational efficiency 
of bank-based systems as well. The analysis came in three instances. Firstly, we suggested a stepwise 
approach (Shleifer, 2000) would be a valid alternative to test the informational efficiency in retail credit 
markets, while it sidesteps the analysis of the allocative and operational efficiencies ―often affected in 
bank-based systems by imperfect competition and informational asymmetries. Then, we contributed 
with an experimental research to deal with the first step in the stepwise approach. The results suggested 
that aggressive behavioral profiles, in terms of overconfidence and risk seeking (prospect theory), tend 
to be correlated to riskier credit strategies, in terms of providing credit to low-quality customers at a 
lower price. Finally, we offered a theoretical model to analyze the second and third steps in the stepwise 
approach: how would a duopoly of a rational and an overconfident bank would compete to grant credit 
to the economy, whether herding strategies would appear, and whether there are limits of arbitrage in 
the industry. The model contributes to explain how the credit cycle is amplified due to banking 
competition when some participants are affected by behavioral biases, and predicts it is an excessive 
optimism during upswings ―rather than pessimism during crisis― what drives the cycle. 
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All together, the research provided in this doctoral thesis could be a relevant contribution to 
identify possible weaknesses of bank-based financial systems, and hence to promote complementary 
regulation ―particularly on macroprudential regulation and the role of central banking. In particular, 
our model shows how behavioral biases might guide retail credit markets and why limits of arbitrage 
would imply bank-based systems are less likely to be informationally efficient than market-based ones.  
Much academic research in recent years has focused on issues like how to avoid a correlated 
behavior by banks, managing systemic risk, which role central banks should play in promoting financial 
stability, etc. Macroprudential regulation tries to address the main drawback of traditional approach to 
banking regulation: capital requirements implicitly assume we can make a banking system safe by 
making individual banks safer, but evidence has shown this is false.270 Regulation had assumed crashes 
occur randomly, but in reality crashes follow booms, which occur quite often because market discipline 
does not operate during upswings: risk falls in the up-phase of economic cycle, so banks expand their 
balance sheets, lower the cost of funding by using short term financing, and increase leverage 
(Brunnermeier et al., 2009). Macro-prudential regulation addresses the stability of the financial system 
as a whole. Among other measures, it requires countercyclical and contingent capital requirements, 
supervision of direct and indirect exposures and linkages, cross border (by IMF, FSB and BIS 
organizations) as well as domestic, higher capital buffers for systemically relevant financial institutions 
(SIFIs), and coordination across countries (Eichengreen et al., 2011). For instance Basel III, the set of 
regulatory standards for the banking industry, beyond requiring higher bank capital requirements and 
other actions, introduces a series of measures to reduce procyclicality, like promoting countercyclical 
capital buffers in good times that can be drawn upon in periods of stress.271 
Another debate today is about the role private banks and central banking should have. Regarding 
banking crises, Beck (2011) concludes it is all about incentives: “regulations should be shaped in a way 
that forces financial institutions to internalize all repercussions of their risk, especially the external costs 
of their potential failure” (p. 2), particularly because bank-lending linkages appear to be the main driver 
of the transmission of stress (Balakrishnan et al., 2009). The debate about central banking, on the other 
hand, is around whether financial stability should be an explicit mandate of central banks. Many authors 
agree with that view ―as well as with international coordination among central banks― but only as long 
as we are aware that monetary policy is not the best tool with which to address a bubble because asset 
price bubbles will not respond to small changes in interest rates (Eichengreen et al., 2011). 
                                                 
270 According to Brunnermeier et al. (2009), risk is endogenous to bank behavior, particularly because if many banks sell an 
asset when its risk increases (fire sales), the asset price will collapse. Some ‘avenues’ might have intensified such endogeneity: 
mark-to-market valuation, market-based measures of risk (like CDS spreads), an increased use of credit ratings ―which tend 
to be correlated with market prices―, etc. 
271 Some authors warn on the perils of “a multiple, but uncoordinated, reform frameworks, such as the Basel III requirements, the 
Capital Requirements Directive IV in Europe, the Dodd–Frank Act in the US, and the Independent Commission on Banking Report 
in the UK” (Beck, 2011, p. viii). 
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Would the behavioral approach introduced in this doctoral thesis provide further evidence on the 
pervasiveness of behavioral biases in the banking industry, then banking regulation should account for 
it. However, as Brunnermeier et al. (2009) say, “solution is not more regulation per se, but better and 
different regulation. The solution must be regulate to internalize externalities (systemic risks)” (p. xv). The 
behavioral approach we use in this thesis would come in support of countercyclical regulation; how to 
implement it, however, is beyond the scope of this thesis. Some biases might be corrected through 
internal debiasing procedures (incentives, career opportunities, firewalls, etc.); others, however, such 
as herding, would require authorities to intervene. Examples include allowing authorities to monitor 
bank’s scorings to statistically ensure banks are not incurring in excessive risk-taking or predatory 
lending,272 or other alternatives authorities may use to arbitrate credit markets.  
Finally, whether it is desirable or not to impose limits to credit during booms and implement 
directed credit during recessions would only be an additional line of debate. Indeed, one should also 
consider the possibility that neither authorities would be efficient when ‘hedging’ credit markets: 
central banks and regulators must infer the ‘fundamental level’ of credit an economy requires given 
information available at the market (a sort-of-definition for EMH in retail credit markets) and apply the 
necessary policies. However, as well as private banks, they might also fail. 
Future research 
Some open lines of research were already mentioned. Chapter 6, for instance, provided a research 
agenda that suggested several means to test our behavioral approach. Firstly, through the empirical 
analysis of whether behavioral biases such as availability, representativeness, overconfidence, excessive 
optimism, risk seeking, and biased self-attribution, among others, might affect the decisions of CEOs and 
employees within the industry. Secondly, through the empirical observation of a credit market 
sentiment that would support the interpretation that the procyclicality of credit may have a behavioral 
explanation. This might be traced by either identifying the effects of a social contagion among market 
participants, or the empirical observation of a correlated credit market ―manifested itself as episodes 
of overreaction, momentum, herding and/or excessive volume of credit.  
In regards to the psychological tests in Chapter 7, several enhancements were suggested as well. 
First, in order to solve the problem detected in the test for overprecision, future tests will require having 
more questions per domain, while it would also be desirable to ask additional questions on personal 
experience to balance domains. In addition, other possibilities would include to introduce questions on 
abilities and perceptual tasks (Stankov et al., 2012) in the trivia test to moderate the general drift 
towards overestimation, and setting the computer application in the prospect theory test to refine 
answers that might be interpreted as a response error by asking an additional questions. Finally, two 
                                                 
272 This is actually a suggestion by Professor Stiglitz, following our conversation in a private meeting in November 2011, 
available at http://www.dpeon.com/index.php/english/8-prof-stiglitz-in-a-coruna.html. 
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open questions in the test for prospect theory are how to improve loss aversion estimations, since 
sensibility of the value function to lower amounts of money varies across individuals, and how to foster 
more realistic answers, particularly in the negative domain. 
The business simulation game introduced in Chapter 8 represents a first effort to explore the 
potential effects of behavioral biases over credit policies. However, time constraints to implement the 
series of psychological tests and the simulation game by the same set of participants imposed two 
important restrictions. The first restriction refers to the fact that the psychological tests implemented 
were required to be shorter versions of classic tests in the literature. Though, as argued in Chapter 7, 
the results obtained were broadly satisfactory, some limits were observed. In addition, the external 
validity of the results obtained critically depends on the accuracy of the test results at the individual 
level. In consequence, it would be desirable to perform repeated versions of the experiment with more 
time for participants to perform the tests. This would allow the introduction of more complete versions 
of the psychological tests, in order to determine whether the results in this thesis are replicable. The 
second restriction was the requirement that only one repetition of the business simulation game was to 
be performed. Again, the external validity of the results might be improved in future research if several 
rounds of the game with randomized economic scenarios are implemented. This would help mitigate 
the effects of a strategic behavior and avoid any randomization bias (Viera and Bangdiwala, 2007), as 
well as introducing the possibility to test the debiasing effects of learning and experience. 
Finally, the model in Chapter 9 has its limits as well. First, the model is a simple one to describe 
how banks would compete and the effects behavioral biases among the industry might induce. Further 
extensions should consider the effects of informational asymmetries and adverse selection, alternative 
models of banking competition, the effects of bankruptcy costs, etc. Finally, another limitation of the 
model relies on the fact that it does not offer an endogenous explanation of the economic cycle. Rather 
than that, we take an exogenous (empirically observed) economic cycle to determine what the effects of 
over and underconfidence would be. Further extensions might introduce complementary explanatory 
variables for the optimism of the banking sector (e.g. collaterals, total amount of debt, past 
bankruptcies) besides the overall economic development and their rival agents’ behavior to endogenize 
the cyclical behavior of the economy with this setup. 
In addition, an open area of research would be to implement an experimental test of the 
theoretical model in Chapter 9 through a modified version of the business simulation game in Chapter 
8. These ideas are yet to be worked out, but it would require to perform a competition among several 
participants granting credit to a pool of potential borrowers, in order to test whether the theoretical 
results obtained in Chapter 9 hold.  
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APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH 
 
In this Appendix we detail the technical specifications of the statistical analyses implemented in the experimental 
research ―Chapters 7 and 8. In addition, we provide some supplementary information regarding the following 
instances. First, the behavioral tests described in Chapter 7, such as the questionnaire on demographic information 
participants had to complete, a sample of questions in the trivia and confidence interval tests, and raw data of the 
participants’ responses in the different behavioral tests. Second, some supplementary statistical information for 
the hypothesis testing in Chapter 7 is provided regarding the regression models and others. Finally, some 
supplementary statistical information to the business game in Chapter 8 regarding raw data of the participants’ 
responses, regression models and others is provided as well. 
 
Statistical analysis. Technical specifications 
IBM SPSS Statistics version 21 was used for statistical analysis. Technical specifications, provided by the 
statistical package, of the analyses implemented are in order.  
The tests of Normality implemented were the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test with the Lillefors Significance 
Correction, and the Shapiro–Wilk test. Additionally, the probability distributions of each variable were compared 
against a Normal distribution using Q-Q plots and box-and-whiskers plots. All statistical regressions used a 
stepwise procedure for variable selection that applies the criteria “Probability of F to enter ≤ 0.05; probability of 
F to remove ≥ 0.10”. The number of observations to be included in the regression considered a ‘missing pairwise’ 
criteria in all instances. 
Factorial analyses considered the following specifications. The extraction method used was a Principal 
Component Analysis (PCA) of the correlation matrix. Descriptive measures provided are the Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin 
measure of sampling adequacy (KMO) and the Bartlett’s test of Sphericity. The rotated component matrix was 
obtained using a Varimax normalization as the rotation method. Finally, Cluster analyses consider the average 
linkage between groups as a method of clustering and the squared Euclidean distance as a measure. 
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R Project (R Core Team, 2012) was also used for the following purposes. rriskDistributions package 
(Belgorodski et al., 2012) was used to fit beta distributions to the interval estimates provided by respondents. 
zipfR package (Evert and Baroni, 2007) was used to estimate the expected absolute deviation (EAD) of the 
estimated beta functions. 
R Core Team (2012). R: A language and environment for statistical computing. R Foundation for Statistical 
Computing, Vienna, Austria. ISBN 3-900051-07-0, URL http://www.R-project.org/. 
Belgorodski, N., M. Greiner, K. Tolksdorf and K. Schueller (2012), rriskDistributions:  Fitting distributions to given 
data or known quantiles. R package version 1.8. http://CRAN.R-project.org/package=rriskDistributions 
Evert, S. and M. Baroni (2007), zipfR: Word frequency distributions in R, In Proceedings of the 45th Annual Meeting 
of the Association for Computational Linguistics, Posters and Demonstrations Sessions, 29-32. (R package version 
0.6-6 of 2012-04-03) 
 
Raw data and supplementary statistical information 
In the Appendix to the experimental research that follows we provide five pieces of information. First, Tables A.1 
to A.4 provide some additional information regarding the behavioral tests described in Chapter 7. These include 
the questionnaire on demographic information participants had to complete, a sample of questions in the trivia 
and confidence interval tests, and the sets of prospects and sure outcomes from which the questions in the risk 
profiler were removed from. Questions and questionnaires in the original tests were either in Spanish or Galician 
languages. Here a translation into English is provided. 
Second, Tables A.5 and A.6 provide the raw data of the responses provided by the participants in the 
experiment and the behavioral variables that were estimated in consequence.  
Third, Tables A.7 to A.11 provide some additional statistical information not included in Chapter 7 regarding 
histograms, normal Q-Q plots and box-and-whisker plots of the behavioral variables, ANOVA tests and regression 
models. 
Fourth, Tables A.12 and A.13 provide the raw data of the strategies implemented by participants in the 
business simulation game in Chapter 8.  
Fifth, Tables A.14 to A.18 provide some additional statistical information not included in Chapter 8 
regarding histograms, normal Q-Q plots and box-and-whisker plots of the game indicators, regression models of 
game indicators to behavioral variables, correlations among variables and factors, and regression models of 
variables and factors of three instances: game factors to behavioral factors, game factors to behavioral variables, 
and game indicators to behavioral factors. 
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TABLE A.1 – Questionnaire for ‘Priors’ 
 
 
TABLE A.2 – Sample of questions in the Trivial test 
 
  
CUESTIONARIO
Sexo Muller Home
Idade Anos
Estudos (1)   1º de Grao   4º de Grao
  2º de Grao   5º de Licenciatura
  3º de Grao   6º de Licenciatura (Dobre)
Mestrado / MBA
Facultade Economía e Empresa, UDC Economía e Empresa, USC
Informática Filoloxía
CC Educación Dereito
Experiencia profesional Sen experiencia Prácticas académicas
Con experiencia laboral remunerada de… … menos de 1.000 eur /mes
… máis de 1.000 eur /mes
(1) Indique o curso máis alto no que está matriculado actualmente
1
Quen interpretaba o papel do estudante Marty McFly na comedia de 
ciencia ficción "Back to the future" ("Regreso ao futuro"), de 1985?
Christopher Lloyd Tom Hanks Outra resposta
Robert Zemeckis Michael J. Fox
2
Cincenta, A Sereíña, Aladino ou O Rei León son películas producidas 
todas elas por que famosa compañía?
Disney Sony Outra resposta
Time Warner Metro Goldwyn Mayer
3
Que actor, ex-marido de Nicole Kidman, protagonizou entre outras as 
películas Rain Man, Minority Report, Mission Impossible e Jerry Maguire?
Daniel Day-Lewis Tom Cruise Outra resposta
Sean Penn Adrien Brody
4
Que filme protagonizado por Hilary Swank e Clint Eastwood gañou o 
Oscar da Academy á mellor película en 2005?
Infiltrados ('The Departed') Brokeback Mountain Outra resposta
Million Dollar Baby Sen perdón ('Unforgiven')
5
Que famoso compositor clásico escribíu nove sinfonías -sendo a máis 
coñecida a Quinta- e quedou sordo nos últimos anos da súa vida?
Joseph Haydn Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart Outra resposta
Gustav Mahler Antonio Vivaldi
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TABLE A.3 – Questions on interval estimates 
 
Correct answers: The first commercial steam-powered device was a water pump, developed in 1698 by Thomas 
Savery (see Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Steam_engine, last access oct-2013). We consider 1837 the 
year of the invention of the telegraph, though in the 1830s several devices were invented. For further information 
see wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electrical_telegraph, last access oct-2013). Regarding shark attacks, 
we borrow that question from Shefrin (2008), who reports a correct answer of only four deaths. The Spanish DGT 
at http://www.dgt.es/portal/es/seguridad_vial/estadistica/accidentes_24horas/evolucion_n_victimas/ provides 
yearly statistics about the number of deaths in the Spanish roads. The number of deaths reported for 2006 was 2989 
(last access oct-2013). The minutes required to walk from the places in A Coruña and Santiago de Compostela 
mentioned in the tests above was estimated using GoogleMaps to calculate distances. At a moderate speed of 5 
km/h the times required would be 23 minutes from María Pita to Torre de Hércules, and 55 minutes from Monte do 
Gozo to Praza do Obradoiro.  
1 En que ano foi patentada a primeira máquina de vapor?
Facilite ademáis un valor mínimo e un valor máximo que lle permitan estar seguro/a da súa resposta ao 90%
Coido que é TAN PROBABLE que fose tanto antes como despois do ano 
Estou un 90% seguro/a de que foi DESPOIS DO ANO 
Estou un 90% seguro/a de que foi ANTES DO ANO 
2 En que ano foi inventado o telégrafo?
Facilite ademáis un valor mínimo e un valor máximo que lle permitan estar seguro/a da súa resposta ao 90%
Coido que é TAN PROBABLE que fose tanto antes como despois do ano 
Estou un 90% seguro/a de que foi DESPOIS DO ANO 
Estou un 90% seguro/a de que foi ANTES DO ANO 
3 Canta xente morreu en todo o mundo durante 2006 debido a ataques de tiburón?
Facilite ademáis un valor mínimo e un valor máximo que lle permitan estar seguro/a da súa resposta ao 90%
Coido que é TAN PROBABLE que fose tanto máis como menos de  mortes
Estou un 90% seguro/a de que foron MÁIS DE  mortes
Estou un 90% seguro/a de que foron MENOS DE  mortes
4 Canta xente morreu en España durante 2006 en accidentes de tráfico?
Facilite ademáis un valor mínimo e un valor máximo que lle permitan estar seguro/a da súa resposta ao 90%
Coido que é TAN PROBABLE que fose tanto máis como menos de  mortes
Estou un 90% seguro/a de que foron MÁIS DE  mortes
Estou un 90% seguro/a de que foron MENOS DE  mortes
5 Cantos minutos se tarda en ir andando a un ritmo moderado (5 km/h) desde a praza de María Pita á Torre de Hércules?
Facilite ademáis un valor mínimo e un valor máximo que lle permitan estar seguro/a da súa resposta ao 90%
Coido que é TAN PROBABLE que se tarde tanto máis como menos de  minutos
Estou un 90% seguro/a de que se tarda MÁIS DE  minutos
Estou un 90% seguro/a de que se tarda MENOS DE  minutos
6 Cantos minutos se tarda en ir andando a un ritmo moderado (5 km/h) desde o Monte do Gozo á praza do Obradoiro?
Facilite ademáis un valor mínimo e un valor máximo que lle permitan estar seguro/a da súa resposta ao 90%
Coido que é TAN PROBABLE que se tarde tanto máis como menos de  minutos
Estou un 90% seguro/a de que se tarda MÁIS DE  minutos
Estou un 90% seguro/a de que se tarda MENOS DE  minutos
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TABLE A.4 – Prospects and sure outcomes for the CPT risk-profiler 
 
 
yi xi pg AS-1 AS0 AS+1 CHECK
serie 1 50 195 720 2.685 10.000
125 370 545 1.375 2.030 3.730 4.775 5.820 6.865 7.910 serie 2 última serie 1
serie 1 70 290 1.180 4.860 20.000 SAMPLE QUEST.
180 585 885 2.405 3.636 7.025 9.185 11.350 13.510 15.675 serie 2 última serie 1
serie 1 40 130 440 1.480 5.000
85 235 340 790 1.135 1.980 2.485 2.990 3.490 3.995 serie 2 última serie 1
serie 1 1.180 4.860 20.000
3.020 7.385 9.905 12.430 14.955 17.480 serie 2 última serie 1
serie 1 440 1.480 5.000
960 2.065 2.655 3.240 3.825 4.415 serie 2 última serie 1
serie 1 50 195 720 2.685
125 325 460 590 1.000 1.280 1.560 1.840 2.125 serie 2 última serie 1
serie 1 20 70 290 1.180
45 125 180 235 415 545 670 800 925 serie 2 última serie 1
yi xi pl AS-1 AS0 AS+1 CHECK
serie 1 -50 -195 -720 -2.685 -10.000
-125 -370 -545 -1.375 -2.030 -3.730 -4.775 -5.820 -6.865 -7.910 serie 2 última serie 1
serie 1 -70 -290 -1.180 -4.860 -20.000 SAMPLE QUEST.
-180 -585 -885 -2.405 -3.636 -7.025 -9.185 -11.350 -13.510 -15.675 serie 2 última serie 1
serie 1 -40 -130 -440 -1.480 -5.000
-85 -235 -340 -790 -1.135 -1.980 -2.485 -2.990 -3.490 -3.995 serie 2 última serie 1
serie 1 -50 -195 -720 -2.685
-125 -325 -460 -590 -1.000 -1.280 -1.560 -1.840 -2.125 serie 2 última serie 1
serie 1 -20 -70 -290 -1.180
-45 -125 -180 -235 -415 -545 -670 -800 -925 serie 2 última serie 1
serie 1 -1.180 -4.860 -20.000
-3.020 -7.385 -9.905 -12.430 -14.955 -17.480 serie 2 última serie 1
serie 1 -440 -1.480 -5.000
-960 -2.065 -2.655 -3.240 -3.825 -4.415 serie 2 última serie 1
Q12 0 -5.000 95%
Q11 0 -20.000 99%
Q8 0 -20.000 1%
Q7 0 -10.000 5%
Q6 0
Q10 0 -5.000 50%
Qprueba 0 -20.000 50%
20.000 99%
Q9 0 -10.000 50%
5%10.0000Q5
Qprueba 0 20.000 50%
Q4 0 5.000 95%
Q3 0
20.000 1%
50%10.0000Q1
Q2 0 5.000 50%
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TABLE A.5 – Raw data from Behavioral Tests (1/3) 
 
p1 p2 p3 p4 p5 a1 a2 a3 a4 b1 b2 b3 b4 c1 c2 c3 c4 min1 max1 med1 min2 max2 med2 min3 max3 med3 min4 max4 med4 min5 max5 med5 min6 max6 med6 1+ 2+ 3+ 4+ 5+ 6+ 1- 2- 3- 4- 5- 6- β1 β2 β3
1 1 18 1 1 1 6 3 4 4 7 4 4 4 7 5 7 6 1700 1800 1736 1800 1850 1816 300 700 367 20 100 83 10 40 25 10 50 35 688 268 1,890 330 160 58 -63 -14 -95 -43 -1,005 -115 2 15 130
2 1 18 1 1 3 6 0 5 7 8 1 5 8 7 5 7 7 1781 N/A N/A 1781 N/A N/A 20 N/A N/A 10000 N/A N/A N/A N/A 40 60 N/A N/A 335 185 1,228 115 240 218 -343 -208 -43 -105 -1,450 -230 2 17 160
3 1 18 1 1 1 4 4 3 6 6 1 1 3 6 4 4 6 1800 1850 1810 1900 1960 1900 400 600 500 5000 12000 10000 15 30 20 10 20 15 910 458 1,228 475 108 113 -108 -14 -125 -60 -565 -330 2 15 200
4 1 18 1 1 1 3 2 2 3 5 2 2 2 6 3 3 3 1800 1900 1800 1900 1950 1900 10 20 20 500 1000 500 10 20 20 20 40 30 510 310 1,890 475 43 22 -343 -14 -125 -78 -1,670 -175 3 25 250
5 1 19 2 1 3 6 2 6 5 10 7 10 10 6 4 5 7 1700 1800 1745 1800 1900 1890 5 25 16 1000 5000 3500 10 30 20 30 60 45 420 185 1,890 425 108 58 -63 -14 -180 -105 -1,005 -280 2 15 170
6 1 19 2 1 1 3 4 2 3 3 1 3 3 5 3 7 7 1700 2000 1750 1500 1999 1650 100 500 250 100 800 200 20 60 30 20 60 45 510 225 1,450 378 43 22 -63 -22 -420 -225 -1,670 -378 10 50 1,000
7 1 19 2 1 1 6 3 2 5 7 2 4 7 6 4 5 7 1950 1960 1955 1915 1925 1920 50 100 75 170 300 200 10 20 15 15 30 20 420 185 1,228 280 108 14 -43 -14 -95 -30 -1,005 -175 3 14 180
8 1 19 4 1 1 4 2 2 5 5 2 2 4 5 3 3 4 1730 1880 1866 1700 1750 1713 20 40 30 230 300 250 20 45 30 50 90 75 688 310 1,890 378 160 88 -28 -14 -28 -20 -565 -475 2 20 500
9 1 19 3 1 1 5 2 3 6 8 1 3 6 7 5 6 7 1750 1900 1850 1850 1912 1870 2 10 7 50 100 79 20 60 30 40 80 50 510 310 1,670 330 28 88 -28 -14 -65 -30 -785 -175 5 40 350
10 1 19 2 2 1 6 1 2 4 8 1 4 6 7 2 6 7 1500 1650 1600 1550 1690 1650 6 26 15 100 200 150 15 25 20 20 40 30 600 268 1,450 378 315 218 -85 -58 -258 -43 -1,005 -115 3 40 300
11 1 19 2 6 1 7 2 4 6 7 3 6 5 7 5 5 5 1760 1855 1830 1670 1800 1720 2 10 6 10000 19000 15500 20 40 26 40 115 95 420 268 1,890 425 63 43 -43 -14 -420 -185 -1,890 -425 2 30 600
12 1 19 2 6 1 7 2 2 7 7 2 3 7 4 5 5 7 1700 1850 1800 1650 1800 1700 5 100 20 300 5000 1000 15 35 25 5 60 30 420 145 1,890 378 43 14 -28 -22 -420 -268 -1,890 -425 5 50 7,000
13 1 20 4 1 1 7 2 4 4 6 1 3 6 6 3 5 6 1850 1950 1900 1700 1975 1800 50 200 100 200 700 400 15 50 30 30 90 50 510 268 343 425 28 14 -43 -30 -420 -60 -1,005 -475 1 20 800
14 1 20 3 1 1 4 4 4 3 7 2 2 5 6 5 4 6 1800 1900 1800 1800 1900 1800 20 60 50 1000 4000 1000 100 200 150 100 200 150 910 395 1,890 425 108 88 -28 -14 -125 -145 -1,890 -425 1 10 150
15 1 20 3 1 1 5 3 4 6 6 3 3 7 5 4 5 8 1700 1900 1850 1000 1900 1700 20 2000 500 500 5000 2000 20 60 30 10 60 30 775 395 1,890 378 240 140 -63 -22 -258 -30 -1,890 -475 3 15 200
16 1 20 3 1 1 6 4 3 3 6 1 4 5 5 4 4 6 1800 1900 1843 1300 1600 1505 5 20 15 100 300 250 15 30 20 15 35 30 510 268 1,890 425 108 58 -63 -58 -180 -105 -1,005 -378 1 10 100
17 1 20 1 2 1 4 2 2 3 5 1 2 3 7 3 5 6 1750 1950 1800 1650 1850 1750 130 350 200 600 1000 800 10 30 15 100 190 120 510 225 1,890 378 200 88 -28 -14 -335 -185 -1,670 -378 5 50 500
18 1 21 1 1 1 2 0 4 4 5 3 4 7 6 4 5 8 1750 1760 1760 1620 1640 1630 900 1E+06 1E+06 300 450 400 10 20 15 15 30 20 510 310 1,890 378 130 88 -28 -14 -65 -43 -1,228 -175 2 15 200
19 1 21 4 1 1 6 4 1 6 5 2 5 7 5 3 4 6 1790 1890 1820 1800 1900 1850 15 50 30 600 1000 750 10 30 20 30 50 40 688 225 1,890 378 108 168 -43 -14 -95 -43 -1,005 -115 4 60 600
20 1 21 4 1 1 5 4 4 7 6 2 4 6 7 2 4 6 1918 1925 1920 1750 1875 1800 180 220 200 22000 29000 25000 22 30 25 20 40 32 910 310 1,890 425 160 14 -28 -14 -28 -20 -1,670 -280 2 20 400
21 1 21 4 1 1 6 1 3 4 8 2 5 6 8 5 6 7 1800 1900 1880 1685 1800 1700 45000 70000 50000 5E+06 7E+06 5E+06 20 35 30 85 120 90 775 353 1,890 425 108 58 -63 -58 -510 -268 -1,890 -425 2 25 500
22 1 21 4 1 1 6 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 5 3 5 5 1650 1860 1790 1700 1900 1810 300 1000 500 1000 5000 2000 15 35 20 15 40 30 910 268 1,890 330 108 43 -28 -22 -95 -60 -1,670 -425 3 30 1,500
23 1 21 4 1 1 2 2 2 4 5 3 3 5 7 5 5 6 1800 1850 1810 1700 1750 1720 2 10 5 120 200 150 20 60 35 15 40 20 420 185 1,450 330 43 70 -85 -30 -258 -30 -1,450 -330 2 10 200
24 1 21 7 1 2 3 4 0 4 4 1 3 4 5 4 4 5 1860 1940 1925 1920 1950 1940 0 5 2 30 120 80 15 35 20 15 25 20 510 268 1,890 425 240 113 -28 -14 -65 -43 -343 -175 4 15 120
25 1 21 7 1 2 6 2 3 6 6 4 7 6 6 5 6 6 1890 1920 1900 1900 1915 1912 25 800 100 150 1000 500 20 60 45 40 130 70 420 225 1,670 475 160 70 -28 -14 -95 -60 -1,228 -175 5 35 300
26 1 21 7 1 2 4 2 1 6 5 2 2 5 7 4 5 7 1850 1890 1870 1860 1900 1880 1350 2000 1750 40000 85000 50000 4 8 5 8 14 10 420 225 1,670 330 278 218 -28 -14 -180 -60 -1,005 -175 2 20 500
27 1 21 1 2 3 3 1 2 1 4 2 4 4 7 3 6 6 1400 1700 1600 1500 1800 1700 5 30 20 10 100 50 100 300 200 100 400 300 258 185 1,890 280 108 88 -63 -30 -258 -185 -1,890 -475 5 10 800
28 1 22 1 1 3 5 2 3 6 6 4 6 8 6 4 6 8 1750 1900 1800 1800 1950 1850 5000 30000 10000 1000 10000 4000 40 90 75 40 90 70 510 268 1,890 425 130 88 -43 -30 -420 -43 -1,890 -425 2 40 500
29 1 22 3 1 4 6 3 2 7 5 1 3 3 5 3 4 5 1750 1900 1850 1800 1950 1900 10 100 50 100 500 300 20 60 40 20 120 60 600 310 1,670 378 315 218 -130 -130 -95 -78 -1,228 -378 2 30 600
30 1 22 4 1 2 7 2 2 3 7 2 4 5 6 2 5 6 1800 1900 1850 1900 1980 1950 1 3 2 100 250 170 20 90 40 60 200 120 510 185 1,228 330 160 22 -43 -30 -420 -145 -785 -378 2 30 1,000
31 1 22 4 1 2 2 0 1 4 4 0 2 4 5 2 4 5 1700 1900 1800 1600 1950 1850 500 2000 1000 100 250 200 20 40 30 20 60 40 775 310 1,890 425 315 218 -223 -108 -420 -145 -1,670 -378 3 100 500
32 1 22 6 1 3 9 3 5 7 7 4 5 6 6 6 5 7 1780 1848 1800 1790 1900 1850 10 60 30 200 500 300 13 25 18 15 30 22 335 145 1,450 330 200 140 -43 -30 -258 -43 -785 -175 2 40 700
33 1 22 7 1 2 5 1 1 2 5 0 3 4 7 4 5 7 1800 1910 1900 1700 1900 1850 0 15 10 200 500 320 10 60 30 45 120 60 688 353 1,890 425 130 140 -28 -14 -65 -30 -565 -115 1 20 400
34 1 22 7 1 3 4 0 3 3 4 1 3 3 4 3 4 4 1400 1600 1500 1650 1800 1700 5000 15000 7000 400 650 600 20 45 30 30 55 45 258 145 1,890 425 63 30 -85 -58 -420 -60 -1,670 -378 5 80 1,100
35 1 22 4 1 2 10 1 5 7 8 3 6 6 8 6 7 7 1680 1750 1710 1850 1920 1880 10 100 50 50 150 80 30 180 120 30 180 100 420 268 1,670 378 160 140 -63 -130 -95 -60 -565 -115 1 15 150
36 1 22 7 1 2 6 0 4 4 8 8 6 5 9 7 9 7 650 1900 1800 500 1800 1700 1 1E+06 50 50 2500 100 1 90 5 30 180 40 510 268 1,890 378 43 22 -43 -22 -43 -30 -565 -175 5 50 400
37 1 23 1 1 2 5 2 2 5 7 2 1 4 8 5 3 6 1000 2000 1500 1000 2000 1600 100 1000 500 500 10000 900 15 60 30 45 120 60 688 185 1,890 378 108 43 -108 -108 -420 -145 -1,670 -280 1 20 1,000
38 1 23 1 1 3 6 2 4 8 8 2 6 7 9 5 8 9 1790 1800 1790 1800 1850 1800 2 50 45 1 350 300 5 20 15 5 60 40 775 225 1,890 475 200 43 -28 -14 -420 -30 -1,670 -115 1 12 120
39 1 23 4 1 4 5 2 1 4 5 2 0 4 7 2 1 7 1550 1650 1600 1850 1900 1870 1 3 2 100 200 150 40 60 45 40 70 50 688 225 1,890 475 28 14 -28 -14 -180 -43 -1,450 -280 2 50 2,000
40 1 23 7 1 2 4 0 3 7 7 1 1 6 6 5 4 7 1450 1600 1500 1380 1500 1400 12 100 50 250 500 450 30 60 45 60 120 90 420 78 1,450 378 63 43 -43 -43 -258 -43 -1,670 -425 2 20 500
41 1 23 4 1 2 3 2 3 5 6 2 2 5 6 1 1 5 1700 1850 1800 1600 1800 1700 40 200 100 100 250 200 30 80 60 50 120 70 95 105 1,890 378 43 14 -28 -14 -420 -268 -1,890 -425 2 20 120
42 1 23 7 1 2 6 5 0 5 7 2 3 5 7 5 5 6 1600 1800 1789 1400 1800 1600 30 80 50 100 1000 200 20 60 30 30 100 60 420 353 1,450 425 130 58 -28 -14 -65 -60 -565 -175 5 50 1,000
43 1 23 7 1 3 8 1 2 6 5 1 0 6 4 2 3 7 1800 1950 1900 1850 1960 1950 2 60 50 50 150 100 30 180 150 60 240 180 688 310 343 280 355 193 -190 -108 -420 -145 -1,450 -230 5 50 500
44 1 23 4 1 1 6 0 1 6 6 1 3 9 7 5 6 9 1700 1900 1875 1600 1900 1850 0 100 20 20 1000 500 10 45 30 20 120 60 420 185 785 175 85 30 -28 -30 -420 -225 -1,890 -425 5 40 400
PRIORS TRIVIAL PROSPECT THEORY
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TABLE A.5 – Raw data from Behavioral Tests (2/3) 
 
p1 p2 p3 p4 p5 a1 a2 a3 a4 b1 b2 b3 b4 c1 c2 c3 c4 min1 max1 med1 min2 max2 med2 min3 max3 med3 min4 max4 med4 min5 max5 med5 min6 max6 med6 1+ 2+ 3+ 4+ 5+ 6+ 1- 2- 3- 4- 5- 6- β1 β2 β3
45 1 23 4 1 2 6 2 2 7 5 2 3 8 6 3 5 8 1780 1950 1800 1900 1950 1920 20 300 100 800 4000 2000 15 30 20 15 30 20 335 225 1.890 425 43 43 -28 -30 -180 -60 -1.450 -280 2 20 250
46 1 23 6 1 2 5 0 2 4 7 1 4 4 8 2 5 6 1700 1936 1850 1750 1914 1875 2 20 10 35 100 50 10 25 15 10 60 30 510 268 1.890 475 43 14 -63 -22 -28 -20 -1.890 -425 0,2 9 95
47 1 23 4 1 1 5 0 0 3 5 2 3 3 5 4 6 7 1850 1930 1900 1750 1920 1850 10 30 30 100 300 200 10 40 20 30 60 40 510 225 1.670 378 200 168 -28 -14 -258 -105 -1.670 -330 2 20 200
48 1 23 7 1 2 4 2 4 4 9 3 6 6 7 5 6 5 1800 1912 1900 1800 1950 1900 5 50 25 50 200 100 20 45 30 30 160 100 510 310 1.890 425 160 70 -63 -30 -510 -30 -1.670 -330 2 18 175
49 1 23 7 1 3 5 2 3 4 6 2 3 5 7 5 5 8 1750 1810 1800 1730 1800 1740 150 300 200 230 300 250 10 30 20 60 180 120 420 185 1.890 425 28 14 -28 -14 -420 -185 -1.450 -378 5 50 500
50 1 24 4 1 1 6 2 1 5 7 3 4 7 8 4 5 7 1790 1870 1830 1750 1900 1850 50 150 100 9000 15000 12000 15 40 25 40 80 60 688 458 1.890 378 160 88 -130 -175 -95 -43 -343 -115 2 20 300
51 1 24 6 1 1 8 3 3 7 9 2 4 8 8 3 3 7 1800 1900 1850 1875 1899 1880 5 25 15 250 600 300 12 30 20 30 150 45 510 268 1.890 378 355 168 -43 -58 -600 -310 -1.890 -425 3 30 500
52 1 24 7 1 1 5 1 2 4 4 2 2 6 6 3 4 8 1800 2000 1900 1700 1900 1800 1 20 10 80 150 100 15 60 40 15 40 30 510 185 1.890 378 43 14 -28 -14 -258 -43 -1.670 -175 1 20 250
53 1 24 7 1 2 3 2 1 5 6 3 3 6 7 5 5 8 1850 1900 1900 1700 1900 1800 50 150 100 40500 55000 50000 8 15 10 1000 2000 1500 910 268 1.890 425 160 88 -63 -14 -65 -30 -343 -175 50 100 500
54 1 24 7 3 2 5 2 5 6 7 3 6 8 6 4 5 7 1840 1885 1857 1790 1839 1815 7 21 12 121 167 157 18 28 21 80 150 110 688 268 1.450 330 355 193 -108 -108 -420 -185 -1.890 -475 3 40 800
55 1 24 7 1 2 7 3 3 7 7 2 4 6 6 4 5 7 1740 1800 1760 1850 1900 1860 5 20 10 30 100 70 20 60 45 30 65 50 180 145 785 280 43 14 -43 -22 -95 -60 -1.670 -378 2 25 400
56 1 25 3 1 2 4 4 3 6 4 4 3 5 6 5 6 6 200 1460 865 700 1400 980 100 10000 1003 87 5892 1200 10 25 15 15 45 25 510 268 1.890 378 108 22 -28 -43 -180 -105 -343 -175 1 10 100
57 1 25 7 1 2 6 4 3 6 7 1 2 5 8 5 6 7 1800 1880 1870 1700 1950 1800 10 100 20 170 500 230 15 160 40 60 600 200 910 395 1.890 378 355 113 -28 -14 -43 -20 -343 -175 10 30 500
58 1 26 7 1 3 6 0 2 7 6 2 6 8 7 5 8 8 1800 1900 1860 1800 1900 1850 2000 7000 4000 1500 3000 2500 5 20 10 20 35 25 775 458 1.890 378 315 113 -28 -22 -180 -60 -565 -115 3 25 250
59 1 27 7 1 3 2 1 2 5 3 3 1 5 6 6 4 8 1400 1500 1475 1600 1800 1700 700 1100 1000 500 1000 800 25 45 30 30 60 50 510 268 1.890 378 28 14 -43 -22 -95 -43 -1.670 -280 2 50 120
60 1 28 4 1 4 3 0 2 2 4 1 3 4 7 5 7 8 1800 1900 1870 1850 1950 1920 1 30 15 100 500 200 20 90 50 20 90 50 775 458 1.890 378 130 88 -43 -14 -95 -105 -343 -330 10 25 500
61 2 17 1 1 1 6 2 2 6 9 6 10 7 8 6 9 7 1750 1800 1770 1850 1880 1864 20 80 50 5000 10000 6000 40 80 60 40 80 60 420 105 1.890 378 108 140 -63 -43 -510 -78 -1.450 -175 2 50 5.000
62 2 18 1 1 1 4 4 3 5 5 3 4 4 6 4 4 5 1800 1910 1870 1650 1750 1700 50 200 100 70 200 100 30 60 45 20 60 30 420 185 1.890 378 85 70 -63 -43 -335 -185 -1.890 -378 2 20 300
63 2 18 1 1 1 8 2 7 7 8 3 5 6 7 3 5 6 1850 1970 1865 1850 1950 1895 5 50 20 50 500 100 10 40 20 15 70 30 600 395 1.890 425 108 140 -28 -14 -180 -30 -1.670 -280 2 30 300
64 2 18 1 1 1 6 2 7 9 7 3 2 9 6 3 3 8 1850 1890 1870 1840 1890 1850 25 500 100 500 1500 1000 10 40 25 25 120 90 910 353 1.670 425 278 218 -293 -108 -335 -145 -1.450 -280 2 40 700
65 2 18 1 1 3 6 2 3 7 7 5 3 7 6 6 4 7 1850 1875 1865 1850 1865 1850 10 50 45 1500 2200 1800 15 35 25 25 95 85 335 225 1.670 335 160 14 -108 -85 -420 -78 -1.005 -175 2 25 250
66 2 18 1 1 1 7 1 3 8 8 4 5 8 7 4 5 7 1770 1830 1800 1830 1875 1850 500 1000 739 1000 2000 1300 10 30 20 40 120 60 335 145 1.450 378 108 88 -43 -30 -420 -43 -1.005 -280 1 15 150
67 2 18 2 1 1 9 4 5 4 10 7 8 9 7 6 7 7 1775 1780 1778 1780 1810 1800 40 60 50 1150 1400 1300 40 50 45 40 50 45 510 268 1.890 475 28 14 -28 -14 -28 -20 -1.670 -378 1 10 100
68 2 18 2 2 1 6 2 3 8 9 3 4 6 8 3 4 5 1800 1900 1870 1800 1950 1860 100 400 200 900 2000 1000 30 120 60 45 80 60 420 185 1.890 425 43 22 -28 -14 -65 -20 -1.450 -175 1 10 200
69 2 19 2 2 1 6 1 4 6 8 1 3 6 7 3 4 6 1770 1800 1780 1840 1890 1860 2 7 5 150 300 200 10 25 15 20 50 30 420 145 1.890 425 200 88 -43 -22 -335 -43 -1.890 -425 1 20 400
70 2 19 2 2 1 7 1 5 8 8 3 4 6 7 5 6 7 1750 1850 1800 1800 1900 1850 20 100 50 90 150 100 20 35 25 15 60 35 510 225 1.890 330 43 14 -108 -58 -95 -145 -1.450 -330 2 25 300
71 2 19 1 2 3 5 1 5 4 8 3 6 4 7 4 6 5 1700 1900 1800 1800 1950 1900 250 2000 1000 100000 200000 150000 20 60 45 60 120 90 510 268 1.890 378 108 70 -63 -30 -65 -43 -1.670 -175 2 20 150
72 2 19 2 2 1 7 3 7 4 8 2 6 5 7 4 7 6 1700 1900 1850 1600 1776 1700 5 10 6 500 500000 160000 10 40 20 30 90 60 510 185 1.890 425 108 14 -28 -14 -65 -30 -1.890 -175 2 15 500
73 2 20 1 1 2 5 3 1 6 8 7 10 10 8 6 8 8 1700 1740 1701 1900 1940 1901 10 70 58 1000 5000 4500 10 40 38 20 100 70 180 105 1.890 378 28 14 -130 -70 -910 -458 -1.890 -475 6 40 400
74 2 20 2 1 1 7 4 3 4 8 5 4 6 6 3 2 4 1725 1790 1750 1600 1700 1650 20 350 150 500 1500 800 30 50 40 45 90 60 510 225 1.890 425 28 14 -28 -14 -420 -145 -1.890 -378 2 50 500
75 2 20 2 1 1 5 1 2 5 4 2 3 5 6 5 3 7 1800 1910 1890 1840 1900 1870 1 50 25 150000 300000 200000 15 60 30 90 200 120 510 268 1.890 475 63 22 -28 -70 -28 -20 -785 -115 2 20 200
76 2 20 2 1 1 5 2 2 6 5 1 2 4 5 3 3 5 1800 1820 1810 1920 1950 1933 8 14 10 20 50 30 20 43 30 20 45 30 420 268 1.890 475 28 14 -28 -14 -125 -185 -1.450 -280 2 25 275
77 2 20 2 2 1 2 2 1 7 4 3 2 6 6 6 5 7 1880 1910 1890 1840 1860 1850 2 30 20 20 110 80 10 50 30 25 70 45 510 268 1.890 280 200 218 -28 -14 -510 -185 -1.670 -378 5 25 350
78 2 20 2 2 1 4 2 1 5 7 1 4 5 7 4 5 6 1800 1950 1900 1800 1900 1850 50 600 300 100 1500 600 30 180 120 30 180 120 510 310 1.890 425 315 218 -43 -14 -510 -105 -1.670 -175 3 35 450
79 2 21 4 1 1 4 3 1 5 5 4 4 4 6 4 4 5 1700 1950 1850 1750 1950 1850 15 100 40 50 500 150 15 50 35 15 60 30 510 268 1.670 425 160 88 -85 -43 -420 -225 -1.450 -378 3 40 700
80 2 21 4 1 3 3 2 2 5 5 2 2 6 6 4 5 7 1400 1950 1800 1900 2000 1950 100 200 150 200 600 365 20 60 40 20 60 40 775 395 1.890 475 130 168 -63 -30 -258 -145 -1.890 -425 1 11 105
81 2 21 7 1 2 5 3 2 5 8 2 3 4 6 3 3 4 1800 1950 1900 1800 1950 1900 100 1000 500 200 2000 1000 15 60 30 20 120 45 420 185 1.890 475 28 14 -28 -14 -258 -105 -1.890 -475 2 20 300
82 2 21 4 1 3 7 1 3 5 6 3 5 5 7 5 7 7 1800 1950 1850 1750 1900 1850 35 80 60 1200 2000 1500 20 40 25 20 45 30 600 268 1.890 378 28 14 -28 -14 -43 -43 -1.005 -378 1 10 110
83 2 21 4 1 1 6 3 3 4 8 1 4 6 6 3 4 5 1600 1850 1780 1800 1950 1910 1 20 7 200 1000 350 15 50 35 20 60 40 180 145 1.670 425 28 14 -108 -14 -600 -268 -1.890 -425 2 50 500
84 2 21 2 2 1 5 3 1 5 5 2 3 6 6 4 5 7 1500 1700 1600 1500 1800 1700 3 30 20 70 180 125 35 70 50 50 120 80 420 225 1.450 378 160 88 -43 -58 -180 -60 -1.005 -330 3 30 400
85 2 21 2 2 1 5 2 2 6 8 3 6 8 7 4 6 7 1840 1900 1860 1830 1860 1840 10 20 15 50 90 65 20 40 30 30 60 40 600 268 1.670 330 200 193 -28 -14 -510 -185 -1.890 -425 3 35 500
86 2 21 2 2 4 3 2 4 9 7 4 5 8 6 5 5 6 1750 1810 1780 1800 1900 1850 1000 10000 2500 120 280 180 3 10 7 20 80 50 510 145 1.890 378 43 14 -28 -14 -180 -30 -1.228 -475 1 10 100
87 2 22 1 1 4 7 4 2 9 7 4 6 9 8 3 6 7 1820 1880 1850 1850 1900 1890 10 1000 100 100 500 250 30 60 40 10 50 30 688 268 1.890 378 160 58 -158 -108 -510 -268 -1.890 -425 2 20 250
88 2 22 4 1 1 4 5 3 7 6 3 2 7 6 4 4 7 1760 1850 1808 1800 1950 1900 100 900 350 100 600 300 12 50 30 20 110 45 510 268 1.890 425 85 43 -43 -30 -510 -78 -1.670 -425 2 50 400
PRIORS TRIVIAL PROSPECT THEORY
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TABLE A.5 – Raw data from Behavioral Tests (3/3) 
 
Note: In order to preserve participants’ anonymity, results in Table A5 have been ranked in terms of gender and age. 
p1 p2 p3 p4 p5 a1 a2 a3 a4 b1 b2 b3 b4 c1 c2 c3 c4 min1 max1 med1 min2 max2 med2 min3 max3 med3 min4 max4 med4 min5 max5 med5 min6 max6 med6 1+ 2+ 3+ 4+ 5+ 6+ 1- 2- 3- 4- 5- 6- β1 β2 β3
89 2 22 4 1 3 7 5 3 7 8 3 6 6 6 2 5 4 1750 1900 1850 1870 1950 1920 1 14 8 75 250 150 10 30 20 10 50 30 510 268 1,890 378 240 168 -63 -14 -180 -105 -1,228 -115 4 50 500
90 2 22 4 1 4 4 2 2 5 8 5 5 8 5 3 3 5 1700 1800 1734 1750 1900 1824 49 149 125 500 1599 1000 12 25 17 10 40 20 910 268 1,890 475 43 14 -28 -14 -420 -78 -1,670 -378 1 15 150
91 2 22 5 1 1 9 3 3 5 8 2 5 7 7 4 5 6 1700 1800 1770 1700 1900 1750 25 500 100 2500 6000 3000 90 200 100 120 400 300 420 225 1,670 425 28 30 -108 -22 -258 -185 -1,450 -378 4 50 600
92 2 22 4 1 1 5 2 1 7 5 3 4 3 3 4 5 5 1700 1900 1800 1600 1900 1700 1000 6000 5000 1000 20000 10000 30 60 40 30 90 60 600 310 1,890 378 108 43 -28 -14 -28 -20 -1,890 -475 2 40 500
93 2 22 4 1 1 5 1 4 5 8 3 4 7 5 4 3 5 1720 1800 1750 1760 1830 1800 20 500 350 1500 2500 2000 15 35 25 20 45 30 510 268 1,890 378 85 22 -43 -30 -510 -268 -1,890 -425 1 10 100
94 2 22 4 1 1 3 2 4 6 6 3 3 4 7 5 6 6 1800 1950 1860 1750 1900 1850 1000 1E+06 10000 1000 10000 2000 10 40 20 10 100 40 420 145 1,890 475 28 22 -28 -14 -125 -78 -1,890 -425 3 50 1,000
95 2 22 7 1 2 6 4 4 6 8 5 4 5 8 6 5 6 1500 1950 1770 1600 1950 1820 2 50 6 20 500 100 20 100 40 15 90 40 420 225 1,890 425 108 58 -63 -43 -420 -268 -1,890 -475 0.9 9 98
96 2 22 7 1 1 10 3 4 9 10 4 4 9 7 3 3 6 1790 1840 1805 1800 1860 1830 500 5000 1000 1000 4000 1200 15 45 20 25 45 35 28 20 343 115 28 14 -343 -208 -180 -105 -1,005 -175 2 15 200
97 2 22 7 1 1 4 2 0 6 5 1 3 4 6 4 4 4 1870 1880 1870 1950 1980 1960 5 5000 500 100 5000 1000 10 240 60 10 240 60 28 20 343 115 28 14 -190 -108 -688 -185 -1,890 -425 10 180 350
98 2 22 3 1 1 3 2 3 5 6 3 4 6 5 4 5 5 1850 1870 1865 1810 1840 1830 9500 30000 15000 500 1100 800 25 35 30 10 30 20 420 185 1,450 175 355 218 -28 -14 -510 -225 -1,670 -230 1 10 100
99 2 22 2 2 1 8 3 4 7 8 2 4 8 8 3 5 8 1740 1800 1780 1800 1910 1850 4 20 10 500 2000 1000 10 40 20 60 240 150 600 225 1,890 378 85 88 -43 -14 -335 -268 -1,450 -378 1 15 200
100 2 23 7 1 2 6 3 2 5 6 4 5 5 6 4 5 5 1000 2000 1900 1000 2000 1920 5 10000 100 15 10000 600 5 300 50 40 600 180 510 268 1,890 475 63 43 -28 -14 -510 -268 -1,890 -475 2 100 500
101 2 23 7 1 1 5 4 5 5 8 5 6 7 7 4 5 5 1800 1900 1875 1775 1850 1800 70 150 100 1800 3000 2000 15 30 22 20 60 40 600 225 1,890 425 200 88 -43 -14 -180 -43 -1,670 -330 2 12 135
102 2 23 4 1 3 7 5 3 8 7 3 2 8 8 4 5 8 1600 1900 1700 1200 1800 1600 30 100 80 175 260 190 25 60 40 35 75 60 420 268 1,890 378 43 14 -28 -14 -258 -145 -1,890 -425 2 15 150
103 2 23 4 1 1 5 0 1 7 7 1 5 6 6 4 4 7 1800 1890 1835 1810 1850 1840 1 60 50 1000 5000 1200 10 20 15 15 30 20 258 225 1,890 475 28 14 -28 -14 -258 -43 -1,228 -280 1 10 100
104 2 23 7 1 1 3 2 1 7 7 5 5 8 6 4 6 8 1550 1720 1640 1700 1900 1815 10 40 24 200 1000 460 60 300 200 200 400 250 420 225 1,450 330 160 140 -158 -22 -258 -145 -565 -230 1 20 250
105 2 23 7 1 2 8 3 3 10 8 3 2 10 7 1 3 7 1750 1900 1850 1700 1850 1800 1000 1E+06 30000 1500 3500 2800 45 150 70 60 200 90 510 268 1,890 378 28 14 -63 -22 -510 -268 -1,890 -425 10 100 1,000
106 2 23 7 1 1 3 1 1 4 4 1 2 3 5 3 2 6 1800 1870 1820 1720 1800 1790 10 80 60 1500 3000 2200 30 120 90 10 90 60 510 310 1,890 475 200 193 -85 -14 -180 -43 -343 -115 2.5 60 400
107 2 23 2 2 2 9 5 4 5 8 4 5 6 6 5 6 6 1800 1900 1850 1750 1850 1800 3000 10000 5000 2000 5500 4000 25 40 30 100 200 150 510 225 1,890 425 28 14 -28 -22 -95 -60 -1,890 -425 1 20 200
108 2 23 2 2 3 6 2 5 6 8 4 4 8 8 6 5 8 1800 1900 1860 1800 1900 1820 12 300 150 1000 6000 2000 10 300 60 60 300 180 688 395 785 280 130 140 -63 -30 -420 -43 -785 -175 2 10 200
109 2 24 4 1 4 8 3 1 5 7 3 3 6 7 4 5 6 1845 1875 1860 1700 1820 1780 65 135 100 70 130 95 20 45 30 50 85 60 600 310 1,890 378 240 218 -28 -22 -95 -60 -343 -115 2 35 550
110 2 24 3 1 1 8 2 4 5 8 2 3 4 6 2 2 4 1800 1850 1825 1800 1850 1825 25 100 60 1000 2200 1500 10 20 15 20 45 35 510 268 1,890 475 43 22 -28 -14 -95 -60 -1,890 -378 2 20 200
111 2 24 6 1 1 6 3 1 9 6 4 2 8 8 6 5 8 1575 1900 1670 1450 1850 1500 3 1000 75 250 17500 800 5 40 20 20 150 130 335 225 1,890 378 28 14 -28 -70 -688 -458 -1,890 -475 10 70 700
112 2 24 7 1 1 6 2 4 5 5 2 2 6 4 3 3 5 1750 1850 1800 1600 1800 1700 100 2000 1000 1000 4000 3000 40 100 60 55 100 60 420 185 1,890 330 108 43 -28 -14 -65 -20 -1,005 -115 1 10 100
113 2 24 4 1 3 3 5 1 6 7 3 3 5 7 4 5 7 1780 1810 1790 1500 1700 1650 15 70 30 3000 20000 5000 40 70 50 10 100 40 510 268 1,890 378 108 43 -63 -14 -180 -43 -1,450 -330 1 20 200
114 2 24 7 1 4 4 2 3 5 9 4 5 7 8 4 5 7 1850 1930 1875 1750 1875 1850 5000 15000 10000 75000 125000 100000 15 25 20 40 80 60 510 268 1,890 475 43 22 -28 -14 -65 -30 -785 -280 1 10 200
115 2 24 7 1 3 5 3 5 5 8 5 3 8 8 6 6 7 1820 1870 1850 1820 1870 1850 45 55 50 199 300 200 90 150 120 90 150 120 510 268 1,890 475 43 14 -63 -14 -510 -268 -1,890 -475 1 10 100
116 2 24 2 2 1 8 3 4 6 6 1 2 4 7 4 4 6 1800 1900 1860 1800 1900 1890 10 200 90 500 3000 1000 15 40 25 30 90 50 420 105 1,228 115 43 58 -158 -130 -510 -185 -1,670 -330 5 50 400
117 2 25 4 1 3 6 1 1 4 5 1 1 4 6 4 2 6 1700 1950 1850 1400 1900 1850 20 140 100 1800 5000 2000 28 45 35 50 80 70 335 145 1,670 378 43 43 -43 -58 -420 -145 -1,890 -425 1 10 150
118 2 25 7 1 3 4 1 1 4 7 2 3 5 7 4 5 5 1800 2000 1950 1800 1950 1900 100 10000 3500 500 3500 1200 8 25 12 30 120 60 600 268 1,890 378 85 88 -28 -14 -95 -60 -785 -280 2 50 500
119 2 25 2 2 1 4 2 4 7 5 3 4 7 7 5 6 5 1200 1600 1500 1200 1600 1400 400 2000 1500 30000 80000 50000 30 75 45 50 80 60 420 145 1,228 330 28 14 -63 -43 -420 -60 -1,005 -280 1 10 200
120 2 26 6 1 1 7 4 3 10 9 4 4 9 7 5 4 8 1750 1800 1765 1900 1950 1922 20 30 25 100 200 180 30 40 35 60 120 90 510 268 1,890 378 108 58 -28 -14 -420 -225 -1,890 -378 3 30 300
121 2 26 7 1 2 5 2 3 7 6 1 1 5 6 3 3 6 1700 1900 1800 1700 1900 1800 250 1000 500 50 150 100 15 35 20 40 100 70 180 185 1,670 378 43 22 -63 -22 -180 -105 -565 -175 1 10 1,000
122 2 27 6 1 3 7 5 4 9 6 3 3 6 5 5 5 6 1750 1850 1790 1300 1700 1600 30 100000 1000 300 3000 1000 15 40 25 5 120 30 510 225 1,890 425 85 88 -28 -14 -420 -43 -1,890 -425 0 6 500
123 2 27 4 1 2 3 1 1 5 7 3 5 6 7 5 5 6 1750 1850 1800 1880 1940 1920 400 600 500 1800 2200 2000 15 30 25 25 35 30 775 268 1,890 425 28 22 -43 -22 -510 -225 -1,890 -378 2 20 200
124 2 28 7 1 2 6 3 2 8 7 4 3 7 5 2 2 6 1600 1880 1780 1780 1900 1850 20 8000 3000 100 1000 400 7 50 25 20 120 40 510 225 1,890 475 28 14 -63 -22 -180 -105 -1,890 -378 2 50 500
125 2 31 7 1 4 5 3 2 6 9 4 7 7 8 4 6 7 1875 1925 1900 1300 1600 1400 500 2000 1000 50 200 100 20 45 25 75 150 120 600 268 1,890 425 315 218 -28 -30 -65 -30 -785 -175 5 30 300
126 2 53 7 1 4 6 5 2 6 9 6 3 9 5 5 4 7 1750 1850 1800 1800 1850 1800 90 220 200 2500 3800 3000 25 40 30 40 60 45 510 268 1,670 378 160 43 -43 -14 -43 -20 -343 -115 3 20 300
AVRG 1.52 22 .2 4 .0 1.3 1.8 5 .4 2 .3 2 .8 5 .6 6.6 2.7 3.8 5.9 6.4 4.0 4.8 6.4 1708 1862 1799 1696 1868 1796 703 36,612 9,420 40,094 65,518 47,491 21 64 38 43 124 77 518.4 246.5 1,718.4 384.4 120.8 74.6 -63.0 -35.7 -267.4 -110.0 -1,381.7 -310.0 3.0 30.4 485.4
MEDIAN 2 .0 22 .0 4 .0 1.0 1.0 5 .0 2 .0 3 .0 5 .0 7.0 2.5 4.0 6.0 6.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 1765 1890 1810 1780 1900 1850 20 140 80 240 1,000 600 15 45 30 30 85 50 510.0 267.5 1,890.0 377.5 107.5 57.5 -42.5 -21.5 -257.5 -68.8 -1,670.0 -330.0 2.0 20.0 300.0
PRIORS TRIVIAL PROSPECT THEORY
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TABLE A.6 – Estimated variables from the Behavioral Tests (1/2) 
  
sex age studies faculty labour E P m1 m2 m3 Mmed Mavrg α
+ α- γ+ γ- βmed βavrg
1 1 18 1 1 1 2 -7.0 0.72 0.01 1.07 0.72 0.60 1.08 0.27 0.53 0.31 1.5 1.6
2 1 18 1 1 3 4 -6.0 N/A N/A 0.59 0.51 0.12 0.25 1.7 1.8
3 1 18 1 1 1 -6 -10.0 0.04 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.11 2.27 0.40 1.00 0.23 2.0 1.8
4 1 18 1 1 1 1 2.0 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.07 1.17 0.42 1.00 0.37 2.5 2.7
5 1 19 2 1 3 18 12.0 0.37 0.83 1.28 0.83 0.83 0.77 0.44 0.68 0.29 1.7 1.7
6 1 19 2 1 1 -2 -8.0 0.65 0.09 1.11 0.65 0.61 0.78 0.76 0.45 0.52 10.0 8.3
7 1 19 2 1 1 4 -2.0 0.02 0.02 0.19 0.02 0.08 0.63 0.27 0.27 0.36 1.8 2.1
8 1 19 4 1 1 0 1.0 0.07 0.01 0.77 0.07 0.28 1.30 0.34 0.69 0.45 2.0 3.0
9 1 19 3 1 1 2 -7.0 0.37 0.01 1.15 0.37 0.51 0.89 0.27 0.47 0.30 4.0 4.2
10 1 19 2 2 1 6 0.0 0.25 0.02 0.40 0.25 0.22 1.05 0.38 0.32 0.19 3.0 3.3
11 1 19 2 6 1 2 -4.0 0.21 0.37 0.62 0.37 0.40 0.90 0.64 0.72 0.55 3.0 3.7
12 1 19 2 6 1 1 -4.0 0.36 0.35 1.11 0.36 0.61 0.66 0.88 0.64 0.76 5.0 26.7
13 1 20 4 1 1 -1 -5.0 0.28 0.10 2.09 0.28 0.83 0.67 0.57 0.20 0.45 2.0 3.7
14 1 20 3 1 1 1 -4.0 0.00 0.10 0.28 0.10 0.12 2.08 0.44 1.00 0.88 1.0 1.2
15 1 20 3 1 1 1 -5.0 0.36 0.97 0.71 0.71 0.68 2.20 0.39 1.00 1.00 2.0 2.2
16 1 20 3 1 1 0 -3.0 0.23 0.03 0.32 0.23 0.19 1.02 0.47 0.70 0.37 1.0 1.0
17 1 20 1 2 1 0 -5.0 0.51 0.09 0.29 0.29 0.30 0.94 0.64 0.52 0.55 5.0 5.0
18 1 21 1 1 1 9 2.0 0.02 0.02 0.19 0.02 0.08 1.05 0.24 0.60 0.47 2.0 1.8
19 1 21 4 1 1 2 0.0 0.40 0.10 0.69 0.40 0.40 1.06 0.26 0.59 0.32 6.0 5.3
20 1 21 4 1 1 -2 -5.0 0.02 0.08 0.43 0.08 0.17 1.90 0.17 1.00 0.80 2.0 2.7
21 1 21 4 1 1 7 -3.0 0.08 0.07 0.26 0.08 0.14 1.76 1.00 1.00 0.74 2.5 3.2
22 1 21 4 1 1 -4 -6.0 1.04 0.40 0.41 0.41 0.62 1.53 0.33 0.87 0.86 3.0 7.0
23 1 21 4 1 1 6 -1.0 0.10 0.02 0.26 0.10 0.12 0.66 0.40 0.38 0.52 2.0 1.7
24 1 21 7 1 2 1 -1.0 0.07 0.02 0.13 0.07 0.07 1.10 0.30 0.58 0.15 1.5 2.2
25 1 21 7 1 2 6 -1.0 0.04 0.12 0.82 0.12 0.33 0.89 0.29 0.62 0.40 3.5 3.8
26 1 21 7 1 2 1 -6.0 0.11 0.12 0.04 0.11 0.09 0.86 0.36 0.32 0.27 2.0 3.0
27 1 21 1 2 3 7 1.0 0.73 0.02 0.35 0.35 0.37 0.60 0.61 0.47 1.00 5.0 4.7
28 1 22 1 1 3 8 0.0 0.75 0.83 0.40 0.75 0.66 1.03 0.51 0.67 0.84 4.0 3.7
29 1 22 3 1 4 -6 -7.0 0.40 0.09 1.29 0.40 0.59 1.19 0.39 0.41 0.51 3.0 3.7
30 1 22 4 1 2 4 1.0 0.21 0.03 0.72 0.21 0.32 0.71 0.58 0.29 0.26 3.0 5.0
31 1 22 4 1 2 3 3.0 0.94 0.03 0.85 0.85 0.61 1.73 0.75 0.72 0.43 5.0 5.8
32 1 22 6 1 3 -2 -10.0 0.33 0.06 0.23 0.23 0.21 0.66 0.38 0.33 0.19 4.0 4.3
33 1 22 7 1 2 3 -4.0 0.12 0.06 2.13 0.12 0.77 1.70 0.26 0.99 0.20 2.0 2.3
34 1 22 7 1 3 1 2.0 0.31 0.03 0.89 0.31 0.41 0.54 0.55 0.81 0.57 8.0 8.0
35 1 22 4 1 2 0 -12.0 0.78 0.02 0.65 0.65 0.48 0.88 0.33 0.45 0.12 1.5 1.3
36 1 22 7 1 2 13 -3.0 0.43 0.05 0.18 0.18 0.22 0.92 0.27 0.65 0.23 5.0 4.7
37 1 23 1 1 2 0 -6.0 1.41 0.43 1.91 1.41 1.25 0.97 0.64 0.60 0.37 2.0 4.3
38 1 23 1 1 3 3 -12.0 0.00 0.02 0.73 0.02 0.25 1.42 0.42 0.86 0.34 1.2 1.1
39 1 23 4 1 4 -1 -2.0 0.37 0.02 0.36 0.36 0.25 1.17 0.34 1.00 0.52 5.0 9.0
40 1 23 7 1 2 1 -5.0 0.08 0.04 0.47 0.08 0.20 0.57 0.41 0.47 0.78 2.0 2.8
41 1 23 4 1 2 2 5.0 0.44 0.03 0.53 0.44 0.33 0.36 0.88 0.81 0.76 2.0 1.7
42 1 23 7 1 2 1 -6.0 0.32 0.09 1.94 0.32 0.79 0.99 0.31 0.50 0.20 5.0 6.7
43 1 23 7 1 3 -5 -5.0 0.15 0.01 0.28 0.15 0.15 0.79 0.64 0.05 0.25 5.0 5.0
44 1 23 4 1 1 6 -5.0 0.21 0.17 2.44 0.21 0.94 0.52 0.81 0.13 0.74 4.0 4.3
45 1 23 4 1 2 1 -5.0 0.17 0.78 0.23 0.23 0.39 0.74 0.37 0.73 0.49 2.0 2.2
46 1 23 6 1 2 5 0.0 0.53 0.01 0.57 0.53 0.37 1.05 0.24 1.00 1.00 0.9 0.7
47 1 23 4 1 1 5 -1.0 0.23 0.02 0.96 0.23 0.40 0.91 0.47 0.42 0.55 2.0 2.0
48 1 23 7 1 2 10 3.0 0.16 0.03 0.98 0.16 0.39 1.14 0.55 0.69 0.50 1.8 1.7
49 1 23 7 1 3 2 -7.0 0.07 0.01 0.89 0.07 0.32 0.73 0.68 0.75 0.45 5.0 5.0
50 1 24 4 1 1 7 -1.0 0.34 0.25 2.98 0.34 1.19 2.04 0.34 1.00 0.05 2.0 2.3
51 1 24 6 1 1 2 -3.0 0.14 0.05 1.57 0.14 0.58 1.12 1.25 0.43 0.93 3.0 3.7
52 1 24 7 1 1 2 -3.0 0.52 0.01 0.44 0.44 0.32 0.79 0.35 0.62 0.47 2.0 1.8
53 1 24 7 1 2 7 -2.0 0.07 0.14 0.16 0.14 0.12 1.81 0.30 1.00 0.14 10.0 21.7
54 1 24 7 3 2 6 0.0 0.15 0.01 0.55 0.15 0.24 1.06 0.79 0.27 0.82 4.0 5.0
55 1 24 7 1 2 -1 -7.0 0.28 0.01 0.87 0.28 0.39 0.46 0.32 0.22 0.76 2.5 2.8
56 1 25 3 1 2 -1 -8.0 0.32 0.47 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.95 0.37 0.61 0.10 1.0 1.0
57 1 25 7 1 2 -4 -14.0 0.17 0.02 0.77 0.17 0.32 2.67 0.27 1.00 0.18 5.0 6.0
58 1 26 7 1 3 7 -5.0 0.35 0.52 0.20 0.35 0.36 2.55 0.33 1.00 0.13 2.5 2.5
59 1 27 7 1 3 2 -6.0 0.17 0.07 0.89 0.17 0.38 0.92 0.27 0.66 0.67 2.0 2.7
60 1 28 4 1 4 5 -6.0 0.19 0.07 1.34 0.19 0.53 2.10 0.40 1.00 0.18 5.0 5.8
61 2 17 1 1 1 16 2.0 0.26 0.33 0.59 0.33 0.39 0.63 0.54 0.61 0.26 5.0 19.0
62 2 18 1 1 1 0 -3.0 0.21 0.02 0.35 0.21 0.19 0.74 0.66 0.59 0.63 2.0 2.3
63 2 18 1 1 1 -2 -7.0 0.20 0.05 0.86 0.20 0.37 1.66 0.31 1.00 0.62 3.0 2.7
64 2 18 1 1 1 -3 -7.0 0.10 0.19 1.35 0.19 0.54 2.46 0.67 1.00 0.25 4.0 4.2
65 2 18 1 1 3 4 -3.0 0.04 0.14 0.77 0.14 0.32 0.72 0.49 0.41 0.17 2.5 2.3
66 2 18 1 1 1 6 -1.0 0.31 0.17 2.27 0.31 0.92 0.62 0.48 0.43 0.27 1.5 1.4
67 2 18 2 1 1 12 1.0 0.03 0.07 0.19 0.07 0.10 1.04 0.23 1.00 0.85 1.0 1.0
68 2 18 2 2 1 3 -1.0 0.29 0.14 1.07 0.29 0.50 0.74 0.08 0.74 0.86 1.0 1.3
69 2 19 2 2 1 1 -3.0 0.18 0.03 0.42 0.18 0.21 0.76 0.45 0.61 0.88 2.0 2.4
70 2 19 2 2 1 0 -9.0 0.54 0.01 1.03 0.54 0.52 0.81 0.45 0.54 0.47 2.5 2.5
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TABLE A.6 – Estimated variables from the Behavioral Tests (2/2) 
  
Note: In order to preserve participants’ anonymity, results in Table A6 have been ranked in terms of gender and age. 
  
sex age studies faculty labour E P m1 m2 m3 Mmed Mavrg α
+ α- γ+ γ- βmed βavrg
71 2 19 1 2 3 6 0.0 0.64 0.30 0.54 0.54 0.49 0.96 0.05 0.59 1.00 2.0 1.8
72 2 19 2 2 1 0 -8.0 0.31 0.58 3.25 0.58 1.38 0.85 0.06 0.68 1.00 1.5 2.7
73 2 20 1 1 2 20 6.0 0.03 0.17 0.47 0.17 0.23 0.42 2.29 0.77 1.00 4.0 4.7
74 2 20 2 1 1 5 6.0 0.23 0.20 0.62 0.23 0.35 0.89 0.65 0.76 0.65 5.0 4.0
75 2 20 2 1 1 1 -4.0 0.19 0.34 0.64 0.34 0.39 1.06 0.19 0.94 0.38 2.0 2.0
76 2 20 2 1 1 -3 -3.0 0.07 0.01 0.47 0.07 0.18 0.93 0.48 0.98 0.40 2.5 2.4
77 2 20 2 2 1 3 -5.0 0.08 0.02 1.55 0.08 0.55 0.93 0.75 0.37 0.54 3.5 3.7
78 2 20 2 2 1 5 -1.0 0.40 0.27 0.56 0.40 0.41 1.26 0.56 0.53 0.32 3.5 3.7
79 2 21 4 1 1 4 1.0 0.91 0.06 0.66 0.66 0.54 1.00 0.75 0.55 0.42 4.0 4.7
80 2 21 4 1 3 3 -3.0 0.38 0.08 0.77 0.38 0.41 2.01 0.54 1.00 0.81 1.1 1.0
81 2 21 7 1 2 2 2.0 0.33 0.37 1.80 0.37 0.83 0.75 0.49 0.97 1.00 2.0 2.3
82 2 21 4 1 3 3 -7.0 0.52 0.20 0.43 0.43 0.38 1.01 0.32 0.70 0.50 1.0 1.0
83 2 21 4 1 1 3 1.0 0.47 0.12 0.86 0.47 0.48 0.49 1.12 0.72 0.77 5.0 4.0
84 2 21 2 2 1 2 -4.0 0.63 0.02 0.54 0.54 0.40 0.79 0.40 0.38 0.37 3.0 3.3
85 2 21 2 2 1 10 2.0 0.21 0.01 0.70 0.21 0.31 0.99 0.81 0.38 0.75 3.5 3.8
86 2 21 2 2 4 6 0.0 0.41 0.02 0.26 0.26 0.23 0.72 0.38 0.63 0.69 1.0 1.0
87 2 22 1 1 4 4 -4.0 0.12 0.05 0.50 0.12 0.23 1.17 1.05 0.64 0.64 2.0 2.2
88 2 22 4 1 1 -1 -6.0 0.36 0.10 1.71 0.36 0.72 1.00 0.64 0.73 0.64 4.0 3.7
89 2 22 4 1 3 1 0.0 0.29 0.04 0.80 0.29 0.37 1.05 0.39 0.49 0.24 5.0 4.7
90 2 22 4 1 4 13 13.0 1.34 0.16 0.36 0.36 0.62 1.60 0.56 1.00 0.58 1.5 1.3
91 2 22 5 1 1 2 -4.0 0.36 1.00 0.23 0.36 0.53 0.78 0.62 0.62 0.44 5.0 5.0
92 2 22 4 1 1 0 -1.0 0.62 0.33 0.92 0.62 0.62 1.15 0.27 0.68 1.00 4.0 3.7
93 2 22 4 1 1 7 6.0 0.51 0.34 0.56 0.51 0.47 0.94 0.99 0.62 0.77 1.0 1.0
94 2 22 4 1 1 1 -7.0 0.51 0.85 2.16 0.85 1.17 0.67 0.35 1.00 0.95 5.0 6.0
95 2 22 7 1 2 2 -7.0 2.88 0.03 1.12 1.12 1.34 0.85 0.94 0.67 0.89 0.9 0.9
96 2 22 7 1 1 1 -2.0 0.24 0.12 0.38 0.24 0.25 0.24 0.53 0.16 0.11 2.0 1.8
97 2 22 7 1 1 1 -1.0 0.01 0.38 1.64 0.38 0.68 0.24 1.08 0.16 0.62 10.0 10.5
98 2 22 3 1 1 6 3.0 0.05 0.11 0.25 0.11 0.14 0.72 0.69 0.15 0.35 1.0 1.0
99 2 22 2 2 1 0 -8.0 0.40 0.34 0.95 0.40 0.57 0.96 0.73 0.60 0.44 1.5 1.5
100 2 23 7 1 2 4 0.0 0.42 0.21 0.88 0.42 0.51 1.06 1.04 0.93 1.00 5.0 5.7
101 2 23 7 1 1 7 2.0 0.20 0.20 1.40 0.20 0.60 1.08 0.34 0.62 0.66 1.4 1.4
102 2 23 4 1 3 -3 -12.0 1.43 0.01 0.99 0.99 0.81 0.84 0.54 0.63 0.82 1.5 1.7
103 2 23 4 1 1 6 1.0 0.30 0.12 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.67 0.40 1.00 0.39 1.0 1.0
104 2 23 7 1 1 12 4.0 1.36 0.15 0.28 0.28 0.60 0.76 0.48 0.32 0.12 2.0 1.8
105 2 23 7 1 2 -1 -3.0 0.46 2.57 0.45 0.46 1.16 0.92 0.99 0.66 0.76 10.0 10.0
106 2 23 7 1 1 1 1.0 0.12 0.39 0.73 0.39 0.41 1.27 0.33 0.71 0.08 4.0 4.2
107 2 23 2 2 2 0 -7.0 0.33 0.51 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.89 0.31 0.76 0.98 2.0 1.7
108 2 23 2 2 3 5 -6.0 0.25 0.63 0.66 0.63 0.51 0.86 0.44 0.16 0.16 2.0 1.7
109 2 24 4 1 4 2 -4.0 0.10 0.01 1.20 0.10 0.44 1.23 0.30 0.53 0.10 3.5 3.7
110 2 24 3 1 1 -2 0.0 0.22 0.31 0.38 0.31 0.30 1.05 0.31 0.99 0.86 2.0 2.0
111 2 24 6 1 1 1 -10.0 0.32 0.27 0.62 0.32 0.40 0.71 1.82 0.64 1.00 7.0 8.0
112 2 24 7 1 1 -2 -1.0 0.36 1.13 0.50 0.50 0.66 0.72 0.09 0.51 0.67 1.0 1.0
113 2 24 4 1 3 3 -4.0 0.12 0.46 0.54 0.46 0.37 0.96 0.36 0.60 0.56 2.0 1.7
114 2 24 7 1 4 11 3.0 0.18 0.21 1.45 0.21 0.61 1.05 0.30 0.99 0.35 1.0 1.3
115 2 24 7 1 3 6 -5.0 0.18 0.01 0.23 0.18 0.14 1.05 1.06 1.00 0.95 1.0 1.0
116 2 24 2 2 1 -8 -13.0 0.17 0.35 3.62 0.35 1.38 0.48 0.79 0.19 0.39 5.0 4.7
117 2 25 4 1 3 -1 -3.0 0.58 0.28 0.49 0.49 0.45 0.60 0.67 0.56 0.75 1.0 1.2
118 2 25 7 1 3 7 2.0 0.27 0.48 0.64 0.48 0.46 1.04 0.35 0.63 0.31 5.0 4.0
119 2 25 2 2 1 2 -5.0 0.30 0.31 0.88 0.31 0.50 0.59 0.50 0.34 0.25 1.0 1.3
120 2 26 6 1 1 2 -6.0 0.18 0.01 0.35 0.18 0.18 0.96 0.77 0.60 0.63 3.0 3.0
121 2 26 7 1 2 -4 -6.0 0.89 0.02 1.20 0.89 0.70 0.54 0.39 0.58 0.13 1.0 4.0
122 2 27 6 1 3 -7 -12.0 0.31 0.28 1.52 0.31 0.70 0.92 0.51 0.68 0.84 0.6 1.9
123 2 27 4 1 2 11 4.0 0.25 0.12 0.23 0.23 0.20 1.39 0.85 1.00 0.63 2.0 2.0
124 2 28 7 1 2 2 3.0 1.50 0.18 2.25 1.50 1.31 0.94 0.42 0.98 0.77 5.0 4.0
125 2 31 7 1 4 11 2.0 0.11 0.03 0.47 0.11 0.20 1.27 0.27 0.53 0.30 3.0 3.7
126 2 53 7 1 4 8 3.0 0.18 0.27 0.48 0.27 0.31 0.93 0.25 0.48 0.15 3.0 2.7
2.9 -2.7 94.4% 97.6% 74.4% % overpr AVRG 1.02 0.52 0.64 0.53 3.01 3.64
MEDIAN 0.93 0.44 0.63 0.50 2.00 2.67
avrg n = 126 0.91 0.50 0.52 0.40 3.0 3.51
median n = 126 0.96 0.43 0.60 0.58 2.0 2.33
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TABLE A.7 – Histograms of behavioral variables (1/2) 
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TABLE A.7 – Histograms of behavioral variables (2/2) 
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TABLE A.8 – Normal Q-Q and Box-and-whiskers plots of behavioral variables (1/3) 
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TABLE A.8 – Normal Q-Q and Box-and-whiskers plots of behavioral variables (2/3) 
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TABLE A.8 – Normal Q-Q and Box-and-whiskers plots of behavioral variables (3/3) 
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TABLE A.9 – ANOVA tests for Gender and Skills 
 
Sum of 
Squares df
Mean 
Square F Sig. Mean Std. Error
Between Groups 17.894 1 17.894 .789 .376 E Female 2.533 .5622
Within Groups 2812.464 124 22.681 Male 3.288 .6283
Total 2830.357 125 P Female -3.410 .5711
Between Groups 56.638 1 56.638 2.613 .109 Male -2.067 .5979
Within Groups 2688.188 124 21.679 Mmed Female 0.301 .0334
Total 2744.825 125 Male 0.380 .0313
Between Groups .195 1 .195 2.992 .086 Mavg Female 0.406 .0346
Within Groups 8.003 123 .065 Male 0.514 .0377
Total 8.198 124 alpha + Female 1.127 .0698
Between Groups .362 1 .362 4.367 .039 Male 0.930 .0436
Within Groups 10.208 123 .083 alpha - Female 0.463 .0276
Total 10.570 124 Male 0.575 .0461
Between Groups 1.218 1 1.218 5.941 .016 gamma + Female 0.631 .0352
Within Groups 25.420 124 .205 Male 0.652 .0296
Total 26.638 125 gamma - Female 0.468 .0336
Between Groups .390 1 .390 4.086 .045 Male 0.577 .0351
Within Groups 11.834 124 .095 βmed Female 3.183 .2551
Total 12.224 125 Male 2.847 .2429
Between Groups .014 1 .014 .215 .644 βavg (r) Female 3.477 .2546
Within Groups 8.154 124 .066 Male 2.917 .2466
Total 8.168 125
Between Groups .375 1 .375 5.008 .027
Within Groups 9.277 124 .075
Total 9.651 125
Between Groups 3.538 1 3.538 .907 .343
Within Groups 483.529 124 3.899
Total 487.067 125
Between Groups 9.601 1 9.601 2.487 .117
Within Groups 467.206 121 3.861
Total 476.806 122
gamma +
gamma -
βmed
βavg (r)
alpha +
alpha -
Descriptives
Gender
Mmed
Mavg
ANOVA Gender
E
P
Sum of 
Squares df
Mean 
Square F Sig. Mean Std. Error
Between Groups 1.709 1 1.709 .075 .785 E Others 3.182 .9132
Within Groups 2828.648 124 22.812 Economics & Business 2.875 .4776
Total 2830.357 125 P Others -3.749 .8029
Between Groups 28.971 1 28.971 1.323 .252 Economics & Business -2.486 .4751
Within Groups 2715.854 124 21.902 Mmed Others 0.350 .0318
Total 2744.825 125 Economics & Business 0.342 .0271
Between Groups .001 1 .001 .018 .894 Mavg Others 0.488 .0672
Within Groups 8.196 123 .067 Economics & Business 0.457 .0284
Total 8.198 124 alpha + Others 0.850 .0379
Between Groups .017 1 .017 .197 .658 Economics & Business 1.060 .0485
Within Groups 10.553 123 .086 alpha - Others 0.499 .0531
Total 10.570 124 Economics & Business 0.526 .0319
Between Groups 0.802 1 .802 3.848 .052 gamma + Others 0.504 .0378
Within Groups 25.837 124 .208 Economics & Business 0.671 .0256
Total 26.638 125 gamma - Others 0.599 .0610
Between Groups 0.013 1 .013 .136 .713 Economics & Business 0.510 .0270
Within Groups 12.211 124 .098 βmed Others 2.955 .3031
Total 12.224 125 Economics & Business 3.018 .2037
Between Groups .507 1 .507 8.198 .005 βavg (r) Others 3.020 .2928
Within Groups 7.662 124 .062 Economics & Business 3.214 .2067
Total 8.168 125
Between Groups .145 1 .145 1.897 .171
Within Groups 9.506 124 .077
Total 9.651 125
Between Groups .073 1 .073 .018 .892
Within Groups 486.994 124 3.927
Total 487.067 125
Between Groups 0.660 1 0.660 .168 .683
Within Groups 476.147 121 3.935
Total 476.806 122
ANOVA Skills
E
P
Descriptives
Skills
βmed
βavg (r)
Mmed
Mavg
gamma +
gamma -
alpha +
alpha -
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TABLE A.10 – Regression models. Behavioral biases to priors (1/3) 
  
Variables 
Entered
Variables 
Removed
1
Gender
R R Square
Adjusted R 
Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
1 .185a .034 .026 .288
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Regression .362 1 .362 4.367 .039
b
Residual 10.208 123 .083
Total 10.570 124
Standardized 
Coefficients
B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) .406 .037 10.882 .000
Gender .108 .052 .185 2.090 .039
Collinearity 
Statistics
Tolerance
Age (r) .021b 0.238 .812 .022 .990
Level .054b .612 .542 .055 .995
Experience -.013
b -.148 .882 -.013 .979
Skills -.057b -.640 .523 -.058 1.000
Stepwise (Criteria: Probab.-of-
F-to-enter <= ,050, Probab.-of-
F-to-remove >= ,100).
1
a. Dependent Variable: Overprecisión 2
Excluded Variables
a
Model
t
1
a. Dependent Variable: Overprecisión 2
b. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), Gender
Model
a. Predictors: (Constant), Gender
ANOVAa
Model
Beta In t Sig.
Partial 
Correlation
Model
Unstandardized 
Coefficients
Variables Entered/Removed
a
Model
a. Dependent Variable: Overprecisión 2
Model Summary
Method
Sig.
1
a. Dependent Variable: Overprecisión 2
b. Predictors: (Constant), Gender
Coefficients
a
Model
Variables 
Entered
Variables 
Removed
2
Gender
Model R R Square
Adjusted R 
Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
2 .214a .046 .038 .453
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Regression 1.218 1 1.218 5.941 .016
b
Residual 25.420 124 .205
Total 26.638 125
Standardized 
Coefficients
B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 1.127 .058 19.277 .000
Gender -.197 .081 -.214 -2.437 .016
Collinearity 
Statistics
Tolerance
Age (r) .055b .620 .537 .056 .990
Level -.016b -.185 .854 -.017 .995
Experience .145
b 1.652 .101 .147 .979
Skills .073b .832 .407 .075 1.000
2
Sig.
Partial 
Correlation
Model
(Constant)
a. Dependent Variable: alpha +
b. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), Gender
Method
Stepwise (Criteria: Probab.-of-
F-to-enter <= ,050, Probab.-of-
F-to-remove >= ,100).
2
a. Dependent Variable: alpha +
Excluded Variables
a
Model Beta In t
Variables Entered/Removed
a
a. Dependent Variable: alpha +
a. Predictors: (Constant), Gender
ANOVAa
Model
t Sig.
Model Summary
2
a. Dependent Variable: alpha +
b. Predictors: (Constant), Gender
Coefficients
a
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TABLE A.10 – Regression models. Behavioral biases to priors (2/3) 
  
Model
Variables 
Entered
Variables 
Removed
3
Gender
Model R R Square
Adjusted R 
Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
3 .179
a .032 .024 .309
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Regression .390 1 .390 4.086 .045b
Residual 11.834 124 .095
Total 12.224 125
Standardized 
Coefficients
B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) .463 .040 11.618 .000
Gender .111 .055 .179 2.021 .045
Collinearity 
Statistics
Tolerance
Age (r) -.054
b -.604 .547 -.054 .990
Level -.017b -.190 .850 -.017 .995
Experience .060
b .674 .502 .061 .979
Skills -.091b -1.034 .303 -.093 1.000
3
a. Dependent Variable: alpha -
b. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), Gender
Method
Stepwise (Criteria: Probab.-of-
F-to-enter <= ,050, Probab.-of-
F-to-remove >= ,100).
3
a. Dependent Variable: alpha -
Excluded Variables
a
Model Beta In t Sig.
Partial 
Correlation
Model
Unstandardized 
Coefficients
t Sig.
3
a. Dependent Variable: alpha -
b. Predictors: (Constant), Gender
Coefficientsa
Variables Entered/Removed
a
a. Dependent Variable: alpha -
Model Summary
a. Predictors: (Constant), Gender
ANOVAa
Model
Model
Variables 
Entered
Variables 
Removed
4
Skills
Model R R Square
Adjusted R 
Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
4 .249a .062 .054 .249
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Regression .507 1 .507 8.198 .005b
Residual 7.662 124 .062
Total 8.168 125
Standardized 
Coefficients
B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) .504 .053 9.516 .000
Skills .167 .058 .249 2.863 .005
Collinearity 
Statistics
Tolerance
Gender .079b .903 .368 .081 .979
Age (r) -.047b -.532 .595 -.048 .973
Level -.082b -.878 .382 -.079 .872
Experience .021
b .239 .811 .022 .982
4
a. Dependent Variable: gamma +
b. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), Skills
Method
Stepwise (Criteria: Probab.-of-
F-to-enter <= ,050, Probab.-of-
F-to-remove >= ,100).
4
a. Dependent Variable: gamma +
Excluded Variables
a
Model Beta In t Sig.
Partial 
Correlation
Model
Unstandardized 
Coefficients
t Sig.
4
a. Dependent Variable: gamma +
b. Predictors: (Constant), Skills
Coefficientsa
a. Predictors: (Constant), Skills
ANOVA
a
Model
Variables Entered/Removed
a
a. Dependent Variable: gamma +
Model Summary
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TABLE A.10 – Regression models. Behavioral biases to priors (3/3) 
 
Model
Variables 
Entered
Variables 
Removed
5
Gender
Model R R Square
Adjusted R 
Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
5 .197
a .039 .031 .274
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Regression .375 1 .375 5.008 .027
b
Residual 9.277 124 .075
Total 9.651 125
Standardized 
Coefficients
B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) .468 .035 13.261 .000
Gender .109 .049 .197 2.238 .027
Collinearity 
Statistics
Tolerance
Age (r) -.135b -1.534 .128 -.137 .990
Level -.040b -.454 .651 -.041 .995
Experience -.096b -1.081 .282 -.097 .979
Skills -.101b -1.154 .251 -.103 1.000
5
a. Dependent Variable: gamma -
b. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), Gender
Method
Stepwise (Criteria: Probab.-of-
F-to-enter <= ,050, Probab.-of-
F-to-remove >= ,100).
5
a. Dependent Variable: gamma -
Excluded Variables
a
Model Beta In t Sig.
Partial 
Correlation
Model
Unstandardized 
Coefficients
t Sig.
5
a. Dependent Variable: gamma -
b. Predictors: (Constant), Gender
Coefficientsa
Variables Entered/Removed
a
a. Dependent Variable: gamma -
Model Summary
a. Predictors: (Constant), Gender
ANOVA
a
Model
Model
Variables 
Entered
Variables 
Removed
6
Level
Model R R Square
Adjusted R 
Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
6 .209
a .044 .036 1.941
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Regression 20.833 1 20.833 5.528 .020
b
Residual 455.973 121 3.768
Total 476.806 122
Standardized 
Coefficients
B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 2.429 .365 6.656 .000
Level .186 .079 .209 2.351 .020
Collinearity 
Statistics
Tolerance
Gender -.128b -1.443 .152 -.131 .995
Age (r) -.083b -.808 .421 -.074 .753
Experience -.043b -.453 .651 -.041 .872
Skills -.048b -.529 .598 -.048 .956
6
a. Dependent Variable: Loss aversion 2 (r)
b. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), Level
Method
Stepwise (Criteria: Probab.-of-
F-to-enter <= ,050, Probab.-of-
F-to-remove >= ,100).
6
a. Dependent Variable: Loss aversion 2 (r)
Excluded Variables
a
Model Beta In t Sig.
Partial 
Correlation
Model
Unstandardized 
Coefficients
t Sig.
6
a. Dependent Variable: Loss aversion 2 (r)
b. Predictors: (Constant), Level
Coefficientsa
a. Predictors: (Constant), Level
ANOVA
a
Model
Variables Entered/Removed
a
a. Dependent Variable: Loss aversion 2 (r)
Model Summary
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TABLE A.11 – ANOVA tests for Gender and Skills on Factors 
 
 
 
Sum of 
Squares df
Mean 
Square F Sig. Mean Std. Error
Between Groups 1.207 1 1.207 1.209 .274 Female -.104 .117
Within Groups 122.793 123 .998 Male .093 .133
Total 124.000 124 Female .112 .149
Between Groups 1.442 1 1.442 1.448 .231 Male -.102 .103
Within Groups 123.558 124 .996 Female -.283 .113
Total 125.000 125 Male .257 .128
Between Groups 9.153 1 9.153 9.798 .002 Female .060 .118
Within Groups 115.847 124 .934 Male -.055 .132
Total 125.000 125
Between Groups .415 1 .415 .413 .521
Within Groups 124.585 124 1.005
Total 125.000 125
Sum of 
Squares df
Mean 
Square F Sig.
Between Groups .238 1 .238 .236 .628
Within Groups 123.762 123 1.006 Others -.094 .189
Total 124.000 124 Economics & Business .020 .101
Between Groups 6.379 1 6.379 6.668 .011 Others -.489 .102
Within Groups 118.621 124 .957 Economics & Business .103 .103
Total 125.000 125 Others .123 .171
Between Groups .401 1 .401 .399 .529 Economics & Business -.026 .102
Within Groups 124.599 124 1.005 Others -.128 .184
Total 125.000 125 Economics & Business .027 .101
Between Groups .436 1 .436 .434 .511
Within Groups 124.564 124 1.005
Total 125.000 125
Gains
Losses
Loss aversion
OC
Gains
Losses
OC
Gains
Losses
Loss aversion
Loss aversion
ANOVA Skills Descriptives
Mean Std. Error
OC
Gains
Losses
Loss aversion
OC
ANOVA Gender Descriptives
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TABLE A.12 – Raw data from Simulation Game (1/2) 
 
1P 1V 2P 2V 3P 3V 4P 4V 5P 5V 6P 6V
1 17.0% 100 16.0% 200 17.0% 150 14.0% 300 17.0% 150 16.0% 100
2 16.0% 150 17.0% 125 16.0% 190 14.5% 270 17.0% 0 15.0% 250
3 10.0% 100 15.0% 200 12.5% 250 13.0% 250 12.0% 240 14.0% 280
4 13.0% 200 18.0% 50 16.0% 150 10.0% 200 16.0% 150 14.0% 300
5 15.2% 200 18.0% 0 17.0% 150 16.0% 200 15.0% 250 12.0% 400
6 16.5% 175 15.0% 250 15.0% 250 15.7% 215 17.0% 150 15.5% 225
7 14.5% 250 13.5% 0 14.6% 250 16.5% 175 16.5% 175 15.5% 225
8 17.0% 150 17.0% 150 18.0% 100 17.9% 105 17.0% 150 16.0% 200
9 19.0% 0 18.5% 65 17.0% 130 18.0% 85 17.5% 125 18.0% 100
10 16.0% 200 16.0% 150 16.0% 120 17.0% 120 16.0% 150 13.0% 300
11 15.7% 215 16.8% 160 15.4% 230 18.5% 75 17.5% 100 14.0% 300
12 18.0% 90 19.0% 0 14.0% 280 16.0% 150 15.0% 230 17.0% 120
13 18.0% 100 16.0% 150 14.5% 275 15.2% 240 16.5% 175 14.2% 290
14 17.0% 150 17.0% 150 18.0% 100 15.5% 225 18.5% 75 18.0% 100
15 16.5% 175 18.5% 75 16.5% 175 18.0% 100 19.0% 50 17.5% 125
16 16.0% 0 18.5% 75 15.0% 250 15.0% 250 15.0% 250 13.0% 350
17 16.7% 165 17.1% 145 16.9% 155 14.9% 255 15.3% 235 15.8% 210
18 15.0% 150 15.0% 250 15.0% 250 15.0% 250 15.0% 160 15.0% 250
19 16.0% 200 17.0% 150 15.0% 250 15.0% 250 15.0% 250 15.0% 250
20 16.0% 170 15.0% 210 16.0% 200 16.0% 190 16.5% 175 17.0% 150
21 17.0% 150 17.0% 150 17.0% 150 18.0% 100 16.0% 200 16.0% 200
22 12.0% 400 0.1% 0 12.0% 10 16.0% 200 15.0% 250 15.0% 240
23 16.0% 200 15.0% 250 14.0% 300 15.0% 250 15.0% 250 15.0% 250
24 16.4% 180 18.0% 0 16.0% 200 15.0% 250 16.0% 200 16.0% 200
25 17.0% 100 18.0% 75 14.0% 300 13.5% 300 14.0% 300 14.0% 300
26 16.5% 175 18.0% 100 15.0% 200 17.0% 150 11.0% 0 16.8% 163
27 17.5% 120 15.8% 210 17.2% 135 18.1% 95 20.0% 0 16.9% 155
28 16.5% 170 15.4% 200 14.4% 270 16.5% 165 16.7% 160 14.5% 275
29 17.0% 150 20.0% 0 18.0% 100 18.0% 100 19.0% 50 17.0% 150
30 17.5% 120 17.6% 120 16.0% 170 16.0% 190 17.0% 150 15.5% 225
31 17.1% 145 16.0% 200 16.0% 200 16.5% 150 16.9% 140 16.0% 200
32 17.0% 150 14.0% 225 15.0% 225 15.3% 150 16.4% 150 13.3% 335
33 17.0% 150 0.0% 0 16.5% 175 16.5% 175 16.5% 175 14.9% 255
34 17.0% 150 15.0% 250 14.0% 300 15.0% 250 15.0% 250 16.0% 200
35 16.0% 180 15.0% 0 15.5% 200 15.5% 200 15.0% 250 14.4% 280
36 17.0% 125 20.0% 0 16.0% 180 13.2% 320 13.6% 300 15.5% 220
37 18.0% 100 17.0% 150 13.0% 350 18.0% 100 18.0% 100 16.0% 200
38 19.0% 25 19.0% 50 19.0% 50 19.0% 50 16.5% 175 16.0% 200
39 17.5% 125 20.0% 0 16.0% 200 15.5% 225 15.0% 250 12.0% 400
40 17.0% 150 18.0% 100 15.0% 250 16.0% 200 18.0% 100 16.0% 200
41 15.0% 250 15.0% 250 15.0% 250 16.0% 200 17.0% 150 15.0% 250
42 17.3% 138 17.3% 125 16.0% 200 19.0% 35 20.0% 0 16.0% 200
43 18.0% 90 19.0% 0 16.0% 200 15.0% 250 16.0% 200 15.0% 250
44 17.5% 110 15.0% 225 16.0% 180 17.0% 150 17.0% 130 16.0% 200
45 16.0% 200 15.0% 250 16.0% 200 15.0% 0 18.0% 0 17.0% 150
46 17.3% 130 16.0% 190 14.0% 225 10.5% 465 16.0% 175 13.0% 345
47 15.5% 225 15.1% 245 16.0% 200 16.5% 175 19.0% 50 16.4% 180
48 17.0% 150 19.0% 30 18.0% 100 15.0% 225 13.0% 300 17.0% 150
49 13.0% 200 15.0% 100 18.0% 0 10.0% 250 13.0% 350 17.0% 100
50 17.2% 140 18.6% 70 17.6% 120 16.5% 175 15.0% 250 17.4% 130
51 17.5% 125 16.0% 200 15.5% 225 15.0% 250 16.0% 200 15.0% 250
52 15.0% 100 12.5% 320 12.5% 200 16.0% 0 14.5% 275 13.0% 350
53 14.0% 200 18.0% 50 13.0% 250 12.0% 400 15.0% 250 16.0% 200
54 13.4% 290 17.6% 100 17.3% 130 15.3% 235 15.3% 235 16.0% 200
55 17.0% 130 17.0% 140 14.0% 280 13.0% 310 14.5% 250 14.5% 265
56 17.5% 120 16.8% 160 16.9% 155 15.5% 225 15.4% 230 15.9% 205
57 17.4% 100 16.0% 0 12.0% 400 12.4% 350 12.0% 400 14.6% 270
58 14.0% 200 18.0% 100 17.0% 150 18.0% 100 15.0% 250 16.0% 200
59 17.0% 150 15.0% 250 15.0% 250 14.0% 300 15.0% 250 16.0% 200
60 14.5% 250 14.3% 288 14.8% 250 14.5% 275 14.6% 270 13.5% 250
61 17.0% 150 0.0% 0 15.0% 250 15.0% 250 15.0% 250 15.0% 250
62 16.5% 175 16.5% 175 13.0% 350 15.0% 250 16.0% 200 16.0% 200
63 17.0% 150 18.0% 100 16.0% 200 15.5% 225 16.0% 200 16.3% 185
64 12.0% 30 0.0% 0 15.1% 245 15.8% 210 15.5% 225 15.5% 225
65 16.0% 200 0.0% 0 16.0% 200 16.6% 170 16.0% 200 16.3% 185
66 13.5% 300 14.0% 275 14.0% 300 18.0% 75 20.0% 0 15.0% 225
67 14.6% 255 17.3% 115 15.0% 230 16.0% 0 15.0% 245 15.5% 221
68 15.6% 220 18.0% 100 14.3% 285 15.4% 230 16.2% 190 16.7% 165
69 17.7% 110 14.7% 260 12.5% 370 18.0% 0 16.0% 0 16.0% 200
70 17.3% 138 18.0% 100 16.0% 200 15.0% 250 16.5% 175 14.0% 300
STRATEGY GAME
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TABLE A.12 – Raw data from Simulation Game (2/2) 
 
Note: In order to preserve participants’ anonymity, results in Table A12 have been ranked in terms of gender and age. 
  
1P 1V 2P 2V 3P 3V 4P 4V 5P 5V 6P 6V
71 17.3% 135 17.4% 130 16.4% 180 16.2% 190 15.7% 215 13.0% 350
72 17.0% 150 16.0% 200 14.0% 300 16.0% 200 16.0% 200 16.0% 200
73 16.0% 200 17.0% 150 18.0% 100 18.0% 100 18.0% 100 15.7% 218
74 16.5% 175 13.0% 300 10.0% 500 16.5% 175 17.0% 150 13.0% 350
75 17.9% 100 16.0% 200 17.0% 150 14.6% 270 18.0% 100 18.7% 65
76 15.0% 200 15.0% 250 16.0% 200 14.0% 250 16.0% 200 14.0% 280
77 17.4% 130 16.1% 195 16.0% 200 18.1% 85 19.2% 30 16.7% 165
78 18.2% 75 17.0% 150 16.8% 160 19.5% 17 19.5% 10 19.5% 25
79 16.0% 200 16.2% 180 15.5% 225 16.5% 100 15.5% 225 16.0% 195
80 16.8% 160 15.0% 250 13.6% 320 18.0% 100 18.0% 100 14.5% 275
81 16.2% 190 10.0% 0 16.0% 200 16.0% 200 17.0% 150 17.0% 150
82 16.5% 150 18.5% 75 16.5% 175 16.5% 175 16.0% 200 17.5% 125
83 18.0% 100 16.0% 200 17.0% 150 14.5% 275 18.0% 100 18.3% 85
84 15.4% 185 16.2% 180 11.9% 400 16.0% 200 14.5% 270 13.9% 305
85 16.7% 165 17.0% 150 15.6% 220 18.0% 100 18.0% 20 14.6% 270
86 17.5% 125 13.0% 350 15.0% 250 18.0% 100 16.0% 200 16.0% 200
87 18.0% 0 17.0% 150 17.0% 150 17.0% 150 17.0% 150 17.0% 150
88 17.5% 110 16.0% 100 12.8% 360 14.0% 300 15.1% 245 14.3% 285
89 16.0% 200 15.0% 200 12.0% 400 13.0% 350 14.5% 275 16.0% 200
90 18.0% 100 12.0% 200 16.0% 200 14.0% 300 13.5% 325 16.0% 200
91 18.0% 100 20.0% 0 18.0% 100 15.6% 220 14.8% 260 15.8% 210
92 11.0% 450 16.0% 200 14.9% 258 13.2% 340 14.3% 285 15.0% 250
93 18.0% 50 15.5% 225 14.5% 275 18.5% 75 17.8% 110 13.9% 305
94 14.5% 275 15.0% 250 16.0% 200 15.0% 220 12.0% 0 17.0% 150
95 16.0% 200 16.0% 200 16.0% 200 16.0% 200 15.6% 220 15.2% 240
96 19.0% 40 17.0% 150 14.0% 300 15.0% 250 16.0% 100 19.0% 30
97 18.0% 20 17.0% 150 16.0% 190 17.5% 100 19.0% 0 16.5% 175
98 14.5% 170 11.3% 400 14.0% 300 18.5% 10 18.0% 45 17.0% 150
99 17.2% 140 17.2% 140 15.0% 250 15.0% 250 16.2% 190 17.5% 125
100 18.0% 75 18.0% 100 16.0% 200 10.0% 500 14.0% 300 16.0% 200
101 13.0% 350 14.5% 275 17.0% 150 18.0% 100 14.5% 275 17.0% 150
102 14.6% 265 18.0% 100 14.8% 255 16.1% 192 15.8% 210 14.7% 265
103 16.3% 170 16.7% 150 16.8% 145 17.3% 127 15.1% 240 13.6% 315
104 16.0% 20 15.5% 25 12.0% 380 10.5% 425 12.0% 350 15.0% 250
105 18.0% 100 18.0% 100 16.0% 200 15.0% 0 13.0% 350 14.0% 300
106 14.5% 6 11.0% 10 14.5% 100 17.0% 60 17.0% 80 13.0% 115
107 18.0% 100 18.0% 100 12.5% 375 18.0% 100 14.0% 300 16.9% 155
108 17.0% 150 17.0% 130 14.5% 275 14.0% 0 19.0% 0 17.0% 150
109 18.2% 90 18.4% 75 14.8% 240 16.0% 200 16.9% 155 14.7% 265
110 17.0% 150 16.0% 200 15.5% 225 15.5% 225 16.5% 175 16.0% 0
111 16.0% 200 16.0% 200 16.0% 200 15.0% 250 15.5% 225 16.0% 200
112 19.0% 0 19.0% 0 14.0% 300 11.0% 450 15.0% 250 15.0% 250
113 16.0% 195 17.5% 120 17.5% 120 18.0% 95 16.5% 175 16.5% 175
114 18.0% 100 0.0% 0 17.0% 150 16.0% 200 16.0% 200 16.0% 200
115 17.0% 150 17.0% 150 17.0% 150 16.0% 200 17.0% 150 17.0% 150
116 16.5% 175 18.1% 95 15.4% 230 17.0% 150 17.0% 0 17.6% 120
117 18.0% 100 16.0% 200 15.0% 250 16.0% 200 16.0% 200 14.5% 275
118 14.0% 200 17.0% 150 15.0% 250 17.5% 125 17.0% 150 14.0% 300
119 14.0% 200 16.0% 150 14.8% 200 15.5% 160 14.0% 250 16.0% 200
120 13.0% 350 15.0% 100 13.0% 325 14.0% 300 16.0% 200 15.0% 250
121 18.0% 100 15.0% 250 15.0% 250 19.0% 50 19.0% 50 16.0% 200
122 16.8% 160 16.1% 195 13.9% 305 13.6% 320 15.6% 220 15.6% 220
123 14.0% 290 15.0% 240 12.0% 400 12.0% 400 16.0% 200 14.0% 300
124 18.0% 100 18.0% 0 17.0% 0 16.0% 200 15.0% 250 15.0% 250
125 16.0% 200 16.0% 200 14.0% 300 15.0% 250 15.0% 250 13.0% 350
126 15.0% 200 15.0% 100 14.0% 300 14.0% 300 16.0% 200 14.0% 300
AVRG 16.3% 154.9 15.6% 139.6 15.3% 219.5 15.7% 193.9 16.0% 178.3 15.5% 216.7
MEDIAN 16.8% 150.0 16.1% 150.0 15.5% 200.0 16.0% 200.0 16.0% 200.0 15.9% 202.5
STRATEGY GAME
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TABLE A.13 – Estimated indicators from the Simulation Game (1/2) 
  
Pavg Pvol VCC Vmax NPL Qavg Qvol
1 16.2% 15.8% 1000 0.870 6.1% 0.980 0.941
2 16.4% 15.5% 985 0.916 5.9% 1.052 0.953
3 12.8% 13.0% 1320 0.607 5.7% 0.843 0.878
4 14.5% 13.8% 1050 0.636 6.0% 0.813 0.848
5 15.9% 14.5% 1200 0.968 5.9% 0.943 1.150
6 15.8% 15.7% 1265 1.000 6.0% 1.081 1.077
7 16.3% 15.4% 1075 0.960 6.2% 0.948 1.043
8 17.2% 17.0% 855 1.000 6.2% 1.018 1.027
9 18.2% 17.7% 505 0.918 5.3% 1.037 1.002
10 15.7% 15.3% 1040 0.800 6.1% 1.089 1.127
11 16.3% 15.7% 1080 0.977 5.9% 1.119 1.105
12 16.7% 15.4% 870 0.870 5.7% 0.961 1.067
13 15.7% 15.3% 1230 0.961 5.6% 1.112 1.102
14 17.3% 17.0% 800 1.000 6.4% 0.962 0.939
15 17.7% 17.3% 700 1.000 6.3% 1.019 1.007
16 16.1% 14.6% 1175 1.000 5.2% 1.075 1.045
17 16.1% 15.9% 1165 1.000 6.1% 0.942 0.939
18 15.0% 15.0% 1310 0.873 5.9% 1.000 1.000
19 15.5% 15.4% 1350 1.000 6.0% 0.979 0.989
20 16.1% 16.0% 1095 0.932 6.2% 1.010 1.017
21 16.8% 16.7% 950 1.000 6.1% 1.020 1.011
22 15.0% 14.1% 1100 0.733 7.1% 0.915 0.929
23 15.0% 14.9% 1500 1.000 6.0% 1.045 1.045
24 16.6% 15.8% 1030 1.000 6.1% 0.912 0.982
25 15.1% 14.3% 1375 0.932 5.6% 0.967 0.984
26 17.2% 16.5% 788 0.940 6.1% 1.075 1.029
27 17.6% 16.9% 715 0.986 6.0% 1.114 1.075
28 15.7% 15.4% 1240 0.954 5.8% 1.122 1.126
29 18.2% 17.5% 550 1.000 6.3% 0.982 1.015
30 16.6% 16.4% 975 0.956 5.9% 1.029 1.035
31 16.4% 16.3% 1035 0.963 6.0% 1.052 1.052
32 15.2% 14.8% 1235 0.852 5.7% 1.151 1.161
33 16.9% 16.1% 930 1.000 5.9% 0.973 1.071
34 15.3% 15.1% 1400 1.000 5.9% 1.044 1.040
35 16.1% 15.2% 1110 0.941 6.0% 0.932 1.039
36 15.9% 14.6% 1145 0.927 6.0% 0.850 0.890
37 16.7% 15.7% 1000 1.000 5.5% 1.174 1.223
38 18.1% 17.1% 550 0.957 5.5% 1.009 1.015
39 16.0% 14.5% 1200 1.000 5.6% 1.000 1.178
40 16.7% 16.3% 1000 1.000 5.9% 1.041 1.055
41 15.5% 15.4% 1350 1.000 6.2% 1.067 1.056
42 17.6% 16.6% 698 0.962 5.7% 1.142 1.080
43 16.7% 15.7% 990 0.990 5.6% 0.961 1.028
44 16.4% 16.2% 995 0.926 5.9% 1.096 1.097
45 17.3% 15.9% 800 1.000 6.2% 1.167 1.011
46 14.5% 13.5% 1530 0.922 5.8% 1.019 0.918
47 16.4% 16.0% 1075 1.000 6.3% 1.074 1.033
48 16.5% 15.4% 955 0.910 6.3% 0.833 0.828
49 14.7% 12.9% 1000 0.625 6.8% 0.692 0.754
50 17.1% 16.6% 885 1.000 6.3% 0.909 0.903
51 15.8% 15.7% 1250 1.000 5.8% 1.043 1.028
52 14.6% 13.3% 1245 0.766 5.6% 1.303 1.152
53 14.7% 13.9% 1350 0.844 6.1% 0.872 0.908
54 15.8% 15.4% 1190 0.948 6.6% 0.864 0.869
55 15.0% 14.6% 1375 0.917 5.8% 0.978 0.966
56 16.3% 16.2% 1095 0.995 6.0% 0.976 0.964
57 14.7% 12.9% 1520 0.961 5.6% 0.896 0.981
58 16.3% 15.9% 1000 0.909 6.3% 0.922 0.905
59 15.3% 15.1% 1400 1.000 6.0% 1.000 0.981
60 14.4% 14.4% 1583 0.934 6.2% 1.026 1.026
61 16.2% 15.3% 1150 1.000 5.8% 0.940 1.031
62 15.5% 15.2% 1350 1.000 5.9% 1.044 1.073
63 16.5% 16.3% 1060 1.000 6.0% 0.964 0.972
64 15.7% 15.4% 935 0.716 5.3% 0.856 1.008
65 16.8% 16.2% 955 1.000 6.2% 0.929 1.002
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TABLE A.13 – Estimated indicators from the Simulation Game (2/2) 
 
Note: In order to preserve participants’ anonymity, results in Table A13 have been ranked in terms of gender and age. 
  
Pavg Pvol VCC Vmax NPL Qavg Qvol
66 15.8% 14.3% 1175 0.922 6.2% 1.198 1.008
67 16.2% 15.3% 1066 0.941 6.3% 1.039 0.945
68 16.0% 15.7% 1190 1.000 6.2% 0.963 1.001
69 16.8% 14.5% 940 0.984 5.4% 1.336 1.261
70 16.1% 15.7% 1163 1.000 5.8% 1.016 1.045
71 16.0% 15.5% 1200 1.000 5.7% 1.051 1.100
72 15.8% 15.6% 1250 1.000 5.9% 1.065 1.075
73 17.1% 16.8% 868 1.000 6.3% 1.027 1.025
74 14.3% 13.2% 1650 0.971 5.6% 1.389 1.424
75 17.0% 16.4% 885 0.994 6.2% 0.977 0.955
76 15.0% 14.9% 1380 0.920 6.1% 1.000 1.002
77 17.3% 16.7% 805 0.976 5.9% 1.121 1.100
78 18.4% 17.4% 437 0.920 6.0% 1.073 1.085
79 16.0% 15.9% 1125 0.926 6.1% 1.006 1.001
80 16.0% 15.3% 1205 1.000 5.7% 1.225 1.221
81 17.0% 16.4% 890 1.000 6.2% 0.928 0.995
82 16.9% 16.7% 900 0.973 6.2% 0.933 0.946
83 17.0% 16.4% 910 1.000 6.1% 0.984 0.951
84 14.7% 14.2% 1540 0.960 5.8% 1.093 1.130
85 16.7% 16.0% 925 0.920 5.8% 1.117 1.112
86 15.9% 15.3% 1225 1.000 5.9% 1.170 1.176
87 17.5% 17.0% 750 1.000 5.4% 1.059 1.000
88 15.0% 14.4% 1400 0.924 5.6% 1.081 1.087
89 14.4% 14.0% 1625 0.970 6.0% 1.012 1.035
90 14.9% 14.5% 1325 0.869 5.9% 1.034 0.977
91 17.0% 16.0% 890 1.000 6.0% 0.900 0.948
92 14.1% 13.6% 1783 1.000 6.6% 0.840 0.825
93 16.4% 15.3% 1040 0.954 5.3% 1.237 1.241
94 16.3% 15.3% 1095 0.973 6.5% 1.031 0.930
95 15.8% 15.8% 1260 1.000 6.1% 1.008 1.010
96 16.7% 15.4% 870 0.870 5.7% 1.000 1.027
97 17.5% 16.7% 635 0.847 5.2% 1.121 1.068
98 15.5% 13.7% 1075 0.804 6.0% 1.207 1.162
99 16.4% 16.1% 1095 1.000 6.0% 0.974 0.983
100 15.3% 13.6% 1375 0.982 5.9% 0.840 0.735
101 15.7% 14.9% 1300 1.000 6.8% 0.938 0.902
102 15.7% 15.3% 1287 0.990 6.2% 0.979 1.009
103 16.0% 15.5% 1147 0.948 6.0% 1.034 1.058
104 13.5% 12.2% 1450 0.744 5.4% 0.906 0.851
105 16.5% 14.8% 1050 1.000 5.6% 1.063 0.920
106 14.5% 14.9% 371 0.225 5.1% 1.260 1.244
107 16.2% 15.0% 1130 1.000 5.6% 1.055 1.079
108 17.6% 16.0% 705 0.972 5.8% 1.175 1.079
109 16.5% 15.9% 1025 0.976 5.5% 1.067 1.101
110 16.8% 16.0% 975 1.000 6.4% 0.951 1.031
111 15.8% 15.7% 1275 1.000 6.2% 0.969 0.966
112 15.8% 13.3% 1250 1.000 5.4% 0.939 0.860
113 17.0% 16.8% 880 0.978 6.4% 0.981 0.972
114 17.2% 16.4% 850 1.000 5.8% 0.943 0.998
115 16.8% 16.8% 950 1.000 6.2% 0.980 0.976
116 17.4% 16.6% 770 1.000 6.1% 1.047 1.010
117 15.9% 15.6% 1225 1.000 5.7% 1.099 1.087
118 15.8% 15.4% 1175 0.922 5.9% 1.054 1.058
119 15.1% 14.9% 1160 0.781 6.2% 0.929 0.925
120 14.3% 14.0% 1525 0.897 6.3% 1.000 1.002
121 17.0% 16.0% 900 1.000 5.6% 1.217 1.210
122 15.3% 15.0% 1420 1.000 5.9% 1.009 0.996
123 13.8% 13.5% 1830 0.989 6.0% 1.024 1.011
124 17.3% 15.6% 800 1.000 6.1% 0.891 1.061
125 14.8% 14.6% 1550 1.000 5.9% 1.070 1.087
126 14.7% 14.5% 1400 0.875 5.9% 1.047 1.051
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TABLE A.14 – Histograms of game indicators 
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TABLE A.15 – Normal Q-Q plot and Box-and-whiskers plot of game indicators (1/2) 
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TABLE A.15 – Normal Q-Q plot and Box-and-whiskers plot of game indicators (2/2) 
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TABLE A.16 – Regression models. Game indicators to behavioral biases (1/3) 
  
Model Variables Entered
Variables 
Removed
1
Overprecisión 2
Model R R Square
Adjusted R 
Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
1 .184
a .034 .026 .010
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Regression 4.422 1 4.422 4.197 .043b
Residual 126.444 120 1.054
Total 130.865 121
Standardized 
Coefficients
B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 15.743 .175 90.120 .000
Overprecisión 2 .655 .320 .184 2.049 .043
Collinearity 
Statistics
Tolerance
Overestimation -.010
b -0.107 .915 -.010 .972
Overplacement -.107b -1.181 .240 -.108 .979
Overprecision 1 -.034b -.278 .782 -.025 .548
alpha + -.096
b -1.065 .289 -.097 .991
alpha - .112b 1.253 .213 .114 .998
gamma + -.118b -1.323 .188 -.120 1.000
gamma - .035
b .384 .702 .035 .979
loss aversion 1 -.066b -.723 .471 -.066 .985
Loss aversion 2 (r) -.015b -.163 .871 -.015 .963
Method
Stepwise (Criteria: Probab.-of-
F-to-enter <= .050, Probab.-of-
F-to-remove >= .100).
b. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), Overprecisión 2
a. Dependent Variable: Average Price
1
Excluded Variablesa
Model Beta In t Sig.
Partial 
Correlation
a. Dependent Variable: Average Price
1
Coefficientsa
Model
Unstandardized 
Coefficients
t Sig.
a. Dependent Variable: Average Price
b. Predictors: (Constant), Overprecisión 2
1
Model
a. Predictors: (Constant), Overprecisión 2
ANOVA
a
Model Summary
Variables Entered/Removed
a
a. Dependent Variable: Average Price
Model Variables Entered
Variables 
Removed
2
gamma -
Model R R Square
Adjusted R 
Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
2 .297a .088 .080 .061
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Regression .042 1 .042 11.287 .001b
Residual 0.434 117 .004
Total 0.475 118
Standardized 
Coefficients
B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) .920 .012 76.798 .000
gamma - .068 .020 .297 3.360 .001
Collinearity 
Statistics
Tolerance
Overestimation -.102
b -1.154 .251 -.107 .999
Overplacement -.090b -1.015 .312 -.094 .995
Overprecision 1 .079b .879 .381 .081 .973
Overprecisión 2 .079
b .880 .381 .081 .979
alpha + -.044
b -.488 .627 -.045 .982
alpha - -.019b -.205 .838 -.019 .894
gamma + .101
b 1.112 .268 .103 .937
loss aversion 1 -.045b -.505 .614 -.047 .999
Loss aversion 2 (r) -.023b -.259 .796 -.024 1.000
ANOVAa
b. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), gamma -
Stepwise (Criteria: Probab.-of-
F-to-enter <= .050, Probab.-of-
F-to-remove >= .100).
a. Dependent Variable: Volume ratio (r)
2
Model Beta In t Sig.
Partial 
Correlation
Excluded Variables
a
a. Dependent Variable: Volume ratio (r)
Model
2
Unstandardized 
Coefficients
b. Predictors: (Constant), gamma -
Coefficientsa
t
a. Dependent Variable: Volume ratio (r)
Sig.
a. Predictors: (Constant), gamma -
2
Model Summary
Model
Variables Entered/Removed
a
a. Dependent Variable: Volume ratio (r)
Method
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TABLE A.16 – Regression models. Game indicators to behavioral biases (2/3) 
 
Model Variables Entered
Variables 
Removed
3
gamma -
Model R R Square
Adjusted R 
Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
3 .219a .048 .040 .003
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Regression .645 1 .645 6.054 .015b
Residual 12.791 120 .107
Total 13.436 121
Standardized 
Coefficients
B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 5.812 .063 91.620 .000
gamma - .263 .107 .219 2.460 .015
Collinearity 
Statistics
Tolerance
Overestimation .080
b 0.899 .371 .082 .999
Overplacement -.013b -.145 .885 -.013 .995
Overprecision 1 -.079b -.869 .387 -.079 .973
Overprecisión 2 -.040
b -.440 .661 -.040 .979
alpha + .118
b 1.316 .191 .120 .982
alpha - -.081b -.863 .390 -.079 .894
gamma + .146
b 1.599 .112 .145 .937
loss aversion 1 -.057b -.643 .522 -.059 .999
Loss aversion 2 (r) -.058b -.650 .517 -.059 1.000
Method
Stepwise (Criteria: Probab.-of-
F-to-enter <= .050, Probab.-of-
F-to-remove >= .100).
Partial 
Correlation
b. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), gamma -
Beta In t Sig.
a. Dependent Variable: Non-performing loans
3
Model
Excluded Variables
a
Sig.Model
Unstandardized 
Coefficients
t
a. Dependent Variable: Non-performing loans
3
b. Predictors: (Constant), gamma -
Coefficientsa
a. Dependent Variable: Non-performing loans
a. Predictors: (Constant), gamma -
3
ANOVAa
Model Summary
Model
Variables Entered/Removed
a
a. Dependent Variable: Non-performing loans
Model Variables Entered
Variables 
Removed
4
gamma +
Model R R Square
Adjusted R 
Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
4 .258a .066 .059 .104
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Regression .093 1 .093 8.526 .004
b
Residual 1.306 120 .011
Total 1.398 121
Standardized 
Coefficients
B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 1.091 .026 42.556 .000
gamma + -.108 .037 -.258 -2.920 .004
Collinearity 
Statistics
Tolerance
Overestimation .016
b 0.184 .854 .017 .997
Overplacement .124b 1.405 .163 .128 .989
Overprecision 1 .126
b 1.429 .156 .130 .999
Overprecisión 2 .049
b .555 .580 .051 1.000
alpha + -.137b -1.252 .213 -.114 .643
alpha - .050
b .559 .577 .051 .991
gamma - .124
b 1.365 .175 .124 .937
loss aversion 1 -.089b -1.010 .314 -.092 .995
Loss aversion 2 (r) -.037b -.416 .678 -.038 .991
Method
Stepwise (Criteria: Probab.-of-
F-to-enter <= .050, Probab.-of-
F-to-remove >= .100).
Model Beta In
b. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), gamma +
a. Dependent Variable: Quality Ratio
4
t Sig.
Partial 
Correlation
Excluded Variablesa
a. Dependent Variable: Quality Ratio
Model
Unstandardized 
Coefficients
t Sig.
4
b. Predictors: (Constant), gamma +
Coefficients
a
4
a. Dependent Variable: Quality Ratio
Model
a. Predictors: (Constant), gamma +
ANOVA
a
Model Summary
Variables Entered/Removed
a
a. Dependent Variable: Quality Ratio
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TABLE A.16 – Regression models. Game indicators to behavioral biases (3/3) 
 
Model Variables Entered
Variables 
Removed
5
gamma +
6
Overprecision 1
Model R R Square
Adjusted R 
Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
5 .216a .047 .039 .09199
6 .298
b .089 .073 .09031
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Regression .050 1 .050 5.886 .017
b
Residual 1.015 120 .008
Total 1.065 121
Regression .095 2 .047 5.797 .004c
Residual .971 119 .008
Total 1.065 121
Standardized 
Coefficients
B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 1.071 .023 47.387 .000
gamma + -.079 .033 -.216 -2.426 .017
(Constant) 1.047 .024 42.795 .000
gamma + -.082 .032 -.223 -2.545 .012
Overprecision 1 .075 .032 .205 2.343 .021
Collinearity 
Statistics
Tolerance
Overestimation -.009
b -.100 .920 -.009 .997
Overplacement .095b 1.059 .292 .097 .989
Overprecision 1 .205b 2.343 .021 .210 .999
Overprecisión 2 .039b .431 .667 .039 1.000
alpha + -.061b -.549 .584 -.050 .643
alpha - -.016b -.178 .859 -.016 .991
gamma - -.006b -.063 .950 -.006 .937
loss aversion 1 -.100
b -1.117 .266 -.102 .995
Loss aversion 2 (r) -.016b -.177 .860 -.016 .991
Overestimation .017c .190 .850 .017 .981
Overplacement .104c 1.182 .240 .108 .987
Overprecisión 2 -.182
c -1.546 .125 -.141 .546
alpha + -.017c -.154 .878 -.014 .623
alpha - -.018
c -.206 .837 -.019 .991
gamma - -.041c -.450 .654 -.041 .913
loss aversion 1 -.111
c -1.269 .207 -.116 .992
Loss aversion 2 (r) -.035c -.395 .694 -.036 .982
a. Dependent Variable: Weighted Quality (r)
b. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), gamma +
c. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), gamma +, Overprecision 1
5
6
a. Dependent Variable: Weighted Quality (r)
b. Predictors: (Constant), gamma +
Method
Sig.
Partial 
Correlation
6
Excluded Variablesa
Stepwise (Criteria: Probab.-of-
F-to-enter <= .050, Probab.-of-
F-to-remove >= .100).
c. Predictors: (Constant), gamma +, Overprecision 1
Sig.
5
t
Stepwise (Criteria: Probab.-of-
F-to-enter <= .050, Probab.-of-
F-to-remove >= .100).
a. Dependent Variable: Weighted Quality (r)
Model
Model
Unstandardized 
Coefficients
Beta In t
Coefficientsa
Model
6
5
ANOVAa
a. Predictors: (Constant), gamma +
Model Summary
b. Predictors: (Constant), gamma +, Overprecision 1
a. Dependent Variable: Weighted Quality (r)
Variables Entered/Removeda
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TABLE A.17 – Factorial analysis. Correlations 
 
 
VARIABLES TO FACTORS
E P Mmed Mavg alpha + alpha - gamma + gamma - βmed βavg (r)
Pearson Correlation -.049 -.121 .061 .145 -.059 .135 -.095 .029 -.032 .024
Sig. (2-tailed) .590 .180 .499 .108 .515 .133 .293 .745 .720 .795
N 125 125 124 124 125 125 125 125 125 122
Pearson Correlation -.037 .051 .150 .040 -,196* .017 -,269** -.091 -.056 .009
Sig. (2-tailed) .678 .571 .097 .660 .028 .853 .002 .314 .538 .917
N 125 125 124 124 125 125 125 125 125 122
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Strategy
Quality
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Correlations
FACTORS TO INDICATORS
Pavg Pvol VCCind VMAXind (r) NPL Qavg Qvol (r)
Pearson Correlation -.103 -.122 .111 -.112 .046 .038 .001
Sig. (2-tailed) .252 .175 .220 .223 .613 .671 .994
N 125 125 125 121 125 125 124
Pearson Correlation -.139 -.079 .085 .051 .157 -,285** -,223*
Sig. (2-tailed) .120 .381 .346 .577 .078 .001 .013
N 126 126 126 122 126 126 125
Pearson Correlation .093 .116 .069 ,299** ,189* .068 -.042
Sig. (2-tailed) .301 .197 .444 .001 .035 .450 .644
N 126 126 126 122 126 126 125
Pearson Correlation -.008 .000 -.032 -.076 -.085 -.061 -.072
Sig. (2-tailed) .933 .999 .721 .406 .345 .501 .426
N 126 126 126 122 126 126 125
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Losses
Loss aversion
OC
Gains
Correlations
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TABLE A.18 – Factorial analysis. Regressions (1/5) 
  
FACTORS TO FACTORS
Model Variables Entered
Variables 
Removed
1
Gains
Model R R Square
Adjusted R 
Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
1 .266a .071 .063 .948
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Regression 8.363 1 8.363 9.297 .003b
Residual 109.740 122 .900
Total 118.103 123
Standardized 
Coefficients
B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) -.016 .085 -.183 .855
Gains -.261 .086 -.266 -3.049 .003
Collinearity 
Statistics
Tolerance
Overconfidence -.016
b -.187 .852 -.017 1.000
Losses -.069b -.789 .432 -.072 1.000
Loss aversion Factor -.040b -.458 .648 -.042 1.000
a. Predictors: (Constant), Gains
Method
Stepwise (Criteria: Probab.-of-F-
to-enter <= .050, Probab.-of-F-
to-remove >= .100).
b. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), Gains
1
a. Dependent Variable: Quality
Model Beta In t Sig.
Partial 
Correlation
Excluded Variables
a
a. Dependent Variable: Quality
1
Model
Unstandardized Coefficients
t Sig.
Coefficients
a
b. Predictors: (Constant), Gains
a. Dependent Variable: Quality
1
Model
ANOVA
a
Model Summary
a. Dependent Variable: Quality
Variables Entered/Removeda
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TABLE A.18 – Factorial analysis. Regressions (2/5) 
 
VARIABLES TO FACTORS
Model Variables Entered
Variables 
Removed
1
gamma +
Model R R Square
Adjusted R 
Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
1 .269
a .072 .064 .948
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Regression 8.377 1 8.377 9.324 .003b
Residual 107.806 120 .898
Total 116.183 121
Standardized 
Coefficients
B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) .645 .233 2.772 .006
gamma + -1.029 .337 -.269 -3.054 .003
Collinearity 
Statistics
Tolerance
Overestimation -.023
b -.256 .798 -.023 .997
Overplacement .080
b .903 .368 .083 .989
Overprecision 1 .158
b 1.817 .072 .164 .999
Overprecisión 2 .034
b .386 .700 .035 1.000
alpha + -.055
b -.503 .616 -.046 .643
alpha - -.008b -.093 .926 -.009 .991
gamma - -.025
b -.276 .783 -.025 .937
loss aversion 1 -.074
b -.840 .402 -.077 .995
Loss aversion 2 (r) -.017
b -.187 .852 -.017 .991
a. Predictors: (Constant), gamma +
a. Dependent Variable: Quality
b. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), gamma +
Method
Stepwise (Criteria: Probab.-of-
F-to-enter <= .050, Probab.-of-
F-to-remove >= .100).
1
Beta In t Sig.
Partial 
CorrelationModel
Excluded Variables
a
a. Dependent Variable: Quality
1
t Sig.Model
Unstandardized 
Coefficients
Coefficientsa
b. Predictors: (Constant), gamma +
a. Dependent Variable: Quality
1
Model
ANOVA
a
Model Summary
a. Dependent Variable: Quality
Variables Entered/Removed
a
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TABLE A.18 – Factorial analysis. Regressions (3/5) 
 
 
1 2 3 4
Dependent 
variable
VMAXind NPL Qavg Qvol 
Constant 0.955 5.950 1.021 1.020
OC -       -       -       -       
(s ignific .)
Gains -       -       -0.031 -0.021 
(s ignific .) 0.001 0.013
Losses 0.019    0.063    -       -       
(s ignific .) 0.001 0.035
Loss Aversion -       -       -       -       
(s ignific .)
R2 0.089 0.036 0.081 0.050
adj. R
2
0.082 0.028 0.074 0.042
Model
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TABLE A.18 – Factorial analysis. Regressions (4/5) 
  
FACTORS TO INDICATORS
Model Variables Entered
Variables 
Removed
1
Losses
Model R R Square
Adjusted R 
Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
1 .299a .089 .082 .061
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Regression .043 1 .043 11.684 .001b
Residual .440 119 .004
Total .483 120
Standardized 
Coefficients
B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) .955 .006 172.785 .000
Losses .019 .006 .299 3.418 .001
Collinearity 
Statistics
Tolerance
Overconfidence -.141
b -1.615 .109 -.147 .991
Gains .051b .581 .562 .053 1.000
Loss aversion Factor -.076
b -.867 .387 -.080 1.000
a. Predictors: (Constant), Losses
Method
Stepwise (Criteria: Probab.-of-
F-to-enter <= .050, Probab.-of-
F-to-remove >= .100).
b. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), Losses
1
a. Dependent Variable: Volume ratio (r)
t Sig.
Partial 
CorrelationModel Beta In
Excluded Variables
a
a. Dependent Variable: Volume ratio (r)
1
Model
Unstandardized 
Coefficients
t Sig.
Coefficients
a
b. Predictors: (Constant), Losses
a. Dependent Variable: Volume ratio (r)
1
Model
ANOVAa
Model Summary
a. Dependent Variable: Volume ratio (r)
Variables Entered/Removeda
Model Variables Entered
Variables 
Removed
2
Losses
Model R R Square
Adjusted R 
Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
2 .189a .036 .028 .003
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Regression .489 1 .489 4.532 .035b
Residual 13.280 123 .108
Total 13.769 124
Standardized 
Coefficients
B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 5.950 .029 202.449 .000
Losses .063 .030 .189 2.129 .035
Collinearity 
Statistics
Tolerance
Overconfidence .028
b .316 .752 .029 .991
Gains .157b 1.794 .075 .160 1.000
Loss aversion Factor -.085b -.957 .341 -.086 1.000
a. Predictors: (Constant), Losses
Method
Stepwise (Criteria: Probab.-of-
F-to-enter <= .050, Probab.-of-
F-to-remove >= .100).
b. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), Losses
2
a. Dependent Variable: Non-performing loans
Sig.
Partial 
CorrelationModel Beta In t
Excluded Variables
a
a. Dependent Variable: Non-performing loans
2
Model
Unstandardized 
Coefficients
t Sig.
Coefficients
a
b. Predictors: (Constant), Losses
a. Dependent Variable: Non-performing loans
2
Model
ANOVAa
Model Summary
a. Dependent Variable: Non-performing loans
Variables Entered/Removed
a
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TABLE A.18 – Factorial analysis. Regressions (5/5) 
  
Model Variables Entered
Variables 
Removed
3
Gains
Model R R Square
Adjusted R 
Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
3 .285
a .081 .074 .103
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Regression .116 1 .116 10.866 .001b
Residual 1.317 123 .011
Total 1.433 124
Standardized 
Coefficients
B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 1.021 .009 110.322 .000
Gains -.031 .009 -.285 -3.296 .001
Collinearity 
Statistics
Tolerance
Overconfidence .033
b .386 .700 .035 1.000
Losses .068
b .784 .434 .071 1.000
Loss aversion Factor -.061
b -.699 .486 -.063 1.000
a. Predictors: (Constant), Gains
Method
Stepwise (Criteria: Probab.-of-
F-to-enter <= .050, Probab.-of-
F-to-remove >= .100).
b. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), Gains
3
a. Dependent Variable: Quality Ratio
Partial 
CorrelationModel Beta In t Sig.
Excluded Variables
a
a. Dependent Variable: Quality Ratio
3
t Sig.Model
Unstandardized 
Coefficients
Coefficients
a
b. Predictors: (Constant), Gains
a. Dependent Variable: Quality Ratio
3
Model
ANOVA
a
Model Summary
a. Dependent Variable: Quality Ratio
Variables Entered/Removeda
Model Variables Entered
Variables 
Removed
4
Gains
Model R R Square
Adjusted R 
Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
4 .223
a .050 .042 .092
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Regression .054 1 .054 6.357 .013b
Residual 1.029 122 .008
Total 1.083 123
Standardized 
Coefficients
B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 1.020 .008 123.653 .000
Gains -.021 .008 -.223 -2.521 .013
Collinearity 
Statistics
Tolerance
Overconfidence -.003
b -.036 .972 -.003 1.000
Losses -.042
b -.471 .638 -.043 1.000
Loss aversion Factor -.072
b -.813 .418 -.074 1.000
Method
Stepwise (Criteria: Probab.-of-
F-to-enter <= .050, Probab.-of-
F-to-remove >= .100).
a. Predictors: (Constant), Gains
a. Dependent Variable: Weighted Quality (r)
b. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), Gains
4
Model Beta In t Sig.
Partial 
Correlation
Excluded Variables
a
a. Dependent Variable: Weighted Quality (r)
4
Model
Unstandardized 
Coefficients
t Sig.
Coefficients
a
b. Predictors: (Constant), Gains
a. Dependent Variable: Weighted Quality (r)
4
Model
ANOVA
a
Model Summary
a. Dependent Variable: Weighted Quality (r)
Variables Entered/Removeda
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APPENDIX THEORETICAL MODEL 
 
In this Appendix we provide the formal proof of the results obtained in the model in Chapter 9. 
 
Maxima – Computer Algebra System was used for mathematical derivations.  
 
Proof of Lemma 1. We first calculate the volumes of loans granted in the possible market configurations and the 
corresponding rates that clear the market. 
I. Rational duopoly. If both banks have the unbiased probability l , they simultaneously solve the same problem, 
which is defined by 
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where i,j=A,B;ij. Inserting the restriction into the objective function ),( il
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i LLE , (A1) can be rewritten as 
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and the solution of (A2) is given by the pair of volumes of loans 
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where i
hL  denotes the volume of loans granted by bank i to high-quality borrowers and 
i
rDlL ,  stands for the volume 
of loans granted by bank i to low-quality borrowers in a rational duopoly. The subsequent interest rates to be paid 
are 
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where 
rDlr ,  denotes the equilibrium interest rate for low-quality borrowers in a rational duopoly. 
II. Asymmetric market. When a rational bank (bank A) and a boundedly rational bank (bank B) compete in the 
industry, they solve two alternative versions of the program given in (A2); namely, 
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the bank A, and 
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the bank B. The assumption of linear costs ensures that markets are separable, so the volume of loans and the 
interest rate in the high-quality market are identical to those in the rational and biased duopolies see (A3) and 
(A5). However, in the low-quality market, we have the volume of loans  
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granted by banks A and B, respectively. Finally, the corresponding interest rate that clears the market for low-
quality borrowers in this asymmetric duopoly amounts to 
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Whenever the no-monopoly condition does not hold, the volume of loans granted by bank A to low-quality 
borrowers would be 0
*
, 
A
aDlL  according to (A9). Thus, the market for low-quality borrowers would become a 
monopoly formed by bank B, which would alternatively solve 
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since high and low-quality markets are separable. The solution of (A12) renders the volume of loans 
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where 
*
,MlL  denotes the volume of loans granted to low-quality borrowers by bank B as a monopolist. Finally, the 
interest rate to be paid by low-quality borrowers in a monopoly amounts to 
O
l
O
l
Ml
cr
r




2
1
2
,


.        (A14) 
III. Biased duopoly. If both banks are biased in the low-quality market, they solve a similar optimization problem 
as in (A1), but where the probability of success of low-quality borrowers is now replaced by O
l . Consequently, 
we get the same strategy for high-quality borrowers (see A3 and A5), whereas for low-quality borrowers we obtain 
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as the volume of loans provided by bank i in a biased duopoly, and 
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as the interest rate to be paid by such borrowers. From here, Lemma 1 straightforwardly follows by taking into 
account (A4), (A9), (A10), (A13) and (A15). First, using (A4) and (A15) we conclude that 
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l   . Next, to see what happens in an asymmetric duopoly where one bank is rational and the other biased, 
consider first the situation where the no-monopoly condition M
ll    holds, that is, the situation where we have 
an asymmetric duopoly. Using (A15) and rearranging, the volume of loans granted in a biased duopoly amounts to 
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while (A9) and (A10) render the volume of loans 
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which are the volume granted in an asymmetric duopoly. The fact that 
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Besides, using (A4) we get in a rational duopoly the volume of loans 
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which leads to 
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Finally, when the no-monopoly condition does not hold, i.e. when 
)1()(
)1(2
cr
cr
O
l
O
l
l





 , we need to 
compare the volume of loans granted to low-quality borrowers in the monopoly market, 
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which is lower than 
*
,MlL  in (A13). On the other hand, it follows that 
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in any case. This completes the proof of the lemma.  
Proof of Lemma 2. We need to compare the expected profits that banks would obtain in different market 
configurations. Consequently, we must be aware that the rational bank A would estimate 
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where 
A
xlL ,  
and
 

xlr ,  are, respectively, the volume of loans granted by bank A in the market configuration x, 
},,,{ MbDaDrDx , we are considering and the clearing interest rate. The objective function of bank B is  
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where O
l  replaces l .  
In order to prove that playing biased is a dominant strategy for bank B we have to check: (i) that the bank B’s 
expected profit in the asymmetric duopoly, B
aDE  (alternatively, in the monopoly 
B
ME  when the no-
monopoly condition does not hold) is higher than in the rational duopoly, B
rDE , and (ii) that its expected profit 
in the biased duopoly, B
bDE  is higher than in the inverted duopoly, 
B
iDE  (alternatively, in the inverted 
monopoly B
iME ), where in both inverted scenarios the banks’ strategies go against their own priors, such that 
(A9) applies to bank B, and (A10) and (A13) apply to bank A. 
Consider first the case in which the no-monopoly condition holds. 
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*
,
*
,
** )]1()1([)]1()1([ AaDlaDl
O
l
A
hhh
A
aD LcrrLcrrE     and 
*
,
*
,
** )]1()1([)]1()1([ BrDlrDl
O
l
B
hhh
B
rD LcrrLcrrE   , the fact that markets are separable implies that 
*
,
*
,
*
,
*
, )]1()1([)]1()1([
B
rDlrDl
O
l
B
aDlaDl
O
l LcrrLcrr    must be proven. Substituting (A10), (A11), (A4) and 
(A6) it follows that bank B plays biased if and only if 
0
)(9
])()()[1)((])(47)(3[)1(
2
22222


O
ll
O
ll
O
llll
O
l
O
l crcr


          (A24) 
and (A24) is satisfied for 









 1
)1(3)1(4
l
O
l
crcr

 , which is true because of Assumption 2.273 
(ii) Now we compare the expected profits in the biased duopoly  
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Consider now the no-monopoly condition does not hold. 
(iii) Following the same logic as above, to prove that B
rD
B
M EE  , and given that markets are separable, 
we need to prove that 
*
,
*
,
*
,
*
, )]1()1([)]1()1([
B
rDlrDl
O
l
B
MlMl
O
l LcrrLcrr   . Substituting (A10), (A11), 
(A4) and (A6), it follows that bank B plays biased if and only if 
0
)(36 2


O
ll 
,        (A26) 
where 22222 )]()()(5)1)((4)1(8[ Olllcrcr    
                                                          222222 )()1(9]))(1)((6)1(12[ l
O
lll crcrcr   . 
To prove that 0  only for small values of l  as 
M
ll   , we proceed as follows. First, we show that 
(A26) is positive at M
ll   .
275 Next, a sufficient condition to have positive profits for values of l  below 
M
l  is that the first derivative of (A26) with respect to l , 
3
2
)(9
)1)(()43()1(
l
O
ll
O
ll crcr

 
,    (A27) 
is negative for all Mll   . The first derivative stated in (A27) is equal to zero at 
)1(3)(
)1(4st1
cr
cr
O
l
O
l





  and negative below that point, since the denominator of (A27) is positive 
whereas the numerator is negative for all st1
ll   . It is then easy to prove that 
)1()(
)1(2M
cr
cr
O
l
O
l
l





  satisfies st1M
ll   . We may do this by simply reducing the cross multiplication 
                                                 
274 This holds for identical reason as in the previous footnote. we solve (A25) = 0 in terms of alpha to find out the alpha that 
makes profits equal to zero to find it would be 



 




l
O
l
crcr 1
2
1
3 . The derivative of (A25) with respect to α is the 
same as in the previous footnote, hence positive. Thus, equation (A25) is increasing, hence positive for all  




 




l
O
l
crcr 1
2
1
3 . Finally, it is easy to check Assumption 2 imposes a minimum alpha that is higher, since 






 





l
O
l
O
l
crcrcr 1
2
1
3
1   as long as 
l
O
l   . 
275 If we substitute M
l
 
in (A26) we get 
O
l
O
l cr


36
)]1()[(5 2
, which is positive for all values of parameter α except at 
O
l
O
lcr



)1( 
 , where it equals zero. However, Assumption 2 imposes 
O
l
O
lcr



)1( 
 . 
420 
 
               crcrcrcr OlOlOlOl  1141312   to 
      01212 222  OlOl crcr  , a condition that simplifies to     Olcr  1  
which rearranged is simply 
O
l
O
lcr





1 , ensured by Assumption 2. Consequently, (A27) is negative 
for values below st1l  and hence the profits given in (A26) are positive below 
M
l . 
 
(iv) Finally, in order to prove that B
iM
B
bD EE  , since markets are separable this only requires to check that 
0)]1()1([ *,
*
, 
B
bDlbDl
O
l Lcrr . Substituting (A15) and (A16) we conclude that bank B plays biased if and 
only if 
0
9
)]1()[( 2


O
l
O
l cr


,      (A28) 
and (A28) holds in all cases except at 
O
l
O
lcr



)1( 
 , where it equals to zero. However, Assumption 2 
that imposes the restriction 
O
l
O
lcr



)1( 
  ensures that (A28) always holds. This completes the proof 
of the lemma.  
Proof of Lemma 3. Given that playing biased is a dominant strategy for bank B, in order to determine the 
conditions for bank A to herd we have to compare its expected profits if bank A plays biased (the biased duopoly) 
and its expected profits if it plays rational and we have the asymmetric duopoly, or the monopoly by bank B if the 
no-monopoly condition does not hold. Consider first that the no-monopoly condition holds. Bank A herds if its 
expected profit in the biased duopoly is higher than in the asymmetric duopoly, AaD
A
bD EE  . This requires, 
given that markets are separable, that 
*
,
*
,
*
,
*
, )]1()1([)]1()1([
A
aDlaDll
A
bDlbDll LcrrLcrr   ,      (A29) 

l
st
l
1

l
st
l
1
Expected excess profits
First derivative
Probab.
Probab.
Expected 
profits
421 
 
but (A29) can be rearranged as 
*
,
*
,
*
,
*
,
*
,
*
,
)1()1(
))(1(
A
aDlaDl
A
bDlbDl
A
aDl
A
bDl
l
LrLr
LLcr


         (A30) 
provided that the denominator of (A30) is positive.276 We may expand (A30) by substituting (A9), (A11), (A15) 
and (A16) for the volumes of loans granted in equilibrium and the corresponding market-clearing interest rates. 
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asymmetric market is a monopoly, i.e. bank A does not herd, such market structure is always the equilibrium 
configuration. This completes the proof of the lemma.  
Proof of Proposition 1. It follows directly from Lemmas 2 and 3.  
Proof of Remark 1. It follows from Lemma 1 and Proposition 1.  
Proof of Lemma 4. Since there will be no herding when the no-monopoly condition is not satisfied (see Lemma 
3), we shall only focus on a market where the possible asymmetric configuration is a duopoly. Consider first the 
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Clearly, the required bias for an unbiased bank not to herd is increasing in α (and obviously in O
l ), and decreasing 
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Clearly, the required bias for the biased bank not to herd is increasing in α and 
l , and decreasing in β, r, c and, 
obviously, U
l .  
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RESUMO EN GALEGO 
 
A crise financeira global dos anos 2007 e 2008 e a crise de débeda pública que lle sucedeu na zona Euro 
persuadiu a académicos e autoridades para revisar os nosos coñecementos acerca do funcionamento 
das economías de mercado. Entre os temas revisados salientamos a natureza dos ciclos económicos, a 
efectividade das políticas monetarias, o papel xogado polos derivados financeiros, ou a efectividade da 
regulación bancaria. Con todo, o factor ao que se lle ten prestado máis atención é, quizais, o crédito.  
O recente episodio anovou o interese no papel que o crédito xoga na economía, traendo a primeira 
liña clásicos como Charles Kindleberger ou Hyman Minsky, entre outros. De feito, o bo comportamento 
das economías occidentais antes da Gran Recesión foi consecuencia en boa medida dos niveis de 
endebedamento asumidos. O exceso de confianza podería ter provocado a crenza, por parte dos axentes 
económicos, de que esta vez era diferente e que os bos tempos haberían durar sempre. Os riscos 
percibidos minorarían, ao que lle sucedería un maior apancamento financeiro. Así, a ratio de pasivos 
financeiros sobre PIB entre 1995 e 2007 aumentou en países como o Reino Unido desde o 128% ao 
213%, e as burbullas inmobiliarias sucedéronse en países tan distantes como os Estados Unidos, Irlanda, 
España, Rusia, Singapur, China ou os Emiratos Árabes. Burbullas todas elas que colapsarían co estoupido 
da crise financeira.  
Nas economías onde o peso do sector bancario non é moi relevante, a ratio de crédito bancario 
sobre PIB tende a permanecer baixo ao longo do ciclo económico. Por exemplo, nos EE.UU. entre os anos 
50 a 1995, a ratio oscilou entre o 7% e o 14% (Himmelberg e Morgan, 1995). Nos sistemas bancarios, 
pola contra, esta ratio é a miúdo moito máis alta e medrou de maneira agresiva durante a pasada crise. 
En España, por exemplo, a mediados dos anos 90 a ratio oscilaba no 60%, para dispararse ata o 175% 
en 2009. O crédito concedido polo sector bancario español ás economías domésticas e empresas entre 
1995 e 2008 pasou dos 271.000 millóns aos 1.870.000 millóns de euros , case sete veces máis. Durante 
o mesmo período, o PIB medrou un 58%. Por outra banda, a análise histórica dos episodios de crise 
financeira internacional por parte de Reinhart e Rogoff (2011) confirma dous feitos adicionais. Primeiro, 
o aumento das débedas privadas é un precedente recorrente das crises bancarias. Tomando de novo o 
exemplo español, en decembro de 2007 só o 0,93% dos créditos concedidos a economías domésticas e 
empresas figuraban como impagados; en xaneiro de 2014, a cifra ascendía ao 13,58%. En cambio, en 
países máis orientados aos sistemas financeiros de mercado, como EE.UU., só se observaban cifras 
similares en tarxetas de crédito e préstamos universitarios. En hipotecas e créditos para compra de 
automóbil, a morosidade apenas excedía o 5%. O segundo feito constatado é que as crises bancarias a 
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miúdo preceden (e predín) as crises de débeda soberana. O nexo foi palpable na recente crise da 
Eurozona e o efecto realimentación entre débeda pública e o balance dos bancos. Por tanto, as crises 
bancarias que seguen a períodos de políticas de crédito laxas non só teñen consecuencias prexudiciais 
sobre a estabilidade do sector bancario, senón tamén sobre toda a economía. 
Por tanto, analizar a eficiencia do sector bancario na concesión de crédito á economía revélase 
como un campo de investigación ben interesante. A seguir, resumimos o principal obxecto da tese, así 
como o enfoque seguido na nosa investigación. Primeiro, determinamos o obxecto de estudo. Segundo, 
enumeramos os principais obxectivos perseguidos. Terceiro, a metodoloxía implementada.  Por último, 
describimos a estrutura da tese e resumimos os contidos de cada capítulo. 
Obxecto de estudo 
Xa que as crises de crédito poden asociarse tanto con efectos desde o lado da oferta como da demanda, 
debemos clarificar de inicio que a presente tese doutoral pon o seu foco no lado da oferta, ao obxecto de 
proporcionar un medio alternativo de análise das causas tras un boom de crédito. 
Así, o obxecto de estudo desta tese é a eficiencia dos sistemas financeiros bancarios á hora de 
conceder crédito á economía. En consecuencia, o ámbito da investigación son os mercados de crédito 
polo miúdo, definidos como as transaccións entre banca comercial e os seus clientes que inclúa a 
concesión dalgún tipo de crédito (préstamos, hipotecas, etc.) financiado, principalmente, cós depósitos 
doutros clientes. A principal innovación é o marco conceptual que empregamos a tal efecto: a economía 
e finanzas do comportamento (behavioral economics and finance na terminoloxía inglesa). Nos sistemas 
financeiros de mercado, o enfoque habitual de análise da eficiencia é a Hipótese do Mercado Eficiente 
(Efficient Market Hypothesis, EMH). Porén, veremos que a competencia imperfecta e as asimetrías de 
información características dos sistemas bancarios deixan a EMH sen contido neste ámbito. A primeira 
contribución desta tese é proporcionar un enfoque behaviorista ou conductual para analizar a eficiencia 
dos sistemas bancarios, o que permitiría explicar o xeito no que os nesgos de comportamento dos 
participantes na industria bancaria poderían explicar os ciclos de crédito. 
Esa é en efecto a principal cuestión que se pretende respostar: podería ser que as burbullas 
crediticias fosen unha manifestación dun comportamento rabaño a consecuencia dos distintos nesgos 
de comportamento dos executivos e empregados na industria? Entendemos que esta é unha cuestión 
relevante que merece ser respostada. As investigacións académicas posteriores á recente crise 
financeira teñen analizado aspectos como o papel dos incentivos, as titulizacións ou o risco moral, pero 
pouco se ten feito por interpretar o papel que a psicoloxía humana podería ter xogado. Non deixa de ser 
curioso: a behavioral economics ten identificado e explicado un feixe de anomalías en areas tan diversas 
como a saúde, a educación, a enerxía, os seguros ou as políticas públicas. A área de máis éxito é, de feito, 
a behavioral finance aplicada aos mercados financeiros. 
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Por tanto, suxerimos ampliar a economía e finanzas do comportamento ao análise da eficiencia 
informativa nos mercados bancarios. Este enfoque complementaría a literatura sobre burbullas de 
crédito, suxerindo que os efectos do risco moral e dos incentivos poderían ter sido máis prexudiciais 
debido aos nesgos de comportamento. Asemade, contribuiría ao debate aberto acerca da necesidade de 
mellorar a regulación macroprudencial (Brunnermeier et al., 2009) ou os pros e contras de separar as 
funcións monetarias e de crédito mediante un sistema bancario de reserva total (Benes e Kumhof, 2012). 
Obxectivos 
O obxectivo fundamental desta tese é a análise da eficiencia informativa dos mercados de crédito polo 
miúdo mediante un enfoque behaviorista. A principal motivación é proporcionar unha xustificación que 
explique como distintos nesgos de comportamento polos participantes na industria bancaria podería 
provocar unha concesión de crédito excesiva polos bancos comerciais e un comportamento gregario 
entre eles. Tal obxectivo fundamental pode ser debullado nunha serie de obxectivos específicos. 
Primeiro, preténdese revisar os principais marcos conceptuais que teñen sido empregados para 
analizar a eficiencia informativa dos mercados financeiros en xeral, e do sector bancario en particular. 
Nese ámbito, interpretamos asemade os obstáculos que limitan a aplicación do enfoque clásico nos 
mercados financeiros, a EMH, ao sistema bancario. Segundo, revisamos en detalle a economía e finanzas 
do comportamento como marco conceptual da nosa investigación teórica e experimental. Terceiro, imos 
na procura dun enfoque alternativo que permita testar a eficiencia informativa dos mercados de crédito 
polo miúdo dun xeito similar ao que se interpreta no ámbito da EMH. Dito enfoque alternativo segue a 
literatura conductual no ámbito dos mercados financeiros, pero salvando a presencia de asimetrías de 
información e competencia imperfecta que impiden a extensión da EMH aos sistemas bancarios. 
Cuarto, buscamos proporcionar evidencia experimental dos efectos que os nesgos psicolóxicos 
poderían ter sobre as políticas de crédito que establecen os bancos. Respecto aos nesgos, centrámonos 
en dúas áreas da literatura conductual: os distintos perfís de risco conforme a prospect theory, e o exceso 
de confianza (overconfidence). A respecto das políticas de crédito, medimos os efectos en termos de 
prezos, volumes e calidade o crédito. Quinto, preténdese proporcionar un modelo teórico que explique 
o comportamento de bancos de distinta natureza, uns dirixidos por executivos optimistas de máis e 
outros racionais, cando compiten por proporcionar crédito a clientes. Entre as preguntas que se 
pretenden responder están por que e cando os bancos racionais estarían dispostos a imitar aos seus 
nesgados competidores, os efectos que os nesgos inducirían na competencia bancaria ao longo do ciclo 
económico, ou as leccións a extraer para o debate por unha regulación macroprudencial mellorada. 
Metodoloxía 
Buscamos establecer se existe xustificación pola que a psicoloxía humana ―en particular, diferentes 
nesgos de comportamento dos participantes na industria bancaria― explique un comportamento 
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rabaño que amplifique os auxes e caídas dos ciclos de crédito. Procedemos como segue. Primeiro, 
identificamos os marcos conceptuais da literatura que poderían contribuír ao noso traballo. Estas son 
as teorías de crédito e eficiencia do sector bancario, a hipótese do mercado eficiente, que é o paradigma 
clásico para testar a eficiencia dos mercados financeiros, e a behavioral finance, a área de maior éxito á 
hora de proporcionar unha interpretación alternativa á EMH nos mercados financeiros. 
Segundo, centrámonos na behavioral finance como marco conceptual da nosa investigación. Así 
pois, revisamos os principais nesgos e anomalías identificados na literatura, con especial atención a dúas 
áreas de investigación: prospect theory e overconfidence.  
Terceiro, introducimos un enfoque behaviorista ao obxecto de analizar a eficiencia informativa 
dos mercados de crédito polo miúdo. Isto require unicamente aplicar o enfoque clásico, resumido por 
Shleifer (2000), no que a behavioral finance analiza a eficiencia informativa dos mercados financeiros. A 
tal efecto, debatemos primeiro as condicións nas que este enfoque sería válido no ámbito dos mercados 
bancarios. Satisfeitas as condicións, o enfoque conductual consistiría nun procedemento en tres etapas: 
identificar se os participantes na industria mostran nesgos que poderían conformar un sentimento de 
mercado, comprobar se o sentimento de mercado podería exhibir tendencias ou patróns predicibles, e 
identificar os límites ao arbitraxe nos mercados de crédito polo miúdo. 
Cuarto, no cerne desta tese, proporcionamos un enfoque teórico e experimental para respostar as 
preguntas das tres etapas. En concreto, desenvolvemos unha investigación experimental para testar o 
primeiro paso, e ofrecemos un modelo teórico que explica de que xeito o comportamento rabaño entre 
bancos racionais e nesgados induciría un sentimento de mercado ao longo do ciclo, e cales serían os 
límites ao arbitraxe que operan na industria e impiden restablecer a súa eficiencia.  
A investigación experimental consta de dous tipos de tests: por unha banda, uns cuestionarios 
deseñados para establecer o perfil psicolóxico, en termos de prospect theory e overconfidence, de cada 
participante; por outra, un xogo de simulación de negocios que replica, nun entorno experimental, o 
xeito no que os bancos outorgan crédito aos seus potenciais clientes, ao obxecto de obter información 
sobre volume de crédito e prezo que cada xogador estaría disposto a ofertar, en condicións de incerteza 
e risco. En total, 126 estudantes de grao e posgrao da Universidade da Coruña (UDC) completaron ambos 
tests, o cal permite establecer a conexión entre os seus perfís de comportamento e as súas actitudes ante 
o risco no xogo. Estruturamos esta premisa básica nunha serie de hipóteses a testar. As técnicas 
estatísticas empregadas a tal efecto inclúen estatística univariada (tests de normalidade, rango 
intercuartil, etc.), bivariada (correlacións, ANOVAs, regresións), e multivariante: regresión lineal 
múltiple (MLR), análise de compoñentes principais (PCA), análise clúster e análise de correspondencias. 
As etapas dúas e tres no enfoque conductual son abordadas mediante un modelo teórico: 
construímos un modelo simple de competencia duopolística entre bancos de distinta natureza que 
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mostra de que xeito os bancos racionais seguirían aos seus nesgados competidores, concedendo 
excesivo crédito en contextos de auxe económico. O modelo predí que os bancos nesgados liderarían o 
sector e os racionais os imitarían en determinadas condicións, que derivamos. Logo, describimos os 
límites ao arbitraxe implícitos no modelo. Por último, ofrecemos unha dinamización do modelo para 
aportar unha intuición da amplificación do ciclo de crédito producido pola competencia entre bancos. 
Estrutura da tese 
Os contidos principais da tese se presentan en tres partes máis un resumo dos principais resultados e 
unha serie de conclusións, seguido polas referencias bibliográficas e apéndices.  
A Parte I está formada por tres capítulos. O Capitulo 1 define os mercados de crédito polo miúdo 
e segue coas principais teorías de crédito e eficiencia bancaria. A revisión das distintas teorías e 
conceptos de eficiencia económica do sector bancario ilustra como este enfoque difire do xeito no que 
se interpreta a eficiencia no contexto dos mercados financeiros. Isto abórdase no Capítulo 2, que 
describe os fundamentos teóricos da EMH. Por último, o Capítulo 3 introduce os fundamentos da 
behavioral finance. Fronte aos postulados de expectativas racionais e mercado eficiente das finanzas 
estándar, a economía do comportamento suxire en cambio un enfoque máis amplo baseado na 
combinación de distintas ciencias sociais, incluídas a psicoloxía, a socioloxía ou a demografía. 
A Parte II está formada por dous capítulos, ambos dedicados a proporcionar un coñecemento en 
profundidade de diversos ámbitos da behavioral finance que resultarán esenciais na investigación 
teórica e experimental da tese. O capítulo 4 presenta unha taxonomía orixinal e revisa en profundidade 
os nesgos e anomalías máis significativos na literatura do comportamento. O obxectivo será seleccionar 
dúas áreas nas que centrar a nosa análise en Parte III. O Capítulo 5 revisa ditas áreas de maneira máis 
extensa, overconfidence e prospect theory. En primeira instancia xustificamos a nosa escolla: son dúas 
áreas relevantes e moi estudiadas dentro da behavioral finance, ambos conceptos teñen sido 
empregados para explicar distintos comportamentos agresivos polos investidores, e poderían así 
mesmo explicar como os erros de percepción dos participantes no sector bancario poderían inducilos a 
proporcionar políticas de crédito pouco sólidas. Logo, poñemos o foco en diversos aspectos que serán 
precisos na investigación experimental na Parte III ―en particular, as distintas medidas dispoñibles e o 
xeito de calibrar os parámetros básicos a nivel individual a través dunha serie de cuestionarios. 
A Parte III está destinada a proporcionar unha xustificación pola que a psicoloxía humana 
desafiaría a eficiencia nos sistemas bancarios. A análise preséntase en tres etapas, dividida en catro 
capítulos. O Capítulo 6 introduce unha alternativa para analizar a eficiencia dos sistemas financeiros 
bancarios. O enfoque, en tres etapas, analiza unicamente o aspecto da EMH referido á eficiencia 
informativa e é válido só para o mercado de crédito no seu conxunto. A investigación experimental dos 
Capítulos 7 e 8 busca testar a primeira das etapas. En concreto, centrámonos nos efectos da prospect 
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theory e o exceso de confianza. Primeiro, o Capítulo 7 busca detectar a existencia destes nesgos entre 
unha serie de participantes nun experimento. Segundo, o Capítulo 8 busca recoñecer se estes nesgos 
poderían alimentar, entre o mesmo grupo de participantes, un comportamento propenso ao risco nun 
mercado simulado de crédito. As sesións experimentais tiveron lugar na Facultade de Economía e 
Empresa da UDC en outubro de 2013, participando un total de 126 estudantes de grao e posgrao da UDC.  
Por último, o Capítulo 9 proporciona un modelo teórico que segue a segunda e terceira etapas do 
método conductual para determinar o xeito no que os bancos compiten para dar crédito. O modelo parte 
do suposto de que algúns bancos na industria estarían nesgados en termos de confianza e optimismo 
excesivos ―en particular, durante os anos de bonanza do ciclo económico. Así, construímos un modelo 
de competencia duopolística entre bancos para mostrar que os nesgos psicolóxicos dos participantes no 
sector serían suficientes para explicar como se amplifican as burbullas crediticias. Logo, estendemos o 
modelo para explicar o xeito no que o ciclo do crédito se amplifica debido á competencia entre bancos. 
Obtemos que o pesimismo non é unha explicación da etapa recesiva do ciclo; pola contra, é a euforia 
durante períodos prolongados de bonanza o que sementaría a subseguinte caída. Por último, ofrecemos 
unha dinamización do modelo para profundar na comprensión de como a competencia entre bancos, 
algúns de racionalidade limitada, amplificarían o ciclo crediticio. Deste xeito, o modelo realiza algunhas 
predicións consistentes coa observación empírica ―en particular, que os efectos dos nesgos son máis 
graves durante a fase alcista do ciclo e canto menor sexa a calidade crediticia do nicho de mercado. 
Principais resultados e conclusións. A tese remata coa divulgación dos resultados principais 
que se extraen do traballo, así como cunha serie de conclusións e suxestións para futura investigación. 
En conxunto, as investigacións desta tese poderían ser unha contribución relevante para identificar as 
posibles eivas do sector bancario, ao obxecto de promover normativas complementarias ―en particular 
sobre regulación macroprudencial e o papel dos bancos centrais. O noso modelo mostraría de que xeito 
os nesgos de comportamento poderían guiar os mercados de crédito polo miúdo e por que os límites ao 
arbitraxe implicarían que os sistemas financeiros bancarios tenderían a ser menos eficientes, no senso 
informacional, que os sistemas de mercado. Con todo, a solución non é máis regulación per se, senón 
mellor regulación. Por exemplo, o enfoque conductual que empregamos suxeriría as bondades dunha 
regulación contracíclica; como levala a cabo, porén, vai máis aló do ámbito desta tese. Máis aínda, 
debemos ter presente a posibilidade de que as autoridades económicas, do mesmo xeito que acontece 
cós bancos, poidan errar no seu propósito de aplicar as necesarias políticas de contrapeso. 
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RESUMEN EN CASTELLANO 
 
La crisis financiera global de los años 2007 y 2008 y la crisis de la deuda pública que le sucedió han 
persuadido a académicos y autoridades para revisar nuestros conocimientos sobre el funcionamiento 
de las economías de mercado. Entre los temas revisados cabe destacar la naturaleza de los ciclos 
económicos, la eficacia de la política monetaria, el papel desempeñado por los derivados financieros, o 
la efectividad de la regulación bancaria. Sin embargo, el factor al que se le ha prestado más atención es, 
tal vez, el crédito. El episodio renovó el interés en el papel que juega el crédito en la economía, trayendo 
a primera línea clásicos como Charles Kindleberger y Hyman Minsky, entre otros. De hecho, el buen 
comportamiento de las economías occidentales antes de la Gran Recesión fue en gran parte resultado 
de los niveles de endeudamiento asumidos.  
El exceso de confianza podría haber provocado la creencia, por parte de los agentes económicos, 
de que esta vez era diferente y que los buenos tiempos durarían para siempre. Los riesgos percibidos 
minorarían, a lo que le seguiría un mayor apalancamiento financiero. La proporción de los pasivos 
financieros sobre PIB entre 1995 y 2007 aumentó en países como el Reino Unido de 128% a 213%, y las 
burbujas inmobiliarias se sucedieron en países tan lejanos como los Estados Unidos, Irlanda, España, 
Rusia, Singapur, China o los Emiratos Árabes. Burbujas que colapsarían con el estallido de la crisis 
financiera. En las economías donde el peso del sector bancario no es muy relevante, la proporción de 
crédito bancario sobre PIB tiende a permanecer bajo en diferentes momentos del ciclo económico. Por 
ejemplo, en los EE.UU. entre los años 50 y 1995, la proporción fluctuó entre el 7% y el 14% (Himmelberg 
y Morgan, 1995). En los sistemas bancarios, sin embargo, esta relación es a menudo mucho más alta y 
creció agresivamente durante la última crisis. En España, por ejemplo, a mediados de los 90 la ratio 
osciló en niveles del 60%, para dispararse hasta el 175% en 2009. El crédito otorgado por el sector 
bancario español a las economías domésticas y empresas entre 1995 y 2008 pasó de 271.000 a 
1.870.000 millones, casi siete veces más. Durante el mismo período, el PIB creció un 58%.  
Por otra parte, el análisis histórico de los episodios de crisis financiera mundial por Reinhart y 
Rogoff (2011) confirma dos hechos adicionales. Primero, el aumento de las deudas privadas es un 
precedente recurrente de las crisis bancarias. Tomando de nuevo el ejemplo de España, en diciembre de 
2007 sólo el 0,93% de los préstamos concedidos a las economías domésticas y empresas figuraban como 
impagados; en enero de 2014, la cifra se situaba en el 13,58%. En países más orientados a sistemas de 
mercado, como EE.UU., sólo se observaban cifras similares en tarjetas de crédito y préstamos 
universitarios. En hipotecas y préstamos para compra de coche, la morosidad apenas excedía el 5%. El 
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segundo hecho es que las crisis bancarias a menudo preceden (y predicen) las crisis de deuda soberana. 
El nexo fue evidente en la reciente crisis de la zona euro y el efecto de retroalimentación entre deuda 
pública y el balance de los bancos. Por lo tanto, las crisis bancarias que siguen tras períodos de políticas 
crediticias laxas no sólo tienen consecuencias perjudiciales para la estabilidad del sector bancario, sino 
también sobre la economía en su conjunto. 
Por tanto, analizar la eficiencia del sector bancario al conceder crédito a la economía se revela 
como un campo de investigación interesante. A continuación, resumimos el objeto principal de la tesis, 
así como el enfoque seguido en nuestra investigación. Primero, determinamos el objeto de estudio. 
Segundo, enumeramos los objetivos principales que se persiguen. Tercero, la metodología empleada. 
Por último, se describe la estructura de la tesis y resumimos los contenidos de cada capítulo. 
Objeto de estudio 
Dado que las crisis de crédito pueden asociarse tanto con efectos desde el lado de la oferta como de la 
demanda, debemos aclarar que esta tesis pone su foco en el lado de la oferta, con el fin de proporcionar 
un medio alternativo de análisis de las causas detrás de un auge del crédito. 
Así, el objeto de estudio de esta tesis es la eficiencia de los sistemas financieros bancarios en la 
concesión de crédito a la economía. En consecuencia, el alcance de nuestra investigación son los 
mercados de crédito minorista, definidos como las transacciones entre los bancos comerciales y sus 
clientes que incluyan la concesión de algún tipo de crédito (préstamos, hipotecas, etc) financiados, en su 
mayor parte, con los depósitos de otros clientes. La principal innovación es el marco conceptual que 
utilizamos para este fin: la economía y las finanzas del comportamiento (behavioral economics and 
finance en su terminología en inglés). En los sistemas financieros de mercado, el enfoque habitual de 
análisis de la eficiencia es la Hipótesis del Mercado Eficiente (Efficient Market Hypothesis, EMH). Sin 
embargo, la competencia imperfecta y las asimetrías de información características de los sistemas 
bancarios dejan la EMH sin contenido en este ámbito. Nuestra primera contribución es proporcionar un 
enfoque behaviorista para analizar la eficiencia de los sistemas bancarios, lo que explicaría cómo los 
sesgos de comportamiento de los participantes en la industria podrían explicar los ciclos de crédito. 
Esta es efectivamente la principal pregunta que queremos responder: ¿podría ser que las burbujas 
de crédito alimentadas por el sector bancario fuesen una manifestación del comportamiento de rebaño, 
como resultado de los distintos sesgos de comportamiento de los ejecutivos y empleados de la industria? 
Entendemos que esta es una cuestión relevante que merece ser contestada. Las investigaciones tras la 
reciente crisis financiera han analizado aspectos como el papel de los incentivos, las titulizaciones o el 
riesgo moral, pero poco se ha hecho por interpretar el papel que la psicología humana podría haber 
jugado. No deja de ser curioso: la behavioral economics ha identificado y explicado un buen número de 
anomalías en campos tan diversos como la salud, la educación, la energía, los seguros o las políticas 
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públicas. El área de más éxito es, de hecho, la behavioral finance aplicada a los mercados financieros. Por 
tanto, sugerimos ampliar las finanzas del comportamiento al análisis de la eficiencia informativa en los 
mercados bancarios. Este enfoque complementaría la literatura sobre burbujas de crédito, sugiriendo 
que los efectos del riesgo moral y los incentivos podrían ser más perjudiciales debido a los sesgos de 
comportamiento. Así mismo, contribuiría al debate abierto sobre la necesidad de mejorar la regulación 
macroprudencial (Brunnermeier et al., 2009) o los pros y contras de separar las funciones monetarias 
y de crédito mediante un sistema bancario de reserva total (Benes y Kumhof 2012). 
Objetivos 
El objetivo principal de esta tesis es el análisis de la eficiencia informativa de los mercados de crédito 
minorista a través de un enfoque conductista. La motivación principal es proporcionar una justificación 
que explique cómo distintos sesgos de comportamiento de los participantes en el sector bancario podría 
generar una concesión de crédito excesiva por los bancos comerciales y un comportamiento gregario 
entre ellos. Tal objetivo fundamental puede ser diseccionado en una serie de objetivos específicos. 
En primer lugar, se pretende revisar los principales marcos conceptuales utilizados para analizar 
la eficiencia informativa de los mercados financieros en general, y del sector bancario en particular. En 
ese ámbito, interpretamos asimismo los obstáculos que limitan la aplicación del enfoque clásico en los 
mercados financieros, la EMH, al sistema bancario. En segundo lugar, revisamos de forma exhaustiva la 
economía y las finanzas del comportamiento como marco conceptual de nuestra investigación teórica y 
experimental. En tercer lugar, buscamos un enfoque alternativo que permita testar la eficiencia 
informativa de los mercados de crédito minorista de una forma similar a la que se interpreta la eficiencia 
en el ámbito de la EMH. Dicho enfoque alternativo sigue la literatura behaviorista en el ámbito de los 
mercados financieros, pero salvando la presencia de asimetrías de información y competencia 
imperfecta que impiden la extensión de la EMH a los sistemas bancarios. 
En cuarto lugar, buscamos proporcionar evidencia experimental de los efectos que los sesgos 
psicológicos podrían tener sobre las políticas de crédito bancario. En cuanto a los sesgos, nos centramos 
en dos áreas relevantes de la literatura conductual: los diferentes perfiles de riesgo de acuerdo con la 
prospect theory, y el exceso de confianza (overconfidence). Con respecto a las políticas de préstamo, se 
miden los efectos en términos de precios, volúmenes y la calidad del crédito. En quinto lugar, se pretende 
proporcionar un modelo teórico que explique el comportamiento de bancos de diferente naturaleza, 
unos dirigidos por ejecutivos excesivamente optimistas y no otros no, cuando compiten por conceder 
créditos a potenciales clientes. Entre las preguntas que queremos responder están el por qué y cuando 
los bancos racionales estarían dispuestos a imitar a sus sesgados competidores, los efectos que los 
sesgos inducirían en la competencia bancaria a lo largo del ciclo económico, o las lecciones que se 
pueden extraer para el debate por una mejor regulación macroprudencial. 
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Metodología 
Buscamos establecer si existe justificación para que la psicología humana ―en particular, diferentes 
sesgos de comportamiento de los participantes en el sector bancario― explique un comportamiento de 
rebaño que amplifique los auges y caídas del crédito. Procedemos de la siguiente manera. Primero, 
identificamos los marcos conceptuales que podrían contribuir a nuestro trabajo. Estas son las teorías de 
crédito y eficiencia del sector bancario, la hipótesis del mercado eficiente, que es el paradigma clásico 
para testar la eficiencia de los mercados financieros, y la behavioral finance, el área de mayor éxito a la 
hora de proporcionar una interpretación alternativa a la EMH en los mercados financieros. Segundo, nos 
centramos en la behavioral finance como marco conceptual de nuestra investigación. Así, revisamos los 
principales sesgos y anomalías identificados en la literatura, con especial atención a dos áreas de 
investigación: prospect theory y overconfidence.  
Tercero, introducimos un enfoque behaviorista con el fin de analizar la eficiencia informativa de 
los mercados de crédito minorista. Esto requiere aplicar el enfoque clásico, resumido por Shleifer 
(2000), por el cual la behavioral finance examina la eficiencia informativa de los mercados financieros. 
Para ello, discutimos primero las condiciones en las que este enfoque sería válido en el ámbito de los 
mercados bancarios. Cumplidas dichas condiciones, el enfoque conductual consistiría en un método en 
tres etapas: identificar si los participantes en la industria muestran sesgos que podrían conformar un 
sentimiento de mercado, comprobar si dicho sentimiento de mercado podría exhibir tendencias o 
patrones previsibles, e identificar los límites de arbitraje en los mercados de crédito minorista. 
Cuarto, en el núcleo de esta tesis, ofrecemos un enfoque teórico y experimental para responder a 
las preguntas de las tres etapas. En concreto, desarrollamos una investigación experimental para poner 
a prueba el primer paso, y ofrecemos un modelo teórico que explica cómo el comportamiento de rebaño 
entre bancos racionales y sesgados induciría un sentimiento de mercado a lo largo del ciclo, y cuáles 
serían los límites de arbitraje que operan en la industria e impiden reestablecer su eficiencia. 
La investigación experimental consta de dos tipos de tests: por un lado, unos cuestionarios 
diseñados para establecer el perfil psicológico, en términos de prospect theory y overconfidence, de cada 
participante; por otro, un juego de simulación de negocios que replica, en un entorno experimental, el 
contexto en que los bancos dan crédito a sus potenciales clientes, en condiciones de incertidumbre y 
riesgo. En total, 126 estudiantes de grado y postgrado de la Universidade da Coruña (UDC) completaron 
ambas pruebas, lo que permite establecer la conexión entre sus perfiles de conducta y sus actitudes 
hacia el riesgo en el juego. Estructuramos esta premisa básica en una serie de hipótesis a testar. Las 
técnicas estadísticas utilizadas para este propósito incluyen estadística univariada (pruebas de 
normalidad, rango intercuartílico, etc.), bivariada (correlaciones, ANOVA, regresiones) y estadística 
multivariante: regresión lineal múltiple (MLR), análisis de componentes principales (PCA), análisis 
clúster y análisis de correspondencias. 
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Las etapas dos y tres en el enfoque conductual se abordan con un modelo teórico: construimos un 
modelo simple de competencia duopolística entre bancos de distinta naturaleza que muestra cómo los 
bancos racionales seguirían a sus sesgados competidores, concediendo excesivo crédito en contextos de 
bonanza económica. El modelo predice que los bancos sesgados liderarían el sector, y los racionales les 
imitarían en determinadas condiciones, que derivamos. Posteriormente, describimos los límites de 
arbitraje implícitos en el modelo. Por último, ofrecemos una dinamización del modelo para aportar una 
intuición de la amplificación del ciclo de crédito producido por la competencia entre bancos. 
Estructura de la tesis 
Los contenidos principales de la tesis se presentan en tres partes más un resumen de los principales 
resultados y una serie de conclusiones, seguido por las referencias bibliográficas y apéndices. 
La Parte I consta de tres capítulos. El Capítulo 1 define los mercados de crédito minorista y 
continúa con las principales teorías de crédito y eficiencia bancaria. La revisión de las diferentes teorías 
y conceptos de eficiencia económica del sector bancario ilustra cómo este enfoque se diferencia de la 
forma en que se interpreta la eficiencia en el contexto de los mercados financieros. Esto se trata en el 
Capítulo 2, que describe los fundamentos teóricos de la EMH. Por último, el Capítulo 3 introduce los 
fundamentos de la behavioral finance. Frente a los postulados de expectativas racionales y mercado 
eficiente de las finanzas estándar, la economía del comportamiento sugiere un enfoque más amplio 
basado en la combinación de ciencias sociales como la psicología, la sociología o la demografía. 
La Parte II consta de dos capítulos, dedicados a proporcionar un mayor conocimiento de los 
ámbitos de la behavioral finance que resultarán esenciales en la investigación teórica y experimental de 
la tesis. El Capítulo 4 presenta una taxonomía original y revisa los sesgos y anomalías más importantes. 
El objetivo es seleccionar dos áreas en las cuales centrar nuestro análisis en la Parte III. El Capítulo 5 
revisa en detalle estas áreas, overconfidence y prospect theory. Primero justificamos nuestra elección: 
son dos áreas relevantes y muy estudiadas en la behavioral finance, ambos conceptos se han utilizado 
para explicar comportamientos agresivos de los inversionistas, y podrían también explicar cómo los 
errores de percepción de los participantes en el sector bancario podrían inducirlos a implementar 
políticas de préstamo poco sólidas. Después, nos centramos en diversos aspectos que serán necesarios 
en la investigación experimental en la Parte III ―en particular, las distintas medidas disponibles y la 
manera de calibrar los parámetros básicos a nivel individual a través de una serie de cuestionarios. 
La Parte III está destinada a proporcionar una justificación por la que la psicología humana 
desafiaría la eficiencia en los sistemas bancarios. El análisis se presenta en tres etapas, dividido en 
cuatro capítulos. El Capítulo 6 presenta una alternativa para analizar la eficiencia de los sistemas 
financieros bancarios. El enfoque, en tres etapas, analiza sólo el aspecto de la EMH referido a la eficiencia 
informativa y es válida únicamente para el mercado de crédito en su conjunto. La investigación 
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experimental de los Capítulos 7 y 8 tiene por objeto testar la primera de las etapas. En concreto, nos 
centramos en los efectos de la prospect theory y el exceso de confianza. En primer lugar, el Capítulo 7 
trata de detectar la existencia de estos sesgos entre un grupo de participantes en un experimento. En 
segundo lugar, el Capítulo 8 busca reconocer si estos sesgos podrían alimentar, entre el mismo grupo de 
participantes, un comportamiento proclive al riesgo en un mercado de crédito simulado. Las sesiones 
experimentales se llevaron a cabo en la Facultad de Economía y Empresa de la UDC en octubre de 2013, 
participando un total de 126 estudiantes de grado y posgrado de la UDC. 
Por último, el Capítulo 9 proporciona un modelo teórico que sigue la segunda y tercera etapas del 
método conductual para determinar la manera en que los bancos compiten por dar crédito. El modelo 
parte de la hipótesis de que algunos bancos estarían sesgados en términos de confianza y optimismo 
excesivos ―en particular, durante los años de auge del ciclo económico. Elaboramos un modelo de 
competencia duopolística entre bancos para mostrar que los sesgos psicológicos de los participantes en 
el sector serían suficientes para explicar cómo se amplifican las burbujas crediticias. Después, 
extendemos el modelo para explicar cómo el ciclo del crédito se amplifica debido a la competencia entre 
los bancos. Obtenemos que el pesimismo no es una explicación suficiente de las etapas recesivas del 
ciclo; al contrario, es la euforia durante periodos prolongados de bonanza los que siembran la caída 
posterior. Por último, ofrecemos una dinamización del modelo para profundizar en la comprensión de 
cómo la competencia entre bancos amplificarían el ciclo de crédito. El modelo realiza algunas 
predicciones consistentes con la observación empírica ―en particular, que los efectos de los sesgos son 
más graves durante la fase alcista del ciclo y cuanto menor sea la calidad crediticia del nicho de mercado. 
Principales resultados y conclusiones. La tesis concluye con la divulgación de los principales 
resultados que se extraen del trabajo, así como una serie de conclusiones y sugerencias para futuras 
investigaciones. En conjunto, las investigaciones de esta tesis podrían ser una contribución relevante 
para identificar las posibles taras del sector bancario, con el fin de promover normativas adicionales 
―en particular, sobre regulación macroprudencial y el papel de los bancos centrales. Nuestro modelo 
mostraría cómo los sesgos de comportamiento podrían guiar los mercados de crédito minorista y por 
qué los límites de arbitraje implicarían que los sistemas bancarios tenderían a ser menos eficientes, 
desde el punto de vista informacional, que los sistemas de mercado. Aún así, la solución no sería más 
regulación per se, sino una mejor regulación. Así, el enfoque conductual que empleamos sugiere las 
bondades de una regulación contracíclica; cómo llevarla a cabo, sin embargo, va más allá del alcance de 
esta tesis. Más aún, hay que tener en cuenta la posibilidad de que las autoridades, al igual que le ocurre 
a los bancos, puedan errar en su propósito de aplicar las necesarias políticas de contrapeso. 
